ML20079C824
| ML20079C824 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Salem  |
| Issue date: | 06/13/1991 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20079C823 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9106260160 | |
| Download: ML20079C824 (4) | |
Text
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SAFETY EVALUAT10ft P,Y THE OFFICE OF 'iUCLEAR PEACTOR PEGULATION f.E,LA,T,Ep, Tp, AFJ!!ppf!!,T,!!,0,S,.,,17,6,,,A!1,D,,105_ T0 FAC1LJ,T,Y, pPERAT1NG LICEtlSE !!OS. OPR-70 AND DPR-75 PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS COMPANY P H I L AD E L P H 1,A,,E L,E,C),RJ f, 00f P,Af t,Y DElt!ARVA POWER AtlD LIGHT COMPANY ATL AtlT1C Cl,TY, ELE,C,TR1C,,COM,P,Ati,Y SAlEtt NUCLEAR GEllERATING STATION, UNIT tt05.1 AND 2 00CKET N0,5.,,50-?]2, Atlp_5py,3,11 1.0 1H,TR0pVCT10N By letter dated February 13, 1991 the Public Strvice Electric & Gai Company, Philadelphia Electric Company, Delmarva Power and Light Company and Atlantic City Electric Company (the licensees) submitted a request for changes to the Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit flos. I and 2, Technical Specifications (TS). The requested changes would redefine the applicable ACT10Hs to be taken on the basis of inoperable fan cooler " units" as opposed to inoperable fan cooler " groups".
P.0 EVALUATION The Salem Nuclear Generating Station incorporates a Containment Spray (CS) system and a Fan Cooling System composed of Containment Fan Cooler Units (CFCU) designed to provide redundant alternative methods to limit and maintain post-accident conditions following a design basis Loss of Coolant Accident or Steam Line Break (LOCA/SLB), to less than the containment design values. The CS system consists of two pumps and associated valving and flow paths. Each pump represents 50% of the total required capacity to meet the containment cooling function. The CS system also provides for the addition of sodium hydroxide to the spray water for radiciodine removal to limit off-site exposures to less than the guidelines of 10 CFR 100.
Credit is taken in the accident analysis for iodine removal by the spray system.
The CFCU system cnnsists of five fw units which also provide 100% of the l
required cooling cepacity for the containment.
No credit is taken for the l
reduction of fission product radioactivity from the containment by the CFCUs.
l The fans are supplied with power from the three train emergency power source 1
(4ky vital buses) such that a single failure of a vital bus, which is the 9106260160 V10613 PDR.HDOCK 05000272 1
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2 i
worse case single failure, will disable no more than two CFCUs and onc containment spray train.
)
i The containment cooling function is satisfied by any of the following conbinations of equipment:
a.
Ali five containment fan coolers, b.
Both containment spray pumps, or Three f.ontainmer', fan coolers and one containment spray pump.
c.
Technical Specification 3.6.2.3 states there are three " groups" of CFCus with two CFCus in each of two groups and one CFCU in the third group. These group assignments are made as follows:
SALEM UlllT 1 Emergency Diesel Generator 1A powers Group 1:
a.
CFCU #11, cooled by SW header #11.
b.
CS Pump #11 and associated room cooler, cooled by SW header #11.
Emergency. Diesel Generator 1B powers Group 2:
a.
CFCU #12, cooled by SW header #11.
b.
CFCU #14, cooled by SW header #12.
Emergency Diesel Generator IC powers Group 3:
a.
CFCU #13, cooled by either SW header #11 or #12.
b.
CFCU #15, cooled by SW header #12 c.
CS Pump #12 and associated room cooler, cooled by Sh header #12.
SALEM Uti1T 2 Emergency Diesel Generator 2A powers Group 1:
a.
CFCU #21, cooled by SW header #21.
b.
CS Pump #21 and associated room cooler, cooled by SW header #21.
Emergency Diesel Generator 2B powers Group 2:
a.
CFCU #22, cooled by SW header #21.
b.
CFCU #24, cooled by SW header #22.
Emergency Diesel Generator 2C powers Group 3:
a.
CFCU #23, cooled-by either SV header #21 cr #22, b.
CFCU #25, cooled by SW header #22 c.
CS Pump #22 and associated room cooler, cooled by SW header #22.
The current technical specifications require that if a single CFCU is inoperable in a two CFCU group, then both CFCUs are declared inoperable even though 50% of the group's capacity it available. The design of the Salem units is such that removal of a nuclear service water header from service for repairs results in the loss of one CS pump, because of the loss of cooling to the room cooler, and a loss of two CFCus. However, the two CFCUs are in separate groups
a
+
3 thereby rendering two " groups" inoperable, by definition.
in this situation, only one hour is available to restore either the CFCUs or the CS system to operable.
Defining the minimum system operability based on groups of components and how the group is aligned with the three train emergency power system is unnecessarily more restrictive than if considered on the basis of the operability of individual CFCUs. The proposed change woulu define the operability requirement based on individual CFCUs rather than on groups, thus alleviating the situation described above while still maintaining the capability to reduce containment pressure in the event of an accident.
Technical Specification 3.6.2.3, Containment Cooling System, contains three
- ACTION statements.
If one group of CFCUs is inoperable and both CS systems are operable, 7 days is the allcwed time to return the CFCUs to operable, i f two groups of CFCOs are inoperable and both CS systems are operable, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is the allowed time to return at least one inoperable group to operable and 7 days to return the second group to operable, i f one group of CFCus is inoperable and one CS system is inoperable, 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is the allowed time to return the CS system to operable and 7 days to return the CFCU to operable.
Technical Specification 3.6.2.1, Containment Spray System, has one ACTION statement that a110wr 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to return an inoperable CS system to operable.
The proposed change to Technical Specification 3.6.2.3 would redefine the ACTION required based on the operability of individual CFCUs as follows:
a.
With one or two CFCUs inoperable, a 7 day period would be allowed to restore the inoperable CFCUs to operable, with no requirements specified for the CS system, b..
With three or more CFCUs inoperable and both CS systems operable, a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> period would be allowed to restore at least three CFCUs to operable and a total of 7 days to restore the remainder of the inoperable CFCUs to operable.
The ACTION Statement associated with one group of CFCUs being inoperable and one CS system being inoperable is being deleted from Technical Specification 3.6.2.3.
However, the ACTION required for operation with up to two CFCUs inoperrble and one CS system inoperable would continue to be defined in the technical specifications for the individual system, 3.6.2.3.a. for the CFCOs and 3.6.2.1 for the CS system. These ACTIONS would require the inoperable CS system to be returned to operable within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and the inoperable CFCUs to be returned to operable within 7 days.
As discussed above, the single failure of either a vital bus or one service water header does not reduce the combination of CS and CFCUs below the minimum required to meet the accident analysis assumptions.
Also, the proposed changes do not impact the plant systems, structures or components important to safety. Therefore, the staff finds the proposed changes to be acceptable.
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4 3.0 STATE C0tlSULTAT10tl in accordance with the Commission's regulations, the tiew Jersey State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had no comments.
4.0 ENVIR0tWEtlTAL CON 51 DERAT 10t!
The amendments change a requirement witt, respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released off site, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such fin:!ing. Accordingly, the amendnents reet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environioental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments.
1 5.0 CONCLUS10tl The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health mnd 'afety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in con'pliance with the Congnission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor: James Stone Date:
June 13, 1991
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