ML20079N701
| ML20079N701 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 02/24/1983 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8303040384 | |
| Download: ML20079N701 (2) | |
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 374ot 400 Chestnut Street Tower II February 24, 1983 BLRD-50-438/82-24 BLRD-50-439/82-21 co i.', 5 n
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,n co D2 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Region II y'h Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator
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Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
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BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - INuuRRECT INSPECTION CODE ON HANGER DRAWINGS BY ITT GRINNELL - BLRD-50-438/82-24, BLRD-50-439/82 FINAL REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector Don Quick on March 1, 1982 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 1748.
This was followed by our interim reports dated March 30, July 26, and October 26, 1982. Enclosed is our final report. We no longer consider 10 CFR Part 21 applicable to this deficiency.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
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L. M. Mills, nager Nuclear Licensing Enclosure cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C.
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PDR ADOCK 05000438 O
PDR An Equal Opportunity Employer
i ENCLOSURE BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNI'TS 1 AND 2 INCORRECT INSPECTION CODE ON HANGER DRAWINGS BY ITT GRINNELL NCR 1748 BLRD-50-438/82-24, BLRD-50-439/82-21 10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency During a review of weld documentation and pipe hanger drawings, plate and shell welds on safety-related hangers were discovered which did not receive a dye-penetrant inspection as required in ASME Section III, Class 2, Subsection NF.
Two causes for this deficiency were determined.
1.
Inspection requirements were overlooked by TVA personnel reviewing the hanger drawings to generate the automated process control (APC) weld cards used in construction of the support.
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2.
TVA's hanger vendor (ITT Grinnell, Providence, Rhode Island) specified some ASME Section III, Class 2, welded joints to the wrong inspection code paragraphs (NF-5231, etc.).
The vendor portion of this NCR is not applicable to other TVA plants since ITT Grinnell has a hanger contract only with Bellefonte. The improper inspection of the hanger drawings for weld inspection requirements may be of generic nature; and therefore, the NCR was directed to other plants for consideration.
Safety Implications The failure to properly inspect the support welds to the correct code paragraph could have resulted in the failure of pipe hangers supporting safety-related piping and equipment, thereby adversely affecting the safe operation of the plant.
Corrective Action NCR 1748 identified two nonconforming conditions involving, nondestructive examinations (NDE) of ASME Section III, Class 2 supports. One of the conditions cited involved incorrect designation of NDE callouts by ITT Grinnell. In working with ITT Grinnell to resolve their portion of the NCR, and after further research into the ASME code, it has been determined that no deficiency exists in ITT Grinnell's method of determining NDE designations. It is recognized that isolated cases of drafting error may exist (such as, specifying the wrong class of NDE--5231 versus 5221). Any such error will be corrected using the establisned revision process.
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s The second condition cited in NCR 1748 involved inspection requirements being overlooked by TVA personnel reviewing the hanger drawings to generate the APC weld cards used in constructing the support. TVA's Division of Construction performed a review of all weld documentation and hanger drawings for ASME Section III, Class 2 supports to determine if the proper weld inspections were performed. Sixty-three welds were identified requiring reinspection. All corrective action on these welds will be completed by May 4, 1983 To prevent recurrence of this deficiency a second review of the APC weld cards is now being performed before their issue for use.
No similar deficiency was found at TVA's Watts Bar Facility. This condition has been identified to TVA's Deferred Nuclear Projects to be investigated after restart of design and construction on Hartsville and Yellow Creek Nuclear Plants.
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