ML20077M235

Petitions Staff of NRC to Immediately Suspend Operating License of Power Station Until Licensee Has Brought Station Into Compliance W/Fire Protection Regulations by Removing Thermo-Lag Fire Barriers Matl

ML20077M235
Person / Time
Site:	Oyster Creek
Issue date:	12/08/1994
From:	Decamp W, Gunter P NUCLEAR INFORMATION & RESOURCE SERVICE
To:	Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
Shared Package
ML20077M242	List: ML20077M235 ML20077M250
References
2.206, GL-86-10, GL-92-08, GL-92-8, NUDOCS 9501120255
Download: ML20077M235 (6)

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, e Nuclear Information and Resource Service J 142416th Street NW, Suite 601, Washington, DC 20036 202-321H)002; fax: 202-462-2183; e-mail: nirsnetenold jh a 2 1%','

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1. a Mr. James Taylor

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Executive Director for Operations United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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PETITION FOR EMERGENCY ENFORCEMENT ACTION UNDER PROVISIONS OF ',jyp, i

10 CFR 2.206 WITH REGARD TO dg+h OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION w

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Inoperable Thermo-Lag Fire Barriers Deployed In Oyster Creek For Safe Shu' lown.

M5h Capabilities Are In Yblation of NRC Fire Protection Regulation j{pdf pj' And Constitute An Installed Fire Hazard Posing An Unreasonable and Unnecessary

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Dear Mr. Taylor:

December 8,1994

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Nuclear Information and Resource Serviu, and Oyster Creek Nuclear Watch (hereinafter 43A refered to as the petitioners) hereby petition the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ufy,

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(NRC or staff) to immediately suspend the operating license of the power station until the 9

licensee has brought the station into compliance with fire protection regulations by removing Thermo-Lag fke barrier material and replacing'it with a competitive product that meets current

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NRC fire protec5 ion regulation in order to protect the health and safety of the public from undue.

risk fiom inoperable and combustible Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire barriers instlled in the Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Generating Station.

9501120255 950103 PDR ADOCK 05000219 P

PDR dedicated to a sound non-nuclear energy policy.

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BACKGROUND h

Thern> Lag 330-1 fire barrier systems have been the focus of public critism and 33 %

xq regulatory controversy for over the past years and a fire safety problem that has plagued the~

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q nuclearindustry for twelve years.

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,4 me Accordmg to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), experience based on the past $

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' two dacadec of nuclear reactor operation indic,ates that the typical nuclear reactor will suffer three y n ya to four significant fires during its licensed lifetime. Fire at a nuclear power plant, according to the f e ;

4 NRC, is a signi6 cant contributor to the risk of a core meltdown. ISdeed,"at some reactors, fire Qq Q Lag can contribute as much as 50% of the risk. Fire not only can act as an initiator of a core melt

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accident but it can also disable equipment and' systems used to alleviate such an accident.~

., y Thermo-Lag was installed as a fire barrier nr.aterial in 79 U.S. nuclear reactors haginnin-sv 1

us in 1982 to meet NRC fire protection regulations, promulgated after a near-catastrophic fire at the; g,g Browns Ferry power plant in 1975, including General Public Utility Nuclear's Oyster Creek 3; #- ]

Three Mile Island Unit I nuclear power generating viations. According to GPUN document h

-m "Ra=panaa to Request for Additional Information Regarding Generic Letter 92-08,'Thermo-Lag

,M, 330-1 Fire Barriers," dated February 10,1994, Oyster Creek has installed a total of 968 liner feet

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of the fire barrier in the rea:: tor and turbine buildings as both one hour and three hour fire barriers and a total of 1250 square feet in fire barriers throughout the plant in areas such as in HVAC

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duct wrap. GPUN has utilimi hourly roving fire patrols throughout the plant since June,1992 to Fi compensate for the patently substandard and allegedly counterfeit fire barrier.

A NIRS Freedom ofInformation Request (FOIA 94-137) to NRC on ihermo-Lag 330-1 l

fire barriers revealed a swpy transmittal sheet dated August 11,1992, from Southwest Research Institute (SwRI), P+iment of Fire Technology, San Antonio, Texas, to GPUN (enclosed) unenting that fire tests were enndactad on Thermo-Lag 330-1 base material specimens for the utility. The report comments, "In all run the -i-ionital ---.-d.=%'k 2 eacnnde mAer it was inearted in the furnmea.. Flamina enntinnad mAer the enaria-a was -

remnved frnm the furnaca - The enaciman failed the enacified criteria haean== of Ammino mAer the first 30 wennde of tantino onteida temnarmeure rise hiaher than 30 da=_ C. and weioht la== of gni SwRI Project No. 01-4510-581-Preleasinary Results, Southwest Itseserch lar'itate, See Antonio, 4

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w NIRS believes this document as revealed through FOIA to be additional public j

l information that pertains directly to the NRC's continued inability to resolve the combustibuity 4

issue for Thermo-Lag 330-1.

wi ne revelation that GPUN has knowlingly operated Oyster Creek with combustible fire

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e; barriers as documented by the SwRI/GPUN telecopy is another event in the Thermo-Lag fiasco

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that has been replete with falsification of data, admitted fraud, and reckless disregard for fire.

Q Mi protection at nuclear power plants and the public's safety.

i Historically, repa=*~i testing of the material has demonstrated that in the event of a

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serious fire, Thermo-Lag is likely to fail its intended f2nction of protecting vital electrical j

cables-which run from the control room to plant safety systems and are used to shutdown the j

reactor. NRC regulations require that the fire barriers protecting electrical cables be able to withstand fire for one hour when smoke detectors and automatic sprinkler systems are present, or three hours if there are no detection and suppression systems. Subsequent industry and NRCj i

testmg has demonstrated that the current installations of Thermo-Lag are likely to fail in far lesg than those required time frames.

(l In June,1992, the NRC declared Thermo-Lag fire barriers " inoperable" and ordered utilities to establish hourly fire watches to compensate for the fact that the fire barrier material does not work.

In July 1992, following 18 months ofinvestigation, NIRS filed a petition with the NRC demanding the removal of Thermo-Lag at the nation's reactors, and its replacement with an l

effective fire barrier material. The NIRS petition stated that Thermo-Lag fire barriers are j

combustible, failed to meet NRC quality assurance and quality control standards for uniformity

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of material, lacked seismicity qualification, failed to pass a required fire hose stream test, and

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I extremely toxic when burned, and that the product's manufacturer grossly miscalculated the ampacity derating figures (used to compensate for heat build-up associated with current loads on power cables).

In August 1992, the NRC's Inspector General issued a report condemning the NRC's handling of the Thermo-Lag issue and documented a decade-long series of failures by the NRC staff to understand the scope of the problem.

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Texas, August 11,1992, NIRS FOIA 94-137, Document 85.

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NIRS followed its initial plea to the NRC with three more petitions, all of which were g

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denied, but which received considerable attention. On March 3,1993, the House Energy j

Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations held a hearing on Bermo-Lag's deficiencies and.

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the NRC's historic failure to address the fire hazard issue.

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Around the same time, a federal grand jury in Baltimore began investigating the material's manufacturer, normal Science, Inc. (TSI) of St. Louis, Missouri.

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-o In April,1994, Industrial Testing Laboratories (ITL) of St. Louis, and its President, Allan * *S i !

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Siegel, pleaded guilty to a felony constituted by five counts of aiding and =ha*ino the j

distribution of falsified test data inconnection with the TSI investigation. Mr. Siegel's plea zg,l bargain with the U.S. Justice Department included an agreement to cooperate with the ongoing if l 3j

-j Grand Jury investigation. In swom testimony, ITL acknowledged that it did not conduct the tests j

of Thermo-Lag fire barriers and was not present to oversee the construction of test configurations

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I b of the material. Additionally, ITL admitted to providing the manufacturer, TSI, with blank 1

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stationery using ITL letterhead to print what was represented to be i%t test results L

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a. e needed for insurance and licensing purposes. In fact,~ ITL did not have a fire test furnace and had m

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very little experience in fire protection testing. NIRS learned that normal Science's tests were wh conducted in a home-made furnace on Thermal Science property.

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On April 15,1994, William R*: ell, Director, NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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responding in writing to a NIRS cc.nplaint regarding technical deficiencies of Thermo-Lag fire 3l barriers said that " combustibility, ampacity derating, and seismic issues eemain open."

On September 29,1994, the U.S. Deg-Luent of Justice issued a seven count indictment against Thermal Science Inc. and its chief executive officer, Rubin Feldman, for Willful Violation of the Atomic Energy Act, Conspiracy to Conceal Material R:ct and Making of False Statements to Defraud the United States in connection with more than $58 million in fire barrier-material. The Justice Department press release anne reing the indictment quoted U.S. Attorney 4

Lynne Battaglia that "the allaced miaennduct in thin c==a mi-==t= a cantamre for the unfetv of the Amerienn neonle" and " individuals and corporations who fraudulently tamper with the nuclear regulatory process will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law."

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THE PE'ITIONERS' CONTENTIONS '

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a. That according to 10 Code of Federal Regulation, Chapter 1, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, App =dii R,

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Section III G2(b), Specific Requirements for Fire Protection, the regulation requires " Separation

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of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal

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distance of more than 20 feet with no intervaning camhustible or five ha>=ed."; 2 j

b. That according to 10 CFR 50 Appendix A Criterion 3, Fire Protection, " Structures, T

systems, and components important to safety shall be designed and located to minimize, consistent with other safety requirements, the probability and effect of fires and explosions.

Nnncamhn=tible and heat reei=*=nt==tari=1= chall be need wherever nractical throughnut the unit-nartienIncly in locations cuch as the containment and cnntrol Innm."3

c. That NRC Generic Letter 86-10 Supplement 1, " Fire Endurance Test Acceptance i

Criteria For Fire Barrier Systems Used To Separate Redundant Safe Shutdown Trains Within i i

The Same Fire Area," issued on March 25,1994 to establish the new areaptance criteria specifically for hose stream testing methodology of Thermo-Lag 330-1 cable tray fire barriers references as guidance the NRC " Standard Review Plan" NUREG-0800, Fire Protection Program, Section 9.5.1, Sa(3)(c). The Standard Review Plan additionally stipulates in the same section [5a(3)] that those fire barrier designs are to "etilire only nnncamhn=tible==*arial=."*

NUREG-0800 defines a " noncombustible material" as "a material which in the form in

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which it is used and under the conditions anticipated, will not burn, ignite, support combustion, or release flammable vapor when subject to fire or heat."'

NUREG-0800 additionally defines that a noncombustible material as one "having a 1

structural h==a of noncombustible man rial, as defimed in a., above, with a surfacing not over 1/8-inch thick that has a ficme spread rating not higher than 50 when measured using ASTM E-84 Test " Surface Buming Characteristics of Building Materials."'-

2 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section III G2b, Fire Protection Progranns, Specific Requiremments, p.570.

8 10 CFR 50 Appendix A Criterion 3 Fire Protection, p. 522.

USNRC, Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0000, Rev. 3, July,1981, p.29.

s NUREG-0000, p.13.

NUREG-0000, p.14 I

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NUREG-0800 further stipulates the control of combustible materials in that

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,i "eafaty-relataA svetemc chnuld be isolatad or cenaratad fmm : nmhnetible m=+arimle "7

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Dat the GPUN has known, at least, since August 11,1992, that the Thermo img 330-1 as,

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a structural base material is combustible as identified in tests of multiple runs conducted for the ~ "[g w

l licensee through Southwest Research Institute where Thermo-Lag 330-1 specimens.Wy -

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"i nited annroxim.ealy 2 =anande maer it was inea ted in the furnaca" and "flamina enatim=1

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mAer the enacimen was mmnved fram the furn=ca."'

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NIRS contends that 1) GPUN has known since August 11,1992 that Thermo-Lag 330-1

~Y as a base material is combustible and 2) GPUN has known since that date that the utility was in 1

,p violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A and Appendix R and the NRC Standard Review Plan, j

j NUREG-0800, as indic=*ad above and 3) GPUN did not report to NRC its findings of the SwRI test results in the GPUN " Response to Request For Additional Information Regarding Generic 9

i Letter 92-08, 'Bermo-Lag Fire Barriers,'" dated February 10,1994 when asked by NRC to..t-l

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l describe the Benno-Lag 330-1 fire barriers installed in the plant as required to meet 10 CTR 1

Appendix R.

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That continued reliance on fire watches as a fire protection activity at the Oyster Creek j

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nuclear power generation station in light of not only an inoperable fire protection system for safe l

shutdown capability of the reactor, but an installed combustible on those same shutdown systems j

constitutes an unreasonable and unnecessary hazard to the public health and safety.

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1 REQUESTED ACTION BY PETITIONERS j

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The petitioners request that the NRC immediately susperxi GPUN's operating license of t

l the Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Generating Station until the licensee has brought the station into j

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compliance with fire protection regulations by removing the Thermo-Lag fire barrier material 4

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and replacing it with a competitive product that meets current NRC fire protection regulations.

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i NUREG.0000, p.33

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SwRI to GPUN, Aug. I1,1992.

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DESCRIPTIOTi 9F THE PETITIONERS i

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Nucle.ar Information and Resource Service (NIRS) is a nonprofit organization whose

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,o; work is related to nuclear power, radioactive v;4;te, and renewable energy. Members include 7if,;

New Jersey residents whose health and safety are put at direct risk by the unsafe operation of the :

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Oyster Creek nuclear power station. With an office in Washington, DC, NIRS has been a stih,l participant in nuclear regulatory affairs, including rulemakings, enforcement actions, and f

- m.w adjudications involving individual nuclear power stations since 1978.

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Oyster Creek Nuclear Watch (OCNW) is a grassroots organization formed in June of' Y[-

r 1994 by citizens concerned about the safety of the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.

Al OCNW is currently in the process of incorporating as a New Jersey not for profit. Most of the OCNW supporters are residents of Ocean County, New Jersey. Their health and safety therefore depend upon the safe operation of the Oyster Creek nuclear generating station. As a local citizen group lacking expertise in the technical issues relawd to nuclear power, OCNW relies upon the

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technical knowledge ofits co-petitioner, NIRS, in the technical aspects of this hi-*.

9 Paul Gunter, Director William decamp, Jr.

r Reactor Watchdog Project Founding Trustee Nuclers Information and Resource Service Oyster Creek Nuclear Watch 142416th St. Suite'601 PO Box 243 i

Washington,DC 20036 Island Heights,NJ 08732 l

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NRC Office ofInvestigation i

NRC Office of the Inspector General l

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UNITED STATES 2

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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December 14, 1994 OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL MEMORANDUM T0:

William T. Russell, Director fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 9

FROM:

ack R. Goldberg eputy Assistant General Counsel for Enforcement

SUBJECT:

5 2.206 PETITION OF NUCLEAR INFORMATION AND RESOURCE SERVICE AND OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR WATCH REGARDING USE OF THERM 0-LAG 330-1 AT THE OYSTER CREEK NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION STATION i

l Attached is a copy of a letter from Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS) and Oyster Creek Nuclear Watch (Petitioners) dated December 8, 1994, requesting action with regard to Oyster Creek Nuclear Power Generating Station, operated by General Public Utility Nuclear (GPUN).

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PetitionersrequestthattheNRCimmediatelysuspendGPUN'soperatinglicensh j

for the Oyster Creek Station until GPUN removes Thermo-Lag fire barrier material and replaces it with a competitive product that meets current NRC fire protection regulations. Although this Petition requests action i

concerning one reactor facility, rather than all reactors using Thermo-Lag, the Petition raises many of the same issues and makes the same request for action as 5 previous Petitions concerning Thermo-Lag fire barrier material.

We recommend that all 6 Petitions be evaluated together in a single Director's Decision. See NRC Handbook 8.11 (Review Process for 10 C.F.R. 5 2.206 Petitions), Part II(B), Criteria for Consolidating Petitions; and November 9, 1994, Memorandum to William T. Russell from Jack R. Goldberg "6 2.206 Petitions of GE Stockholders' Alliance, Toledo Coalition for Safe Energy, and Dr. D. K. Cinquemani".

3 Among the many bases for their request, Petitioners state that:

(1) Southwest Research Institute conducted fire tests on Thermo-Lag 330-1 specimens for GPUN i

and reported that all specimens ignited approximately 2 seconds after being 4

inserted into the furnace and that the specimen failed specified criteria because of flaming after the first 30 seconds of testing, outside temperature rise higher than 30 degree C, and weight loss of 50%; (2) GPUN's operation of l

Oyster Creek with knowledge of the Southwest Research Institute report is an example of GPUN's reckless disregard for fire protection and public safety; (3) in the event of fire, Thermo-Lag is likely to fail its intended function of protecting vital electrical cables running from the control room to plant safety systems used to shut down the reactor; (4) current' installations of

Contact:

Jenny Lon o i

504-3566'

W. Russell Thermo Lag are likely to fail in less time than the one hour (when smoke detectors and automatic sprinkler systems are present) or.three hours (when there are no' fire detection or suppression systems) NRC regulations require for fire barriers to withstand fire; (5) the NRC Inspector General issued a report in August 1992 condemning the NRC's handling of the Thermo-Lag issue and documenting the NRC staff's failure to understand the scope of the problem; (6) in April 1994, Industrial -Testing Laboratories and its President pleaded guilty to five felony counts of aiding and abetting the distribution of falsified test data; (7) on September 29, 1994, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a seven count indictment against the manufacturer of Thermo-Lag and its chief executive officer for willful violations of the Atomic Energy Act, conspiracy to conceal material facts and making false statements to defraud the United States, in connection with $58 million in fire barrier material; (8) GPUN has' known since at least August 11, 1992, that Thermo-Lag 330-1 as a structural base material is combustible, that GPUN has been in v

violation of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Apperdices A and R and the NRC Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800; (9) GPUN failed to report the Southwest Research Institute test results in response to Generic Letter 92-08 of February 10, 1994, when asked to describe the Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire barriers installed as required to meet 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix R; and (10) continued reliance on fire watches at the Oyster Creek Station are an' unreasonable and unn i

l to the public health and safety bec4use of an inoperable fire protection i

system for safe shutdown of the reactor and installed combustible material og the shutdown systems.

i I have attached drafts of a letter of acknowledgement to the Petitioners and a i

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Notice of Receipt of the Petition for publication in the Federal Register.

i Since the Petitioners made a request for an immediate suspension of the Oyster j-Creek Station operating license, substantive input from the staff is needed to address that request in the acknowledgement letter.

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Please inform Jenny Longo of my staff of the technical contact who will be

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involved in preparing a response to the Petition.

Please ensure that I am l

provided copies of all correspondence related to the Petition and that I as asked to concur on all staff correspondence.

Attachments:

1.

Copy of Petition 2.

Draft Letter to Petitioner

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3.,, Draft Federal Register Notice cc w/atts:

M. Malsch, OGC

'5. Burns, OGC i

W.'Olmstead, OGC i

L. Chandler, OGC j

T. Martin, RI S. Ebneter, RII l

J. Martin, RIII L. Callan, RIV j

S. Peterson, NRR 1

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Mr. Paul Gunter Director, Reactor Watchdog Project Nuc1 Information and Resource Service 4

Suit II 1424.Jth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C.

20036 i

William decamp, Jr.

Founding Trustee l

Oyster Creek Nuclear Watch P.O. Box 243 l

Island Heights, New Jersey 08732

Dear Messrs. Gunter and decamp:

1 This letter is to acknowledge receipt of your letter, dated December 8,1994, j

in which you request action with regard to the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating

Station, i

You request that the NRC immediately suspend GPUN's operating license for the Oyster Creek Station until GPUN removes Thermo-Lag fire barrier material and l

replaces it with a competitive product that meets current NRC fire protection i

regulations.

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i Among the many bases for your request, you state that:

(1) Southwest Research i

Institute conducted fire tests on Thermo-Lag 330-1 specimens for GPUN and reported that all specimens ignited approximately 2 seconds after being inserted into the furnace and that the specimen failed specified criteria i

because of flaming after the first 30 seconds of testing, outside temperature a

rise higher than 30 degree C, and weight loss of 50%; (2) GPUN's operation of l

Oyster Creek with knowledge of the Southwest Research Institute report is an exa:nple of GPUN's reckless disregard for fire protection and public safety; (3) in the event of fire, Thermo-Lag is likely to fail its intended function 4

of protecting vital electrical cables running from the contrcl room to plant safety systems used to shut down the reactor; (4) current installations of 1

i Thermo Lag are likely to fail in less time than the one hour (when smoke j

detectors and automatic sprinkler systems are present) or three hours (when there are no fire detection or suppression systems) NRC regulations require for fire barriers to withstand fire; (5) the NRC Inspector General issued a report in August 1992 condemning the NRC's handling of the Thermo-Lag issue a-and documenting the NRC staff's failure to understand the scope of the problem; (6) in April 1994, Industrial Testing Laboratories and its President pleaded guilty to five felony counts of aiding and abetting the distribution j

of falsified test data; (7) on September 29, 1994, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a seven count indictment against the manufacturer of Thermo-Lag 3

and its chief executive officer for willful violations of the Atomic Energy Act, conspiracy to conceal material facts and making false statements to defraud the United States, in connection with $58 million in fire barrier material; (8) GPUN has known since at least August 11, 1992, that Thermo-Lag 330-1 as a structural base material is combustible, that GPUN has been in violation of 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendices A and R and the NRC Standard Review Plan, NUREG-0800; (9) GPUN failed to report the Southwest Research Institute test results in response to Generic Letter 92-08 of February 10, 1994, when asked to describe the Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire barriers installed as required to i

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5 i-P. Gunter W. decamp, Jr.

meet 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix R; and (10) continued reliance on fire I

l watches at the Oyster Creek Station are an unreasonable and unnecessary hazard l

to the public health and safety because of an inoperable fire protection

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i system for safe shutdown of the reactor and insta11eu />mbustible material on l

the shutdown systems.

Your request for an immediate suspension of the operating license for the j

Oyster Creek station is (aranted or denied) because (staff to provide l

explanation i

j Your Petition has been referred to me pursuant'to 10 C.F.R. I 2.206 of the j

Commission's regulations. Your Petition will be evaluated together with 6

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previous Petitions recently submitted requesting similar action regarding NRC-i licensed reactors using Thermo-Lag 330-1 fire barrier material. See NRC l

l Handbook 8.11.(Review Process for 10 C.F.R. 5 2.206 Petitions), Part II(B),

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Criteria for. Consolidating Petitions. A provided by Section 2.206, action will be taken on your request within a reasonable time. I have enclosed for 4

your information a copy of the notice that is being filed with the Office of j

the Federal Register for publication.

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Sincerely l

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William T. Russell, Director I

Office of Nuclear Reactor j

f Regulation 1

Enclosure:

As stated j

cc:

[All licensees using Thermo-Lag]

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