ML20080A201
| ML20080A201 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1983 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8307250230 | |
| Download: ML20080A201 (2) | |
Text
-
5 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY.
hHNA[obod^'iNNESSEE 374o1
~
- f 400' Chestnut tLMet Tower.II 83 JUL 19 Al0 : F41715' 1983 BLRD-50-438/82-60 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn:
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303~
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
+
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - WESTINGHOUSE LOW VOLTAGE SWITCHGEAR -
BLRD-50-438/82 FINAL REPORT i
The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE Inspector Don Quick on August 23, 1982 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 1948. This was followed by our interim reports dated September 21, 1982, and April 4, 1983. Enclosed is our final report.
If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
Very truly yours, l
l TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 1hh
)
L. M. Mills, Manager
{
Nuclear Licensing Enclosure cc:
Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commisssion Washington, D.C.
20555 t
Records Center (Enclosure)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 i
, _ _. b, tfg PD
(>b'FIC f b5 An Equal Opportunity Employer
ENCLOSURE BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 WESTINGHOUSE LOW VOLTAGE SWITCHGEAR BLRD-50-438/82-60 10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency The affected low-voltage switchgear was supplied by Westinghouse, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. During a test of the HVAC chilled water pump, the 1EX2-A switchgear failed to trip when power 'ias lost inadvertently.
Upon restoration of power, the pump motor was activated without benefit of component cooling water or lubricant because the low-voltage switchgear associated with these systems did trip thereby preventing unintentional reenergization.
Consequently, the HVAC chilled water pump was burned out.
An investigation has revealed that the cause of the deficiency was the insertion of a DC fuse block incorrectly in the low-voltage switchgear.
The incorrect configuration resulted in an open circuit which, in turn, prevented the switchgear from tripping.
Safety Implications The cited DC fuse blocks are used in a variety of electrical class IE safety-related systems. Consequently, should a similar fuse block be inserted incorrectly on a safety-related system, a loss-of-function of safety-related components is possible, thus adversely affecting the safety of operations of the plant.
Corrective Action
~
TVA has elected to matchmark the subject fuse blocks in the switchgear subject to this deficiency with a strip of white or fluorescent paint approximately 1/4-inch in width. The fuse blocks will be matchmarked with the fuses in the "on" position. This will ensure that the operator can readily distinguish the correct position of the fuse block upon insertion and will both correct and prevent recurrence of the subject deficiency.
Corrective actions will be complete by August 31, 1983.
1 l
?
. ~ - - -...
-,