ML20080G363
| ML20080G363 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 09/15/1983 |
| From: | Baxter T METROPOLITAN EDISON CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-2.E.1.1, TASK-2.K.3.05, TASK-TM NUDOCS 8309200244 | |
| Download: ML20080G363 (41) | |
Text
..
., {
.,e.'
'o
^*
e.,
- 00CKETED SHAw, PITTMAN,' PoTTs & TROWBRIDGE USHRC A PARTNERSMIP OF PROFESSDONAL CORPORATIONS 1800 M STREET. N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. c. 20036
}
RAMSAv o. POT'S, PA SHELDON J. WEISEL. PC JEFFERY L YASLON EDWARDO. young.EH FFIC *MkAWMp tTEuART L. P TTMAN. PA JoMN A. McCuu.OuGM. P C.
JAC= MenAv
- %re's,
GEORGE F. TRowSReOGE. P C.
J. PATRtCE MICREY. PA THOMAS M. McCORMcC OCHET
.a eCum.JR.
STEPHEN D. POTTS P C.
J. THOMAS LENHART. P C.
TELECOPtER JOMN L CARR.JR.
OE RALO CHANNOFF. PA STEVEN L WELT 2ER.P C PMRIP J. MARVEY A. WMtTE PMiLup o. SoSTwiCa. PA oEAN o. AuuCn.PA (a02) saa.cose a saa inee ROSERT M. GomoON
'stA ETM.SARG Ek TIMOTMY MANLON. PC JOHN ENGEL PC SARGARA J. MORGEN LESUE M. SMITM GEORGE M. ROSENS JR P.C,
CHARLES S. TEMKIN. PA SONNIE S.GOTTUES VIRGINaA S. RuTLEDGE FREG A. LITTLE.PA - '.
STEPHEN S. MUTTLER. PC -
RAptyag gog,,
MOwARO M. SMAFFERMA88 RATHERiME P. C g,g,cg ggggg,MEER,,
JOMN S. RMtWELANDER. PC,.
WINTMROP N.' SROWN. PA.
DESOMAMS.SaySER
.gyg SpuCE w. CMuRCMRL PA JAMES 3. MAMUN P C.
(202)822-1072 SCOTT A. ANENBERG TRAV45 T. SROWN.JR LESUE A. NICMOLSON,JR., PA RANDAL 3. RELL PA CAMPSELL MRLEFER ReCMARD M. MMONTMAL MAE! YIN O. mRALL P C.
ROSERTE.ZAMLER.PC.
PAUL M. THOMAS STEPMEN 3. MElMANN ReCMARO J. KENDALL PC ROSERT S. ROSSINS. PC ggggy SETM M. MOOGASIAN SANDRA E. SRuSCA J1 Y fL BRBE RG. P C.
STEVEN M. LUCAS, P C.
SMEILA MCC. MARVEY EREEN L GROWNELL SARSARA M. ROSSOTTI. PC DAVID M. RuSENSTEIN. P C.
SS-20S3 (SMAwLAw WSM)
DEUSSA A. msDGwAY KENNETM J. MAuTMAN PAMELA M. ANDERSON GEORGE W. ALLEN.JR PA RICHARO E. GALEN CA SLE.'SM AwkAw.
DAveD LAWRENCE MRLER ALEXANDER D. TOMASZCZum FRE $ DRASNER. P C.
LYNN wMITTLESEY wRSON N. mENLY wESSTER. PA MATIAS F. TRAVIESO DIA2 FREDERICK L. MLEIN PMeup D. PORTE R NATMANIEL P. SWE ED. JR., PC VICTORIA J. PE RRINS STEVEN p. PITLER*
MICHAEL A. SWIGER MARu AUGENSUCK. PA JOMM M. O'NEILL JR.
RfCMARO J. PARRfMO ELLEN SMERIFF J ""
- g ELLEN A. FREDELO ANITA J. FINMELSTEIN 6 RNEST L. BLAnt. JR, P C.
JAY A. EPSTtEN MANNAM E. M. UEBERMAN EILEEN M. G6EIMER CARLOTON S. JONE S. PC MAND L ALLEN TMOMAS A. SANTER PA EUSABETH M. PENOLETON COUNSEL SANDRAE.FOLSOM OAV80 m. SAMR JAME3 M. SURGER, P C.
MARRY M. GLASSPtEGEL JUDITH A. SANDLER C. SOwCOtN TRAIN
- seof memorreno see a c.
WRITER S DeRECT DBAL NL,MSER September 15, 1983 822-1090 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 In the Matter of Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No. 1)
Docket No. 50-289 (Restart)
Dear Mr. Chilk:
Please find enclosed copies of the following documents, which include information potentially relevant and material to matters under adjudication in the plant design and procedures phase of this proceeding, which is now before the Commission:
1.
Letter 5211-83-219, August 15, 1983, H. D. Hukill, GPU Nuclear, to D. G. Eisenhut, NRC, Auto RC Pump l
l Trip (NUREG 0737, II.K.3.5).
1 l
t i
I l
l i
i 8309200244 830915 PDR ADOCK 05000289 0
ar s
+
~SHAw, PITTMAN, PoTTs & TROWBRIDGE
^
A PARTNENSMir OF PHOPESMONAL COe#ONATIONS 1.
Mr. Samuel'J. Chilk September'15, 1983 Page Two i
2.
~ Letter 5211-83-232, August 23, 1983, H. D. Hukill,
.GPU.. Nuclear,.to J F..Stolz,'NRC, Long. Term EFW Mods(N, UREG' 07~37,?. II.E ;I;1').. - ~
~
~
. g',
s U
3.
Letter 5211-83 250, September 7, 1983, H. D. Hukill, N'
. )
GPU Nuclear, to J. F. Stolz, NRC, 25'F Subcooling Margin.
's Respectfully submitted,
.s nn _
Thomas A. Baxter Counsel for Licensee TAB:sg i
Enclosures Di cc:
Service List a
T t
4
\\
t s
4 9
4 1
I 4
\\
4 '
m...
,~,,
~
.:.o.
. UNITED STATES OF. AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of
)
)
i METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY
)
Docket No. 50-289
)
(Restart)
, _..O., (Three. Mile Jaland. Nuclear.
).
. ' 'S tation," U' nit!"No. :l')' ~
)
~
SERVICE LIST Chairman Nunzio J. Pallarlino Dr. Reginald L. Gotdiy U.S. Nuclear Regulatory remniasion.
Atcmic Safety and Licensing Appeal Washington, D.C.
20555 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ocxtmission Comnissioner Victor Gilinsky Washington, D.C.
20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Washington, D.C.
20555 Ivan W. Smith, Esquire Chairman Cemniaaioner James K. Asselstim Atcznic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory nemniacion U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Washington, D.C.
20555 Washington, D.C.' #20555 C""insioner Fr*e~defick M. Bernth Cl' Dr. Walter H. Jordan U.S. Nuclear @ story (bmnission Atomic Safety dd Licensing Board
~
Washington, D.C.
20555 Panel 881 West Outer Drive Cmmissioner 'Ihcmas M. Roberts Oak Ridge, Tennessee 3783,0 U.b. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Washington, D.C.
20555 Atcznic Safety and Licensing Board Dr. Linda W. Little
~
Docketing and Service Section Panel Office of the Secretary 5000 Hermitage Drive U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Raleigh, North Carolina 27612 Washington, D.C.
2055 r
James M. Cutchin, IV, Esquire Gary J. Edim. ' 3m re Office of the Executive Iegal Director
' ~~
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cmmission l
Chairman Atanic Safe.t asi, 4.ransing Appeal' -
Washington, D.C.
20555 4
Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Camissiori' John A. Ievin, Esquire Washington, D.C.
20555 Assistant Counsel Pennsylvania Public Utilty Ccmnission Dr. John H. Buck P.O. Box 3265 Atcmic Safety and Licensing Appeal Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission
. Douglas R. Blazey, Esquire Washington, D.C.
20555 Chief Counsel Department of EnviIortnental Resources 514 Executive House, P.O. Box 2357 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120
~.
.o
, Jordan D. Cunningham,* Esquire 2320 North Second Street Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17110 Ms. Iouise Bradford
'IMI AIERr 1011 Green Street Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17102 Ellyn R. Weiss, Esquire Harmon & Weiss 1725 Eye Streetl N.W., Suite 506 Washington, D.C.
20006 Steven C. Sholly Union of Concerned Scientists 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 1101 Washington, D.C.
20036
_ AN3RY/'IMI PIRC
~
~
1037 Maclay Street Harr @ ',jPsnnsylvania 1,7,103_ [
Willian S. Jordan, III, Esquire Harmon & E iss 1725 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 506 Washington, D.C.
20006 Chauncey Kepford Judith H. Johnsrud Environnental Coalition on Nuclear Power 433 Orlando Avenue State College, Pennsylvania 16801 Marjorie M. Aamodt l
R. D. 5 Coatesville, Pennsylvania 19320 t
i.,
I l
l l
9 m
3---
,%y.
e
--
- w w
. ; y,- z.u.,. ;.
- .s
. (;.,
y..
-(..
. t.T.
.,.g
- s...
osOff
}'
~
e ox 480 r
Route 441 South Midcletown, Pennsylvania 17057 0191 717 944 7621 TELEX 84 2386 Writer's Direct Dial Number:
' August 15, 1983 5211-83-219
- 4.. ;- r.5 f.4.. r,.y ;,. c..r; yfy, y.,,.. z..e....:,..... ;,,,
- ...j..
.,,.g a.
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn:
D. G. Eisenhut, Director Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Sir:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Statien, Unit 1 (TMI-1)
Operating License No. DPR-50 Docket No. 50-289 Auto RC Pump Trip (NUREG 0737, II.K.3.5)
Our letter of March 31, 1983 (5211-83-017) notified you of our plans to revise the RCP trip criterion fr m 1600 psig ESAS to 25 F subcooling margin. This has been' accomplished.
Our letter of June 8, 1983 also advised you of our intent to join the B&W Owners Group on this subject to further analyze and qucntify the margins associated with the new criterion we have adopted.
Enclosed is a description of the plan for the sub=ission of the supplemental
-information consistent with the other B&W Owners.
G?1*. will provide the information consistent with other B&*a* Owners in May, 1984.
Sincerely,
-!. D. Huki,n M.re: tor, TM1-1 liDE:1RF.:vj f cc:
R. Conte J. T. Sto1r J. Van \\*liet
- 3. Sheron GPU Nuclear Corporation is a subsidiary of the Genera; :mlic Utilities Corporation
4:.n.4
?:
.:-w e p: p.e.s.):
- w..
. a -..-
..a, :..
n.L p.
s, p Aw :. -->
.e
,,y
-c
- 3...-
PIAN FOR RESG.UTION OF 'D*.I ACTION ITEM II.K.3.5
" Automatic Trip..of Reactor Coolant. Pamps",
/,
a j...
2 INTRODUCTION
'Ihe criteria for resolution of NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.5, " Automatic Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps", are provided in a letter from D. G. Eisenhut (NRC) to GPU Nuclear on March 4, 1983. As discussed in our letter of March 31, 1983, GPUN has revised the ICP Trip Criteria from 1600 psig ESAS to 25'F subcooling margin under 10CFR 50.59. We B&W Owners Group has been formulating a plan to demonstrate compliance with those criteria. S e following represents this overall position and plan.
PIAN FOR TREA'IMENT OF RC PUMP OPERATION te treatment of reactor coolant pumps during accidents and transients has received extensive attention over the past several years. THE B&W Owners Group has performed analyses evaluating the offeet of 'a delayed BC pu::.p trip using Appendix K'assunptions during the course of a small break IOCA accident and has determined that an early trip of RC pw.,5 is required to show conformance to 10 T R 50.46 for a range of break sizes.
Tnerefore, to be consistent with the conservative analyses performed, it is our position that the reactor coolant pumps should be tripped if indications of a small break LCCA exist.
i Tne B&W Owners Group and B&W maintain that it is highly desirable tc maintain BC p q operation during non-LOCA events, as an aid in the mitigatien cf transients. Consistent with this phiolosophy, de comept of subcooling margin was chosen as an indicator for the need to trip :C prps.
It is our intention to demonstrate that this concept is consistent with cur philosophy fer handling It pu:rps during transient conditions a-f cc piies with the intent of the criteria stated in your letter of March *, 1.:53. The sy ptom approach of subcooling margin,' developed as part of the Abnc.a1 Transient Operating Guidelines Program, is intended to replace the presen: guidelines of tripping solely.on the presence of a low PC pressure ISFAS sig.al.
It is the position of the B&W Owners Group anf 5&~i that reactor coolant p=p trip can be achieved safely and reliably by the cpera:cr.
It has been determined that a loss of subcooling margin wil'. occcur for those SEL:X".s where a pump trip is regaired for compliance with ICCFR 50.46.
.a
,,w n.-
,n,,,.
,,a v-,.v...-n.
,,n-n.-.
-..w-.-m--
.-m,,,,
,... ;;.,. :, c:.p... ;.,.x. ; ;~.:v 3:
.g..-::.. V. 6. u..,. 1: ' oy.
e
. u o,.
.z -
m,
. ~.;
./
W e B&W ' Owners Group will undertake a program based on the above positions to
~
demonstrate that the concept of subcooling margin is an appropriate indicator of the need to trip E pumps, yet still allows continued EP operation for steam ge drator tube ruptures (SGIR). 'Ihe concept of succooling mare n i
will be examined for the more likely non-IM. transients to deanstrate that under realistic ccnditicus an indication requi:d.ng RC pulp trip is unlikely.
?.
8
.This.progrhm l's also intended.to provide!.the'.justificaricn.-fo'r manual EP trip on indication of loss of subcooling margin. Tripping on loss of subcooling margin will assure pung trip prior to the development of significant system voids. No attempt will be made to demonstrate acceptability of continued BCP operation during small break conditions. No request for an exemption of 10CFR 50.46 will be reade to allow continued EP operation during SBLOCA.
The specific plan for resolution of the RC punp trip issue is structured to address the specific criteria stated in the March 4, 1983 letter.
A description of the plan, related to the criteria with which it is intended to address, follous:
I.
Pumo Operation Criteria Which Can Result in RCP Trr Nrine Transients and Accidents 1.
Setpoints for RCP Trip:
a.
The RCP trip criterion, based on loss of subcooling margin, was developed with the intent of assuring that an indication for K pung trip would occur for those SBIDCAs where pug trip was required to meet the criteria of 10CFR 50.46. A spectrum of analyses has been performed using Appendix K asstr ptions which demonstrate that a loss of sul: cooling will always occur for small breaks that have the pctential to uncover the core i
and er.ceed 10 CFR 50.46 criteria if the IPs a-e : _ppec uncar certain two-phase conditions.
'2 erefere, less of subcooling can be used as an indicator cf the 4
need for EP trip. The actual value of the setpoin: (25'F) will be verified to ensure that this indicator will allow continued forced RCS flow during realistic SGTRs up to and including the design basis S3 7. - a single dou'cle ended rupture..The setpoint will als:
- e verified to include
~
consideration for minimizing the indication for need :c trip E pu. ps for more..likely. non X". events such as a mild m
J overcooling transients.
No partial or staggered RCP trip sche.es will be considered except for the extreme case where mechanical damage te the pump is likely as this adds te increased decision making en the part of the operator during transient conditiens.
_2_
.,. g c.
.n 7
/.
v,
+
s l
b..
The RCD. trip criterion based on s$ cooling margin precludes ~
~
operation of the RC pu::ps in a Fighly ~ voided syste:: (exceot for ICC conditions).
c.
A primary objective of the paraceter and setpoint veri #ication is the avoidance of reactor coolant p=p trip for non-IDCA events particularly SGIR. ' Realis ic operator actions in accordance with the procedures are e>pected to avoid loss
.c of subcooling;and the.need to t:iprthe, reactor: coolant n=es.
- . p.w,
x.
'for:this~evente Furthermore, 'since subcooling rargin ti:n21'd be quickly regained following rakeuo or IPI initiation, with-out loss of natural circulation even i# the coerator failed to take actions to prevent RCP tripping and ESFAS actua ion, restart of the ptros would be allowed.
Ccnsequently, reliance on the PORV for depressurization is unlikely.
d.
The significance of primary systen voiding due to flashing of hot coolant is disucssed as pa:-t of operator training.
The subject void treatment is being stoplemented by additional guidance on preventicn, detection, and ritigation of voids.
This is considered outside of the AIOG scope but will be addressed.
Actions following ccntainment isclation signals will be e.
reviewed to ensure consistency in the trear:nent of availability of cooling water and sas' injection to prevent pmp da: rage.
Instructions for p=o trip are provided in the AIOG guidelines in the inlikely event of mechm*ml ut::p damage. Crtieria for restart of RC p=os include assdng that cooling water and seal injection are available.
Existing IMI-l procedures also include the guidance.
f.
Instructions for raintaining or reinitiating forced RC ilos:
are contained in AIOG for ICC cc-ditic.s.
2.
Guidance for Justification of L.~c.al RO Trip A spect: rn of snail break ID3s has been analyzed fer 17 and a.
205 FA plant types using the GJ_-~1 c:de.
Using de A prdix K evaluation techniques, there e>is:s a cciina:icn :f break sizes and RC ptrp trip times W.ich result in exceedin 10 ER 50.46 lirits.
Fcr de t.::s: break size. :..e.
is:
size <.9.ich requires the earlies: p=
rip, rip : :s: cc:=
wisin 2 rd.nutes of the indica:ic of need for p=o rip.
As break size decreases, core -'-
'e available for cpera:::
action.
the critical time peried cf high void fe:=arien
(>70Q @.en RC ptro Cip is no: rec = rended, has als ber.
de:e:rined.
The critical ti e e-ici fer 6e break re:uiring de earliest coera: ion acticn ci a is shcr: (5 -inutes)
.en pt=p Mp coul'd result in exceedi g l'. G 50.46 c:izeria..
S
- v.
q, -....
.j.
U L
'y.
b.
A best estimate SBIDCA analysis will be perforred for each general plant. type, over the spectrum of., sizes determined by w
- r.
the ' conservative analyses 't'o!de'termine -(a) 'the' time available
- ~
for a required E pump trip, and the period of time when r pump trip is not recomended or (b) the lack of indication for a required pump trip.
If it is determined that a need for I
~ pump trip exists, the time for operator action will be
.t..' detemined and'; justified by-cocparison.to ANSI. Standards and
/ operating experience. An indication of reasonable operator action time is expected to justify canual EP trip.
3.
Other Considerations a.
The level of quality of instrumentation, as described in the enclosure to the March 4,1983 letter, used to produce the signal indicating the need for r pu p trip, will be provided by GPUN to supplement the B&WOG generic subnittal for treatment of E punps during transients.
b.
The AItXi guidelines and plant specific Emergency Operating Procedures contain criteria for the timely restart of reactor-coolant pumps when conditions which will support safe p; p operation exist. Table 6 of the F.qcipment Operator chapter of ATCG provides the conditions when E pamps can be restartec-c.
plant operators have been trained in their responsibility for performing E P trip in the event of a small break LCCA.
Current plant procedures (non-ATOG) require r pump trip on 25'F subcooling margin.
Instructions for plant operation are reinforced by regular requalification class and simulator training. Operators have been trained on the concept cf r pu p trip on subcooling cargin.
II.
Pumo Ooeration Criteria htich Will Not F.esult in EF Wip Duri.c Sansients and Accidents Sirce it is the position of the B&WO3 and B&W tha: ds safest method fr: I p.:=p operation following SBIICA is (=anual) trip, the criteria statef i :his section will not be addressed.
4
_4
...n,
.,n.-...,-,-,.g.,,-,-~,m.-.
,--,-,.,,a.
~.,n,,.,,m,
~ _ __
.p
.1
..w.
PIAN FOR RESOLUTION OF S'.I ACTION ITDi II.K.3.5
~
?"Abtomatic. Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps" DTERODLCTION The criteria for resolution of NUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.5, " Automatic Trip of Reactor Coolant Pumps", are provided in a letter from D. G. Eisenhut (NRC) to GPU Nuclear on March 4, 1983. As discussed in our letter of March 31, 1983, GPUN has revised the RCP Trip Criteria fro 1600 psig ESAS to 25'F subcooling margin under 10CFR 50.59. S e B&W Owners Group has been formulating a plan to demonstrate compliance with those criteria. The following represents this overall position and plan.
PLAN ER TREABENT OF RC PUMP OPERATION The treatment of reactor coolant pumps during accidents and transients has received extensive attention over the past several years. THE B&W Owners Group has performed analyses evaluating the effect of a delayed RC p=p trip using Appendix K assumptions during the course cf a small break IfG. accident and has determined that an early trip of RC p=ps is recuired to show conformance to 10CFR 50.46 for a range of break sizes. Tnerefore, to be consistent with the conservative analyses performed, it is our position that the reactor coolant pumps should be tripped if indications of a small break LCCA exist.
The B&W Owners Group and B&W maintain that it is highly desirable te maintain I p=p operation during non-LCG. events, as an aid in the mitigatien cf transients. Consistent with this phiolcsephy, the cencept of subcooling margin was chosen as an indicator for the need to trip :C prps.
It is our intention te demonstrate that this concept is consisten with our philosophy for handling I pu: ps during transient conditions anf complies with the intent cf the criteria stated in your letter of March 4,1.~53.
The s; ptor approach cf sub:ocling margin, developed as part of the Abnrral Transient Cparating Gaidelines Program, is intended to replace the presen: guifelines cf tripping solely.on the presence of a low PC ' pressure ISTA5 sig.31.
It is the positicn of the B&W Owners Group a.,f 51% -ha: reacter coolan: p. ;
trip can be achieved safely and reliably by the :: ara cr.
It has bee-determined that a loss of subcooling margin will :ccur fcr those SE_OCAs where a p=p trip is reqairec ror crcp,.,a.ce cr. _.:: Ov."c.
7
.g...,__
.r
~.
~
GPU Nuclear Corporation i
2f. -Q
$gf cost Offi e Box 450 noute 44, South Micdetown. Dennsy!vania 17057 019; 717 944 7621 TELEX 84 2386 Writer's Direct Dial Nurncer:
August 23, 1983
.~;. : Y. ;.p :. ', ;..:.y;.g.M.,.-9... 4,..
- ,.,5211.8_3-a2
. z. -
.-.;,~
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attn:
J. F. Stolz, Chief Operating Reacter Branch No. 4 Dvision of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Cc:nmission Isashington, D.C.
20555
Dear Sir:
=Three Mile-Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (ni!-1)
Operating License No. DPR-30
-Docket No. 50-289 Long Ter= EFW Mods (NUREG 0737 II.E.1.1)
In response te NUREG 0737 Item II.E.1.1 and as discussed in the teeting at DII-_1 on July _11,- 1983 with members of your Staff and those of eine, enclosed please find-a description of'the modifications to the Emergency Feedvater (EEC) Sys:e= to be completed prior _to startup fre the' Cycle 6 refueling.
The purpose of these modifications is to upgrade the E5i systen to a safer:-
grade systen in crder to provide in:reased reliability in its capabili:y te ni:1;;a:e the effects of design basis accidents when :he main feeduater sys:en is not available.
These codifications vill be made in accordance with the recu,.rements c,...., G 05eS Sections 9.1.,.a anc.,,..._.i.e,..__,.
f..,
sect, ens a uu.
c r.:.e
- < a II.E.1.1 and II.E.1.2, Atomic Safe
- y and Licensing Icard (ASL3) Par'tial Initial Decision Section II, Subsection 0, and using the acceptance criteria of S:andard'Keview Plan Sections 9.2.6, 10.'.9 and associated Iranch Technical i
pcsi:icn ASE 10-1 as principal guidance.
The cdificatiens being 1:ple=ented as par: cf this up;rade include mechanical l
sys:en configura ion changes, nechanical (seistic) and electrical (enciren-rental). equip ent cualifica: ion upgrades, changes :c the cen:rci syster f::
EM? cc:penen:s and seismi: upgrade cf piping sec:icns in the Yain Stest.
Energency Feedvater and Main Feedva:er Systens.
Sincerely, q / h' TfU u...o.s. 4 _ -
i
~
t
.. _..... : vj :.
un : u.
ec:
R. Cen:e. J. Van Vlie:
{-
.GPU Nuclear Cor00 ration is a subsiciary of the Ge.e a' Occlic UtiM.es 0:50crat!Dn
6 DERGDCY FEEDWATER SYSTDi IONG TERM SAFETY GRAIE MCDIFICATIONS I.
IN'3GXX'rION s
gi M==nt describis!thE functional', design, quality o g,-
s
~
~
~
- ' assurance, health and safety, and licensing requirements for the installation and operation of modifications to the Emergency Feedwater (EEW) System of Unit No.1 of the tree Mile Island Nuclear Station ('IMI-1).
B.
The EEW System shall rsnain generally as presently configured with modifications to insure the addition of emergency feedwater to both OISGs assuming a single active failure concurrent with loss of offsite power. In addition, the modified system shall be capable of providing controlled emergency feedwater flow to an intact OPSG for at least two hours without relying on alternating current (AC). power.
Conversion of direct current (DC) from the statian batteries to alternating current is acceptable for this application.
1.
All automatic initiation features provided for the EEW system shall be retained. A new automatic EEW control system for controlling CPSG level independent of the Integrated Control System (ICS) shall be provided.
In addition, the capability to manually control EEW flow
'and set an automatic level setpoint from the main control room shall be provided.
2.
All the equit: ment required to initiate or control EEW or to realign the water source to the E!W pu:ps with the exception of valves EE'-V4 and 5 shall be operable from the main control room.
3.
A redundant control valve shall be installed in the flow path to each OPSG in parallel with the existing control valve. A normally open block valve shall be installed downstream of each control valve to provide additional isolation capability of EEW flow to an OrSG. A i
cavitating venturi has been provided in the EEW flow
^ path to each OISG to limit ficw.
l 4.
'Ihe installation and arrangement of cavitating venturis, control valves and block valves shall provide accessibility for plant maintenance, inservice j
inspection and operability of the cceponents.
l l
l 1
~
t 5..
he installation and-arrangement of electrical,
. instrumentation and control ccznponents shall provide testability of equipnent and maintenance of electrical separation.
6.
Mechanical, electrical, instrumentation and. control
~f components, shall'nottbe' located in high. energy line break. jet zones unless they'are shielded from such jets. Components shall be located such that they are not subject to damage from high energy pipe whip.
II.
Mechanical Systems Recuirements and Modifications A.
Requirements 1.
Process piping design temperature and pressure shall be consistent with the original design basis of the EEW and related service systems as identified in GAI specification SP-5544 unless system modifications call for more stringent requirements.
2 2.
All new piping which is part of the EEW system shall be designed, fabricated, inspected, tested and erected in accordance with ANSI B 31.1 " Power Piping Code".
3.
Inspections required by ANSI B 31.1 shall be performed.
4.
S e seismic design criteria for the piping and support system shall be in accordance with Seismic Class I design bases as defined in CAI specifications SP-5544, item 2:15, " Plant Piping for 'IMI" and the 'IMI-l FSAR.
Seismic identification symbol shall be S-I.
5.
Installation, erection and testire of all piping shall be in accordance with ASME Section XI.
6.
Installed cleanness class shall be Class B in accordance with GPCRC Spec. 3050B-001.
7.
All new valves and the cavitating venturis shall be designed and fabricated in accordance with ASME Section III, Class 3.
B.
Modifications 1.
Add Cavitating venturis in each Cnce Through Steam Generator (OISG) EEW Line.
(Complete)
.t t.
l i
a.
This modification has been implemented to limit the flow of EEW to a ruptured OTSG in order to ensure sufficient EEW flow to the intact OrSG and to limit the mass and energy release within the reactor building for overpressure prevention. The venturis will limit the flow.to the OTSG in order
,., [tio' reduce ' excess'ive ' reactior', coolant system - (PCS)
' overcooling.
2.
Provide Redundant Safety Grade EEW Control and Block Valves a.
This is being provided to prevent a single active failure from preventing the addition of EEW to an OrSG and to ensure the capability to isolate EEW flow to a ruptured CISG.
b.
The control valves shall have sufficient range to control the EEW flow to the CISG(s) when the plant is being cooled and the OrSG(s) are being 2
depressurized and the EEW flow requirement is less than that initially required.
c.
The EEW system block valves shall normally be open, and in addition, the EEW initiating signals shall also provide an open signal to the block valves. Each valve shall be provided with an electric motor operator and shall fail "as is" on loss of power. D e valves shall also have remote manual operation capability from the main control room.
i III.
Structural Recuirements and Modifications A.
Requirements 1.
All components which are part of the 4 System or which l
are required to act in support of this system shall be qualified for Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE). loadings to I
ensure structural integrity and functional operability l
of active corrponents during and after an earthquake.
~
All existing EEW system components shall be seismically qualified by analysis or by type tests if required. The qualification of new components shall be accomplished by either analysis or testing.
2.
D e structural design of the EEW syster modifications shall be consistent with the original design basis of the EEW system and the related service systems as l
.s
.t identified in the 'IMI-1 FSAR and GAI specifications SP-5544 and SP-5661. Khere practicable, all portions of the EEW system shall be. installed indoors within seismic Class S-I aircraft-hardened structures. All portions of the system required to perform the safety function shall be designed to Seismic Class S-I requirements.
3.-
'Portidn's"dd'the EEW' system loedted outdoors'shall be' designed ~to Seismic Class S-I" requirements and shall be designed to withstand the effects of the design basis natural phenomena identified in the 'IMI-l FSAR Section 2.
4.
All piping and valves shall be connected and supported in such a manner that any stress due to weight, ther::al effects, internal piping conditions and external envirorrnent will be within the maximum allowable stresses required by the ANSI B. 31.1 " Power Piping Code".
5.
Structural steel shall be designed in accordance with AISC-70 (including latest supplements) using AS'IM-A36
?
steel, except weld unit stresses shall be as specified in Table 9.3.2.1 of ANS Dl.1, -79 " Structural Steel Welding Code".
B.
Modifications 1.
eggrade the EIW pumps recirculation line from recirculation control valves (EF-V-8A/B/C) to Condensate Storage Tank (CO-TlB) to Seismic Class I requirements.
a.
This modification will ensure that failure of this piping due to a seismic event shall not cccur and thus prevent depletion of the required CST inventory for the EIW function.
2.
Evaluate and modify the vent stacks for safety valves MS-V22A/B and at:nospheric dt.. p valves MS-V4A/B to Seismic Class I requirements.
a.
.The. vent stacks for safety relief valves 33-V-22A/B and at:mospheric dmp valves BS-V-4A/B are ro: ed through the Intermediate Building floors. This modification will prevent the release of main steam to the Intermediate Buildire as a result of vent stack failure due to a seismic event.
Therefore, this modification will reduce the pussibility of overpressurization in the building and protect the Emergency Feedwater system l
components form the exposure to the hostile l
l t
1 l
environment and gravity missiles.
3.
Intermediate Building Flood Prctection from rz ::ain Feedwater Line Break.
a.
This modification is being inplemented to mitigate
.the effects of flooding.due to a postulated main 9, r....
s.-
,# /feedwateriline-break'in<the Intermediate Building by allowing water to' flow into the tendon access gallery and portions of the alligator pit which are presently isolated. By removing the t.pr half of the "stop walls" in the alligator pit and opening entrance "A" and "C" to the tendon access gallery, the time required for water to flood EL.
295' in the Intermediate Building will be increased from 86 seconds to approximatey 25 minutes.
I IV.
Electrical Requirements and Modifications A.
Requirements
?
1.
The electric power and control system shall be designed as a Class lE system. Components of the system required to operate during a loss of all AC power (Station Blackout) shall be powered from the non-interruptable vital AC or DC buses.
2.
Each train of EEW to each OISG shall be powered from its associated power sources to facilitate safety grade initiation and control of EEW to each OrSG.
3.
Electrical equipnent shall be qualified in accordance with applicable sections of It.:2. 323, Ic22. 344, I --
382, and huEG-0588 or the Division of Operating Reactor Guidelines appended to I.E. Bulletin 79-OlB as appropriate.
B.
Modifications 1.
Provide a safey grade pcwer supply to valves CO-V-111A/B and upgrade the cable routing for power supply to valves CO-V-14A/B to meet Seismic Class I requirements.
I l.
a.
This modification shall provide the capability to isolate a damaged Condensate Storage Tank (CST) from the EEW system by clocing COV-lllA/B from the Main Control Roce so that the intact CST will have sufficient water available for the EEW system function.
Similarly, the. ability to close
.,u.,
~
CO-V-14A/B from Lthe Main. Control'Roca, will allow
~
isolation of non-EEW functions from the CST.
These features will be used in conjunction with revised EEW plant operating procedures to close CO-V-14A/BV and CO-V-lllA/B whenever there is an EEW initiation and the CST has reached the Technical Specification limit for EEW inventory.
2.
Delete the existing cross connect between electrical busses that allows a control room operator to load both EEW punp motors onto a single diesel generator in order to ensure electrical sepu..on of the buss,es. (Catplete) s 3.
A review shall be conducted of the emergency power bus loadings to assure that changes in bus loadings resulting from these modifications will maintain the bus loadings within acceptable limits.
V.
Instrumentation and Control Recuirements and Modifications A.
Requirements 1.
New control systems shall be installed to initate and regulate EEW flow. Control of EEW flow to each OISG shall be independent of control for the other OrSG.
Each control system shall be of Class lE (safety grade) design. Electric power for the control systems shall be from safety grade uninterruptable sources.
l 2.
The control systems shall be designed so tnat no single active failure will prevent delivery of the required emergency feedwater to an OTSG. Also, the probability l
of a single failure causing inadvertent injection of EIW into an OISG shall be minimized.
3.~
The control system shall be designed to enable control of emergency feedwater for at least two hcurs during l
loss of all (on-site and off-site) alternative current (AC) power sources witn the exception of the battery j
backed 120 VAC vital sources. During the loss of all AC t
l I _
a b
power condition for two hours, only the turbine driven emergency feedwater controls are required to be functional.
s 4.
The design of the safety grade controls shall be in accordance with applicable sections of IEEE 308, IEEE 279 and its supplements and IEEE 379. System level manual initiation shall not be provided as recorrmended by IEEE-279.
Instead, the system components shall be provided with a manual starting or control capability as appropriate for each conponent.
5.
All cable routing of electrical and instrumentation shall be checked to comply with Appendix R of 10CFR50 (i.e., Fire Protection Evaluation).
6.
'Ibe alligator pit flood detection system shall consist of level indication located in the alligator pit.
Condenser hotwell low-low level alarm can be acccmplished via the existing hotwell low-low level signals.
?
7.
'Ihe EEW system shall receive automatic initiation signals for the following conditions:
a.
Ioss of both Main Feedwater Pumps, or b.
Ioss of four (4) Reactor Coolant Pumps (PCP), or c.
Feedwater line break as detected by high Main Steam to Ebedwater differential pressure, or d.
Iow CfrSG water level.
8.
The EEW system block valves shall normally be open and, in addition, the EEW initiating signals shall also provide an open signal to the block valves. A control switch shall be provided for each block valve for re ote operation from the control room. Direct indication of actual valve position shall also be provided in the control room.
9.
The capability to manually control EIW flow fro.T the l
control room shall be provided. This capability shall include features to allow-independent control of each flow control valve and position indication from.each control valve.
10.
The capability of selecting an automatic level control setpoint shall also be provided.
l' l
11.
The failure mode of the control valves shall be fail-closed on loss of either instrument air, electrical power, or control signal.
.s.
.u 12.
New steam generator level instruments external of ICS shall be provided for the following functions. Level is expressed as distance above the top of the lower tubesheet:
a.
Automatic control of EEW at 30" for the condition of at least one PCP. operating and 240" for loss of
, all~ four ICP.'s.
b.
Initiation of EEW at a low-low OrSG water level of 18".
c.
High level alarm at 337".
d.
Low level alarm at 23".
e.
High-high level alarm to indicate OrSG overfilling. Alarm is to occur at a water level of 380".
f.
Isolation of main fe:dwater (MEW) on $ high-high level of 370" (which is above the ICS high level limit control point of 346").
g.
Operator selected auto level setpoint for use following a ICCA.
13.
In addition, the ICS shall utilize the instruments for the following purposes:
a.
OrSG level control during heat up b.
High OrSG level limit during power operation c.
Low OrSG level limit durirs power operation
.d.
OrSG level control after the reactor trip.
14.
The modification of the 0"SG 1evel instruments shall use the top of the lower tubesheet as a reference point and use the same measurement unit (i.e., irrh). Tnese instruments shall be compensated for process pressure and environmental temperature to aid plant startup and post trip level control.
15.
Automatic EEW initiation signals for feedwater line break as detected by high r.ain steam to feedwater differential pressure, or low OrSG water level shall be generated by using four (4) channels of level measurement and 2 out of 4 (2/4) logic for each actuation (Train A and B)... -
~..
4 16.
EEW control valve modulation shall utilize two (2) channels (one for each EEW control valve) of OrSG level measurement out of a total of four (4) channels.
However, EPW initiation on low water level shall be dependent upon a 2 out of 4 (2/4) logic. Capability shall be provided to bypass this initiation from the main control room.
e 17'.
Main feedwater (MEW) control shall be performed by the existing Integrated Control System (ICS).
Isolated fully compensated level signals from one (1) of the four (4) channels of level measurements shall be utilized by the ICS as described above. Main feedwater isolation upon high OrSG level shall be initiated by a 2 out of 4 (2/4) logic utilizing these same level signals. This shall be performed external of the ICS. Existing level instruments associated with ICS shall be removed.
18.
Main feedwater isolation shall also be initiated on a feedwater line break utilizing a 2 out of 4 (2/4) logic based upon differential pressure between main steam and feedwater system and by the Main Steam Line Rupture Detection System (MSIRDS). The MSLRDS also utilizes a 2-out of four -(2/4) logic for detection of main steam pressure below 600 psig.
19.
Two (2) safety grade wide range OrSG level indications shall be provided in the control room for each OrSG.
20.
A safety grade water level indication and low-low water level alarm shall be provided in the control rocm for each condensate storage tank.
21.
All instrumentation independent of the ICS and control equipment shall be cualified for operability during a Safe Shutdown Earthquake and, when instruments are to be located in the Intermediate Building, for the environmental conditions existing in the Intemediate Building following a main steam line break.
B.
bbdifications 1.
Deletion of the Main Steam Line Rupture Detection System
.(MSLRDS) Signals to the emergency feedwater control valves EF-V-30A/B.
(Couplete)-
The deletion of the MSMSDS signals to the EEW System improves the availability of the OrSG's as a heat sink
-9
and improves the reliability and capability of EFW flow to the MSG (s) during loss of normal feedwater flow.
2.
' Provide safety grade EEW initiation and main feedwater isolation on high main stear /feedwater differential pressure.
High main stieam pressure relative to main feedwater pressure is an indication of a main feedwater line rupture. mis indication along with low MSG level) anticipates failure of the secondary heat sink due to a main feedwater failure.
3.
Provide a safety grade MSG level instrumentation and signals for main feedwater (MEW) MSG high water level isolation and MSG low water level initiation of the EEW system.
The isolation of main feedwater on MSG high water level protects against MSG overfilling caused by failure of the feedwater control system within the Integrated
?
Control System (ICS).
4.
The control system shall be of dual setpoint design with the setpoints dependent on whether or not the reactor coolant (RC) pungs are running.
On loss of all four (4) reactor coolant (BC) pumps, the control system shall open and control the EEW flow control valves to maintain a higher MSG water level setpoint as required to achieve reactor natural circulation cooling within the Reactor Coolant System (ICS). If at least one PC pump is operating, the control system shall control CTSG water level to a lower setpoint sufficient for forced circulation ICS cooling.
5.
Provide a safety grade automatic control system independent of the Integrated Control System (ICS) that permits the Emergency Feedwater System to control MSG level without control interaction with the main l,
feedwater system.
6.
Upgrade the controls for the Main Steam Line Pupture I
Detection System to safety grade such that a single i
failure of the control system will not prevent isolation when required. W e probability of a single failure causing inadvertent actuation shall be minimized.
The MSLRDS shall identify a ruptured CTSG when the main steam pressure falls below 600 psig and shall then automatically isolate the main feedwater to that MSG.
. 1.
8.
Provide an overspeed trip alarm in the Main Control Room for the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump (TDEEWP) EF-P-l.
This alarm will provide indication of a loss of a portion of the EEW system.
9.
Provide an " alligator pit" flood detection alarm using safety grade components and a control grade main condenser hotwell low-low level alarm in the Main Control Room.
This modification will provide an operator with a control room alarm indicating a possible main feedwater line break.
10.
Evaluate the Emergency Feedwater and Engineered Safeguard (ES) Electrical Power, Control, and Instrumentation Cables that are presently routed through the alligator pit.
?
The EEW and ES electrical power, control and instrumentation cables need to be evaluated to determine their capabilty of performing their safety function after a main feedwater line break incident and subsequent alligator pit flooding.
11.
A portion of the existing EEW system controls is within the ICS. This interface is being replaced with the modification as identified in previous sections. CtrSG level measurements associated with the EEW system shall he provided to the ICS through suitable isolatien.
VI.
Miscellaneous Criteria A.
Electrical and Control Equipment E".vironmental Qualifica icn Equipment which is part of the EEW system or which is re:uired l
to act in support of this system and which is located in the Intermedi..te Building, shall either be upgraded to he qualified for the hostile environmental conditions resulting from a Main Steam Line Break (MSG) in this building c:.he replaced with qualified equipment er be relocated to an environmentally acceptable location which is otherwise suitable for their safety furction. -
9 B.
Maintenance
_ Maintenance of valves, instrumentation and controls shall be acc mplished in accordance with manufacturer's instructions and recomendations. Pipe routirg and equipment location shall be selected to facilitate maintenance and be consistent with the requirements of Section I.B.
C.
Surveillance and In-Service Inspection Inservice inspection requirements of ASME B&PV Code Section XI for system design and inspection apply to the design of these modifications.
The system shall be designed to allow functional testing of all new equignent during cold shutdown conditions. It shall also be designed to allow for periodic testing in accordance with the 'IMI-l Technical Specifications, Section 4.9.
'Ihe design shall be consistent with requirements of the 'IMI-1 Technical Specifications limiting conditions for operation of the turbine cycle, Section 3.4.
7 D.
Interfacing Systems These modifications require interfaces with the Main Feedwater, Main Steam, Condensate, Instrument Air and Class lE electrical systems as specifically identified in previous sections.
Charges to any of these systems shall not degrade the ability of these systems or any other plant sys; ems to perform their design functions.
E.
Testing Requirement Adequate provisions shall be made in the design of the system modifications to allow hydrostatic testing of the piping system, calibratien of instrumentation, and functional testing of the controls and alarms.
F.
Quality Assurance This modification is classified as Important to Safety.
Quality Assurance requirements shall be in accordance with the i
" Operational Quality Assurance Plan for 'Ihree Mile Island l
Nuclear Station, Unit 1," with.epecific requirements as indicated.
I l !
G.
Human Factors Human factors reviews of the man-machine interfaces shall be performed to aid in the develognent of the system modifications. 'Ihe interface points of type, location and arrangement of controls and display, system labelling,
. alarm / warning. system. logic,, maintenance requirements, and
. procedural guidelines shall be reviewed and documented.
H.
ALAPA
'Ihe design of this sytem shall implement AIAFA concepts for both the construction activities and for the operating and maintenance aspects of these modifications. The AIARA impact of these modifications on other systems and personnel access shall also be considered in the design of these modifications.
?
p __.- as GDU Nuclear Corporation r*
cute 4 S uth Mid letown. Peansylva".ia 17C57 019" 717 944 7621 TELEX 84 2386 Wnter's Direct Dial Nun.ber:
September 7, 1983 5211-63-250 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation A::::
F. Stolz, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No. 4 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission k'ashington, D. C.
20555
Dear Sir:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1 (TMI-1)
Operating License No. D?R-50 Docket No. 50-289 25 F Subcooling Margin The purpose of this letter is to infor= you of the results of recent reevaluations of instru=ent string error and the RCS physical configuration factor associated with the subcooling cargin =eni:or syste=.
In our let:er of March 31, 1983 (5211-83-017), GPUN indicated that a 25 F subcooling
.argin (SCM) action point for RCP trip was justified based on calculations perforced during accident conditions (i.e., 53 LOCA) which showed tha: the saximum string error for pressures greater than 300 psig is -18. o- (.,..e-)
/
_.t. e :
with an assuned 5 F physical configuration factor.
This factor was assuned
- c beund any difference be: ween the indicated pressure a: the he: 1ec pressure instru ent and :he actual pressure a
- he :cp of :he he: leg.
Since March, we have reevaluated both the physical conficuration fac:cr C
and :he string error.
These evaluations concluded tha the 5 ? physical configura:1cn., actor could be rec.ucec to less t:.an 1.
- (.e:. 1) :e scccun:
.w-for :he elevatica difference from the ins:ru.en: :1p te :he :cp of the
- u.....
n : <. :.n a.,.y, v:. L.,-
. c... < c... :
C...
..:.:...:..<et.c.c....
...u
..c.
s.
.s c
.=c.
- c. ;.s.e
, c.es.. m.,
e....a.eg
.u..,...
.a.. a s,...,.
.w.. u.. s... <
..w
..c...
-c
.....<-.. -.. e gc.u.
4.,e,.
<.=.,e.,e..y.gn a.
,,,ec
.,...-ynys
.w..
psi;.
'Jsing a very conservative R2 pump head ceid frac:icn cc relatier
/Kef. 2), :he head degradation is less than 1^7.
The instruran: err:r f er 51 '.0CA was reevaluated using nore censarvative assump:1cns and o
- ..... a e u>.c _e _a u
.nn.1 - (.e.;.
c, r
...:<a
........c...>
.c.c.
c.. u evalua:ed to be - 10.3 7.
These chan;es de n:: a :er zur ::nclusic
.ne
,o.r
.t. : a..w.cc.0>
s ub C o c.,.<. 3. c-. a... c C. a,.
a....C.
..C
..s.,
e..
3
.c.
.... 7
..... <a 6.
ce r. r. (..
b u ~. '. 's. e ';' d o
"..e".d.#.# v *. b a
- s o... r 4 -.. ". e, =.3
'e
.'..a.. r ra e -.' :0-s Se u.
~;
.s in A1.AS-7 29, da t e d May 2 6, 1c 6 3.
The Appeal 3:ard 2; eed wi:h :he ^f r c
.... c.. ".,,.0 V I ; *<.. e.,. sn. e t.
...c
.e. v. c.. < C.,
e.**
r*
w
- h.n
..._..e....u...c-....e..e...
e.. e e. : s.; ".
(u,,
e e ya.1 ~., 2....... a..
.u...,...
. u....e.
.......:.....c.t..g.
u a.
az.
G3U NU Isar CCfporation is a SUOSi:.a'. Of '99 GG Wa Oc t.i.7 L:1!:eS COTO!3t ~
Mr. J. F. Stolz 5211-83-250 exceeds 20 F during SB LOCA conditions, but is entirely offset by the conservatism in the physical configuration f actor.
Consequently, our conclusion that the 25 F action point is appropriate remains valid.
Sincerely, f
H. D. Hus111 Director, TMI-1 HDH:LWH:vj f cc:
R. Conte J. Van Vliet Ref.
1.
GPUN Calculation 1101x-5450-015 (Attached) 2.
EPRI Report (NP2578) "Two Phase Performance of Scale Models of a Primary' Coolant Pump", dated 9/82, p. 6-12 3.
GPUN Calculation 11014-322B-009, Rev. 2 & 3 (Attached) 4.
GPUN Calculation C-1101-655-5350-001 ( Attached)
P 9
-w,-
r
-m
<-w-,
--w n
In PLI Nuciccr c..,c / /d/A -3.@ -0/f I OF e
t SHEC NO SUBJECT
. 4 66^4bM....Mj $..b.
kSM*.
DATE.
AN
.. M "....
?
CHK'O BY A E..#"I Y
t y'
m
~
r f.,%
(
h *d (sr -.}
.,a 4-v Y
dn.T " N frc-t.0m S Y + \\.
O o x; ~
c y T T:
S C H ( sd c m a)
N$
.M hsN wL W&J e GG-Cv tc fL b.
d fb W
me o
Q C t.
[
M%
fM O
k b
C es-CN t r.
10 f.
Y l 8
.E -
WEc -
% f.
a h @T
't
. 7 IO
/
w tk b i f f
97j(,.
f e
i'
(
f j /.f., \\ $ % ct i Cy N
'M L
-+e +6 TE fq eq w c~p e
-C 4 o
[,-:ek M C
% 3>ca L yn +,,
ie 6 f =.5 3 D,i' f-L W 4
+
$1H cV ACOO 0016 :a.a e
Ud Nucicer
,..sc//gf-5gg,-id S H EET N O......D. O F... I..
SUBJECT.
DATE.
..k.k..[.
.k..
COMP BY/DATE.. 7[N./ 3 5'b CHK'D. SY/DATE.d.4J6..T[.4..
$ - $L cfe:In La yi %
xL.
L 4bak "r% q i= W " &.2-r Claiu e 033L.
y = p,o iLn.,,
( 7m 3 -1 C, eje a43)
G Up =
- 0. 0 ! H 1 * '/ll -
G
'
- F ^ ( Ic~ A p im C 90 kF
- 0. ca 6 t9 SVih CO 2 2 0 o fa
~
w d c7 f m1 S
Ck = 3l,w L = ta Sr.
Td4 6 -t r 4 cm p
f=0.cne > 3G" FQe 66Lf H%
/2c. = i)vP
'3'W' *f
=
y 3,<. n e. o. i Se p - o. I c' %eide P e -- A-3 7
p,v.,.c c d f = 3, g (,,(b c. cts 86 10 (7/e,c ) e o. c266f" r c C3 G y_
. clW-
/V k I. Y- + 2.lo G
2 2c cpm
%, p psc
-6 c
oy
- 3. I C - to xo.ollbuc-( % c )t.41Hf
.casim (gyc
.- 0. % ' 3.b
=
- 4. 4
( a 6
w t' a AOOO 0016 e s.e c
~
e e,
Nuciocr se. // ?/ #-IE8 C.' f~
- e S H E E* N C...... f... O F....
. [..$. [.!.d.
SU3JEOT DATE.
OCMP BY/DATE.
. NC fl..
OMWD. BY/DATE M&8.s.flQ.
F.% -
M M C-f k
'i L 4-4 d
T3x cC: p.- u G
s f = d Q pu O
civT l.3 F
-A P y Tc' 3 c-o fs; r ( }_cu < 2
( rw~ 'Te gM itcf)
AJ rde-T
- o. 3
- F J
[ L~ r u WY 1 l C"3 fIs A Y
N wt-w ee h.
M td k
a ( M
- t. 3 ' t--
ACOO 0016 ti ec
' h- '- d P'.u :::l oo r.'
!.^. '. 3.2.-t...-c.: : c 4
s,
. u...e..
e f..
s... ~
.a.... h....,.. h..!.,.,. e. ; e. '... (.Y.. :..v*
~
=.
5',....,
gt w
W
.........A..s.,.:..-
.....i. ~1
.2.. '..:.
(,.
..,A..
i
.C#.*l.
'h, CCME E Y/CAYE. j.,-
w.............,:...:..
- t. o m.......
- m.. n,w. g<.,.'r..u.,...,,.
/
'f
.i e --,,,
o.
'L
~.7 l7offp' cr.:.
p^
g' v-;Sy v n/--- ;W, rph:;__
QG i
v t.__
(. a, x..._ /
'. m.
m.
q.
- g..
g
-y 1.,,
.J n
.p.
n2-m) r.
.,_c. j....-
'ocue em._1.j..z.i.3..., u... 3 6
,n._ W I.c.,.J., h'_.
.._.ry,W,A,//.
{%:
.to S su) M.c.a,-c.%
9
_.. _.. _.I2,,l T, I ~7
../ s p l :~; -(
TI9 a. ord
_L.-c.k.d...a.ac:.r. :s cf.Q. d.e>
- c. ~c u
jC.20C./' E h & m. -e*-.d.y$c i
- h.D c
('. C.
f w.
Y. 5 t',U d.: 1/
Y I
- c n.c. 4 i l >. ~2,
Gi s..e
. : -...t.
?.A U17e~p :
fL. he]~1 sls -....
p
- k", a \\W
_ _f / D W-* -)
_y
. I '.
T Ii.~
0*t 'CM.
~~
h ny,.L.. i in U., J Mve %c _.:~, o 2
!. 1 "
I e LS-
....T" f / o ' (~7.N ACT E
- _ cop,p'
__ J, 0 0 7. d'.\\ c).) La '.,..s;! is.x.. Jpd-y I /,.2 C.rt.k...
- ,o-.
. ". ?.l_.. -
-
- O~ 5'.i " (\\ (g a.
~
.aCC.. :-
vi:'-l-c.
~
o.,5p siY t".5$< :.: L**. fr.r.'-:b-
. fcw
.?
. ::cc e r.,
-m.<
?2E,.:::
sm w.
ru ". a-.--~ j i -a L s:
w :. eq., LA.:
~./.13 c.com.
.:./ 5
.,/o
,. 2 r,
J., 1 c s ia
.>-- h.s.c.
.l _.
/< s.<A t IS-
.:- t.o.
Lr',
As.ym.. ' a 11," sp,,;,,. &9:... g, o o 2.. __ =, o c.1 O 7.).
?,n. i.,.w
.':... w.i 4 i.~ -
=,/
~ oS3
^.. :- )
.ci?.Js :a.
= %."
. l1..
i :.a.d.
<CCI
- b C3.1
- ~M* ?
-h y '.'.~0 ~~ % =,. s..
. :pc A' c. cx a #
I
$"Y f.A,/
$t&p4=r -
ik L,1 c's J - N U M
{c
'*~."E.*
'~
Ls. d se _p.-~ m'u '.
t-
.M o ccut' u t
~7, t ?-
.:', ! O
.' i. c
- r... t.,..
J., i,, e
. _...., ~.
.~~L:-I
., t 5'
.:i, i O
.' [.
/iA.rc.v wi s
.n l..,_
,/ : '_ y
_ - j 0 w.j.,.... 'Ts.-r 9 r
.00 2.
-r
~~-
- 1,.
w--..,
~
- g-l3 s a
.. <-,...ont ~
_1
.~
,..s
......... =.
=.....
g
...,4.
a n-
.4.-.
ACOO 0016 i t.s c -.
+
o
_t m
. l /~: M N U CI'3Or
-~.
... C : <-
rs.
s.,EETt<c. L.
- .r. ;.
e.,.....
-t-.
DA g, b*,. '...
CO # BY/0 ATE, CHK'D. BY/CATE fTr t /v) t*/*W
- dcJtC26,
/ 2
'3.
L,I
's
/ /
,t
.f
,, w
- t. ~..,. : 4
,,e.-.
ei,
-~p v, 2 +
v, + v c)..
s Q
M 88-
- y g
- f.'",~ $' b; i I (' 'L
~!~
/ 1
-i.-
t y)j.
k
- / + r'i
~'
)
~
[$
t
.-.,,,J.,,,
fp (
3
% '. L#
g I
,',,;,,,~
~--
i
.,.4., )
' - = * *
'%e f
/
,,5,
.' ~.
h p'
Q g
fi C07 --l, CCl L,Q)
/ll M
' / o s'
~~~
4 -l
~'
0 5 :; 033 + a.r.253., p
.:-. ', (.
- /
s' p
h~j ee
./
'g (,,.
y
'g b
+
4
. (m. 'f,l, I.
=
- I
% t.nCl s.,,.
a
.h. -
,.*s
[Of
~
n.
~
. - A sd
' ',' g
==
r
~. q i s, a
+/+
s a
an.a g
M N M M
' k M. [*.S A
- M 7
=,O33 6@E g
l
=~~
-fy-fr~n.
.~ < s
" r '>~ %
l2.c )
~
.$q/. M e
,~~ /
.h
- ](n**
--r,; a.n
=,5
.=. wi.
o
--p c.a e E~. N
-*- *~
T ' s ~~m.
Lj(.
/*
'd p.4
" = ~
j
,f f
.n"
< * ?<
, l(,q
,m
% y.
f,9
?,
l (p } -
.,b V ';
=*= C g.
e.-
'i f-5 f
s.
a gJ.r.
.p_
aw 1
=.;
- m:y
.., t zR,,:* s-g~
s
- P a***-
d, 9
,.4 m; ~ :
M e Aooo oaw s a.e c 9
.,f..y.7l
. (. -.. _.
C g
s,.
..g..,.
...y,s :, ;
j*..
.. a.
p...
.e F
'* W h Nucioar
- v.v
..:.z.i.
c -
SHE E* NC.U.
. OE SUEJEOT......
,A75, C O!.*
SY/C ATE.
c.
y, rE.
S ~7 t m e.:-rc~
wucn (3)I
<:/v e
~~
h TL F
V I,f t
(~.l-Av)\\ P_. 4
/,1*b) f% ty i 't.
'~
.gitt) i N
~
' r.
3 'T U
- (7'.
la.py\\ \\ '-
ly )\\ t u I:
I
$.j '
- d..} p 9n., ( t 8
< os )(
N r
l
(< OD j,1!:nf.; '~ [,ttp +, irp ju z
', _' r' m
-(2,; tg I Q/7(F 3
J'
.I e.fre r 7
~
--l 2 5, k-l% 4-
' 4
+ +- W Ip.V p,u t o O
i s
j su
~~ ~. ~
{f z.,,m, ) 2
,1 5.)s e croc r*
v ris.
~~~~
'"~" # /R D
I-sy a
bDe.Ac E 9 O bj.
=.5~
Es. ?>
(3c')
v a{Pq (e n cos, & - n d~u
T
- n..
- b-
-l G o s c-)
a r
i
~
_T Ep(C C.
((
. &[.-;[
,s
- -m cz_r3 f,m (D C)2.%
O <5 Vu
- <2 5
= < D t 'h
. fy
..._. _. 5 &.
/M b Ir,)
~
y t *)
A000 0016 t a.s c
- /
w.
h <
n n
,q wrs N u ^v h%r.
e'
' ':r
' ~ ~ - ~ -
74 0.
S c..e. N.m,
/
SUBJEOT.
DATE I'N CCMk B Y/D A TE.
\\
- s..........
CHK'O. BY/D ATE
- rse v... s c.5.. 1.'2.
t l i T'
.-.)....
()W OfO
../..
s Q
, <c-
.-.., 3 n
/'2.
1
?...../.=/2.
.e-
- r M 7.
. =.
.,.. V. I.,
.,J,
e i.
/ 1 / *.. t I L. -(
~.
-o A C.2.
2f 9 25 i
~...
x, l}WJf,./3Y*, A
- hCA.
C4./,4 kpw. k
, s'"*C*S' *?
''*-VN'%~'$*.,!hff ib h@ -(4,4*C4. f'uJA.
s 9,.r_
2 ut,, m,- -
ne,s, v ~
. m e,.;
.,x.
t.e :
r (2. z.z.w-J
+./
, /
o,.
- Y.'
".~
%.?,
.,.z,., ',
- n.._DSu
..M A..t,1
.i
~:
se. d I c.6..L.5~..... _.... _
/g y
J.
,G, s (36
.c d-
...4,/
o c. 7
(.pr)
I.5""
7p3 rr
/ -
--..., o G l
/2.r )
.. -\\.) t.7 5-r.I&1 O. Q.....
In.
O --)
e--
sw
_Dgut.c.E...l.
~
- (c.
.-?*t- @ $
W i DOM W' K-sacn G-t.'.W Lff,,
te @ $~
, 00 3 '3 % (?.C.' fo's A N ' /, t r) c t.u rs,~G
~'
~~
f u'v*#- w) p-wq bc7crim irJE Looe
, fCCw? A c./
M 7 >/ q,,e bf*Y sGOu TI'
.~
~.......
h3(C4- /7 1
f j/ O_.
I Qg '
.jk 7 F r $~. -. -.. ;~ r 'bY.,**
- 2..v""i j
o
\\]'l-;;
di 2.f
. O 2,S
[.C.- ).
n j
.. s. h & l Q'.').
- ~~'g' a r'.y.
,~
g
~. -
t, g,
3 1
ADOO 0016
- to o --
$.u..'.. ] '*....
...o H es 9tOO COOY
- ~ '
~'
~
g,
} '~
Jo Q'+
,e f, ^, %. e y
= -.
r-GC2) V q\\'5.',e)
. ")T
+
f -
~"
t
.2 f
_1 b7O'
~7"
.h p'
--l-
. (% #
4 7
'y' -
?_
.3 L / --
2 g 2 t t., /.
- (l. H, T.
L ") h ;,-
t
>3 f,,
s
)
1 QC/
+- ! 8 l '
- - l-.*1t! + Q G' L. -
'~
3Ji a / '7/' f 7g
[%)
s 7
YG D
QQ)*
q t
w w
JOJD
. ~..
L e g-
"2
- 9., '
,,1O' ( L/s[,/, ~~.
') ) b y*
~~
o M*.v,6 (I,I-l r
h 00 S ) T (U j s
hl t
coflj -
+
/V3 '.
Z 1\\
Ij\\
q q\\
f
- ttals, s.o St+At l
'~
l %g+s. asj e,/s 4
~2. (, y r
~h
- 'A-1J?P
'2. (-
~~iCL =
Li
.. se,.'<nw 5 /g -
r r
r-i o
('2.) h 1 i-L, f,_
I-
" % ?.Ohl
( 7 I) c.%.
_S i.,
\\
')
2y i
~2
/
]
S
' 'J +
- .L q
-t-D'n + -% + ~h +th1,-i L
~
g
/
i
'7.
(
~
, ?'l~
l."Y=')'+f,,'(621 y
+ ~?.,b ).J. &
~
c'x7~
c/
JCJJD
~
s 31v0/A9 C.MHO
++ -
e:.,;
~ 31vC/A9 a. 4CO 4-givo
............. 10 3. E n 3 30
' '"' ON 13 3 ws
~
4.:., -:
- " o v:
.seolonN W
. - ~.
l
- E NUCI#
crt. uo....,? ' *. ~ L '
~ ~ ' '
C-;EET NO.
C:
.c E'J1JE O T....
OATE.
i CCU.7 BY/CATE.
-w..
eng C. BY/C ATE 1
k f,,/
f j
- /"rb
\\ Lt t
m I
'T
--' e 4
/
4lI "cca s
p g
4 e E t 1W.*f. L :-.
Ipn';, J. (p..w, r:. 7 Q.,m,p,=
i o
ra y& C l'L/F C
~,W, f CC( 1M f===
2
[NDI@YN h,
C&
m <., o
(;V J
,, o.
Z{e }
1 k
i e
i 1
4 i'.
A 4
t
.~
1i f
I 1
O
~
1 t
t.
AOOO 0016 : se 4
..e-e
.,c:/ =
.O W.! Mucicar zu,:.y:.goff fgg R-cd svur:T.N~.l. 86.r#$9M. dP_4/M...hu/foj..
- ), I~s /j.'E.d3.
~< ~ '
4-COMP. BY/DATE..h[
...h.h.
b..
.0
- A.$. h.
CHg*. BY/DATE,r)
)b v
i 3
/3
/4 g
g
'1*
rr we r/r n
TJ l
/f' g
qso f eg L._
T.:-
9 81
/.2 iV
- T pr s
25ac ps,4 (ig m, -
- - - -.t
& S 'PE UIStoA) is 'Rccw RE b )5EdAusf SL) i~ w n s M r A S L f
& ACNtWS T+JC 69Lf-uc6TED ACdL k./9a y' fcs/2-MotuLCS /,0,2 5 I.
7imts/ME FQ R788 opru succrs: AT Fua kac 6:c's) ne uop mucy. er u ouLc was wona as c. c3% (c.?:71).
Br>scDed Tkt.s DATA A e%i24iAs of 33%.ug s 14 Coco 75 inc I,L,3 Le=?
/AisceAAcf To 'Cchuc fr 3G~Adzug.fcyof
.847a A.
YHf PE!V 1005 dac.cuCAnct.) of 7eJt: 1.c c f to c c u c c o f, 3 0 ' f E P AnActf!Gft ~841'soEEA) HcCOLES 3 L I3 Ascos. 7~J1$ AM Fe-r:/2-
,9PPeeks ou dpc;n Ls=p DMMM 18-ac ?/C 2C/ 5 30r NOT ou SCdM.IR9-3 &k: Dw$ oy 4:7 9 ~5 LIC ~*[ V - D 6*/
791s pouct w: ucr in.sTs,u st avc :~~3 d&Cm 20 neo 84r' 13d' L/SGL r.;e. rcd.
Us7C:
$AWUf.ATOUb Qpia % ne. FQ'm wbc.O., 7: 'A -Ari 1%Out.S* J3 3 c-m.
y pnc 4.c.
f41 3 n e e.
t C. 5c
- C.333 D C.\\
' cask T"'wTsa'L.
J. f 3 Jtv
- C. To i 4,22 3 UC3 s.W hs.2./~.60/vmcu ?.s f
S.,p v~
L0U Z C. C d [ ic
%pu - v'-
T,; j,g ;-
- C. Su
- C.ts ? (tc)
.'. e c vwc s Fu Ust '-
VOQ)L[ {&
lNE.G" b cEv.@2E p,4
- 0.s o
- .123 0 -)
ve. sa w.a w m
.1 o. I o c.00 (;c)
T:50 9 2 5 E*c"10 g,p
- 0.50
- c. I 67 ( 'C j 4.?, JCT h 505 AEC E55*
,,q
,,5 C 2 C. 'O ('tj
%:x.x'# d M C U 056D-
.. \\C '11.
.S
- 2i CSc~D AOOO 0016 u se r-
~
w.
4i :.
E' N uciear y; l/4,'.f.5 n 3 ;; 9 e,
SMEC NC.. b...
O:. 4..
SUBJECT DATE.. T.* b5..T3.,
COMP BY/DATE.
CHiCD. BY/DATE
$G t ElidibR Es. kwucs M 4 H-9 /-
I r-s 2
s 2
TAR *R (2,fli *
[Ais)t (Ag) & (Lig) + (%) + (%3+()- (Ti2
- I~-)
'I I(.333)s+ (.333)s
+ (.333)s (.cv.7)i [.ot3+.!:,7,)st (.L74.l!.'7)'l s 4
! O.7 15 70 -
=
DE \\,t,3, = 1.M (3c~)
A C' r f3 (2,34) : I. I '.
S TRtu e> E F to %. I,'1.,3,13 t 14-
,s
- 2. ' "-
D.C
~
(Et2.02 12 3!
'.Eu$ uta is
(.56[+(.715)
L.v nexe 9 u...
T)p (cumu. 6) 57:
- 3. 5 3 O c' g
'9adsorrio 3 i 5%
- l. 4 7 0d bc0ti II An C O.f'c
' J,231 (C r)
Lu t 0.5
" 12 ?G (ed Va
- C. !L 5
- O.o M O F en C.f; 1 C. /4 7 ('G AOOO 0016
- sc
Iw I Huclear
//clefJ:: 1-u?
- .:. ye.
SHEET NC 1.
.O~
h.
SUEJECT.
DATE... T..9.5*E.1..
COMP. BY/DATE,
CHK'D BYrATE w
Metod l'A o, t_
Ais 0.5 f.33 3 C2.r) h
.5 r. I '. '7 Ci N
%.2.
5
- . \\ '.'? (.i c- )
./ (_ a C. 2. 5
- .as
'R1 h
+.\\
oc
~\\
h to,= W A e.1 or
.\\
Metou;15 Ag
- E
!.33 3 (tr';
'R is
- .i
- . cc.7 (:.e-)
MG r1
- .067 C:.r)
Nts I,5
- . l f.? (ie T't5
- 1. 5 2.i b7 Cic)
Ma boi5 16 bis
- .o05
- .00353 ed Lw I.cc 5
. cc 33 3 (e-)
Y=td D h \\**)
ls O
- bl l's
^% r) i,5 333 C.r)
Y )")
! *25
- .e&S :c) in
.5
- . p7 (ir) l I
l i
l l
4b1r warso
/,,<.c ;c.c.c 7 $MS-C - o_Y T ~ ; A-K-6
%: :.sur-.- :m, - :, i:
.L c m % n 6 ~ m o= k'L.
i l
l l
l l
AOOO 0016 ::.s e l
i
,n
n.
fW Nuclear A.
Nw,../ /:/.u. 3..;.p y.c - ?
.(
SHEET NO. h.
C8 SU JECT, DATE.
. $--E6. ?.I'.3.
COMP. BY/DATE.,
CHCD. BY/DATE EREete l.oep = f(T/Fe)% + (h) & (An)% +(La )
Y 17 i"
Til
- Y $
7)
Y 4NgY
[$
u f
av
/
g,,
IL) 15
?
- 5 E
O.c /
(
I'2-i D
I7 Y
O
(* 14, r (1.L?) i- (.3 33)%
- - (,3 33.) 7 (S.33)et.
=
. [ 4 **.lb ) Y,f b 7 Y, O b k) ~h" (,lb 7 Y,!b 7 "", b 7
,lb 7) cur + c13N3 nf +(.m) w.co.)-
+
l' e =
? {.LG)*+{,333)~+ h /,9I
~
U
- i. 4 M /+ -
=
\\
ES t C. ND b I g % "" ) b -
=r
-k-M_
m -
-.1 er
, t 7 YE h E d<.O k 8 E MC2.I.0cp - f.s,fiCH,'.7e. E h C0%
i 4,'L\\ y, +, c.
=c
-i
=
e UN YA D
- /d coa o4 au tJ
=**
Tu w =a c a - t +.21 % i roc ': spa a )
=
j_ve,c-4 c c - eg. j % - /s
+e v
t
.u -
l rs ; L C,fr-T'EC - 11. I F
T AOOO 0016 i t-e t
&Ea ~
- a.; ~; l~'Y'i~ ~!E~
E# ~# ~
M HUClear SA ut2F7?cvJ ///Ed6//v' $0fJt"~0fC Na-$s 2 h - C, _,
g,g--
/ffod //t./GLys.i - kbij $cciDr"7
- Y?:-/
E-
~
5 ~ D ~~~ ^
/
2 3
/2
/h U )-
V f/c" -- ///,
1
/'t
7d -- -
o,.-
g -- ' -.- - -. D: / (>
l 7
?
//
/2.
\\-
\\v/
- / 0 c.'s y"a C
Pf
. *k~ - 'Yh) - -. - - -.
-r.,'y n 4o ~s //M/6
h lJ k ~//,;oiUf.I l.1 c G t./IIECQ /bG C h-U[t
$ U k [ ())R: G 'bj' E%{
~
i9c wie /r Z~C. d 3 7s //c c.< ods4c 7,Fea Vcd/c e.: /, Z f 3 @ /// C c)
'70
[C C /7/oDyc G;,
Sif.') f 2c)Jl G i a N [- re'/N 4 O lh il P.) r2
/,2 f.~s C F.T G 2.C"7 %. /7.c /Q,7,0 sea / Win-rw~ % d4u-TM N: 7 r
- s-
/
o ftlS M C2 7Aiwi.,.X 7 ~.T72i" 6 52,20/?. CJF 2 0 24;~'/ ha.:= loc. A CQ i9 anico Est:per: pmpw.a ne7w vs Dev.:ec3iG.
A 8otM ~ / trv.r A/nt'c p / 5;e styjycD'W: C'J 6f1:/fd 4 => c.,*? 4//t-Mt:v>n
/0- 6 va-t/2.>. T ACs/ 3 l' cay //c7 w [c: c'ri;- / z 7-M i.a ;;
C 4 Alo?2. - 22 /= ~ ff?' - E i//!-/. '7~ 7 ; ///GV4.s kl/*J /al:7 /$/J ~ac t ET.i-sVs atc <i /;*.5 Q../7/iEu/t ~ //dr*f 8G~ //L=~6 c 227it./ ~
/
/.Ar/,. f u n V-e; /scwas.<.y
.:o. z. r
- G/G~'[2G /
So f,5 Bit t**y 50 1 >~
- ..., O { ?. S,
~)**f Qst:stirsucc -
.N./2[f/cy'5, O
'W. l~ i*^ - ~ *'.s CfC/ryts5M<!'
I 6 if (4%fasj b.od'a.fu,2,eA y 6,=~PEc7 /v'i ow Gidw fo/t $di//N/r.//r/4 hs,//cE
/f =s:~EC7.s, hee AA-717/w-
/
67'cc
//(.)/ X.3 2 2 5 ~C'O ?
/5 ace :ew
l
& Nuclear
- ..: ~c l-it-i c'U-53; a-:. -
5-EE sc 1.E.E:-
- E
- v: sv:A s
- - :av:.
t G ) N t/!aj$ 2 dii)' + 2h. -- U..<;..---
A 7!5 ff 17) f-A"f?Nd"l'-
?
9 7
f V 7 ) ' t { 2 ( D? + 27z t 7'.- t ? 7,', ( / ;., ' +
- C, :, 1 (' A :
I 7'-( t Kc) ' t :,, D G.:,.
-- (.. R,- ; ; ;-
- /
i
[_fh Etxe.it
Z
-/-g g 2-tr sf Sp wn~
~
=-
O./47) 0 /C1) N 0 312)' +{0.?: 3 ) ' + l'0 8 % [ 0 C C V
[c 1:3) ~'
, t.
s-
+- ( O 2fj + 6 33 2 ) % !D o uf *7 ) 'L G
- G C'7 }
l I
4 C El's ? (Cr: :
? I.s'N' 5'x o.7) ) E 2 2 c. 7 -
c., a
+}a
-+ o. 2.
1
/ cap caw. = -: ' 2. ] a ola
/Je vanc. = /40 sm D
.i n EcA-oa
~l 17
..-70 ro o,e fem 3 Mey c-gitoA
=-
i/C. 95*/
/-?cun a h us,-rw si,seaw= noum o - /4
?: '?
l aCCO OOM
,, -. -. - - -,. -