ML20080P251
| ML20080P251 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook |
| Issue date: | 02/02/1984 |
| From: | Devincentis J PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Starostecki R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20080P219 | List: |
| References | |
| SBN-622, NUDOCS 8402220482 | |
| Download: ML20080P251 (4) | |
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SMW STAM PUBLIC SERVICE "C : "., Ofke:
Companyof New Hampshire 1671 Worcester Road Frominoham, Massachusetts 01701 (617) -872-8100 February 2, 1984 SBN-622 T.F. B4.2.7 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, PA 19406 Attention:
Mr. Richard W. Starostecki, Director Division of Project and Resident Programs
References:
(a) Construction Pemits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444 (b) USNRC Letter, dated December 27, 1983, " Combined Inspection Nos. 50-443/83-17; 50-444/83-13", R. W. Starostecki to R. J. Harrison
Subject:
Response to Combined Inspection Nos. 50-443/83-17; 50-444/83-13
Dear Sir:
It was reported in the subject Inspection Report that certain of our activities were not conducted in accordance with commitments in the FSAR.
In response to the reported FSAR deviations, we offer the following:
FSAR Deviation A The Seabrook FSAR, Section 3.8.1.1, states that containment liner welds that are embedded in concrete are leak chased to a system which permits leak testing of the welds throughout the life of the plant.
Coitrary to the above, the leak chase channels around containment penetrations, X60 and X61, were not connected to the piping system which vents the leak chases through the concrete to the containment atmosphere. Thus, no capability exists for the future leak testing of these particular penetration welds.
This deviation is applicable to Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444.
YAEC Position The liner welds for containment penetrations X60 and X61 were properly tested before the welds became inaccessible. The QA records f or these welds were recently examined to confirm this. The welds successfully underwent non-destructive examinations and leak testing to meet code requirements.
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l' United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission February 2, 1984 Attention:
Mr. Richard W. Starostecki, Director Page 2 We' intended to provide' future leak testing of these welds, but inadvertently the venting pipes which connected the leak chase channels to the containment atmosphere were left out during construction. Because it is not a code requirement to provide leak chase channels for future testing and because
'the total weld length for these two penetrations is extremely small in relation to the total amount of containment liner welding, we will not perform the extensive backfitting required to install the venting pipes.
Corrective Action The Seabrook FSAR Section 3.8.1 will be amended to reflect the above l
position.
ISAR Deviation B The Seabrook FSAR, Section 8.3.1.1.e.3, indicates design of the diesel generator bus ducts to prevent a single event from disabling both of the redundant diesel generator systems.
Contrary to the above, the diesel generator, non-segregated phase, 5 kV bus ducts for both trains were installed without adequate consideration of the ability of the misalignment collars to act as vibration dampers. Thus, existing accepted field conditions fail to provide design assurance that a single event (i.e., seismic) will not disable both of the redundant diesel generator systems.
This deviation is applicable to Docket No. 50-443.
YAEC Position The referenced SB FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.e.3 pertains to the routing and physical separation of the bus duct such that a sfugle event such as fire, missile, etc., will not disable both redundant diesel generator systems.
Hence, there is no deviation to the above referenced FSAR section.
However, a deviation from the intent of the specification of the 5 kV non-segregated phase bus duct, No. 9763-006-144-1, Section 3.2.5.2.3, entitled
" Vibration and Expansion Joints" does exist. The r.anufacturer provided the correct part to allow for movement due to expansion of the bus enclosure, and misalignment ~of/the diesel generator terminal box. Unfortunately, the misalignment of the diesel generator box was beyond the ma'rgin that the manufacturer had envisioned when the proper part was designed; thus, potential damage could have occurred to the bus enclosure due to vibration or other movements.
Corrective Action To correct the above described deviation, the manufacturer of the bus
-duct has been requested to manufacture spacers at the diesel generator terminal. box in order to bring the misalignment within acceptable limits to allow the existing misalignment collars to function according to Section 3.2.5.2.3 of Specification No. 9763-006-144-1, e
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.g United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission February 2,1984 Attention:
Mr. Richard W. Starostecki, Director Page 3 Delivery of these spacers is expected by the end of March 1984, and
. installation is expected by the end of April 1984.
FSAR Deviation C The Seabrook FSAR, Section 6.2.2.2.e and Figure 6.2-77, indicates that the containment isolation valves, for the recirculation piping feeding the suction of the ' containment spray and residual heat removal pumps, are housed.
in encapsulation tanks designed to withstand containment design pressure and to meet Saf ety Class 2 criteria. The FSAR further commits to ANSI N18.2, which specifies that Safety Class 2 tanks are to be designed and installed to ASME Section III, Code Class 2 criteria.
Contrary to the above, the encapsulation tanks (CBS-TK-101A and 101B) for the recirculation piping, contairmaent isolation valves were improperly designed and installed with regard to ASME Section III, Code Class 2 criteria, in that the tank piping penetration seam closure welds were designated as fillet welds, instead of the Code-specified full penetration welds.
This deviation is applicable to Docket No. 50-443.
]
YAEC Position, The incorrect weld designacion was detailed due to a misinterpretation of the ASME code. The piping penetration sean closure weld was thought to be the closing seam of a typical electrical or mechanical penetration assembly.
However, in this case the pressure retaining boundary extends beyond the
. containment liner penetration to the encapsulation tank and the encapsulation tank expansion joint.
Corrective Action The weld detail will be revised to satisfy ASME III, Code Class 2, criteria by April 30, 1984. We are currently evaluating other areas where there may exist a similar potential misinterpretation of ASME Code designation re quireme nts. We expect this evaluatien to be completed by February 29, 1984 Very truly yours,
YANKEE AIDMIC ELEC1RIC (DMPANY
/
i John DeVincentis Project Manager ec: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Service List
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William S. Jordan, III, Esquire Brentwood Board of Selectmen Harmon & Weiss RED Dalton Road 1725 I Street, N.W. Suite 506 Brentwood, New Hampshire 03833 Washington, DC 20006 Roy P. Lessy, Jr., Esquire Office of the Executive Legal Director Edward F. Meany
.U.S. Nuclear R2gulatory Commission Designated Representative of Washington, DC 20555 the Town of Rye 155 Washington Road Robert A. Backus, Esquire Rye, NH 03870 116 Lowell Street P.O. Box 516 Calvin A. Canney Mancehster, NH 03105 City Manager City Hall Philip Ahrens, Esquire 126 Daniel Street Assistant Attorney General Portsmouth, NH 03801 Department of the Attorney General Augusta, ME 04333 Dana Bisbee, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Mr. John B. Ianzer Office of the Attorney General Designated Representative of 208 State House Annex the Town of Hampton Concord, NH 03842 5 Morningside Drive Hampton, NH 03842 Anne Verge, Chairperson' Board of Selectmen Roberta C. Pevear Town Hall Designated Representative of South Hampton, NH 03S42 the Town of Hampton Falls Drinkwater Road Patrick J. McKeon Hampton Falls, NH 03844 Selectmen's Office 10 Central Road Mrs. Sandra Gavutis Rye, NH 03870 Designated Representative of the Town of Kensington Carole F. Kagan, Esq.
RFD 1 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel East Kingston, NM 03827 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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Jo Ann Shotwell, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Mr. Angie Machiros Environmental Protection Bureau Chairman of the Board of Selectmen Department of the Attorney General Town of Newbury One Ashburton Place, 19th Flost Newbury, MA 01950 Boston, MA 02108 Town Manager's Office Senator Gordon J. Humphrey Town Hall - Friend Street U.S. Senate Amesbury, Ma.
01913 Washington, DC 20510-(Attn: ' Tom Burack)
Senator Gordon J. Humphrey 1 Pillsbury Street Diana P. Randall Concord, NH 03301 70 Collins Street (Attn: Herb Boynton)
SEabrook, NH 03874 Richard E. Sullivan, Mayor Donald E. Chick City Hall Town Manager Newburyport, MA 01950 Town of Exeter 10 Front Street Exeter, NH 03833-