ML20080L938
| ML20080L938 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1995 |
| From: | Gundrum L NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20080L941 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9503030063 | |
| Download: ML20080L938 (7) | |
Text
ea ath p
g y
i UNITED STATES s
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 3000H001
%...../
TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY CENTERIOR SERVICE COMPANY AND THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-346 DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNIT NO. 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE f
Amendment No.195 License No. NPF-3 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by the Toledo Edison Company, Centerior Service Company, and the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (the licensees) dated October 7, 1994, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act),
and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (1) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No NPF-3 is hereby amended to read as follows:
9503030063 950227 PDR ADOCK 05000346 P
\\
l '
(a) Technical Srecifications I
The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 195, are hereby incorporated in the license.
The Toledo. Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
- 3. - This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented not later than 90 days after issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION b
j Linda L. Gundrum, Project Manager Project Directorate III-3 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance: february 27, 1995 i
l 6
4 9
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.195 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3 DOCKET NO. 50-346 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.
Remove Insert 3/4 5-4 3/4 5-4 3/4 6-12 3/4 6-12 8 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 6-3 8 3/4 6-3
t r
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (Continued) b.
At.least once per 18 months, or prior to operation after ECCS piping has been drained by verifying that the ECCS piping is full of water by venting the ECCS pump casings and discharge piping high points.
c.
By a visual inspection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash, clothing, etc.) is present in the containment which could be transported to the containment emergency sump and cause restriction of the pump suction during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed:
1.
For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establish-ing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY, and 2.
Of the areas affected within containment at the completion of each containment entry when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.
d.
At least once per 18 months by:
1.
Verifying that the interlocks:
a)
Close DH-11 and DH-12 and de-energize the pressurizer heaters, if either DH-ll or DH-12 is open and a simulated reactor coolant system pressure which is greater than the trip setpoint (<438 psig) is applied. The-interlock to-close DH-11 and/or DH-12 is not required if the valve is closed and 480 V AC power is disconnected from its motor operators.
b)
Prevent the openino of DH-ll and DH-12 when a simulated or actual reactor coolant system pressure which is greater than the trip setpoint (< 438 psig) is applied.
2.
a)
A visual inspection of the containment emergency sump which verifies that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.
b)
Verifying that on a Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) Low-Low Level interlock trip, with the motor operators for the BWST outlet isolation valves and the containment emergency sump recirculation valves energized, the BWST Outlet valve HV-DH7A (HV-DH7B) automatically close in s 75 seconds after the operator manually pushes the control switch to open the Containment Emergency Sump Valve HV-DH9A (HV-DH98) which should be verified to open in 575 seconds.
3.
Deleted l
DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 5-4 Amendment No. 7,7),7%,
- ,7/,)#,#7,195 i
i CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS (Continued)
{
- c. - Deleted l
d.
At least once-per 5 years by performing an air or smoke flow test through each spray header and verifying each spray nozzle is unobstructed.
I i
DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT I 3/4 6-12 Amendment No.195
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS BASES With the RCS temperature below 280*F, one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.
The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that, at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.
I The function of the trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) contained in baskets in the containment normal sump is to neutralize the acidity of the post-LOCA borated water mixture prior to establishing containment emergency sump recirculation.
The borated water storage tank (BWST).
borated water has a nominal pH value of approximately 5.
Raising the borated water mixture to a pH value of 7 will ensure that, chloride stress corrosion does not occur in austenitic stainless steels in the event that chloride levels increase as a result of contamination on the surfaces of the reactor containment building. Also, a pH of 7 is assumed for the containment emergency sump for iodine retention and removal post-LOCA by the containment spray system.
The Surveillance Requirements (SR) associated with TSP ensure that the minimum amount and density of TSP is stored in the baskets, and that the TSP in the baskets is sufficient to provide adequate, post-LOCA, long-term pH adjustment.
Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the event of a LOCA. Maintenance of proper flow resistance and pressure drop in the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:
(1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum resistance configuration, (2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance i
with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acceptable level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above that assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.
Containment Emergency Sump Recirculation Valves DH-9A and DH-9B are de-energized during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 to preclude postulated inadvertent opening of the valves in the event of a Control Room fire, which could result in draining the Borated Water Storage Tank to the Containment Emergency Sump and the loss of this water source for normal plant shutdown.
Re-energization of DH-9A and DH-9B is permitted on an intermittent basis during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 under administrative controls.
Station procedures identify the precautions which must be taken when re-energizing these valves under such controls.
Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) outlet isolation valves DH-7A and DH-78 are de-energized during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to preclude postulated DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No.D,JD,AM,MA,195
CONTAINNENT SYSTEMS BASES leakage rate are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.
Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) outlet isolation valves DH-7A and DH-78 are de-energized during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to preclude postulated inadvertent closure of the valves in the event of a fire, which could result in a loss of the availability of the BWST. Re-energization of valves DH-7A and DH-7B is permitted on an intermittent basis during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 under adminis-trative controls. Station procedures identify the precautions which must be taken when re-energizing these valves under such controls.
Containment Emergency Sump Recirculation Valves DH-9A and DH-9B are de-ener-gized during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to preclude postulated inadvertent opening of the valves in the event of a fire, which could result in draining the Borated Water Storage Tank to the Containment Emergency Sump and the loss of i
this water source for normal plant shutdown.
Re-energization of valves DH-9A and DH-9B is permitted on an intermittent basis during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 under administrative controls.
Station procedures identify the precautions which must be taken when re-energizing these valves under such controls.
3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the containment cooling system ensures that 1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and 2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post-LOCA conditions, 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the containment isolation valves ensures that the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation within the required time limits specified ensures that the release of radioaaive material to the environment will be consistent with the assumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.
Containment isolation valves and their required isolation times are addressed in the USAR. The opening of a closed inoperable containment isolation valve on an intermittent basis during plant operation is permitted under administrative control. Operating procedures identify those valves which may be opened under administrative control as well as the safety precautions which must be taken when opening valves under such controls.
DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 6-3 Amendment No. AAA, AA//, AA2,195