ML20080L212
| ML20080L212 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 09/26/1983 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8309300185 | |
| Download: ML20080L212 (2) | |
Text
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY '. J ?.~
CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 374oh
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400 Chestnut Street Tower N7fg M,
Ef September 26, 1983 4
8 8g BLRD-50-438/83-17 BLRD-50-439/83-13 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn:
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
4 BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - CANNOT IDENTIFY GRADE OF NUTS BECAUSE OF ORIENTATION - BLRD-50-438/83-17, BLRD-50-439/83 THIRD INTERIM REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE Inspector P. E. Fredrickson on January 26, 1983 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 2182. This was followed by our interim reports dated February 24, and June 14, 1983 Enclosed is our third interim report. We expect to submit our next report by March 24, 1984.
a If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at r
FTS 858-2688.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
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L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Licensing Enclosure oc (Enclosure):
Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director Office of Ir.3pection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 i
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ENCLOSURE h
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 CANNOT IDENTIFY GRADE OF NUTS BECAUSE OF ORIENTATION BLRD-50-438/83-17, BLRD-50-439/83-13 NCR 2182 10 CFR 50.55(e)
THIRD INTERIM REPORT Description of Deficiency The grade of nut on approximately 50 percent of all high strength bolted connections installed in the plant cannot be identified since the nuts were j
installed with the grade markings faced against the structural member.
Nuts were installed by craft personnel without any attempt being made to place markings outward for easy identification. The procedures do not specifically state that the nuts are to be turned outward for identifica-tion, although this must be done in order to verify the grade of material.
The high strength nuts in question are very similar to a heavy-hex low strength nut which has no identifying markings and is in use at the project. Because of a lack of segregation in the field, the possibility exists that low strength nuts have been installed in place of high strength s
nuts. The cause of this deficiency has been determined to be the lack of procedural guidance for the installation of high strength nuts.
Interim Progress i
TVA's Division of Construction (CONST) and Singleton Materials Laboratory have completed a sampling of high strength connections in Category I structures. A search of more than 600 connections revealed only 60 nuts installed without the high-strength markings turned outward for easy identification. Further investigation of these 60 nuts revealed only one nut which was not of the correct material.
Analysis of this one nut by Singleton Materials Laboratory has shown that although it was not the proper nut, it would have in fact served acceptably in its application.
Based on the apparently limited failure by CONST to install the nuts with the markings facing outward (i.e., as opposed to the estimated 50 l
percent error rate previously indicated), these test results are being l
forwarded to the Division of Engineering Design for further l
consideration.
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