ML20079M241

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Proposed Tech Spec Changes Re Isolation of Containment Atmosphere Monitoring Sys During Operation of post-accident Sampling Sys
ML20079M241
Person / Time
Site: FitzPatrick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/23/1984
From:
POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:
Shared Package
ML20079M231 List:
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 NUDOCS 8401270227
Download: ML20079M241 (5)


Text

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ATTACHMENT I Proposed' Technical Specification Changes RelatedLto the Isolation of Containment Atmosphere Monitoring System during Operation of the Post-Accident Sampling i

)

j New York Power Authority j

James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 l 1984 h

8401270227 840123 PDR ADOCK 05000333 P PDR

JAR.'PP 3.7 (aint'd) 4.7 (cont'd)

9. Prinary contairanent Atnesphero 9. Prinary Contairunent Atnosphere tunitcring Instrinents Fbnitoring Instnsnents
a. Prir.ury contalment atros- a. Instnnentation shall be ptcre shall to continuously functionally tested arvi nnnitorut for hydrogen and calibrated as specified in oxygen W_n the contairvrent Table 4.7-1.

inte<Jrit.y is required.

The exception to this is when the Post-Accident Samoling System is to be opefated. In this instance the containment atmosphere n. Starviby Gas Treatnent systua monitoring systems may be

1. Standby Gas Treatnent Systrsn isolated for a period not surveillance chall be performed to exceed 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> in a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period, as indicated Lelow:
a. At least once per operating a cycle, it clull le danonstrated
3. Standbr Gas Treatment System that:
1. Exccpt as specified in 3 7.B.2 (1.) Pressure dmp acmss tie belew, both circuits of the anhird high-efficiency M am :b'r Gils Treatment System cha1 be operable at pil times arvi charcoal filters is less than 5.7 in of yher secondary containment ulter at 6,000 ccfm and I ntegri ty is required.

(2.) Each 39 FM leater shall dissigote greater tion 29FM of electric power as calcu-lated tr/ the followirv) ex-pression:

P = h EI t.here P a Dissipated Electxical Power; E = ltasurat lire-to-line 4

trcrstri nt in. )ti, )(, )(,ff . 69 101 voltago in volt s (Rri); I = Aver-ago ricatanol ghase current in arq cres (teti)

ATTACHMENT II

+ Safety Evaluation Related to the Isolation of Containment Atmosphere Monitoring System during Operation of the Post-Accident Sampling System (JPTS 18)

New York Power Authority James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket 50-333 1984 w ., - -

a

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. I'. ; ~. Description of the Change The proposed change to the-FitzPatrick-Technical Specifica-

~tionsLrelates-to the isolation of containment atmosphere

. monitoring during post-accident sampling.

- Specifically, when the post-accident sampling system is ,

F in use, the containment atmosphere monitoring system be-comes isolated. )

t The following change to the Technical Specifications is

.therefore_being proposed. .

~In Section 3.7.A.9.a on page 181, the following sentences -

are-added: "The exception to this is when the Post-Accident Sampling System is to be operated. In this instance, the con-tainment atmosphere monitoring systems may be isolated for a period not to exceed 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> in'a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period." .

II. Purpose of'the Change The post-accident sampling system and the containment atmo-sphere monitoring system'utilire a common discharge line to the torus. When the post-accident sampling-system is to be used, either valve 27SOV-205 or 27SOV-124D must be opened to -

return either a liquid sample or a gas sample to the torus.

These valves are interlocked with 27SOV-124G or 27SOV-124C, ,

respectively, which' prevent' backflow.of a potentially highly contaminated sample to the containment atmosphere monitoring

. panels.

These proposed changes would permit the primary containment

~ atmosphere sampling system.to be isolated for a maximum of three hours in a twenty-four hour period when the post-accident sampling system is in operation. This three hour period will permit periodic testing of the post-accident sampling system, and personnel training.

III. Impact of the Change

The Authority considers that this proposed amendment can be classified as not likely to involve'significant hazards con-siderations since it is a change to make a license conform to regulations where the license change results in very minor changes to facility operations. This is clearly in keeping ~with the regulations as defined in Example (vii),

Federal Register, Vol. 48 No. 67 dated April 6, 1983, page 14870.

~

The Post-Accident Sampling System was installed to comply with NUREG-0737. Once the initial operator training period is'over, the system will be operated for routine testing to insure its operability. As a result, the Containment Atmo-spheric Sampling System would be out of service for less than 2% of the time during a calendar year. This is an insignif-icant fraction of total operating time.

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i es' e It is acceptable to remove the containment Atmospheric Sampling. System from service for brief intervals because the rate of change of the oxygen and hydrogen concentration in containment is extremely slow. This is due to the large volume of *he containment and the fact that it is inerted with nitrogen. Should it become necessary to interrupt operation of the PASS system, and resume containment atmosphere monitoring, this can be readily accomplished in a short

-period of time.

IV. Implementation of the Changes Implementation of the changes, as proposed, will not-impact the fire protection program at FitzPatrick, nor will the changes impact the environment.

V. Conclusion The incorporation of these changes: a) will not increase the probability or the consequences of'an~ accident or mal-function of equipment important to safety as evaluated pre- '

viously in the Safety Analysis Report; b) will not increase the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a type other than that evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report; c) will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification; d) does not constitute an unrevicsed safety question,-and e) involves no Significant Hazards Consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92. l I

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