ML20080G418
| ML20080G418 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 01/23/1984 |
| From: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Bishop T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| ANP-28678-BSK, ANPP-28678-BSK, DER-83-65, NUDOCS 8402130382 | |
| Download: ML20080G418 (4) | |
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Arizona Public Service Company P.O. Box 21666 + PHOENIX, ARIZONA E5036 rn January 23, 1984 y@.
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e UlS.NuclearRegulatoryCommission liigion V Creekside Oaks Office Park 1450 Maria 1.ane - Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368 Attention: Mr. T. W. Bishop, Director Division of Resident Reactor Projects and Engineering Programs
Subject:
Final Report - DER 83-65 A 50.55(e) Reportable Condition Relating to PSV's From C-E Were Discovered In Poor Condition When Preparing For Unit 2 Cold-Hydro File: 84-019--026; D.4.33.2
Reference:
A) Telephone Conversation betueen P. Johnson and R. Tucker on September 28, 1983 B) ANPP-28097, dated October 26, 1983 (Interim Report)
Dear Sir:
Attached is our final written report of the Reportable Deficiency under 10CFR50.55(e), referenced above.
k Very truly ours 7 CLC.JL fE R E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
APS Vice President, Nuclear ANPP Project Director EEVB/TRB:ru Attachment cc:
See Page Two 130 940123 AD K 05000529 s
PDR 3P 21 l
Mr. T. W. Bishop DER 83-65 Page Two cc:
Richard DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement j'
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 T. G. Woods, Jr.
J. A. Roedel D. B. Fasnacht A. C. Rogers B. S. Kaplan W. E. Ide J. Vorees J. R. Bynism P. P. Klute 5
A. C. Gehr W. J. Stubblefield W. C. Bingham R. L. Patterson R. W. Welcher
- 11. Foster D. R. Hawkinson L. E. Vorderbrueggen G. A. Fiore111 S. R. Frost J. Self D. Canady Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, GA 30339 is
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FINAL REPORT - DER 83-65 DEFICIENCY EVALUATION 50.55(e)
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY (APS)
PVNGS UNITS 2 I.
Description of Deficiene,y During preparation for Unit 2 reactor coolant system hydrotesting in September,1983, the primary safety relief valvee 2-J-RCE-PSV-200, -201, -202, and -203 were removed by Startup and
.,found to be dirty, rusted and coated with condensate throughout the intbrnals. The valves were supplied by Combustion Engineering (C-E) and manufactured by Dresser Valve Company.
The subject valves were installed in 1981 for construction fitup.
The valves were left in place while adjacent construction activitien proceeded.
Additionally, pneumatic pressure testing was done on the relief-side piping with the valves left in place.
Either of these actions could cause the contaminated condition.
The cause is attributed to noncompliance with specification and procedural requirements as follows:
- a. The Dresser technica'l manual log no. 10407-N001-6.04-55 states that "The Nuclear Power Plant owner or his agent is responsible for providing a program to protect the cleanliness level of the valve and their (SIC) spare parts at the construction site in compliance with ANSI N.45.2.1, cleanliness level B."
- b. Bechtel work procedure WPP/QCI Mo. 203.0 for piping system pressure testing states the " Flanged pressure relief valves (PSV's) shall be removed or blinded off during pressure tests."
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Analysis of Safety Implications s This condition is evaluated as reportabic under the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e). Prudent evaluation of this condition indicates that the condition cannot remain uncorrected without representing a significant safety condition. Malfunction of primary safety relief valves can result in (1) overpressure of the primary system, or (2)
_ uncontrolled release cf radioactive steam to the containment. The deficiency constitutee damage to components which will require
' 'N repair and testing to re-establish the adequacy of the components to perform their safety,related function.
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Final Report - DER 83-65 Page Two III. Corrective Action 1.
The Unit 2 valves will be sent to Wyle Laboratories for reconditioning and testing prior to reinstallation as dispositioned by NCR SM-2886.
2.
The Dresser Technical Manual log no.10407-N001-6.04-55 has been revised by Bechtel to emphasize the importance of the ANSI N45.2.1 cleanliness requirements.
3.
To preclude recurrence of this condition on Unit 3, Bechtel Engineering will send an interoffice memorandum which advises Bechtel Construction to remove the currently installed Unit 3 valves and verify that they meet the cleanliness requirements of ANSI N45.2.1 Level B.
The valves will then be stored in accordance with the Dresser Technical Manual until Hot Functional Testing on Unit 3.
4.
The cicanliness level for the Unit 1 primary safety valves has been addressed in DER 82-54.
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