ML20077H072
| ML20077H072 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 06/27/1991 |
| From: | ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20077H071 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9107050119 | |
| Download: ML20077H072 (2) | |
Text
. _ _...
e..
R
. PROPOSED TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION CllANGE l
l
-1 i
I
-i i
l t
f^.
[. )-
l:
u p[R-9 O7050119 910627 l
ADOCK 05000313 I
.p.
i..
3.8.15* The spent fuel shipping cask shall not be carried by the Auxiliary Building crano pending the evaluation of the spent fuel cask dror accident and the crano design by AP&L and NRC review and approval. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.
3.8.16 Storago in the spent fuel pool shall be restricted to fuel assemblies having initial enrichment less than or equal to 4.1 w/o U-235.
The provisions of_ Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicablo.
3.8.17 Storage in Region 2 (as shown on Figure 3.8.1) of the spent fuel poc1 shall be further restricted by burnup and enrichment limits specified in Figuro 3.8.2.
In the event a checkerboard storage configuration is deemed necessary for a portion of Region 2, vacant spaces adjacent to the faces cf any fuel assembly which does not meet the Region 2 burnup criteria (non-restricted) shall be physically blocked before any such fuel assembly may be placed in Region 2.
This will prevent inadvertent fuel assembly insertion into two adjacent storage locations..The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable, 3.8.18 The baron concentration in the spent fuel pool shall ho maintained (at l
all times) at greater than 1600 parts per million.
Eases Detailed written procedures will bo_available for use by refueling personnel.
These procedures, the above specifications, and the design of the fuel handling equipment as described in Section 9.6 of the FSAR incorporating built-in interlocks and safety features, provide assurance that no incident could occur during the refueling operations that would result in a hazard to public health and safety.
If no change is being made in core geometry, one flux _ monitor is su f ficient. This permits maintenance on the instrumentation. Continuous monitoring of radiation levels and neutron flux provides immediato indication of an unsafe condition.
The requirement that at least one decay het.t removal loop be in operation -
ensures that-(1)-sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel at the refueling l
temperature (normally 140'F), and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is l
maintained through the reactor core to minimize the offects of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification.(')
The requirement to have two decay heat removal loops operablo when there is loss than 23 feet of-water above the core, ensures that a single failure of.the
. operating decay host removal loop will not result in a completo loss of decay
. heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel-head removed and'23 foot of water above the core, a large heat sink is available for core cooling, thus in the event of a failure of the operating decay heat removal loop, adequate timo is provided to-initiato emergency proceduros to cool the core.
The shutdown margin indicated in Specification 3.8.4 will keep the coro.
i L
-subcritical, even with all control rods withdrawn from-the core.(2) Although the refueling baron concentration is sufficient to maintain the core k 5 0.99 if all the control rods were removed from the core, only a few contro1*Nds will l
be removed at any one timo during fuel shuffling and Note:
- An exception to 3.8.15 is granted for the period of October 15, 1991, i -
through January 31, 1992, for the movement of two spent fuel rods I
utilizing a 17 ton shipping cask.
. Amendraent No. //, 55, 57, /(>, /p/,
59a