ML20079N735
| ML20079N735 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 10/29/1991 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20079N730 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9111110368 | |
| Download: ML20079N735 (5) | |
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\\ ***+*/ SAFETYEVALUATIONBY_THE,0FFICLOF,NUCLEARREACTOR,REGULATI.ON R3ATEDTOAMENDMENT_NO.172TOFACILITYOPERATINGLICENSENO.DPR-59 POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES,A._F1TZPATRICK,N[} R @WERf M NT DOCKET NO. 50-333
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated July 9,1991, the Power Authority of the State of New Ynrk (the licensee) submitted a request for changes to the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear PowerPlant,-TechnicalSpecifications(TS)
The requested changes would revise Table 3.2-7, " Instrumentation That Initiate 3 ?ccirculation Pump Trip,"_and-Table 4.2-7, " Minimum Test and Calibration Fn dency for Recirculatica Pump Trip," to reflect a modification to the Reactor Water Recirculation Pump Trip (RPT) system logic. The logic for the system was changed as part of the modi'ications required by 10 CFR 50.62, " Requirements for Reduction of Risk from Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) Events for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants."
2.0 BACKGROUND
On July 26, 1984, theCodeofFederalRegulations(CFR)wasamendedtoinclude Section 10 CFA 50.62, "Roquiremen;3 for Reduction of Risk from Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) Events for Light Water-Cooled Nuclear Powe*
Plants" (known as the "ATWS= Rule"). An ATWS is an expected operational transient (such-aslossoffeedwater,lossofcondentervacuum,orlossof offsite_ power) whi;n is acco:apanied by a failure of the reactor trip system (RTS) to shutdown the reactor. The ATWS Rule requires specific improvements in the design and operation of connercial nuclear power facilities to reduce the likelihood of failure to shutdown the reactor fol' ainq anticipated transients, and to mitigate _the_ consequences of an ATWS event.
For each boiling water reactor, three systems are required to mitinate the consequences of an ATWS event.
1.
Itmusthaveanalternaterodinjection(ARI)systemthatisdiverse
_(from the reactor trip system) from sensor output to the final actuation devices. The ARI system _must have redundant scram air header exhaust re11able-manner and be independent (gned to perform its function in a valves. The ARI system must be desi from the existing reactor trip system) from sensor output to the final actuation device.
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It must nave a standby livid control system (SLCS) with a minimum flow capacity and boron content equivalent in control capacity to 86 gallons per minute of 13 weight percent sodium pentaborate solution. The SLCS and its injection location must be de31gned to perform its function in a reliable manner.
3.
It must have equipment to trip the reactor coolant recirculating pumps automatically under conditions indicative of an ATWS. This equipment must be designed to perform its function in a reliable manner.
The licensee modified the logic of the reactor water recirculation pump trip actuation instrumentation during the 1990 refueling outage to comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.62. The primary objective of the logic change was to maintain or improve reliability of the trip logic while providing a desigr. with on-line testability. The modified RPT system is designed to trip both reactor recirculation pumps on high reactor pressure or low reactor water level in the event of an ATWS. The actuation logic is one-out-of-two-taken-twice from pressure signals or one-out-of-two-taken-twice from level signals.
3.0 EVAltlATION The proposed amendment to the James A. FitzPatrick Technical Specifications (TS) updates Tables 3.2-7 and 4.2-7 to reflect the stated changes to the logic of the Reactor W3ter Recirculation Pump Trip (RPT) System. Specifically, the minimum number of operable channels per trip system would be changed from one to two. Furthermore, the required action statements to be implemented when channels become inoperable would be revised to read:
Action A When the number of c erable channels is one less than the required number of operable channeh per trip sys. tem for one or both trip systems, hours.
restore the inoperable channel to an operable condition within 72 If not restored within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, place the inoperable channel in a tripped condition within one hour.
If placing the inoperable channel in the tripped condition would result in a recirculation pump trip, take Action C.
Action B When the number of cperable channels is two less than the required number of operable channels per trip system for one or both tri) systems, either restore at least one channel per trip system to an opera de status within one hour er place the inoperable channels in the tripped condition within one hour.
If placing the inoperable channel in the tripped condition would result in recirculation pump trip, take Action C.
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i Action C If Action A or B is not completed within the allowed tice, be in the start-up/ hot standby n.oce within the next six hours.
1he ATkS-RPT logic consists of two trip syst ams to complete the
- Reactor Low Level' trip function and two trip systeus to conclete the "peactor High Pressurt" trip function. The actuation of both trip systeros in either the reactor low leul logic, or the reactor high pressure logic will result in a trip of both recirculation purt.ps. Each trip system consists of two instrument channels in a parallel configuration. With a one. cut-of-two-taken-twice trip logic arrangen,ent, a single channel being inoperable in ene or both trip systes.s will not it.hibit a recirculation
> ump trip dut ing~ an A1WS event.
furthennure, a channel can be pl6cto in tle trippeo corAtion for one of the trip systerrs without causing an ATke-RPT actuation. This trip logic ensures that the instrumentation would be anilable in case of an ATUS event by using a design whit.h is reli6ble and which is testable while the reactor is at power.
When the number of operable channels is one less than the required nunber of operable channels pur trip system for one or both trip systems a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Limiting Condition f or Operation (LCO) has bten esthblished, ihisLCOis appropriate since with a one-out-of-two-taken twice icgic, a single charnel being inoperable in ore or both trip systems will not inhibit a recirculation pun.p trip der'.ng an ATWS event.
Furthernere, the LCO provides acequate tine to restore the channel to operable and return tFe recirculation pump trip logic to its full complement of cperable channels.
If not restored withiu within one hour. perable channel must be placed in the tripped condition 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, the ino When the number of operable channels is two less than the i
required number of operable channels per trip syster4 f or one or both trip systems-there is the potential fcr a failure of the ATWS-RPT actuaticr.
capabi1Ity. Therefore, a more restrictive one hour LCO has been established to restcre at least one channel per trip system to an operable status.
If not restored within one hour, the iroperable chantels must be placed in the triF-M condition within one hour. The NRC staf f concludes that the probability ci a_ f ailure of the ATWS-RPT actuation coincident with an ATWS event is very low ano thus the one hour LCO is appicpriate. Action C has been added to Table 3.2-7 such that if either of the stated LCOs cannot be L
satisfied, the plant n.ust be brought to the start Lp/ hot standby n.ooe within the-i next six hours. The NRC staff finds the proposed actions taken, in response to l
inoperable instrument channels, ensure that the rectreulation pum) trip system L
is available to mitigate the con #equences of.an ATWS event. Furtiermore, the proposed actions are consistent with the proposed Standard Technical L_
Specifications being--implemented in the Irproveo Technical Specification L
Program.
L TS Table 4.2-7 is being revised to require instrunent channel checks at 't I
minimum frequency of once per day, an instruttent channel functional test of the l
trip unit cnce every 31 days, tilp unit calibration every six ntnths, channel u..
. calibration once every opu cting c)cle, and a simulated automatic actuation and logic functional test once evs ry operating cycle.
These test and calibration frequencies are consistent with the FitzPatrick TS for Core and Containment Cooling system instrumentation. These checks and functional tests are more comprehensive and frequent than those currently specified and, thus, would provide equal or better assurance of system operability.
Changes have also been made to Tables 3.2-7 and 4.2-7 which revise the format and content of the tables to improve their clarity.
The NRC staff determines that these changes to the tables are administrative changes snd cannot impact the capability of the ATWS-RPT circuitry.
Based on the above evaluation, the fRC staff finds that the proposed changes to TS Tables 3.2-7 and 4.2-7 are consistent with the modified ATWS-RPT design that enhancer the system's ability to respond and mitigate the consequences of an ATWS event, furthermore, the required action statements and surveillance requirements are adequate to ensure that the ATWS-RPT system is available to mitigate the consequences of an ATWS event.
Therefore, the NRC concludes that the proposed changes to the technical specifications are acceptable.
4.0 STATE CONSULTATION
in accordance with the Cornission's regulations, the New York State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.
5.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATJON The ar,wndn. ant changes a requirement wit! respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to the surveillance requirements.
The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no tignificant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (56 FR 41585). Accordingly, the amendment n.eets the eligibility criteria for categoricalexclusionsetforthin10CFR51.22(c,(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmertal impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
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6.0 CONCLUSION
The Comission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, thati (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public, i
Principal Contributor:
H. Li Date: Octolmr 29, 1991 1
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4 Docket No. 50 333 October 29, 1991 DISTRIBUTION:
5'eE~iHicfied sheet Mr. Ralph E. Beedle Executive Vice President. Nuclear Generation Power Authority of the State of New York 123 Main Street White Plains, New York 10601
Dear Mr. Beedle:
StMJECT:
ISSUANCE Of AMENDMENT TOR JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLA~T (TACN0.fa1076)
The Conatssion has issued the enclosed Amendment No.172 to facility Operating License No. DPR-59 for the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant.
The amendment consists of changes to the Technical Specifications in response to your application transmitted by letter dated July 9,1991.
The amendment revises Table 3.2 7, " Instrumentation That Initiates Recirculation Pump Trip " and Table 4.2 7, " Minimum Test and Calibration frequency for Recirculation Purp Trip,"(RPT) system logic.
to reflect a modification to the Reactor Water Recirculation Pump Trip The logic for the systen was chanced as part of the modifications required by 10 CFR 50.6E,
" Requirements for Reduction of Risk from Anticipated Transients Without Scram (A1HS)EventsforLight. Water-CooledNuclearPowerPlants."
A copy of the reiated Safety Evaluation is en; ed. A Notice of Istuance will be included in the Commission's next regular blaekly Federal R_egister notice.
Sincerely, Q1T2FA 51tMD BY, Brian C. McCabe, Project Manager Project Directorate 1 1 Division of Reactor Projects. 1/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosures:
1.
Arendment No.172 to DPR.59 2.
Safety Evaluation ec w/enclosuras:
See next page
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FITZ AMDT 81076
i DATCD: October 29, 1991 AHENDMENT NO.172 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR 59-FITZPATRICK Docket file-NRC & Local PDRs PDI-1 Reading S. Yarga, 14/E/4 J. Calvo, 14/A/4 R. Canta C. Vogan B. McCabe-C. Cowgill OGC-WF D. llagan. 3302 HNBB G. Hill (4),P-137
-Wanda Jones P-130A C. Gritnes,11/F/23 H. Li, 8/H/3 ACRS(10)
GPA/PA OC/LfMB PDI-1 Plant File S. Newberry,11/D/23 L
cc: Plant Service list n.
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