ML20080K821
| ML20080K821 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05000097 |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1983 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-1010, NUDOCS 8309290436 | |
| Download: ML20080K821 (72) | |
Text
.
Safety Evaluation Report related to the renewal of the operating license for the Zero-Power Reactor at Cornell University Docket No. 50-97 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation September 1983 7r%y l
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NOTICE 1
Availability of Reference Materials Cited in NRC Publications J
Most documents cited in NRC publications will be available from one of the following sources:
- 1. The NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20555
- 2. The NRC/GPO Sales Program, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555
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Referenced documents available for inspection and copying for a fee from the NRC Public Docu-ment Room include NRC correspondence and internal NRC memoranda; NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement bulletins, circulars, information notices, inspection and investigation notices; Licensee Event Reports; vendor reports and correspondence; Commission papers; and applicant and licensee documents and correspondence.
The following documents in the NUREG series are available for purchase from the NRC/GPO Sales Program: formal NRC staff and contractor reports, NRC sponsored conference proceedings, and N RC booklets and brochures. Also available are Regulatory Guides, NRC regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission Issuances.
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GPO Pnnted copy pnce: $4. 50_
l NUREG-1010 Safety Evaluation Report related to the renewal of the operating license l
for the Zero-Power Reactor l
at Cornell University Docket No. 50-97 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation September 1983 s.....e l
[
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l ABSTRACT This Safety Evaluation Report fcr the application filed by Cornell University (CU) for a renewal of Operating License R-80 to continue to operate a zero power reactor (ZPR) has been prepared by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of l
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The facility is owned and operated by Cornell University and is located on the Cornell campus in Ithaca, New York.
The staff concludes that the ZPR facility can continue to be operated by CU without endangering the health and safety of the public.
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Cornell University ZPR SER jij
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. _ _. -. - _ _ _ _. ~.. _.. _. _. _, _ _. _ _. _. ~,
_ _,. _. -...._i.._... _. _ _.
i TABLE OF CONTENTS P.ag ABSTRACT..........................................................
iii 1
INTRODUCTION............................................
1-1 i
i 1.1 Summary and Conclusions of Principal Safety l
Considerations..........................................
1-2
- 1. 2 Reactor Description.....................................
1-2
- 1. 3 Reactor Location........................................
1-3 1.4 Shared Facilities.......................................
1-3 l
- 1. 5 Comparison With Similar Facilities......................
1-3 1.6 Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982........................
1-3 2
SITE CHARACTERISTICS....................................
2-1 2.1 Geography...
2-1
- 2. 2 Demography........................................
2-1 i
2.3 Nearby Industrial, Transportation, and Military Facilities.........................
2-1 l
2.4 Meteorology......................................
2-1 2.4.1 Severe Wind Considerations.......................
2-2 j
2.4.2 Precipitation and Flooding......................
2-2 2.4.3 Conclusion......................................
2-2 i
l 2.5 Geology'and Hydrology...............
2-2 2.6 Seisnology..............................................
2-3 1
2.7 Conclusion.........................
2-3 l
3 DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS................
3-1 r
l
_ ' 3.1 Wind Damage.............t....
3-1 3.2 Water Damage...........................................
3-1 3.3 Seismic-Induced Reactor Damage..........................
3-1
-G.4 Mechanical Systems and Components.......................
3-1 3.5 Conclusion..............................................
3-1
~
4 REACTOR.................................
4-1 l
4.1 Reactor Core............................................
4-1 4.1.1 Fuel Elements....................................
4-1 4.1.2 Control Rods.....
4-2 l
4.2 Reactor Tank...............................
4-2 4.3 Support Structure.......................................
4-2 4.4 Reactor Instrumentation.....
4-2 4.5 Biological Shield.......................................
4-3 4.6 ' Dynamic Design Evaluation...............................
4-3 Cornell University ZPR SER v
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f f -
_....c
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page 4.6.1 Excess Reactivity and Shutdown Margin............
4-3 4.6.2 Conclusions......................................
4-4 4.7 Functional Design of Reactivity Control System..........
4-4 4.7.1 Water Level......................................
4-4 4.7.2 Control Rod Cluster..............................
4-5 4.7.3 Scram Circuitry and Interlocks...................
4-5 4.7.4 Conclusions......................................
4-6 4.8 Operational Procedures..................................
4-6 4.9 Conclusions.............................................
4-6 5
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.......................................
5-1 5.1 General Description.....................................
5-1 5.2 Water Dump Storage Tank.................................
5-1 5.3 Storage 'ank Fill System................................
5-2 5.4 Reactor Core Tank Fill System...........................
5-2 5.5 Reactor Core Tank Dump System...........................
5-2 5.6 Water Level Indicating System...........................
5-2 5.7 Demineralizer System....................................
5-3 5.8 Reactor Tank............................................
5-3 5.9 Fill Pump...............................................
5-3 5.10 Dump Valves.............................................
5-3 5.11 Agitator................................................
5-4 5.12 Conclusion..............................................
5-4 6
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES...................................
6-1 6.1 Zero-Power-Reactor Cell.................................
6-1 6.2 Reactor Building Heating and Ventilation System.........
6-1 6.3 Contamination Control Features..........................
6-2 6.4 Conclusion..............................................
6-2 7
CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM...........................
7-1 7.1 Control Rod Drives and Control Rod Assemblies...........
7-1 7.2 Source and Source Drive Control.........................
7-2 7.3 Control Rod Withdrawal System...........................
7-2 7.4 Reactor Tank Fill Control System........................
7-3 7.5 Heater Control System...................................
7-3 7.6 Sump Pump Control System................................
7-3 7.7 Reactcr Dump Valve Control System.......................
7-4 7.7.1 Temperature Dump Valve...........................
7-4 7.7.2 Partial Du-r Valve...............................
7-4 7.7.3 Main Dump V :lve..................................
7-4 i
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Cornell University ZPR SER vi
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i TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page 7.8 Instrumentation.........................................
7-4 7.8.1 Startup Channel..................................
7-4 i
7.8.2 Log Neutron Level and Period Channel.............
7-5 7.8.3 Linear Neutron Level Channel.....................
7-5 l
7.8.4 Two Log Safety Channels..........................
7-5 l
7.8.5 Two Linear Flux Channels........................
7-5 7.8.6 Remote Area Radiation Monitoring System..........
7-6 7.8.7 Reactor Water Temperature Monitoring System......
7-6 7.8.8 Reactor Tank Water Level Monitor.................
7-6 7.8.9 Dump Storage Tank Water Level Monitor............
7-6 7.8.10 Annunciator......................................
7-6 7.8.11 Strip-Chart Recorders...........................
7-7 7.8.12 Television and Intercom Systems..................
7-7 7.8.13 Portable Automatic Data Printout System..........
7-7 7.9 Interlock and Bypass Panel..............................
7-7 7.10 Scram System............................................
7-8 7.11 Radiation Hazard Alarm System...........................
7-8 7.12 Conclusion..............................................
7-8 1
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ELECTRIC POWER..........................................
8-1 8.1 Facility Electrical Power...............................
8-1 t
8.2 ZPR Electrical Power....................................
8-1 8.3 Conclusion..............................................
8-1 9
AUXILIARY SYSTEMS............................................
9-1 i
9.1 Fire Protection System..................................
9-1 9.2 Communications Systems..................................
9-1 9.3 Compressed Air System...................................
9-1 9.4 Fuel Handling...........................................
9-1 9.5 Conclusion..............................................
9-1 10 EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAMS........................................
10-1 10.1 Experimental Features...................................
10-1 10.2 Experimental Review....................
10-1 10.3 Conclusion.............................
10-1 11 RADI0ACTi d '/;STE MANAGEMENT.................................
11-1 11.1 ALARA Commitment........................................
11-1 11.2 Waste Generation and Handling Procedures................
11-1 1
11.2.1 Solid Waste......................................
11-1 11.2.2 Liquid Waste.....................................
11-1 11.2.3 Airborne War +e....................................
11-2 l
11.3 Conclusions.............................................
11-2 l
l Cornell University ZPR SER vii l
s
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
P,,ag 12 RADIATION PROTECTION PROGRAM.......
12-1 12.1 ALARA Commitment.........................................
12-1 12.2 Health Physics Program...................................
12-1 12.2.1 Health Physics Staffing....
12-1 12.2.2 Procedures........................................
12-1 12.2.3 Instrumentation...................................
12-2 12.2.4 Training..........................................
12-2 12.3 Radiation Sources........................................
12-2 12.3.1 Reactor...........................................
12-2 12.3.2 Extraneous Sources............................
12-2 12.4 Routine Monitoring.......................................
12-3 12.4.1 Fixed-Position Monitors....
12-3 12.4.2 Experimental Support..............................
12-3 12.5 Occupational Radiation Exposures.........................
12-3 12.5.1 Personnel Monitoring Program......................
12-3 12.5.2 Personnel Exposures...............................
12-3 12.6 Effluent Monitoring..........
12-3 12.6.1 Airborne Effluents................................
12-3 12.6.2 Liquid Effluents..................................
12-4 12.7 Environmental Monitoring.................................
12-4 12.8 Potential Dose Assessments...............................
12-4 12.9 Conclusion...............................................
12-4 13 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS........................................
13-1 13.1 Overall Organization 13-1 13.2 Training...............
13-2 13.3 Emergency Planning..................
13-2 13.4 Physical Security Plan..
13-2 13.5 Conclusion...............................................
13-3 14 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS...........
14-1 14.1 Natural Phenomena........................................
14-1 14.2 Mechanical Rearrangement of the Fuel....................
14-1 i
l 14.3 Reactivity Insertion.....................................
14-2 14.3.1 Scenario..........................................
14-2 14.3.2 Assessment........................................
14-2 Cornell University ZPR SER viii i
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page 14.4 Conclusion...............................................
14-3 15 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS......................................
15-1 16 FINANCIAL QUALIFICATIONS....................................
16-1 l
17 OTHER LICENSE CONSIDERATIONS..................................
17-1 17.1 Prior Reactor Utilization................................
17-1 l
17.2 Multiple or Sequential Failures of safety Components.....
17-2 17.3 Conclusion...............................................
17-2 l
18 CONCLUSIONS...................................................
18-1 I
19 REFERENCES........
19-1 l
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Cornell University ZPR SER ix l
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LIST OF FIGURES P, a.ge 1.1 Control Rod Cluster Assembly................................
1-4
- 1. 2 P l a n V i ew o f Wa rd Lab o ra to ry.................................
1-5
- 1. 3 Elevation and Details of Zero Power Reactor.................
1-6 2.1 Map of Ithaca Area...........................................
2-4 2.2 Cornell University Campus....................................
2-5 2.3 Ithaca Urban-Area Population Distribution...................
2-6 5.1 ZPR Water Processing Flow Diagram............................
5-5 13.1 Organizational Structure for Radiation Protection............
13-4 LIST OF TABLES 7.1 ZPR Scram Conditions.........................................
7-9
- 7. 2 Interlock and Bypass Panel Display...........................
7-10 12.1 Number of Individuals in Exposure Interval..................
12-5 Cornell University ZPR SER x
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INTRODUCTION The Cornell University (CU) (licensee) submitted a timely application to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) (staff) for renewal of the Class 104 Operating License R-80 for its zero power reactor (ZPR) for a period of
(
20 years.
The application was by letter (with supporting documentation) dated i
October 1978, as amended by letter and submittals dated March 1981 and March 1983.
Cornell University has held an operating license for the ZPR since 1963.
CU currently is permitted to operate the reactor within the conaitions authorized in past amendments in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations Paragraph 2,109 (10 CFR 2.109), until NRC action on the renewal request is completed.
The staff technical safety review with respect to issuing a renewal operating l
license to CU has been based on the information contained in the renewal appli-cation and supporting supplements, plus responses to requests for additional information.
The renewal application includes:
a Physical Security Plan; prcposed Technical Specifications; Environmental Report Data; Safety Analysis Report and revisions; Financial Qualifications as supplemented through April 20, 1981; Reactor Operator Requalification Program as supplemented through Novem-ber 4,1981; and an Emergency Plan dated October 29, 1982.
This material is available for review at the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street N.W., Washington, D.C.
The renewal application contains the information regarding the original design l
of the facility and includes information about modifications to the facility made since initial licensing.
The Physical Security Plan is protected from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.790(d)(1) and 10 CFR 9.5(a)(4).
The purpose of this Safety Evaluation Report (SER) is to summarize the results of the safety review of the CU ZPR and to delineate the scope of the technical details considered in evaluating the radiological safety aspects of continued operation.
This SER will serve as the basis for review of the CU application l
for renewal of an operating license for a period of 20 years for the ZPR at a maximum authorized thermal power level of 100 W.
The facility was reviewed against the requirements of 10 CFR 20, 30, 50, 51, 55, 70, and 73, applicable regulatory guides (Division 2, Research and Test Reactors); and appropriate accepted industry standards (American National Standards Institute /American Nuclear Society (ANSI /ANS 15 series)).
Because there are no specific accident-i related regulations for research reactors, the staff has, at times, ccmpared I
calculated dose values with related standards in 10 CFR 20, the standards for l
protection against radiation, both for employees and the public.
This Safety Evaluation Report was prepared by Harold Bernard, Project Manager,
[
Division of Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Major contributors to the technical review include the project mana;;er (NRC) and J. Hyder, D. Whitt;ker, and C. Thomas of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) under contract to the NRC.
l Cornell University ZPR SER 1-1
i 1.1 Summary and Conclusions of Principal Safety Considerations The staff evaluation considered the information submitted by CU, past operating history recorded in annual reports submitted to the Commission by the licensee, reports by the Commission's Office of Inspection and Enforcement, and onsite observations.
In addition, as part of the licensing review, the staff obtained laboratory studies and analyzed several pc,stulated accidents for the CU ZPR.
The principal matters reviewed for the CU ZPR and the conclusions reached were the following.
)
I (1) The design, testing, and performance of the reactor structures, systems, and components important to safety during normal operation are inherently safe, and safe operation can reasonably be expected to continue.
(2) The expected consequences of a broad spectrum of postulated credible accidents have been considered, emphasizing those likely to cause loss of integrity of fuel-element cladding.
The staff performed conservative analyses of serious credible accidents and determined that the calculated potential radiation doses outside of the reactor room are not likely to exceed 10 CFR 20 doses in unrestricted areas.
(3) The licensee's management organization, conduct of training and research ar.tivities, and security measures are adequate to ensure safe operation of the facility and protection of special nu: lear meterial.
(4) The systems provided for control of radiological effluents can be operated to ensure that releases of radioactive wastes from the facility are within the limits of the Commission's regulations and are as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA).
(5) The licensee's Technical Specifications, which provide operating limits controlling operation of the facility, are such that there is a high degree of assurance that the facility will be operated safely and reliably.
(6) The financial data and information provided by the licensee are such that the staff has determined that the licensee has sufficient revenues to cover operating costs and to ensure protection of the public from radiation exposures when operations are terminated.
(7) The licensee's program for providing for the physical protection of the facility and its special nuclear material complies with the applicable requirements in 10 CFR 73.
(8) The licensee's procedures for training its reactor operators and the plan for operator requalification are adequate; they give reasonable assurance that the reactor facility will be operated competently.
(9) The licensee has submitted an emergency plan dated October 28, 1982, thereby complying with applicable regulations.
- 1. 2 Reactor Description The CU ZPR is a water-moderated and -reflected, heterogeneous reactor.
The reactor fuel is 2.1% enriched uranium dioxide.
Various grid plate patterns Cornell University ZPR SER 1-2
I enable different arrangements of fuel.
Approximately 800 fuel elements are utilized; some of these have end fittings from which the caps can be removed so that experiments such as foils can be inserted.
Fifteen control rod cluster assemblies containing multiple rods with poison sections can be located in any position inside the core (Figure 1.1).
Four control rod clusters were origi-nally used in the reactor.
One of the four control rod assemblies has been mod-ified to handle experiments only, leaving three remaining control rod assemblies.
1.3 Reactor Location The reactor is located in the Ward Laboratory Building in the southern part of the southwest section of the Cornell University campus as shown in Figures 1.2.
The elevation of the CU ZPR core and its appurtenances is shown in Figure 1.3.
The elevation of the ground floor of the laboratory is approximately 775 ft,
^
which is 60 to 65 ft above the level of Cascadilla Creek.
There has been no new construction in the immediate vicinity of Ward Laboratory and there are no plans for future construction, according to the licensee.
- 1. 4 Shared Facilities Ward Laboratory, in addition to housing the CU ZPR, also contains a TRIGA reactor (Operating License R-89), a gamma irradiation cell licensed by New York State, and an accelerator facility.
For details of the TRIGA reactor, see NUREG-0984, August 1983.
The accelerator facility consists of three rooms below ground level at the east
(
end of the reactor laboratory and a fourth room for service equipment on the south side.
Access to the control room, accelerator room, and target room area is through the machine shop in the basement of the reactor laboratory.
Services to the accelerator room from the equipment room enter through a sealed concrete labyrinth.
1.5 Comparison With Similar Facilities The CU ZPR is very similar to reactcrs that have been used at Brookhaven National Laboratory, Westinghouse, Rensselaer Polytechnical Institute, and other facilities for criticality studies.
- 1. 6 Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 Section 302(b)(1) of the Nuclear Waste policy Act of 1982 provides that the NRC may require, as a precondition to issuing or renewing an operating license for a research or test reactor, that the applicant shall have entered into an agree-ment with the Department of Energy (DOE) for the disposal of high-level radio-active waste and spent nuclear fuel.
DOE (R. L. Morgan) has determined that universities and other government agencies operating nonpower reactors have entered into contracts with DOE that provide that DOE retain title to fuel and is obligated to take the spent fuel and/or high-level waste for storage or reprocessing.
i Because the Cornell University reactor is a research reactor, it is in con-l formance with the Waste Policy Act of 1982.
l Cornell University ZPR SER l-3
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2 SITE CHARACTERISTICS 2.1 Geography Cornell University is located in the heart of the city of Ithaca, which lies in the Finger Lakes region of New York State.
The city of Ithaca is at the southern tip of Cayuga Lake in a very hilly area (Figure 2.1).
l The elevation of the campus around Ward Laboratory is 760 to 7'O ft.
Casca-I dilla Creek, the receiving stream for much of the campus runoff, is at an ele-vation of $710 ft, a drop of $60 to 65 ft from Ward Laboratory first-floor elevation and $100 ft away.
Cascadilla Creek also forms the southern boundary of the CU campus, separating the university from the adjacent residential
- area, i
l 2.2 Demography Figure 2.2 shows the CU campus and its approximate boundary.
Inside that bound-ary are classroom and laboratory buildings, service buildings, dormitories, and other usual university buildings.
The remaining part of the map (outside the campus boundary) is a residentiai area except for a commercial area along College Avenue and Eddy Street, along Dryden Road between Eddy Street and Lindan Avenue, and along Stewart Avenue.
The campus is separated from the residential and com-mercial areas to its south by the gorge of Cascadilla Creek.
The population distributien of the Ithaca area is shown in Figure 2.3.
The total population in the area is about 25,000.
In the immediate vicinity, the nearest residence is about 300 ft away on the opposite side of Cascadilla Gorge.
2.3 Nearby Industrial, Transportation, and Military Facilities Ithaca is serviced by several commercial airlines using Tompkins County Airport, which is located approximately 2 air-miles from the campus.
There are no railroads, heavy industry, or military installations in the vicin-ity of the campus.
l The staff concludes that there is virtually zero probability of risk of acci-dents to the reactor from activities associated with military, heavy industry, j
or transportation operations.
2.4 Meteorology The temperature at Ithaca averages between 25 F in winter to 68 F in summer.
Meteorological information is obtained from the Tompkins County Airport.
Prevailing winds during fall and winter are predominantly from the southeast.
There also is a consistent strong wind from the northwest, which is more pre-dominant in the spring and summer months.
l Cornell University ZPR SER 2-1
1 When regional cyclonic meteorological disturbances are absent, local topograph-j ical and thermal conditions produce a " night wind" doscribed from Cornell
/
University Extension Bulletin No. 764 as follows:
The so-called night wind of the Cayuga Lake Valley blows during f
the summer months at times when the absence of cyclonic distur-bances gives full play to local influences.
Commonly it sets in a few hours after sunset as a light breeze from the south, grad-ually increases in strength until a velocity of about eight miles an hour is reached, and then continues steadily throughout the night.
This current has its origin on the hillsides at the southern end of the lake, and it flows' northward down the water-courses converging into the main depression.
As it moves north-waro over the smooth surface of the lake, it is augmented by the numerous cool currents which join the main stream through the watercourses that debouch upon the valley from either side.
2.4.1 Severe Wind Considerations The weather in this region is usually controlled by the extra-tropical cyclones that frequently pass over the area.
These storms can cause occasional high winds and are usually from the southeast.
The peak 5-min wind in the period l
1909 through 1943 was 70 mph in January 1939. While winds in the 45 to 70 mph range have been experienced in every month of the year, such velocities are not unusual for an area in the temperate latitudes.
i The area is not in the usual path of tropical storms; only seven hurricanes have crossed central New York since 1800.
Hurricane Hazel (October 1954) passed through the area causing some damage to trees and roofs.
2.4.2 Precipitation and Flooding The maximum 24-hour precipitation of 7.90 in, was recorded in July 1935 and was associated with thunderstorm activity, and the highest 24-hour precipitation associated with a tropical storm occurred in 1972 with Hurricane Agnes (letter from B. E. Dethier to Dr. K. B. Cady, 1980).
On these two occasions local flooding was experienced in the Ithaca area.
However, flooding of the reactor building did not occur as it is virtually impossible because of the topography of the site.
2.4.3 Conclusion The staff concludes that there are no unique meterological conditions that could produce or cause a significant risk to the safe operation of the CU ZPR.
2.5 Geology and Hydrology The unconsolidated mantle at the site of the CU ZPR consists primarily of thin-bedded lacustrine silt and fine sand of moderate permeability and subordinate local pockets of highly permeable deltaic gravel.
The underlying bedrock is the Enfield and Ithaca Formations, both of which consist of shale with numerous j
interbedded flaggy silt-stone units.
Because of the relative impermeability of Cornell University ZPR SER 2-2
l l
shale, flow through these formations is controlled by the well-developed conju-gate joint system.
Ultimately the ground water would emerge to join surface flow in Cascadilla Gorge, mostly above the Central Avenue Bridge.
- 2. 6 Seismology South central New York is considered to be relatively seismically stable.
The likelihood of a significant shock originating in the vicinity of Ithaca is low, but earthquakes of light-to-moderate intensity are fairly frequent in north-eastern New York with relatively large events occurring in the St. Lawrence Valley.
They are perceptible in the Ithaca region on an average of perhaps once a decade.
The nearest moderately damaging (maximum modified mercalli intensity VIII (MMI VIII) earthquake had its epicenter near Attica (Wyoming County) more than 100 mi away in western New York.
This earthquake was widely felt across New York and New England but structural damage was restricted to a radius of $10 mi around Attica.
It probably had a MMI of about III in Ithaca.
Historically the nearest felt event to Ithaca was over 25 mi away and had a maximum MMI of II.
2.7 Conclusion The staff concludes that there are no hydrological, geological, or seismologi-cal conditions that pose unacceptable risks to the CU reactor facility or the contiguous public.
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i l
3 DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS 3.1 Wind Damage Except for perhaps superficial damage from the 1937 hurricane, wind has not I
caused any damage to any of the CU buildings, including Ward Laboratory.
i l
3.2 Water Damage As stated in Section 2.1, Ward Laboratory is located s60 ft above Cascadilla Creek.
In addition, drainage away from the laboratory is excellent; accord-ingly, there is no risk of. flooding at the reactor site.
3.3 Seismic-Induced Reactor Damage l
As stated in Section 2.6 of this report, the CU campus is located in a moder-ately stable seismological region.
In the unlikely case of severe seismic damage to the reactor structure and loss of coolant, there would be no melting of the core fuel and, therefore, no dispersion of fission products (as dis-cussed further in Section 14.2).
The staff, therefore, concludes that the radiological consequences of seismic damage to the reactor facility and to the reactor core would be insignificant.
3.4 Mechanical Systems and Components The mechanical systems of importance to safety are the neutron-absorbing con-trol rods suspended from the superstructure, which also supports the reactor core.
The motors, gear boxes, electromagnets, switches, and wiring are above the level of the water and readily accessible for testing and maintenance.
An extensive preventive maintenance program has been in operation for many years for the CU ZPR facility to conform and comply with the performance requirements of the Technical Specification; The effectiveness of this preventive maintenance program is attested to by the small number and types of malfunctions of equipment over the years of opera-tion.
These malfunctions have almost exclusively been one of a kind (that is, no repeats) and/or of components ' hat were fail safe or self-annunciating.
Therefore, the staff concludes that there appears to be no significant deteri-oration of equipment with time or with operation.
Thus, there is reasoneble assurance that continued operation for the requested period of renewal will not increase the risks to the public.
- 3. 5 Conclusion The CU ZPR facility was designed and built to withstand all credible and proba-ble wind and water damage contingencies associated with the site.
A seismic event has a small likelihood of occurring and the consequences of such occur-rence would be minimal and would pose no radiological hazard to the public.
Cornell University ZPR SER 3-1
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4 REACTOR The CU ZPR is a light-water moderated and reflected heterogeneous reactor fueled with low-enriched uranium dioxide fuel.
Reactor control is achieved by insertion and withdrawal of neutron-absorbing control rod clusters.
The ZPR first achieved criticality in December 1962.
The ZPR is essentially a critical assembly operating at very low power levels and, therefore, incorpo-rating a negligible fission product inventory.
The maximum authorized power level is 100 W.
The reactor is used primarily for teaching and demonstration purposes in formal courses and workshops at the university.
4.1 Reactor Core The reactor core consists of a lattice of vertically arranged cylindrical fuel elements immersed in an open tank of demineralized water.
The water serves as both moderator and radial and axial reflector.
The elements are positioned by top and bottom grid plates that incorporate hold patterns that establish spe-cific water-to-fuel volume ratios ranging from 1:1 to 4:1.
The active fueled region of the core comprises a right circular cylinder 48 in. high and ~16 to 20 in. in diameter, depending on the lattice configuration chosen.
4.1.1 Fuel Elements Four types of fuel elements are available for use in the CU ZPR reactor:
normal, decappable, short, and fuel-follower control.
In all elements, the fuel material is 2.1% enriched uranium dioxide in the form of sintered pellets nominally 0.6 in. in diameter and 1.0 in. long.
In all caces the fuel pellets are contained in seamless aluminum tubes that have a 0.666-in. outer diameter and are 0.028-in. thick.
The total pellet inventory is approximately 1,400 kg of U0 contcining less than 36 kg 23sU.
2 There are 740 normal elements that constitute the primary fuel element type used in the reactor.
These elements are 59.25 in. long and contain fuel pel-lets stacked to an active length of 48 in.
The normal elements are sealed with welded top and bottom end plugs.
lhere are 60 decappable elements designed for experimental purposes.
These elements have the same active length as the normal elements but contain removable, 0-ring-sealed top and bottom plugs to permit insertion of foils and special pellets.
The control rods include a fuel-follower section that contains 48 in. of UO 2 fuel, the same as in a normal fuel element.
The control rod clusters are described further in Section 4.1.2.
Cladding and end plugs are available to construct 100 short elements $18 in.
long.
However, the university has no plans to use these elements and future use will require prior NRC approval.
In addition to the reactor fuel described above, CU possesses 1,365 kg of natural uranium in the form of 800 aluminum-clad, UO fuel elements.
These 2
elements will not be used in the ZPR core without prior NRC approval.
Cornell University ZPR SER 4-1
- =. _-__
4.1.2 Control Rods Reactor control is achieved primarily by three control rod' clusters that are i
vertically positioned within the fuel lattice by remotely operated electro-mechanical cable-type drives.
The control cluster consists of three individual control rods 9 ft 4 in. long and 0.666 in. in outer diameter.
The lower fuel-4 follower section of each control rod is filled with UO pellets to an active 2
length of 48 in., the same as a normal fuel element.
A welded plug separates the follower section from the control (poison) section, which is filled with 50 in. of boron carbide.
j The control rods are joined at the top by an aluminum adapter that ensures the proper spacing of the rods for a specific water-to-fuel lattice arrangement.
i The rods are guided within the core by vacant fuel element holes in the upper and lower grid plates.
4.2 Reactor Tank All core components are located in a 7-ft-diameter by 7-ft-deep by 3/8-in. thick 4
aluminum tank. Horizontal "I" beams anchored into the side walls of the reactor cell provide support for the tank.
A smaller (2-f t-diameter by 4-f t-deep) l source shield tank is attached to an opening in the bottom of the reactor tank.
This tank provides the shielding for the startup source in its withdrawn posi-tion and space for the fuel followers when the control rods are fully inserted.
Five instrument thimbles to facilitate experiments also are provided within the l
reactor tank.
Two dump lines, one 6 in, and t u nthar 4 in. in diameter, empty the reactor tank water into a dump storage tank located beneath the reactor tank.
The 4-in. dump line enters the reactor tank through an 8-in. high standpipe.
The top of this standpipe is located so that the water level with the 4-in. dump I
l line open will be 3.5-in. below the bottom of the active fuel.
The top of the 6-in. dump line is flush with the bottom of the reactor tank, allowing the tank to drain completely.
Water is pumped into the reactor tank from the dt.mp storage tank through a 3-in. fill line.
A reactor tank overflow line is provided by a 4-in. standpipe whose inlet is located 10 in, below the tank top.
4.3 Support Structure The fuel elements are supported by a 3-in.-thick aluminum top grid plate.
The forces on the top grid plate are transmitted through a 3-in.-thick retaining ring to four aluminum support columns.
The support columns are welded to the bottom of the reactor tank.
True vertical alignment of each fuel element is maintained by a 1/2-in.-thick bottom grid plate.
Sets of grid plates are available for five water-to-fuel volume ratios ranging from 1:1 to 4:1.
4.4 Reactor Instrumentation The operation of the CU ZPR is monitored by instrument channels that measure neutron density and core water temperature.
The signals are displayed at the Cornell University ZPR SER 4-2
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reactor console and also are used to initiate automatic reactor scrams if pre-set limits are exceeded.
Four neutron-sensitive channels measure reactor power over the range from source level to full power.
A source range channel, which provides both visual and audible signals, is used to monitor source multiplication during startup.
i Two of the remaining three neutron level channels provide scram signals to the safety circuits when preset power levels are exceeded.
A log neutron channel measures and displays the reactor period and initiates a scram if the period becomes shorter than 5 sec.
Similarly, a thermocouple located in the reactor tank displays the core water temperature on the reactnr console and initiates i
a scram if excessive temperatures are recorded.
In addition to the above instrumentation, area monitors, a closed-circuit tele-vision and an intercom are provided to facilitate communication between the control room and reactor cell and inform the operating staff of any abnormal or hazardous situations.
t l
More detailed discussions of reactor instrumentation are given in Section 7.
l 4.5 Biological Shield The concrete cell in which the ZPR core is located constitutes the biological shield for the reactor.
The cell walls are constructed of 2.5 f t of ordinary concrete in the vicinity of the reactor and 2 ft of ordinary concrete else-where.
The ceiling is composed of 2 ft of high-density concrete.
An interlock prevents entry into the cell while the reactor is in an operating mode.
4.6 Dynamic Design Evaluation The safe operation of the CU ZPR is accomplished by the use and manipulation of a reactivity control system that includes water addition and peison-bearing control rods.
The reactor instrumentation monitors and displays changes in reactor parameters such as power, neutron density, water level, and water temperature thereby providing information for appropriate operator response.
In addition, interlocks prevent inadvertent reactivity addition, and a scram system initiates rapid, automatic shutdown when safety settings are exceeded.
Further stability and safety are incorporated in the Technical Specification requirement that all critical cores must have a predicted or measured negative isothermal temperature reactivity coefficient at temperatures above 80 C.
In the unlikely event of inadvertent high power operation leading to high tempera-tures, the negative temperature reactivity coefficient will tend to limit the reactor power.
4.6.1 Excess Reactivity and Shutdown Margin
[
The CU ZPR Technical Specifications limit the maximum core excess reactivity to 4.00$.
Reactivity worths of unsecured experiments are limited to less than 1.00$ and worths of all types of experiments are limited to 2.00$.
In addition, the reactfrity insertion rate in a critical configuration, including both water insertion and control rod withdrawal, is limited to 0.07$ per second.
I l
l Cornell University ZPR SER 4-3
4 The Technical Specifications further require that at least three control rod cluster assemblies be operable and that the insertion of any single control assembly shall make the reactor subcritical.
Only one control rod cluster may I
be withdrawn at a time.
I In the current core configuration, the excess reactivity is 0.275, and the reactivity worths of the three control rod assemblies are 2.20$ each.
i Therefore, as required by the Technical Specifications, insertion of any one control assembly will shut the reactor down.
The total shutdown margin with t
all control rods inserted is 6.33$.
4.6.2 Conclusions The Technical Specifications require that any one of three control assemblies be capable of bringing the reactor subcritical.
This ensures adequate shut-dowr. margin and provides sufficient redundancy in the unlikely event of a c -
l trol assembly malfunction.
Limiting the reactivity insertion rate to value3 less than 0.07$ per second provides that in the unlikely event of an unexpected and unabated reactivity insertion, the reactor operator and/or automatic scram signal will have adequate time to safely shut the reactor down.
Limiting the reactivity worth of unsecured experiments to less than 1.00$ precludes prompt excursion caused by an experiment malfunction.
On the basis of the above considerations, the staff concludes that reactivity addition will be sufficiently limited and adequate redundant shutdown capabil-ity provided to ensure safe operation of the ZPR.
i l
4.7 Functional Design of Reactivity Control System Reactivity changes may be made in the CU ZPR by changing the reactor tank water level or by manipulating control rod clusters.
Electrical interlocks are provided that prevent reactivity insertion by more than one meanc at a time (water level only or single control rods).
4.7.1 Water Level The water level in the reactor tank is controlled remotely from the reactor console.
Water is pumped into the reactor tank through a 3-in. inlet line by activating a spring-return toggle switch.
The 125 gal per minute fill pump is driven by a 7-hp continuous-duty synchronous electrical motor.
Flow rate can be controlled by a manually operated gate valve. There are two water-level indicators at the ZPR console.
One shows the level in the reactor tank, and the other shows the level in the dump storage tank.
Water can be removed rapidly from the core tank by opening three fast-acting i
pneumatic valves (one 6 in. and two 4 in. in diameter) located in the dump j
lines between the reactor tank and dump storage tank.
All three valves are designed to spring open on' loss of either pneumatic pressure or electric They arc remotely operated from the console or automatically activated power.
by a scram signal.
Microswitches located on the valves cause lights on the console to indicate either open or closed conditions.
Cornell University ZPR SER 4-4
4.7.2 Control Rod Cluster Primary reactor control is achieved with control rod clusters that are posi-tioned vertically within the fuel lattice by remotely operated electromechanical cable-type drives.
The control rods were described previously in Section 4.1.2.
The control rod cluster is coupled to the drive cable by a socket-type quick-disconnect fitting.
The control rod drives are attached to a support carriage mounted over the core.
The carriage is designed to allow the control drives to be positioned anywhere in the central part of the core, thereby providing the flexibility of core conf 4 -ation needed in critical assemblies.
The drives incorporate a 1/80 hp reversible single phase, 115-V, 60-cycle motor controlled by a lever-operated switch located on the console.
An analog and digital position indication of each rod cluster also is displayed on the console.
Under normal operating conditions, power to a magnetic clutch secures the con-trol rod cluster cable.
Any scram condition or loss of power will deenergize the clutch, release the cable, and cause the poison section of the control rods to drop by gravity into the fuel lattice, shutting down the reactor.
On initiation of a scram, the control clusters must insert 90% of their reactivity worth in less than 1 sec.
An interlock system prevents the withdrawal of more than one control rod at a time after the reactor tank has been filled with water or the withdrawal of any control rod while the tank is being filled.
Furthermore, control rods cannot be withdrawn unless a mechanical interlock is placed over the core that inter-acts with microswitches on the control rods.
This device is called a tem-plate.
Although this system may be bypassed with the use of a key, the key can only be used with proper authorization by appropriate supervisory personnel.
4.7.3 Scram Circuitry and Interlocks The interlocks and scram circuitry ensure that several reactor core and opsra-tional conditions must be satisfied for reactor operations to occur or continue and that the reactor is rapidly shut down if hazardous or unexpected conditions arise.
The scram-logic circuitry incorporates a set of open-on-failure logic relay switches in series.
Any scram signal or component failure in the scram logic will result in loss of current to the magnets in the control rod clusters and to the solenoid in the dump-line valves, causing rapid insertion of neutron poison, removal of water moderator, and subsequent reactor shutdown.
A 14 point annunciator system located on the control console provides the reactor operator with a visible and audible signal in the event any scram condition exists.
The annunciator can be reset only after the scram condition has been corrected.
An elaborate series of interlocks incorporating signals from various instru-ments and microswitches requires that startup operations be performed in a safe and controlled sequence.
To provide the flexibility often needed during criti-cal experiments, a key bypass switch allows the bypassing of individual inter-locks.
All bypassed conditions are displayed prominently on the console.
The keys are issued, with proper authorization, only to appropriate operating per-sonnel.
The interlocks that prevent reactivity from being added by more than one means at a time cannot be bypassed.
Cornell University ZPR SER 4-5
4.7.4 Conclusions The CU ZPR is equipped with safety and control systems similar to those found at other nonpower reactors. There is a sufficient redundancy of control rods to ensure safe shutdown even if the most reactive rod fails to insert upon receiving a scram signal.
Interlocks are provided to allow an orderly startup sequence in accordance with safe operating procedures and to prevent inadver-tent reactivity additions that might lead to hazardous conditions.
Independent scram sensors and circuits are provided to automatically shut the reactor down if hazardous conditions are approached, and several manual scram buttons allow operators to initiate a scram from strategic locations including the control console and reactor cell.
The control rods, rod drives, scram circuitry, and interlocks have performed reliably and satisfactorily in the CU ZPR for many years.
In addition, appropriate checks, tests, and calibrations are required to verify continued operability and satisfactory performance of the control system.
On the basis of the above discussion, the staff concludes that the reactivity control system of the CU ZPR is designed and should function to adequately ensure safe operation and safe shutdown of the reactor under all operating conditions.
4.8 Onerational Procedures Cornell has implemented administrative controls that require review, audit, and written procedures for all safety-related activities.
A Ward Laboratory Safety Committee reviews all aspects of the ZPR operation to ensure that the reactor facility is operated and used within the terms of the facility license consis-tent with safety of the public as well as of the operating personnel.
The responsibilities of this committee include review and approval of operating procedures, new experiments, and proposed changes to the facility or its Technical Specifications.
At least once a year the committee inspects the facility, reviews safety measures, and audits operations.
Written procedures, reviewed and approved by the Safety Committee, have been established for safety-related activities, including reactor startup, operation and shutdown, preventive or corrective maintenance, and periodic inspection, testing, and calibration of reactor equipment and instrumentation.
The reactor is operated by trained NRC-licensed personnel in accordance with the above-mentioned procedures.
4.9 Conclusions The staff has reviewed the information regarding the reactor fuel, core arrange-ment, control elements, structure, and instrumentation.
The staff concludes that the CU ZPR is designed and built according to good industrial practices.
The staff further concludes that the design and performance capability of the components is adequate to ensure the safe operation of the reactor during the proposed licensing period.
The staff review of the CU ZPR reactor facility has included its specific design and installation, its control and safety instrumentation, and its Cornell University ZPR SER 4-6
[
operating procedures.
As noted earlier, these features are similar to those found at other nonpower reactor facilities.
Furthermore, tha ZPR has operated safely and reliably for the past 20 years.
Based on the review of the CU ZPR, the staff concludes that there is reasonable assurance that the CU ZPR is cap-able of safe operation, as limited by its Technical Specifications, for the period of the license renewal, Cornell University ZPR SER 4-7
5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM The coolant system for the CU ZPR is composed of several subsystems and shares several components with the CU TRIGA coolant system.
The following sections describe the ZPR coolant system (see Figure 5.1).
t 5.1 General Description There is no circulatory coolant system for the CU ZPR.
Thermal power is so low that cooling is accomplished by convection and tank water evaporation.
Makeup water is provided by a fill-line from the storage tank or the demin-eralizer system (Figure 5.1).
The water level in the reactor tank is controlled remotely from the reactor console; for safety purposes, the water is always lowered to a level below the active fuel level before personnel enter the reactor cell.
The lowering is accomplished by dumping the water through a 4-in. valve into a storage tank located below the core tank.
To completely empty the core tank, there is a 6-in. dump valve, which also is opened in all scrams.
An additional indepen-dent 4-in. valve in the 6-in. dump line is adjusted to open whenever the reac-tor water exceeds a set temperature.
The storage tank contains an agitatur to aid in obtaining a uniform temperature.
The same tank also contains two steam-to-water heat exchangers for raising the water temperature to values necessary to indicate effects of temperature, reactivity, or other parameters.
The heaters raise the bulk water temperature faster than possible with the reactor.
The core tank and the storage tank form a closed system that includes a mixed-bed demineralizer unit.
5.2 Water Dump Storage Tank The water dump storage tank is aluminum and is located directly below the reactor core tank.
This storage tank has a capacity of 2,200 gal and is used for storing the reactor moderator during dump or transfer operations.
Mounted within the dump storage tank are a steam-operated heater for adjusting the moderator temperature, an agitator for mixing the moderator, and a temperature-sensing element that provides a signal for a console-mounted temperature indicator.
A float-type sensor, located in a standpipe mounted on the cell pit wall, transmits water level information to the console.
The following piping enters the top of the storage tank:
(1) 4-in. normal dump line (2) 4-in. temperature dump line (3) 6-in. scram dump line (4) 4-in. reactor core tank overflow pipe (5) 1-in. source shield tank drain pipe A 3-in. outlet pipe at the bottom connects to both the water reprocessing system outside the cell and reactor core tank fill system.
A 4-in. overflow pipe is provided within the storage tank to preclude the possibility of pumping Cornell University ZPR SER 5-1
water into the reactor core tank while filling the storage tank from outside i
the cell.
The outlet of the overflow pipe feeds into the ZPR sump.
Access into the dump storage tank is provided through a 16-in. port near the top of the tank.
5.3 Storage Tank fill System The storage tank is filled with highly demineralized water from a mixed-bed demineralizer at a flow rate of approximately 10 gal per minute.
The water is transferred from the demineralizer through a 1-1/2-in. pipe by way of a manually operated figure-eight valve.
The water enters the storage tank from the top.
5.4 Reactor Core Tank Fill System Water is pumped into the reactor core tank from the dump storage tank at a maximum flow rate of 125 gal per minute.
A 4-in. pipe between the storage tank and the suction side of the pump contains a manually operated gate valve and a strainer.
A 4-in. pipe between the pres-sure side of the pump and the inlet to the reactor core tank contains a check valve, a replaceable cartridge-type filter, and a manually operated gate valve for controlling the flow rate.
A pressure gauge and a pressure transmitter are installed between the check valve and the pump.
The pressure-indicating re-ceiver is located on the console.
A 2-in. pipe, which has a manually operated gate valve, is located on the core tank fill line at a point between the filter and the check valve.
This 2-in. iron pipe feeds into the waste water system of the building.
5.5 Reactor Core Tank Dump System Two dump lines, one 6 in. in diameter and one 4 in. in diameter, containing pneumatically operated, diaphragm-type valves, empty the reactor core tank contents into the dump storage tank.
The 4-in. dump line enters the reactor core tank through a standpipe extending above the bottom of the reactor core tank.
The top of this standpipe is located below the bottom of the active fuel.
The 6-in. dump line is located opposite the 4-in. " partial dump" line.
The top of this larger dump line is flush with the bottom of the 7-ft-diameter core tank.
An additional 4-in. dump line runnirg from the 6-in. dump line into the dump storage tank contains a pneumatically operated, diaphragm-type valve.
A 1-in. drain line, which has a manually operated gate valve, runs from the bottom of the source shield tank into the top of the dump storage tank.
A reactor core tank overflow line is provided by a 4-in. standpipe.
The top of the standpipe is located 5 in. inside and 10 in. below the top of the reac-tor core tank.
The standpipe penetrates the reactor core tank 34 in. below the top of the core tank and runs into the tcp of the dump storage tank.
5.6 Water Level Indicating System A 2-in. line runs from the bottom of the reactor core tank to a 6-in.-diameter standpipe located on the south wall of the ZPR cell.
This standpipe contains a float that transmits water height information to the console from a Selsyn Cornell University ZPR SER 5-2
transmitter operating,off the float by a drum-and-cable arrangement.
The 6
transmitter, drum, and level-indicating microswitches are housed in an 8-by 8-by 11-in. box mounted en top of the standpipe.
A 1/2-in. line, which has a manually operated gate valve, runs from the bottom of the dump storage tank to a float-type water level indicator inside an 8-in.-square standpipe.
This standpipe is mounted on the north wall of the ZPR cell.
- 5. 7 Demineralizer System
~
A demineralizer system, which takes suction from the north end of the bottom of the storage tank, removes ions by a mixed-bed cartridge demineralizer and discharges into the storage tank pump suction well.
A remote-reading resis-tivity probe is installed in the storage tank.
This system is used to provide demineralization without using the large-scale demineralizer system, located outside the ZPR cell, that is frequently in use demineralizing the TRIGA reactor pool water.
5.8 Reactor Tank All core components are located in a 7-ft-diameter by 7-ft-deep aluminum tank having 3/8-in.-thick walls.
About 14 in. of the reactor tank protrudes above the floor level.
Horizontal "1" beams anchored into the side walls of the cell provide the support for the reactor tank.
A smaller tank (2 ft in diam-eter by 4 ft deep), attached and opening into the bottom of the reactor core tank, provides the shielding for the startup source and space for the fuel followers when the control rods are fully inserted.
This smaller tank is called the source-shield tank.
Five adjustable instrument thimbles are pro-vided in the 7-ft-diameter core tank.
The inside ends of these horizontal thimbles can be moved to within 6 in. of the core center.
Two of these thim-bles view the vertical center of the core, one from the north and the other from the south.
Two more thimbles are located 12 in. below the former two.
The fifth thimble views the vertical center from the west.
5.9 Fill Pump l
The fill pump is a 125 gal per-minute pump driven by a 7-hp, continuous-duty electric motor.
The motor is turned on by a spring-returned toggle switch labeled " water control." To restrict the conditions under which the moderator l
can be added, this toggle switch also is interlocked with both the scram l
system and " rods cocked" circuit.
Check valves and gate valves that make it possible to dispose of water from the 7FC paep storage tank, are in the imme-diate vicinity of the pump.
There arc tv water-level indicators on the ZPR console.
One indicates the level l0
.e actor core tank, and the other indi-cates the level in the dump stor e ' '
c 5.10 Dump Valves.
There are three fast-acting pneumatic valves located in the water dump lines between the reactor core tank anJ the dump storage tank.
One of these is a 6-in. valve and the other two are 4-in. valves.
They all are designed to spring open on failure of either pneumatic pressure or electric power.
They are operated remotely from the console.
Microswitches on the valve cause lights on the console to indicate either OPEN or SHUT.
l Cornell University ZPR SER 5-3
1 5.11 Agitator The agitator is used for mixing the reactor coolant in the dump storage tank before pumping it into the reactor tank.
The agitator is controlled by an alternate-action,7shbutton switch containing ON and 0FF indicator lights.
This switch is located on the control console operating panel.
5.12 Conclusion The CU ZPR cooling system is well designed.
It provides for demineralization of the bulk water and protects the utility lines from contamination by use of check valves and reverse head.
The system also is equipped with a 6-in. scram dump valve, which can empty the water from the reactor tank in approximately 60 sec in case of an emergency.
The system also providas accurate and timely information to the ZPR operator by use of temperature, conductivity, and liquid level sensors.
Based on design, component quality, workmanship, maintenance, and general engi-neering considerations, the staff concludes that the CU ZPR cooling system is adequate to provide for reliable and safe operation of the ZPR for the duration of the licensing period.
i Cornell University ZPR SER 5-4
I Reactor Pneumatic Tank Valve
>4Gote volve i
MCheck Volve F
t 4" Overflow Pump Line o
ll Not to Seele
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r To 3" Fill Trigo Line J
4" Temperature }
j Dump Volve Source
/g j
Shield
//
6" Scram Dump Tonk
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o 0l$,
fq/g<->4 Valve l}l. Deionized
/
House 4, Normal Wo3er Dump Valve ZPR T
Mohe-up "I
duLimy ju fb Agitator Overflow Sump,
o I
l h'ener Storage Tonk j
wi A
T.mpe,otur ll
,12 I"
I Sensor i
Mixed Bed 2
l To Floot Type I
DeloMzer l
o Liquid Level 3=
Reactor o
Transmitter p,,,,,
Equipment '
I Cell Room s.
cc,,on e
T St,o,ner Filter ~~L "
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1:
2 5
1:=
{-
2,
- 2" s, 1 Weste Water
~
Water Reprocessing rom House TrigoT TWater i
Figure 5.1 ZPR water processing flow diagram Cornell University ZPR SER 5-5
\\
\\
6 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES The engineered safety features associated with the CU ZPR consist of the reac-tor cell and the cell isolation capabilities of the building heating and venti-lation system.
7 6.1 Zero-Power-Reactor Cell The concrete cell, in which all parts of the ZPR other than the control console are located, constitutes the biological shield for the reactor.
So that the cell may be isolated from the rest of the building, when and if desired, all pipe and conduit penetrations of the cell wall are sealed, the access plugs and personnel door are gasketed, and the inlet and exhaust ducts of the cell venti-lating system can be closed off by solenoid-operated valves.
The cell is separated from the control room by a labyrinth.
Entrance to this labyrinth is through a gasketed and interlocked door.
A gasketed and stepped 3-ft by 4-ft roof plug is also in this labyrinth.
The cell itself 1s approxi-mately 12 ft by 26 ft and is divided into two areas.
The core tank is located in the area nearest the entrance.
Tne floor in this area is a steel plate supported on "I" beams connected to the walls.
In the southwest corner of this cell is a ladder that allows access to the ZPR cell pit.
The pit is about 13 ft 6 in. square and is about 20 ft deep.
The reactor and related equipment occupy a large portion of the pit volume.
Directly over the core is a stepped and segmented cylindrical plug.
This plug is interlocked electrically with the labyrinth plug and cell entrance door.
The second part of this cell is designated as the fuel and grid plate storage area.
The spare fuel and unused grid plates are kept in this area.
The entire cell is monitored by a Geiger-type radiation alarm system that can operate from an emergency battery supply.
The alarm is disarmed while the core is opera-ting.
Otherwise, it serves as a criticality alarm for the cell.
6.2 Reactor Building Heating and Ventilation System The reactor area is air conditioned for comfort and temperature control.
This system maintains an upper limit for humidity in the bay.
Heating is provided by hot water reheating coils located in the duct system of the air conditioner.
Hot water radiators of the enclosed, finned-tube type also are used.
Approxi-mately 15% fresh air makeup is provided by the ventilation system and exhaust ducts with manually operated valves to maintain atmospheric pressure.
Heating for the upper floors of the office and laboratory wing of the building is provided by hot water radiators.
The basement of the wing is provided with forced-air ventilation combined with hot water heating units.
There is no air conditioning for this portion of the building, except for an air conditioning
)
unit located in the counting room.
An exhaust fan is provided in the classroom.
When water is brought above the partial fill point of the ZPR, all airflow in the cell is shut off by pneumatically operated fail-safe valves.
This ensures Cornell University ZPR SER 6-1
1 that, if a release of radioactivity should occur, there will be a relatively high degree of containment in the cell.
The cell ventilation control system is designed so that (1) when the core tank moderator level is raised to the bottom of the fuel, the cell inlet and exhaust ventilation valves automatically close and (2) when the moderator level drops below the bottom of the fuel, the ventilation valves remain closed until the operator activates a switch located on the control console.
These provisions ensure that-the cell ventilation valves do not open automatically in the event of an accident.
6.3 Contamination Control Features The building design has a number of features that are especially designed to facilitate control of any release of radioactive material resulting from either normal or accident conditions.
The experiments are carried out under standard laboratory procedures for han-dling radioactive material.
Hoods with absolute filters are provided in the "D
chemistry and ZPR laboratories for use in experimental operations in which air-borne radioactivity might be released, and covered drums in the chemistry lab-oratory and elsewhere are used for collection of any resulting active liquid wastes.
Separate covered drums for collection of swipes, contaminated glass-ware, and other solid wastes also are furnished.
Disposal of the drums follows government and University regulations.
The neutron flux in the ZPR core can produce radioactivity in the water and in the small amounts of air within the core (specifically, 16N in the water, 41Ar in the air, and miscellaneous activities in any corrosion products or foreign matter in the water).
Control of the 16N docs not require special measures because its short half-life (7.1 sec) guarantees its decay to negligible levels before personnel can come into contact with it.
Control of the 4 tar, which has a half-life of 109 min, is achieved by isolating the ZPR cell by closing all ventilation valves and personnel access doors.
Control of activated impurities is achieved by two measures:
(1) the water admitted to the core is deminer-alized to keep the concentration of activatable impurities as low as possible and (2) the same purification system is used to remove those impurities that are activated.
To provide control of waterborne activity from spills, all drains in the ZPR cell, incluaing floor drains, empty into a sump in the TRIGA reactor equipment room where the activity can be monitored (as discussed in Section 11.2.2).
6.4 Conclusion The engineered safety features for the ZPR are designed primarily to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidental radioactive spills and/or gaseous releases.
The ventilation system and reactor isolation system, when operated in c<, junction with strict procedures, appear to be capable of coping with any credible scenario under normal and accident conditions.
Therefore, the staff concludes that the engineered safety features are adequate to ensure safe operations for the period of the license renewal.
\\
Cornell University ZPR SER 6-2 j
I I
I 4
7 CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM The various reactor instruments and control components are interconnected to provide remote operation of the reactor in the ZPR cell from the console in the control room.
An electromechanical interlock system is provided to ensure I
a startup procedure in accordance with sound operating practices developed for zero power reactors in use by other facilities.
To ensure versatility and
)
safety, a key bypass system is provided.
Not only are these keys administra-tively controlled, but all bypass conditions are displayed prominently on the console.
There is a safety system in addition to the interlock system.
This safety system is linked to the neutron monitoring instruments, temperature sensing devices, and interlock system, so that the reactor will be automati-cally shut down if a potential hazard exists.
7.1 Control Rod Drives and Control Rod Assemblies f
Reactor control is achieved primarily by three control rod clusters that are positioned vertically within the fuel lattice by remotely operated electro-I mechanical cable-type drives.
Three of the four control rod clusters must be operable for the reactor to be able to start up.
Each control rod cluster con-sists of three 9-ft-4-in.-long, 0.666-in.-diameter control rods.
The bottom half of each control element contains between 2,240.0 and 2,353.5 g of UO 2 i
fuel.
The top half of the control element is filled with B C as a neutron I
4 poison material.
l The control rods are joined at the top by an aluminum adapter that ensures the proper spacing of the control rods for a specific core water-to-fuel ratio.
l Adapters for water-to-fuel ratios of 1:1,1.5:1, 2:1, 3:1, and 4:1 are provided.
The control rods are guided within the core by vacant fuel element holes in the upper and lower grid plates.
The control rod cluster is coupled to the control rod drive cable by a socket-type quick-disconnect fitting.
The control rod drives are mounted on an overhead chain-operated support carriage.
The electrical portion of the drive consists of position-indicating motor-control and magnetic-clutch circuitry.
The mechanical portion consists of the dashpot, drive box, and cable hardware.
Both digital and meter position-indicating systems are provided.
The digital section consists of a four-digit digicon counter electrically connected to four display tubes mounted on the control console.
The meter section consists of a 10-turn potentiometer operated on the cable side of the magnetic clutch.
Thus, the control rod cluster position is indi-cated at all times during normal operation and during a reactor scram.
The potentiometer, in conjunction with a direct voltage source, transmits a signal to a console-mounted 4-1/2-in. dc voltmeter that is calibrated in inches.
The drive motor is a 1/80 hp, reversible, single phase, 115-V, 60-cycle motor controlled by a lever-operated switch that is located on the console control panel.
The switch is designed with a spring-return action to the neutral posi-tion from the " withdraw" position and a detent action in the " insert" position.
Cornell University ZPR SER 7-1
The magnetic clutch is energized by direct current, which is controlled by the reactor scram bus interlock system.
The magnetic clutch is energized under normal reactor operating conditions, thereby securing the control rod cluster cable.
Any scram condition will interrupt the energizing current.
The mag-netic clutch then will release the cable, allowing the control rod cluster to drop by gravity into the fuel lattice.
The magnetic clutch also is controlled at the console by an alternate-action pushbutton switch containing ON and 0FF indicator lights.
The dashpot contains limit switches for prevention of overdrive in either direction and for operating relays and indicating lights when the control rod cluster is in the UP limit, DOWN limit, and C0CK positions.
The following is a brief list of specifications:
i (1) control rod cluster stroke:
55 in.
(2) time between receipt of a scram signal and initial control rod cluster movement:
140 msec maximum (3) maximum time for scram cycle:
1 sec (4) steady-state speed:
19 to 20 in./ min (5) deceleration:
10 g 7.2 Source and Source Drive Control A 1-Ci PuBe neutron source is positioned near the bottom of the fuel lattice for reactor startup.
The unit also serves as a check source for the neutron-sensitive channels.
The position of the neutron source is controlled by a remotely operated electromechanical cable-type drive.
The drive unit is secured to an aluminum support that is welded to the top of the dump storage tank.
The electrical portion of the drive consists of position-indicating and motor-control circuitry.
The mechanical portion consists of the source guide tube, gear box, and a cable with source holder.
Position indication is obtained by a torque transmitter operated by a drive gear box.
The torque transmitter is coupled electrically to a torque receiver-indicator dial that is mounted on the control console.
The drive motor is a reversible, single phase,15-V, 50-W ac motor that is The capable of driving the source up or down at a speed of 1 in. per second.
motor is controlled by two lever-operated switches.
One switch is mounted on the control console, and the other is mounted locally near the source drive.
The console-mounted switch controls the source between the upper power limit and the source STORE position.
The local switch controls the source between the STORE position and the OUT position.
From the OUT position the source can be removed and smear tested for possible leakage.
7.3 Control Rod Withdrawal System The control rods are withdrawn remotely from the console by bat-handled toggle switches.
Three positions are confirmed by lighted display:
DOWN, COCK, and Cornell University ZPR SER 7-2
t l
UP.
There are two continuously reading indicators--digital and meter.
Startup safety and control are enhanced by the following conditions, which must be satisfied (or bypassed with a special key) before control rod withdrawal.
(1) The core template must be on.
(2) The source must be in the startup position (zero dial reading) or the neutron flux must be up.
(3) With the reactor tank water level below full, a minimum of two control I
rods must be at insert limit.
7.4 Reactor Tank Fill Control System The water moderatcr level is controlled remotely from the console by a bat-handled toggle s'eitch.
Three positions are confirmed by lighted display:
EMPTY, PARTIAL, and UP.
A continuous display of water level is provided by a Selsyn meter.
Water is pumped into the reactor tank from the dump storage tank.
The pump motor is controlled by a momentary-action lever-operated switch located on the control console.
To ensure limited reactivity rate insertion, a valve that can throttle the water inlet flow is located in the fill line.
The following conditions must be satisfied before the pump motor can be energized.
(1) The scram relay must be reset.
(2) The reactor tank cannot be filled above the partial level without the
" reactor tank fill" key switch on and the display indicating READY.
(3) One rod must be at insert limit and two rods must be cocked.
(This condition can be bypassed.)
- 7. 5 Heater Control System The temperature of the reactor moderator can be adjusted by a steam-to-water heat exchanger installed in the dump storage tank.
Steam is applied from the central campus system.
The unit is equipped with an adjustable thermostat.
Steam to the heat exchanger is controlled by a solenoid valve, which in turn is controlled by an alternate-action push switch containing ON and 0FF indicator lights.
This switch is located on the control console operating panel.
7.6 Sump Pump Control System The sump pump, located at the lowest point in the pit, is controlled by an alternate-action pushbutton switch connected in series with a float-switch that opens on low sump level.
The sump level is indicated on the control console operating panel by a vertical scale meter that is equipped with high-level alarm contacts.
A buzzer is ener-gized by these contacts, thereby alerting the reactor operator when the sump level has reached a preset high limit.
Sump pump ON and 0FF indicator lights are provided on the console.
Cornell University ZPR SER 7-3
i i
i 7.7 Reactor Dump Valve Control System i
Three dump valves that open in the event of a scram conditiois are provided.
]
Each valve is maintained closed by air pressure, which is controlled by an electromagnetic solenoid.
To open the valve, the solenoid is de-energized, j
allowing the air pressure to drop to zero.
The valve then is forced open by a builtin compression spring.
The function of each valve is described below.
7.7.1 Temperature Dump Valve The 4-in. temperature dump valve functions primarily to increase the number of independent water dump lines to three, to ensure a final shutdown mechanism by i
water dump.
This valve was originally connected directly to the core thermo-couple only, hence its name.
The water level is adjusted by this valve, which j
is controlled by the " water control" toggle switch and also by a pushbutton switch, both of which are located on the control panel of the console.
7.7.2 Partial Dump Valve T'3 4-in. partial dump valve is placed in a water line that terminates as a standpipe, the top of which is below the horizontal center of the core.
The l
water level is maintained at the top of this standpipe when the valve is open.
This valve is controlled by a pushbutton switch located on the control console 1
j and can be closed only when the " reactor tank fill" key switch is on.
i 7.7.3 Main Dump Valve The 6-in. main dump valve provides a means for dumping the reactor moderator in a short time (approximately 50 sec).
This valve is controlled by a pushbutton i
switch located on the control console and can be closed only if two rods are cocked and two rods are at insert limit.
7.8 Instrumentation The reactor instrumentation provides adequate information for determining the behavior of the reactor during any phase of operation and applies this informa-tion, through suitable circuitry, to control the reactor or scram it as neces-sary.
This instrumentation is mounted in the control console, which also contains the necessary reactor control switches and indicator lights on the control panel.
In addition, four strip-chart recorders are provided to record the reactor operating history.
A television monitor and intercom system are available in the console to facilitate communication between the operator and the reactor cell.
7.8.1 Startup Channel The startup channel is used for monitoring neutron source multiplication during critical experiments and reactor startup.
The following instruments are used:
(1) BF counter 3
(2) preamplifier (3) linear amplifier with pulse-height discriminator Cornell University ZPR SER 7-4
I l
(4) log count-rate meter with high voltage supply (5) scaler.
r 7.8.2 Log' Neutron Level and Period Channel
- This channel provides a means for measuring and recording the neutron level over a single range of 7 decades. -The reactor period covered is from -30 see to +3 sec.
Short period ana high-flux scram trips are provided.
The following instruments are used:
f (1) electrically compensated ion chamber j/
(2) ion ct) amber voltage supply.
f p
(3) linear micro-microammeter (4) strip-chart recorder 7.8.3 Linear Neutron Level Channel This channel provides a means for measuring and recording the neutron level 1
over 8-1/3 decades in 20 overlapping ranges.
An upscale-flux scram trip on any scale is supplied.
The following instruments are used:
(1) electrically compensated ion chamber (2) ion chamber voltage supply (3) linear micro-microammeter (4) strip-chart recorder 7.8.4 Two Log Safety Channels Each channel provides a means for measuring the neutron level over a single range of 6 decades.
One of the safety channels is considered a wired spare.
A high-neutron-level scram trip is supplied by each channel.
The following instruments are used for each channel:
(1) uncompensated ion chamber (2) ion chamber voltage supply (3) log micro-microammeter 7.8.5 Two Linear Flux Channels The primary function of these two channels is to provide a means of obtaining neutron flux information required to carry out reactor physics experiments and routine critical experiments.
The following instruments are used for each channel:
(1) BF counter 3
(2) preamplifier (3) linear amplifier with pulse-height discriminator (4) linear count-rate meter (5) high-voltage supply Cornell University ZPR SER 7-5
(
7.8.6 Remote Area Radiation Monitoring System Remote gamma-ray detectors are located in the ZPR cell and the ZPR control room l
with ranges of 0.1 mR per hour to 100 R per hour and 0.01 mR per hour to 10 R
(
per hour, respectively.
The following instrumentation is used:
(1) two remote Geiger-type gamma radiation probes (2) two station indicators and power units 7.8.7 Reactor Water Temperature Monitoring System Temperature sensing elements are located in the dump storage tank and the reac-q tor tank.
The outputs from both sensing elements are controlled by a lever-y operated switch mounted on the control console.
The switch is spring-returned to the reactor tank temperature sensing element.
The temperature range covered l
is 16 to 150 C.
A high-temperature scram trip is provided.
The following instruments are used:
(1) two type "J" thermocouples (2) lever-operated control switch (3) millivolt-to-current transducer (4) dial-type precision indicator (5) high-limit control relay 7.8.8 Reactor Tank Water Level Monitor A float-type water level indicator is used.
The float mechanism drives a synchrotransmitter that is coupled electrically to a synchroreceiver indicator mounted in the control console.
7.8.9 Dump Storage Tank Water Level Monitor This unit is similar to the reactor tank water level monitor.
The float mech-anism is located in the dump storage tank.
- 7. b.10 Annunciator A 15 point annunciator system, located on the control console, provides the reactor operator with a visible and audible signal in the event of any scram condition outlined in Table 7.1.
This system consists of one flasher relay, one horn, one engraved lucite-covered light box for each annunciator point, and switches mounted on the con-trol panel for alarm silence, alarm reset, and alarm test.
The operation of the system depends on the receipt of a scram signal, which causes the horn to sound and the bulb in the light box to flash, clearly indicating the current scram condition.
After the scram condition is noted, the " alarm silence" pushbutton switch may
(
be pressed, thereby silencing the horn and causing the flashing light to remain steady.
Only after the scram condition has been corrected can the annunciator be reset by pressing the " alarm reset" pushbutton.
The system may be tested at any time by pressing the " alarm test" pushbutton.
3 Cornell University ZPR SER 7-6
1
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7.8.11 Strip-Chart Recorders i
.T history of the reactor behavior is recorded and continuously displayed by four strip-chart recorders mounted on the control console.
The recorders are the potentiometer type.
Two of the recorders are connected individually to l
the log-neutron-level channel and the linear-neutron-level channel.
The other two are used to record other data, for example, count rates.
l 7.8.12 Television and Intercom Systems A television camera is located in the cell so that one may monitor the behavior of the core during operations.
An intercom channel also may be on during operations.
These channels can supply the operator with information supple-mentary to information gained by other telemetering devices.
They also facili-tate communication between operator and personnel in the cell who may be per-forming core changes during shutdown.
7.8.13 Portable Automatic Data Printout System This system provides a means for the accurate and rapid handling of data received from three pulse channels.
The system consists of the following instruments mounted on a dolly with wheels:
(1) digital printer (2) two scalers with printout features (3) two timers i
(4) scanner (5) control panel 7.9 Interlock and Bypass Panel There is an interlock system to ensure a uniform and safe startup sequence and a mechanically automatic safeguards control.
This interlock system incorporates signals from various instruments and microswitches to display, through relays, 4
whether an unsafe, potentially unsafe, or safe condition exists.
The sequential operation required by the interlock system to bring the core to supercritical above the source range is:
(1) template on, (2) cell door closed, (3) source up, (4) rods cocked, (5) water up, and (6) flux up.
This interlock system prohibits or discourages the following sustained conditions:
(1) cell door open and safety instruments off (2) flux up and cell door open (3) water above partial and cell door open (cannot be bypassed)
(4) rods not cocked, water partial, and cell door open To ensure maintenance operation and the experimental versatility that is requisite to a zero power reactor research program, a key bypass system is used.
This bypass system precludes any necessity of using "jumpe'r" connections.
When no bypasses are used, there are, in addition to the sequential operation listed above, two more interlocked conditions; these are (1) the source must be in the " store" position when the cell door is open and (2) the rods must be l
" cocked" with the water at " partial" when the cell door is open.
However, with the use of appropriate bypass keys, any part of the startup sequence and the two conditions mentioned immediately above can be negated.
Cornell University ZPR SER 7-7
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5 Two more key switches appear on the bypass panel.
These are the " console power" and " reactor tank fill" keys.
The " console power" key turns on the vol-tage regulator, which supplies most of the instruments with power as shown in Table 7.2.
7.10 Scram System j
i A reactor scram is achieved by causing the control rods to drop into the core by gravity and by dumping the water moderator.
All scram conditions are dis-played on the annunciator and must be reset manually at the console.
The scram conditions are listed in Table 7.1.
7.11 Radiation Hazard Alarm System Whenever a radiation hazard may endanger the ZPR operating personnel, an alarm is sounded by a bell located over the ZPR cell door.
The alarm is sounded on the following conditions:
(1) cell door open and console instrument power off (2) cell radiation high, cell door closed, and console instrument power off (3) control room radiation high 7.12 Conclusion The control and instrumentation system at the CU ZPR facility is well designed and maintained. The quality of workmanship and of individual components ap-pears to be high.
Overall, the system is redundant, well protected from spu-rious noise and interference, and well documented by drawings.
Both nuclear and process parameters are well monitored.
The control and instrumentation system at the CU ZPR facility is closely inte-grated with the TRIGA control cetem; as such, it makes use of-well-established technology and components.
This fact, in addition to the factors outlined above and in Section 7 of the Cornell TRIGA SER (NUREG-0984, August 1983),
leads the staff to conclude that the CU ZPR instrumentation and control is adequate to ensure safe reactor operations for the duration of the license period.
I Cornell University ZPR SER 7-8
l Table 7.1 ZPR scram conditions Conditions Detector Unit Initiating Action Safety channel Ion chamber Log micro-microammeter no. 1 no. 1 high*
f Safety channel Ion chamber Log micro-micreammeter no. 2 no. 2 high*
Linear flux high Ion chamber Linear micro-microammeter Log flux high Ion charnber Log N amplifier Short period Ion chamber Period amplifier low chamber supply Voltmeter Relay Low air pressure Pressure gauge Microswitch Water temperature high Thermocouple Electronic relay Manual scram Pushbutton switch Pushbutton switch Safety instruments not on Relay Regulated power supply Door open, flux up Ion chamber Long N recorder Door open, source up Microswitch Microswitch Door open, water partial Float Microswitch relay rods not cocked Door open, water above Float Microswitch partial
- 0ne of these channels is considered a wired spare.
Cornell University ZPR SER 7-9
3 Table 7.2 Interlock and bypass panel display Circuit Designation Condition Display Effect Template on No template None Rods cannot be withdrawn Template on Sat Normal startup sequence is valid Key bypassed Bypass The template microswitch is shunted Cell door Door or roof plugs open None Rods cannot be withdrawn Door and roof plugs Sat Normal startup sequence closed is valid Keys bypassed Bypass Some of the microswitch contacts on the roof plugs and door are shunted Source up Source not up None Two rods cannot be cocked Source up Sat Normal startup sequence is valid Key bypassed Bypass The up limit microswitch is shunted Rods cocked Two rods not at mid-None Water cannot be pumped to point of their travel the core tank and other rods not down Two rods at midpoint Sat Normal startup sequence of their travel and is valid other rods down Key bypassed Bypass Water can be pumped into the core tank Water up Water not at upper Sat Normal startup sequence limit is valid Key bypassed Bypass Water can be added Flux up Flux below preset None Rods cannot be withdrawn limit on log recorder unless source is up Log flux above its low Sat Reactor is above source limit multiplication subcritical range Cornell University ZPR SER 7-10
Table 7.2 (Continued) circuit Designation Condition Display Effect Flux up Key bypassed Bypass Rods can be withdrawn in (continued) low flux range without source multiplication l
Console power Main console circuit None No power to any console breaker off instruments Main console circuit Off No voltage to instruments breaker on that use regulated voltage Key on On Voltage available to all reactor console instruments Reactor tank Key off Safe Partial dump line open fill Key on Ready Partial dump line can be closed Cornell University ZPR SER 7-11
8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM 8.1 Facility Electrical Power Electrical power for building lighting and equipment is 120 or 208 V, three phase, four wire, 60 cps.
The total estimated power requirement for the facility is 300 kVA.
The main power control panel is located in the electrical utility room, v th subpanels located as required in other areas.
Fluorescent i
lighting is used throughout the building except in the counting room and the ZPR cell, where incandescent lighting is used, and in the high-ceilinged part of the reactor bay, where mercury vapor lights are installed.
In addition, mercury vapor lights are provided in the gamma irradiation cell.
Because the ZPR will scram in case of a power interruption and the decay heat generated in the core after scram is minimal, no emergency power is required; however, battery-operated emergency power is supplied for lighting and for radiation monitoring equipment in event of a power outage.
8.2 ZPR Electrical Power i
Regulated power is supplied in CU ZPR control console instrumentation by a 2.5-kVA automatic voltage regulator housed in a separate cabinet.
An emer-gency power supply operated by a 12-V storage battery, which is connected to the radiation area monitoring equipment is in the same cabinet.
In the event of a power line failure, the output of the battery is converted automatically to line voltage at line frequency and supplied to the radiation monitoring equipment.
Under normal conditions the battery is maintained fully charged by a trickle charger.
8.3 Conclusion The electrical system at the CU ZPR facility is a standard and well-accepted electrical supply system designed and constructed to specifications similar to those at other research reactor facilities.
The system does not employ any exotic components or technology.
The level of system maintenance is very high, and the system is operated by strict procedures.
Configuration control of the system is maintained by drawing and logbook.
These factors, when con-sidered with the fact that both the TRIGA and ZPR reactor cores will scram in the event of power failure, lead the staff to conclude that the electrical power system is adequate for safe operation of the ZPR for the time period of i
the license renewal.
i Cornell University ZPR SER 8-1
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4 9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9.1 Fire Protection System Fire protection is provided by external fire hydrants and by portable extin-guishers located throughout the facility.
An automatic internal fire alarm system with heat-sensing elements in nearly every room is tied into the main university system.
A builtin CO gas extinguishing system is part of the 2
gamma cell and may be operated from the cold work area.
9.2 Communications Systems Several communications systems are installed in the facility.
A public address system is provided with microphones in the TRIGA control room and in the supervisor's office.
An internal dial-telephone system with stations suitably located throughout the building is provided.
The ZPR control room, cell, and laboratory are interconnected by a separate intercommunication sy's tem.
Standard commercial telephone service connects into the main univer-sity systea.
9.3 Compressed Air System The compressed air system consists of a compressor located in the mechanical utility room and a series of pipes, regulators, and valves to provide com-pressed air to the reactor facility.
9.4 Fuel Handling Historically the fuel in the ZPR has had such a low fission product inventory that radiation readings on the surface of the fuel cladding have been barely measurable.
Therefore,.J'l handling has been conducted without the use of any special equipment other than standard protective clothing.
9.5 Conclusion The auxiliary systems in use at the CU ZPR facility are designed and used to assist in safe reactor operations.
The equipment and fuel-handling systems are designed to enable personnel to service the reactors with a minimum of exposure to radiation and other hazards.
The handling and shipping casks for radioactive materials meet all existing regulatory requirements.
Design, work-manship, component quality, and maintenance levels appear to be very high in all the auxiliary systems.
All the above factors, coupled with the administrative controls used in opera-tions at the CU ZPR facility, lead the staff to conclude that the auxiliary systems are adequate to support both reactors in a safe and reliable manner.
i i
Cornell University ZPR SER 9-1
10 EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAMS The ZPR is used almost exclusively as a teaching tool by the Nuclear Science and Engineering Program of the College of Engineering.
Several reactor param-eters are determined experimentally by students under the direct supervision of knowledgeable facility personnel.
10.1 Experimental Features i
Easy rearrangement of the fuel configuration and easy insertion and removal of foils and other measuring devices is facilitated by limiting the power level, thereby avoiding handling problems arising from buildup of fission products and activation of structural members.
Current usage is about 100-W hours per year of operation, including on the order of 25 startups.
The fuel elements can be arranged with their lengths vertical in various lat-tices in an open tank of demineralized water.
The elements are positioned by two suitably bored grid plates, the upper one of which carries the entire weight of the elements.
The fuel elements are aluminum tubes filled with sin-tered uranium dioxide pellets; there are 740 normal elements with welded end plugs and 60 elements from which watertight end plugs can be removed so that foils and so on.can be inserted and removed.
A variety of extra pellets with holes and other special shapes are for experimental use.
Other variable features of the ZPR include five sets of grid plates to provide water-fuel ratios of 1,1.5, 2, 3, and 4 and a steam-operated heat exchanger in the storage tank for adjusting / controlling moderator temperature.
10.2 Experimental Review Although the CU ZPR is used only for proven step-by-step student experimental studies, these activities are reviewed by the Ward Laboratory Safety Committee
~
I to ensure that the reactor facility is operated and used in a manner within the terms of license and consistent with the safety of the public and of personnel within the laboratory.
10.3 Conclusion t
The staff concludes that the design of the experimental features, combined with the detailed procedures applied to all experimental studies, is adequate to ensure that experiments are unlikely to release significant quantities of radioactive materials to the environment and are unlikely to cause damage to the reactor system.
Therefore, the staff has determined that reasonable provisions have been made so that the experimental programs and facilities do not pose a significant risk of damage to the assembly or of uncontrolled release of radioactive materials.
Cornell University ZPR SER 10-1
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11 RADI0 ACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT The CU ZPR and the CU TRIGA reactor are housed in the same building, and any radioactive wastes generated by their use are combined.
Therefore, this chap-ter addresses the management of radioactive waste resulting from the operations of both reactors.
The major radioactive gas expected from normal operations at the ZPR is 41Ar.
l Calculations indicate that concentrations in the ZPR room will be about 1/100 of 10 CFR 20, Appendix B, Table I, limits.
A small volume of radioactive solid water, primarily resins, is generated by reactor operations, and some addi-tional solid waste is produced by the associated research programs.
No radio-active liquid wastes are generated directly by normal reactor operations.
How-ever, liquid radioactive waste is produced by the regeneration of the resin bed in the water demineralizer system.
Additional small amounts of radioactive f
liquid waste are developed as a result of several of the reactor-based research activities.
)
11.1 ALARA Commitment The Ward Laboratory Safety Committee instructs all personnel to develop proce-dures to maintain the generation and possible release of radioactive waste materials to a level as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA).
Examples of adherence to the ALARA commitment include (1) the installation of a check valve in the CU TRIGA reactor pneumatic transfer line to minimize un-necessary 41Ar releases and (2) the change in the ZPR cell ventilation control system to require manual restart after reactor operations.
11.2 Waste Generation and Handling Procedures 11.2.1 Solid Waste Solid waste generated as a result of reactor operations consists primarily of ion exchange resins and filters, potentially contaminated prper and gloves, and occasional small, activated components.
Some of the reactor-based research results in the generation of solid low-level radioactive waste in the form of contaminated paper, gloves, and glassware.
This solid waste generation typi-cally has contained a few millicuries of radionuclides per year.
Solid waste is collected by the CU health phy. cs staf f, combined with other university generated waste, and held temporarily before being packaged and shipped to an approved disposal site in accordance with applicable regulations.
11.2.2 Liquid Waste Normal operations of these reactors produce no radioactive liquid waste.
liow-ever, some of the research activities are capable of generating limited volumes of such waste, and the sinks in the two laboratories are connected to portable, disposable drums.
i Cornell University ZPR SER 11-1
All drains in both reactor rooms lead to the sump in the reactor facility equipment room.
Sump contents can be pumped to a 2,000 gal waste storage tank for decay if significant radioactivity is detected.
The largest volume of potentially contaminated water is produced by the regen-eration of the dimineralizer.
This periodically generated effluent also can be discharged to the 2,000 gal waste storage tank.
Before any releases to the sanitary sewer system, representative samples are collected from the sump or from the storage tank and analyzed by standard techniques.
If the concentra-tions of radioactive materials in the water are less than the guideline values of 10 CFR 20.303, the contents are discharged directly to the sewer.
If the activities exceed the values of 10 CFR 20.303, additional dilution water may be added to reach acceptable concentrations.
11.2.3 Airborne Waste The principal airborne waste is composed of gaseous 4 tar and neutron-activated dust particulates.
N generation is negligible because of the low flux level 16 in the ZPR.
No fission products escape from the fuel cladding during normal operations.
Other radioactive airborne emissions are produced principally by the neutron irradiation of air and airborne particulate materials in the TRIGA reactor thermal column and beam ports.
This air is swept constantly from the beam room and discharged to the environment through the Ward Laboratory exhaust stack where it is diluted with air from the ventilation system at the rate of 2,200 f t3 per minute.
A stack monitoring system measures the gaseous concentrations in the effluent.
During normal operations, no measurable radioactive particulates are released in the air effluents from this stack.
Cornell University personnel have mea-sured the release of 41Ar over the years with gas-sampling instruments cali-brated with known quantities of 41Ar..
During the years since the reactor was first licensed, CU has reported an average annual release of less than 0.2 Ci of 41Ar from both reactors.
The licensee's and the staff's evaluations each show that this amount of release would lead to exposures in unrestricted areas that are small fractions of the limits specified in 10 CFR 20.
In accordance with the ALARA principles, Cornell has committed itself in its Technical $peci-fications to several conditions that will minimize 4 tar ' production and subse-quent release.
11.3 Conclusions The staff concludes that the waste management activities of this reactor faci-lity have been conducted and are expected to continue to be conducted in a man-ner consistent with 10 CFR 20 and with the ALARA principles.
Among other guid-ance, the staff review has followed the methods of ANSI /ANS 15.11, "Radiologi-
-cal Control at Research Reactor Facilities," 1977.
Because 41Ar is the only potentially significant radionuclide released by the reactor to the environment during normal operations.
The staff has reviewed J
the histcry, current practice, and future expectations of the quantity and handling of 41Ar at the CU facility and concludes that the doses in unrestricted areas as a result of actual releases of 4 tar have been and are expected to remain a small percentage of the limits specified in 10 CFR 20 when averaged Furthermore, the staff's conservative computations of the dose over a year.
Cornell University ZPR SER 11-2 I
beyond the limits of Ward Laboratory give reasonable assurance that potential doses to the public as a result of 41 Ar would not be significant even if there were a major change in the operating schedule of the CU reactors.
4 Cornell University ZPR SER 11-3
12 RADIATION PROTECTION PROGRAM The CU ZPR and the CU TRICA are housed in the same building, and the radiation protection programs are a combined project.
Therefore, this chapter addresses the radiation protection policies and practices as they affect the operations of both reactors.
Cornell University has a structured radiation safety program with a health physics staff equipped with radiation detection instrumentation to determine, control, and document occupational radiation exposures at its reactor facility.
In addition, the reactor facility has monitors to identify both liquid and air-borne effluents at the points of release to comply with applicable guidelines.
12.1 ALARA Commitment As stated in Section 11.1, the Ward Laboratory Safety Committee has formally established _the policy that operations are to be conducted in a manner to keep all radiation exposures ALARA.
All proposed experiments and procedures at the reactor are reviewed for ways to minimize the potential exposures of personnel.
All unanticipated or unusual reactor-related exposures will be investigated by both the health physics and the operations staff to develop methods to prevent recurrences.
12.2 Health Physics Program 12.2.1 Health Physics Staffing The normal health physics staff at CU consists of two professionals and several technicians.
This staff provides radiation safety support to the entire uni-versity complex, including an accelerator and many radioisotope laboratories.
The routine health physics-type activities at the reactors are performed by the operations staff.
The formal health physics staff is available for consulta-tion and the head of the Environmental Health Department is a member of the Ward Laboratory Safety Committee.
The staff believes that the radiation safety support is adequate for the research efforts within this reactor facility.
12.2.2 Procedures Detailed written procedures have been prepared that address the radiation safety support that is expected to be provided to the routine operations of the university's research reactor facility.
These procedures identify the interac-tions between the operational and experimental personnel.
They also specify 1
numerous administrative limits or action points as well as appropriate responses and corrective action if these limits or action points are reached or exceeded.
Copies of these procedures are readily available to the operational and research staffs and to the administrative personnel.
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Cornell University ZPR SER 12-1
12.2.3 Instrumentation i
The University has acquired a variety of detecting and measuring instruments for monitoring potentially hazardous ionizing radiation.
The instrument cali-bration procedures and techniques ensure that any credible type of radiation and any significant intensities will be detected promptly and measured correctly.
12.2.4 Training All reactor-related personnel are given an indoctrination in radiation safety before they assume their work responsibilities.
Additional radiation safety instructions are provided to those who will be working directly with radiation or radioactive materials.
The training program is designed to identify the particular hazards of each specific type of work to be undertaken and methods to mitigate their consequences.
Retraining in radiation safety is provided as well.
As an example, all reactor operators are given an examination on health physics practices and procedures at least every 2 years.
The level of retrain-ing given is determined by the examination results.
12.3 Radiation Sources 12.3.1 Reactor Sources of radiation directly related to reactor operations include radiation from the reactor core, ion exchange columns, filters in the water cleanup sys-tems, and radioactive gases (primarily 41Ar).
The fission products are contained in the fuel's aluminum cladding.
Radiation exposures from the reactor cores are reduced to acceptable levels by water and concrete shielding.
The ion exchange resins and filters are changed routinely before high levels of radioactive materials have accumulated, thereby limiting personnel exposure.
Personnel exposure to the radiation from chemically inert 41Ar is limited by dilution and prompt removal of this gas from the reactor room and experimental areas and its discharge to the atmosphere, where it diffuses further before reaching occupied areas.
12.3 2 Extraneous Sources Sources of radiation that may be considered as incidental to the normal reactor operation but that are associated with reactor use include radioactive isotopes produced for research, activated components of experiments, and activated sam-ples or specimens.
Personnel exposure to radiation from intentionally produced ratioactive mate-rial as well as the required manipulation of activated experimental components is controlled by rigidly developed and reviewed operating procedures that use the normal protective measures of time, distance, and shielding.
Cornell University ZPR SER 12-2
12.4 Routine Monitoring 12.4.1 Fixed-Position Monitors The zero power reactor has a fixed position radiation monitor in the reactor cell and another in the zero power reactor control room.
The CU TRIGA reactor facility has two fixed position radiation monitors in the experimental area, a radiation monitor on the bridge above the reactor, and a radioactive gas moni-tor located near the top of the reactor.
All monitors have adjustable alarm set points and read out in the control room.
12.4.2 Experimental Support The health physics staff participates in experiment planning by reviewing all proposed procedures for methods of minimizing personnel exposures and limiting the generation of radioactive waste.
Approved procedures specify the type and degree of radiation safety support required by each activity.
12.5 Occupational Radiation Exposures 12.5.1 Personnel Monitoring Program The CU personnel monitoring program is described in its Radiation Safety Instructions.
To summarize the program, personnel exposures are measured by the use of film badges assigned to individuals who might be exposed to radia-tion.
In addition, non-self-reading pocket chambers are used, and instrument dose rate and time measurements are used to administrative 1y keep occupational exposures below the applicable limits in 10 CFR 20.
All visitors are provided with non-self-reading pocket chambers for monitoring purposes.
12.5.2 Personnel Exposures The annual exposure history for the last 5 years for CU is given in Table 12.1.
12.6 Effluent Monitoring 12.6.1 Airborne Effluents As discussed in Section ll, airborne effluents from the reactor facility con-sist principally of 41Ar.
The stack gas monitoring system measures the radioactive gases discharged from the entire reactor complex; the only identifiable radioactive gas is 41Ar.
The system consists of a Geiger-Mueller tube positioned inside of the stack. The instrumentation readout consists of a meter and a strip-chart recorder in the control room.
The detector count rate is proportional to the amount of radio-active gases in the stack and hence to the concentration in the air stream.
High concentrations and detector failure activate alarms in the control room.
This gaseous monitoring system has been calibrated by releasing a small, known quantity of 42Ar into a closed loop " mock-up" of the stack.
It now is checked annually with a known external gamma source.
1 Cornell University ZPR SER 12-3
)
12.6.2 Liquid Effluents The CU ZPR generates no radioactive liquid waste during routine operations.
However, leaks in the primary coolant system do have the potential for releases, and experimental activities associated with reactor usage also may generate radioactive liquids.
The major source (volume) of liquid waste is from regen-eration of the demineralizer system.
Any leaks from the ZPR facility will drain to the sump in the reactor equipment room that handles any leakage from either the ZPR or the TRIGA facilities.
The sump contents can be pumped to a 2,500 gal waste storage tank for decay should significant radioactivity be detected.
The periodically generated waste liquid produced by the regeneration of the demineralizer also can be collected in the waste storage tank.
Before any releases of potentially contaminated waters to the sanitary sewer system, representative samples are collected and analyzed by standard tech-niques.
If the concentrations of radioactive materials in the waste are less than the guideline values of 10 CFR 20.303, the liquids are discharged directly to the sewer.
12.7 Environmental Monitoring The program of sampling environmental air and water previously conducted by the Sanitary Engineering Department has been discontinued.
This program was ter-minated after s15 years of operations because of the lack of statistically valid positive findings as a result of the radioactivity readings being undis-tinguishable from normal background values.
12.8 Potential Dose Assessments Natural background radiation levels in the Ithaca area result in an exposure of about 100 mrems per year to each individual residing there.
At least an addi-tional 8% (approximately 8 mrems per year) will be received by those living in a brick or masonry structure.
Any medical diagnosis by X-ray examination will add to these natural background radiations, increasing the total accumulative annual exposure.
Conservative calculations by the staff based on the amount of 41Ar released during normal operations from the reactor facility stack predict a maximum annual dose of less than 1 mrem in the unrestricted areas.
12.9 Conclusion The staff's review of the radiation protection program at CU indicated that (1) the program is properly staffed and equipped (2) the reactor health physics staff has adequate authority and lines of communication (3) the procedures are integrated correctly into the research plans (4) surveys verify that operations and procedures achieve ALARA principles (5) effluent monitoring programs con-ducted by university personnel are adequate to promptly identify significant releases of radioactivity to predict maximum exposures to individuals in the unrestricted area.
Y Cornell University ZPR SER 12-4
On the basis of the above, the staff concludes that the CU radiation protection program is acceptatle, receives appropriate suppert from the university admin-istration, and procedures will continue to protect the health and safety of the public during routine reactor operations.
Table 12.1 Number of individuals in expcsure interval Number of individuals in each range Whole-body exposure range (rem) 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 No measurable exposure 25 18 19 21 25 Measurable exposure
> 0.1 0
2 0
1 1
< 0.1 0
0 0
0 0
Number of individuals monitored 25 20 19 22 26 Cornell University ZPR SER 12-5
13 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 13.1 Overall Organization Radiaticn safety at the Cornell University Ward Laboratory is subject to regu-lations of the NRC, the New York State Department of Public Health, and the Cornell University Radiation Safety Committee.
Governmental and university regulations, and the terms of the AEC-issued operating license form the frame-work within which administrative procedures, safety rules, operating proce-dures, and emergency procedures have been drawn up, and enforced, by the CU reactor personnel.
An organization chart showing the lines of responsibility and communication is given in Figure 13.1.
The individual with overall responsibility for radiation safety a'< the labora-tory is the Director of the Laboratory.
The CU Radiation Safety Committee has authority over all radiation safety mat-ters at the university.
It is independent of the Ward Laboratory organization and both regulates and inspects radiation activities over the entire campus, including the Ward Laboratory.
The individuals designated on the organization structure chart (Figure 13.1) as " Responsible Person on Duty" are the persons who have the direct responsi-bility for close-contact procedures and for immediate supervision of operations in progress.
These people are relied on to ensure tnat safety rules are actu-ally enforced, operating and emergency procedures are actually followed, and, in general, that hazardous or potentially hazardous activities are prevented.
Each area of responsibility has rules and procedures that were established initially by the Ward Laboratory Director and consequently approved by the CU Radiation Safety Committee.
In summary, the system for achieving radiation safety at Ward Laboratory con-sists of safety rules, operating procedures, and emergency procedures which implement the applicable governmental and university regulations; administra-tive procedures to assign responsibilities and to establish and modify rules and procedures; and a chain of individual responsibilities.
The ultimate re-liance is placed on personnel acting responsibly within a framework of rules and procedures.
Responsible persons on duty (Figure 13.1) are appointed by the Director of Ward Laboratory with the approval of the Department Director and of the CU Radiation Safety Committee.
Because of the wide variety of activities that take place in the laboratory and that may involve potential hazards to people or property, activities are grouped into the following areas of responsibility.
(1) TRIGA - operation of the CU TRIGA reactor including isotope production but not miniature lattice or exponential experiments Cornell University ZPR SER 13-1
9 (2) ZPR - operation of the zero power reactor lattice and exponential experi-ments and activities in the zero power reactor laboratory (3) Gamma cell - activities using the gamma irradiation cell, the set-up room, and the cold work area (4) Dynamitron - activities using the accelerator aid facilities (5) Radioactive sources and materials - activities. involving use of all por-table radioactive sources (especially the strong neutron sources in the subcritical reactor and the graphite sigma pile) and of radioactive materials used in tracer and similar experiments For each area of responsibility there is a separate person who is responsible for keeping the Director informed of the state of affairs and efficacy of safety measures in that area.
13.2 -Training Most of the training of reactor operators is accomplished by inhouse personnel.
The applicant's Operator Requalification Program has been reviewed, and the staff concludes that it meets applicable regulations (10 CFR 50.34(b)(8)).
13.3 Emergency Planning 10 CFR 50.54(q) and (r) require that a licensee authorized to possess and/or operate a research reactor shall follow and maintain in effect an emergency plan that meets the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50.
In 1979 the guid-ance available to licensees was contained in RG 2.6 (1978 for Comment Issue) and in ANS 15.16 (1978 Draft).
In 1980, new regulations were promulgated, and licensees were advised that revised guidance would be forthcoming.
Thus, re-vised ANS 15.16 (November 29, 1981 Draft) and RG 2.6 (March 1982 For Comment) were issued.
On May 6, 1982, an amendment to 10 CFR 50.54 was published in the Federal Register (47 FR 19512, May 6,1982) recommending these guides to licensees and establishing new submittal dated for emergency plans from all research reactor < licensees.
The deadline for submittal from a licensee in a class 2 MW was November 3, 1982.
The applicant made a timely transmittal of an emergency plan, thereby complying with existing appiicable regulations.
13.4 Physical Security Plan Cornell Universty has established and maintained a program designed to protect the reactor and its fuel and to ensure its secuMty.
The NRC staff has re-viewed the plan and visited the CU ZPR site.
The staff concludes that the plan, as amended, meets the requirements of 10 CFR 73.67 for special nuclear materials of low strategic significance.
CU's licensed authorization for reac-tor fuel falls within that category.
Both the Physical Security Plan and the staff's evaluation are withheld from public disclosure under 10 CFR 2.790(d)(1) and 10 CFR 9.5(a)(4).
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Cornell University ZPR SER 13-2 1
13.5 Conclusion On the basis of the above discussions, the staff concludes that the licensee has sufficient experience, management structure, and procedures to provide rea-sonable assurance that the reactor will be n;naged in a way that will cause no significant risk to the health and safety of the public.
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l Cornell University ZPR SER 13-3
o Board of Trustees 5
- I l
Ei President of j'
the University 1
3 I
l
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47 Vice President for Provost na Facilities and Business 3!
Operations I
1 vs Eo
- Director, University Radiation
- Dean, Life Safety Services Safety Committee College of Engineering
- Director, Nuclear Science and Engineering Program y
Ward Labo'ratory Safety Committee
- Director, Director of Ward Laboratory Radiation Safety I
Reactor Ilealth Physics Staff Supervisor I
I l
Responsible Pe rson L
l on Duty Analogous lines for other Areas Reactor f Responsibility Operator line of responsibility l
line of communication User Figure 13.1 Organizational structure for radiation protection
4 14 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS The ccnsequences of potential accidents in the CU ZPR are minimized by the re-latively low power levels at which the reactor is operated. Most experimental runs are performed at the 0.1-W 1evel, with occasional activation runs at 1 W.
Only once, for a radiation survey, was the reactor operated at the authorized maximum power level of 100 W.
Even at 100 W, the power level is a factor of 5,000 less than the authorized power of the CU TRIGA reactor, which is housed in the same building.
Because of the larger number of fuel elements in the ZPR, the power per element is further reduced by a factor of 2 to 5 compared with the TRIGA reactor, depending on the water-to-fuel volume fraction in the ZPR.
The low power levels and low use of the ZPR result in a very small accumulation of fission products during normal steady-state operations and a correspondingly low level of decay heat and radioactivity stored in the fuel elements.
There-fore, some accidents normally postulated for nonpower reactors, such as loss of pool water and handling of irradiated fuel, do not constitute a hazard in the CU ZPR.
In fact, the rapid removal of water is a normal shutdown mechanism in this reactor.
To pose a significant hazard, a ZPR accident must both generate and release a significant amount of fission products.
The licensee and the staff evaluated the potential accidents resulting from (1) natural phenomena, (2) mechanical rearrangement of fuel, and (3) reactivity insertion.
In no case is a release of fission products to the environment or reactor cell expected.
14.1 Natural Phenomena The licensee considered the potential effects of fires, windstorms, floods, and earthquakes on the CU ZPR and stated that hazards from these events are not significant.
As stated in Section 2, the staff agrees with those conclusions.
14.2 Mechanical Rearrangement of the Fuel This type of accident would involve some externally originated event that causes rearrangement of the fuel to a supercritical configuraton.
Merely dis-persing the fuel and breaching the cladding would not constitute a significant hazard because of the low fission product inventory accumulated in the fuel elements.
The fuel elements are positioned and protected by upper and lower aluminum grid plates that are supported by four aluminum columns.
The structural design of the core and core support structure was based on an 800 rod configuration of metallic uranium fuel.
As there is no overhead crane for fuel handling that may drop a heavy object onto the core and as there are no seismological events that could cause rearrangement of the core, the staff concludes that there is no credible mechanical rearrangement of the fuel would lead to an accident with more severe consequences than those analyzed in Section 14.3.
Cornell University ZPR SER 14-1
14.3 Reactivity Insertion Reactivity is inserted into the CU ZPR by either adding to the water moderator or withdrawing poison control rods.
The Technical Specifications require that during operation with a core loading capable of criticality, both water flow and control rod drive speeds shall be limited so the reactivity insertion rate at all times is less than 0.07$ per second.
At the rated fill pump speed, the water reactivity insertion rate is less than 0.07$ per second even with the control valve in its fully open position.
The control rod drives are geared so that at the rated drive motor speed the rods travel at a rate of 19 in. per minute.
Under this condition the maximum instantaneous reactivity insertion rate will remain less than 0.07$ per second as long as the total rod worth is below 5.755.
An interlock prevents rod withdrawal while the reactor tank is being filled or the withdrawal of more than one control rod at a time after the tank is full.
Finally, the Technical Specifications also limit the reactivity worth of unsecured experiments to less than 1.00$ to preclude an accidental superprompt transient.
14.3.1 Scenario The following two reactivity accidents were analyzed by the licensee and re-viewed by the staff:
(1) an instantaneous reactivity insertion (at delayed criticality) of 1.20$ equivalent to the failure of a maximum-worth unsecured experiment and its subsequent movement into its most reactive position while the reactor is operating on a 20 sec period and (2) a continued, unabated reac-tivity insertion at the maximum allowable rate of 0.07$ per second coincident with failure of the first two indicated automatic scram circuits.
In the first accident analyzed (instantaneous insertion of 1.20$), the licensee
~
assumed that only the 23sU Doppler coefficient contributed prompt reactivity feedback and estimated this effect to be 0.0018$ per centigrade degree.
The resulting calculated transient produced a total energy release of 27 MW seconds and peak fuel and cladding temperatures of 687 and 353 C, respectively.
The cladding stress would remain below its yield strength, and no damage to the fuel element or release of fission products would be expected.
The second accident (continued insertion of 0.07$ per second) was assumed to be initiated from the lowest attainable neutron background level (only spontaneous 238U fissions).
This assumption would produce the worst transient.
Under nor-mal circumstances the reactor operator would observe the extraneous reactivity insertion and take appropriate action to terminate the transient.
If not stop-ped by the operator, the linear power scram and the period scram would termin-ate the transient 8 sec and 10 sec, respectively, after delayed criticality.
Under the assumed accident scenario these scrams failed, and the transient is terminated by the log power scram 15.6 sec after delayed criticality.
A maxi-mum excess reactivity of 1.1$ is reached 15.8 sec af ter delayed criticality.
The maximum fuel and effective cladding temperatures would be 374 and 197 C, respectively, well below levels that would result in fuel element damage.
14.3.2 Assessment The staff believes that the reactivity insertion accidents postulated by the licensee are representative of the most severe transients that can credibly i
Cornell University ZPR SER 14-2
r occur at the CU ZPR.
The staff has reviewed the licensee's accident assump-tions and calculations and finds them reasonable and acceptable.
Therefore, the staff concludes that it is unlikely that a credible nuclear excursion in the CU ZPR would lead to fuel melting or cladding failure.
Thus, there is reasonable assurance that significant fission product activity will not be released to the environment as a result of a reactor reactivity transient.
14.4 Conclusion The staff has reviewed the credible transients and accicents for the CU ZPR.
On the basis of this review, none of the postulated accidents were found to release fission products to the environment.
Therefore, the staff concludes that there is reasonable assurance that operation of the CU ZPR for the 20 year license renewal period does not pose significant risk to the health and safety of the public.
1 4
Cornell University ZPR SER 14-3
15 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS The licensee's Technical Specifications evaluated in this licensing action de-fine certain features, characteristics, and conditions governing the continued operation of this facility.
These -ehnical Specifications are explicitly in-cluded in the renewal license as Appendix A.
Formats and contents acceptable to the NRC have been used in the development of these Technical Specifications, and the staff has reviewed them using the Draft Standard ANS 15.1 (September 1981) as a guide.
On the basis of its review, the staff concludes that normal plant operation within the limits of the Technical Specifications will not result in offsite radiation exposures in excess of 10 CFR 20 limits.
Furthermore, the limiting l
conditions for operation, surveillance requirements, and engineered safety fea-tures will limit the likelihood of malfunctions and mitigate the consequences to the public of of f-normal or accident events.
Cornell University ZPR SER 15-1
k i
16 FINANCIAL QUALIFICATIONS The CU ZPR is owned and operated by Cornell University in support of its role in education and research.
Therefore, the staff concludes that funds will be made available, as necessary, to support continued operations and eventually to shut down the facility and ;aaintain it in a condition that would constitute no risk to the public.
The licensee's financial status was reviewed and found to be acceptable in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.33(f).
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f Cornell University ZPR SER 16-1
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r 17 OTHER LICENSE CONSIDERATIONS 17.3 Prior Reactor Utilization Previous sections of this SER concluded that normal operation of the reactor causes insignificant risk of radiation exposure to the public and that only an off-normal or accident event could cause some exposure.
Even the worst case, hypothetical accident of instantaneous reactivity insertion would not lead to a dose to the the most exposed individual that is more than a small fraction of applicable guidelines or regulations (10 CFR 20).
In this section, the staff reviews the impact of prior operation of the faci-lity of the risk of radiation exposure to the public.
The two parameters in-volved are the likelihood of an accident and the consequences if an accident occurred.
Because the staff has concluded that the reactor was initially designed and constructed to be inherently safe, with additional engineered safety features, the staff also must consider whether operation will cause significant degrada-tion in these features.
Furthermore, because loss of integrity of fuel clad-ding is a condition that would potentially release fission products, the staff considered mechanisms that could increase the likelihood of failure of the cladding.
Possible mechanisms are (1) radiation degradation of cladding strength, (2) corrosion or erosion of the cladding leading to thinning or other weakening, (3) mechanical damage as a result of handling or experimental use, and (4) degradation of safety components or systems.
The staff's conclusions regarding these parameters, in the order in which they were identified above, are as follows:
(1) fhe low use of the ZPR and its low power make it highly unlikely that radiation will damage the cladding during the license renewal period of 20 years.
(2) Heat removal from the core is obtained by natural thermal convection, so the staff contludes that erosion effects as a result of high flow velocity will be negli ible.
High primary water purity is maintained by continuous 3
passage through the filter and demineralizer system that maintains pool water quality at a conductivity of 5 mmho-cm 1 With conductivity limited by the Technical Specifications to below 5 mmho-cm 1,
corrosion of the cladding is expected to be negligible, even over a total 40 year period.
(3) The fuel is handled as infrequently as possible, consistent with periodic surveillance.
Any indications of possible damage or degradation are in-vestigated immediately.
The only experiments that are placed near the core are insolated from tne fuel cladding by a water gap and at least one metal barrier.
Therefore, the staff concludes that loss of integrity of
)
1 cladding through damage does not constitute a significant risk to the public.
Cornell University ZPR SER 17-1
(4) University personnel perform regular preventive and corrective maintenance and replace components as necessary.
Nevertheless, there have been some malfunctions of equipment.
However, the staff review indicates that most of these ralfunctions have been random one-of-a-kind incidents, typical of even good quality electromechanical instrumentation.
There is no indica-tions of significant degradation of the instrumentation, and the staff further concludes that the preventive maintenance program would lead to adequate identification replacement before significant degradation occur-red.
Therefore, the staff concludes that there has been no apparent sig-nificant degradation of safety equipment and, because there is strong evi-dence that any future degradation will lead to prompt remedial action at the CU ZPR facility, there is reasonable assurance that there will be no significant increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a reactor accident as a result of component malfunction.
The low power and low use of the ZPR result in very small accumulations of fis-sion products.
Therefore, the staff concludes (1) that the risk of radiation exposure to the public has been acceptable and will continue to be well within all applicable regulations and guidelines during the history of the reactor, and (2) that there is reasonable assurance that there will be no increase in that risk in any discernible way during this renewal period.
17.2 Multiple or Sequential Failures of Safety Components Of the many accident scenarios hypothesized for the CU ZPR, none produce conse-quences more severe than the hypothetical accidents reviewed and evaluated in Section 14.
The only multiple-mode failure of more severe consequences would be failure of the cladding of more than one fuel element.
Because of the very low fission product inventory in the fuel, this type of scenario will result in only a small fraction of the values in 10 CFR 20.
17.3 Conclusion For the reasons stated above, the staff concludes that none of the various con-ditions or mechanisms (as stated in Section 17.1) will cause any significant risk to the health and welfare of the public.
Cornell University ZPR SER 17-2
18 CONCLUSIONS On the basis of its evaluation of the application as set forth above, the staff has determined that (1) The application for renewal of Operating License R-80 for its research reactor t'iled by the Cornell University, dated October 6, 1978, as amended, complies with the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR, Chapter 1.
(2) The facility will operate in conformity with the application as amended, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission.
(3) fhere is reasonable assurance (a) that the activities authorized by the operating license can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public; and (b) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the regulations of the Commission set forth in 10 CFR, Chapter 1.
(4) The licensee is technically and financially qualified to engage in the activities authorized by the license in accordance with the regulations of the Commission set forth in 10 CFR, Chapter 1.
(5) The renewal of this license will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
a Cornell University ZPR SER 18-1
i-19 REFERENCES Code of Federal Regulations, Title IU, " Energy," U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
General Atomics Company, GA-0471, " Technical Foundations of TRIGA," Aug. 1958.
--, GA-4314, M. T. Simnad, "The U-ZrHz Alloy:
Its Properties and Use in TRIGA Fuel," E-117-833, Feb. 1980.
Simnad, M.
T., F. C. Foushee, and G. B. West, " Fuel Elements for Pulsed TRIGA Research Reactors," Nuclear Technology, 28:31-56, 1976.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-0984, " Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Renewal of the Operating License for the Cornell University
?
TRIGA Research Reactor," Aug. 1983.
--, RG 2.6, " Emergency Planning for Research Reactor," Mar. 1982.
Industry Codes and Standards American National Standards Institute /American Nuclear Society (ANSI /ANS),
15.11, " Radiological Control at Research Reactor Facilities," 1977.
American Nuclear Society (ANS) 15.1," Standard for the Development of Technical Specification for Research Reactors," Sept. 1981.
--, ANS 15.16, " Standard for Emergency Planning for Research Reactor,"
Draft 1978 and Draft 2, Nov. 1981.
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Cornell University ZPR SER 19-1
NRC eoRu 336 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 1
BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET NUREG-1010 4 TITLE ANO SUBTITLE (Add Volume No.,,f wrepresol
- 2. (Leave s/m41 Safety Evaluation Report related to the renewal of the operating license for the Zero-Power Reactor at 3 RECIPIENT'S ACCESSION NO.
Cornell University
- 7. AUTHORIS)
- 5. DATE REPORT COMPLE TED M ON TH l YEAR September 1983 9 PERF ORMING ORGANIZATION N AME AND MAILING ADORESS (include 2,p Codel DATE REPORT ISSUED Division of Licensing lveAR uON m Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation September 1983 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 6 (tee
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Washington, DC 20555
- 8. (Leave Nank)
- 12. SPONSORING CHGANIZATION NAME AND MAILING ADORESS (loctum lea Co*/
- 10. PROJECT / TASK / WORK UNIT NO Same as 9, above.
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4 13 TYPE OF RE PORT PE RIOD COVE RED (inclusive daars)
Safety Evaluation Report 15 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14 (Leave We*J
- 16. ABSTR ACT (200 words or less)
This Safety Evaluation Report for the application filed by Cornell University for renewal of operating license number R-97 to continue to operate the Zero Power Research (IPR) reactor has been prepared by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The facility is owned and operated by Cornell University and is located on the university campus in Ithaca, New York. The staff concludes that the ZPR reactor facility can continue to be operated by Cornell University without endangering the health and safety of the public.
- 17. KE Y WORDS AND DOCUMENT ANALYSIS 17a DESCRIPTORS Non Power Reactor Cornell University Zero Power Reactor License Renewal 17b IDENTIFIERS.OPEN ENDED TERVS j
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