ML20078L495
| ML20078L495 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1983 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20078L494 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8310210347 | |
| Download: ML20078L495 (3) | |
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 23 T0' FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-79 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY INTRODUCTION On June 16, 1983, TVA requested changes to the operating license for Sequoyah Unit 2 as a result of their review of the work activities scheduled for the forthcoming Unit 2 cycle 1 refueling outage. The licensee had previously notified the NRC on April 14, 1983, of their intent to submit a request to defer four of the items that were scheduled to be completed during the refuel-ing and maintenance outage. The items delaycd for approximately 12 months-(second refueling outage) are the post accident sampling system; the integrated particulate, iodine and noble gas monitor; reactor vessel water level; and com-plete upgrading of the Technical Support Center.
EVALUATION An integrated schedule of all activities at Sequoyah Unit 2 was reviewed to assess (1) prioritization of work activities according to safety significance; (2) status of design information, availability of materials and procurement actions for NRC license items; and (3) establishment of management limitations on manpower levels.
It was concluded that the four items cannot be completed within the planned 74 day outage for refueling and maintenance, and maintain a high degree of quality of the other scheduled work as well as the appropriate level of safety for Unit 1 which will be operating during the Unit 2 outage.
The manpower levels during the outage period were reviewed to assure that maxi-mum trades and labor personnel limits had been properly established and prior-ities of the work to be completed were consistent with the overall requirements for safe operation.
Extending the outage was considered as an alternative to adding more resources to complete the four items within the planned outage. The completion of the items would add an additional 9 weeks to the current outage period which is considered unnecessary. Compensatory measures have been taken, 5
as aescribed beiow, such that the deiay of approximateiy 12 months (second relcM on Unit 2) involves no significant hazards considerations.
The items L
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-(a) A post accident sampling system is required that has the capa-0 p'
bility to promptly obtain and perform radioisotopic and chemical o8 analysis of reactor coolant and containment atmosphere without M
excessive exposure to plant personnel. During this period for completing system modifications and equipment installation, o
nE sampling stations and interim procedures have been established
'"A to provide an acceptable level of primary coolant system activity measurements in the unlikely event a degraded core condition should occur.
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. (b) Additional instrumentation is required that will accomplish particulate, iodine and noble gas monitoring inside containment during the course of an accident. Procurement of high range monitors for in-containment usage delayed the completion of the system design with the effect of delaying installation of equip ment by the end of the current outage period.
Interim acceptable measures are in effect whereby out-of-containment monitors are utilized to provide an adequate correlation of the outside con-tainment radiation readings with in-containment radiation levels that are possible during the course of an accident.
(c) Additional instrumentation or controls are required to supplement existing instrumentation in order to provide unambiguous, easy-to-interpret indication of inadequate core cooling. A reactor vessel level indicator needs to be installed. The reactor vessel level indicator and its associated instrumentation is part of the inadequate core cooling detection system that is being developed as a generic effort through the Westinghouse owners' group. An important aspect of this item is the emergency procedure for the utilization of the system and the training of operators.
Procedures and training are expected to be completed at the time of the installation of the Sequoyah reactor vessel level indicator.
Additional procedures are needed for Sequoyah since this plant has an upper head injection system which does not exist for most Westinghouse plants.
Important elements of the inadequate core cooling detection system are already installed and operational which provide a satisfactory level of detection for the interim period. These are the primary coolant saturation monitors and the backup displays of the incore thermocouple temperature readouts up to the high temperatures that could occur during an accident.
(d) Upgrading the emergency support facilities is required in order to fully comply with guidelines established by the NRC. The Technical Support Center (TSC) is operational and it has the same habitability requirements as the main control room with adequate communications and data input for handling emergency situations. Due to procurement delays related to the Safety Parameter Display System, it has not been installed in the main control room. Therefore, the TSC will not receive this type of improved data input until the installation of the system is complete. The TSC facilities continue to be adequa*,e for full power operations.
ENVIRONMENTAL' CONSIDERATION We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any signif-icant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further con-NIC FORM 318 (10/801 NRCM O240 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
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cluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the stand-point of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR 551.5(d)(4), that an environ-mental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
CONCLUSION The Commission made a proposed determination that the amendment involves no signifi-cant hazards consideration (SHC) which was published in the Federal Register (48 FR 36930) on August 15, 1983, and consulted with the state of Tennessee. No public comments were received and the state of Tennessee did not have any comments.
We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1)thereis reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated: September 30, 1983 Principal Contributor:
C. Stahle, Licensing Branch No. 4, DL i
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September 30, 1983 AMENDMENT N0. 23 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR SEQUOY^H UNIT 2 DISTRIBUTION w/ enclosures:
bec w/encidsures:
ocket No. 50-328 NRC PDR LB #4 r/f Local PDR C. Stahle NSIC d'
M. Duncan TERA OELD A. Rosenthal, ASLAB E. Adensam ASLBP R. Hartfield, MPA ACRS(16)
R. Diggs, ADM W. Jones (10)
D. Eisenhut/R. Purple J. Souder T. Barnhart (4)
E. L. Jordan, DEQA: I&E J. M. Taylor, DRP: I&E L. J. Harmon, I&E File H. Denton i