ML20076J681
| ML20076J681 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 06/27/1983 |
| From: | Devincentis J PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 GL-82-33, SBN-525, NUDOCS 8307060090 | |
| Download: ML20076J681 (18) | |
Text
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SEABROOK STATION
% Olnes:
1671 Worcessor Rood Ptb5c Service of New Hampshire M"M* "" "
(617). 872 - 8100 June 27, 1983 S BN-525 T.F. B7.1.2 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Attention:
Mr. George W. Knighton, Chief Licensing Branch No. 3 Division of Licensing
References:
(a) Construction Permits CPPR-135 and CPPR-136, Docket Nos. 50-443 and 50-444 (b) USNRC Letter, dated May 12, 1983, " Issuance of Supplement No. I to the Safety Evaluation Report (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)," G. W. Knighton to R. J. Harrison (c) PSNH Letter, dated April 14,1983, " Response to Generic Letter 82-33, Supplement No. 1 to NUREG-0737,"
J. DeVincentis to D. G. Eisenhut
Subject:
Emergency Classification System
Dear Sir:
In response to the open item delineated in Supplement No. I to the Safety Evaluation Report (Reference (b)), we have enclosed a new Section 5.0 of the Seabrook Station Radiological Emergency Plan which provides a conceptual description of the Emergency Classification System.
Please note that the Emergency Action Level setpoints (Tables A.1-A.5) and Emergency Status Indicators (Tables A.1-A.5) color combinations are tentative (some also indicate that setpoints and color schemes will be provided later). Section 5.0 should be reviewed in light of its conceptual nature. The Westinghouse Owners Group, as of this writing, is continuing to revise its Emergency Response Guidelines (ERCS) in response to the NRC review. Thesc ongoing changes to the ERGS are expected to effect the Emergency Action Level setpoints and Emergency Status Indicators color combinations.
Setpoints and color combinations will be provided subsequent to completion of the ERCS and Seabrook Station Emergency Operating Procedures (Reference (c) commits to December 1983 for completion of Emergency Operating Procedure s).
0307060090 830627 PDR ADOCK 05000443 g
E PDR 1000ElmSt..P.O. Box 330.Monchester.NHO3105 Telephone (603)669-4000 TWX 7102207595
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a United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission June 27, 1983 Attention:
Mr. George W. Knighton Page 2 The enclosed Section.5.0 will be incorporated in OL Application Amendment 49.
Very truly yours, YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY Avhb John DeVincentis Project Manager ALL/pf Enclosure cc: Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Service List i
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- Rep. Beverly Hollingworth Ms. Olive L. Tash Coastal Chamber of Commerce Designated Representative of 209 Winnacunnet Road the Town of Brentwood Hampton, NH 03842 R.F.D.
1, Dalton Road Brentwood, NH 03833 William S. Jordan, III, Esquire Harmon & Weiss Edward F. Meany 1725 I Street, N.W.
Designated Representative of Suite 506 the Town of Rye Washington, DC 20006 155 Washington Road Rye, NH 03870 Roy P. Lessy, Jr., Esquire Office of the Executive Legal Director Calvin A. Canney U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission City Manager Wachington, DC 20555 City Hall 126 Daniel Street Robert A. Backus, Esquire Portsmouth, NH 03801 116 Lowell Street P.O. Box 516 Dana Bisbee, Esquire Manchester, NH 03105 Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Philip Ahrens, Esquire 208 State House Annex Assistant Attorney General Concord, NH 03842 Department of the Attorney General Augusta, ME 04333 Anne Verge, Chairperson Board of Selectmen Mr. John B. Tanzer Town Hall Designated Representative of South Hampton, NH 03842 the Town of Hampton 5 Morningside Drive Patrick J. McKeon Hampton, NH 03842 Selectmen's Office 10 Central Road Roberta C. Pevear Rye, NH 03870 Designated Representative of the Town of Hampton Falls Ruthanne G. Miller, Esquire Drinkwater Road Law Clerk to the Board Hampton Falls, NH 03844 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mrs. Sandra Gavutis Washington, D.C.
20555 Designated Representative of the Town of Kensington Dr. Maury Tye, President RFD 1 Sun Valley Association East Kingston, NH 03827 209 Summer Street Haverhill, MA 01830 Edw6rd J. McDermott, Esquire Sanders and McDermott Mr. Angie Machiros Professional Association Chairman of the Board of Selectmen 408 Lafayette Road Town of Newbury Hampton, NH 03842 Newbury, MA 01950 Jo Ann Shotwell, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Bureau Department of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Boston, MA 02108
SB 1 & 2 Amendment 49 FSAR May 1983 5.0 EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 5.1 Summary An Emergency Classification System has been defined which categorizes a wide spectrum of component or system failures and other occurrences that could potentially reduce station safety margins. The incidents are categorized according to severity in the following four classes: Unusual Event, Alert, Site Area Emergency, and General Emergency.
These predetermined emergency classes are declared by Seabrook Station per-sonnel. They assist emergency response organizations in determining the assessment, corrective and protective actions to be taken onsite and offsite.
Emergency classifications are based upon events identified by certain measur-able and observable indications of station conditions. These indications of degrading station status are called Emergency Action Levels L.3.Ls) and are listed in detail with their associated station conditions in Appendix A.
These EALs aid the operator in emergency recognition and assure the first step is completed in emergency response. It must be recognized that if conditions warrant such action, the classification of the event may change as the incident increases or reduces in severity.
5.2 Symptomatic Approach to Classification A symptomatic approach has been developed to assist the operator in emergency recognition and classification. In order to concentrate the amount of plant process data provided to the operator to that which is necessary for event classification, use is made of the color coded status trees that are associated with the sympton based Emergency Operating Procedures. These symptomatic status tree analyses allow the operator to recognize accident severity and concentrate on the appropriate corrective actions. Symptomatic status trees which relate to Seabrook Station EALs are provided along with a description of the approach in Appendix A.
5.3 Emergency Classes 5.3.1 Unusual Event AN UNUSUAL EVENT INDICATES A POTENTIAL DEGRADATION OF STATION SAFETY MARGINS WHICH-IS NOT LIKELY TO AFFECT PERSONNEL ON-SITE OR THE PUBLIC OFF-SITE OR RESULT IN RADIOACTIVE' RELEASES REQUIRING OFF-SITE MONITORING.
Unusual Events are conditions which do not cause serious damage to the station and may not require a change in operational status. For a complete list of the Unusual Event conditions, refer to Appendix A, Table A.I.
5-1
SB 1 & 2 Amandnant 49 FSAR May 1983 5.3.2 Alert AN ALERT INDICATES A SUBSTANTIAL DEGRADATION OF STATION SAFETY MARGINS WHICH COULD AFFECT ON-SITE PERSONNEL SAFETY, COULD REQUIRE OFF-SITE IMPACT ASSESSMENT, BUT IS NOT LIKELY TO REQUIRE OFF-SITE PUBLIC PROTECTIVE ACTION.
Station response and off-site notification associated with this event classification assure that sufficient emergency response personnel, both on and off site, are mobilized and respond to event conditions. Actual releases of radioactivity which substantially exceed Technical Specification limits may be involved, and thus radiation monitoring and dose projection may be an integral portion of the emergency response required.
For a complete list of Alert conditions refer to Appendix A, Table A.2.
5.3.3 Site Area Emergency A SITE AREA EMERGENCY INDICATES AN EVENT WHICH INVOLVES LIKELY OR ACTUAL MAJOR FAILURES OF STATION FUNCTIONS NEEDED FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC.
The events included in this Site Area Emergency category represent a potential for off-site releases which could impact the public to the extent that pro-tective actions may be necessary. For a complete list of Site Area Emergency conditions, refer to Appendix A, Table A.3.
5.3.4 General Emergency A GENERAL EMERGENCY INVOLVES SUBSTANTIAL CORE DEGRADATION OR MELTING WITH POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY.
For a complete list of General Emergency conditions, refer to Appendix A, Table A.4.
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SB 1 & 2 Amendment 49 FSAR May 1983 APPENDIX A EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM AND EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Tables A.1 through A.4 represent the station conditions and associated Emergency Action Levels (EALs) that are categorized in accordance with the four emergency classes. The emergency conditions include a wide spectrum of events that represent varying degrees of threat to station personnel onsite or the public offsite. As the tables show, full use is made of the various degrees of challenge to the five Critical Safety Functions (CSFs);
1)
Suberiticality, 2)
Core Cooling, 3)
Heat Sink, 4)
RCS Integrity, and 5)
Containment Integrity.
EALs relate levels of challenge to the CSFs and other numerous process para-meter indicators of emergency conditions such as system pressures, liquid levels, radiation intensity, and temperatures, to appropriate emergency classifications.*
Symptom based status trees simplify the initial emergency classification process by relating the most critical safety parameter indicators directly to the EALs. The individual status trees for each of the five emergency con-ditions used in conjunction with Table A.5 assist the operator in emergency classification and also directs them to the appropriate Emergency Operating Procedures for mitigation of the incident. Symptomatic status trees indicating emergency conditions are available to the operator on the plant process com-puter and are displayed on SPDS. Hard copies of these status trees are also available.
The CSF status trees, Figures A.1 through A.5, are based on plant events which pose a threat te the safety status of the plant. Color coding is used to identify event priorities for the individual branches of the status trees as follows:
() GREEN The Critical Safety Function is satisfied - no operator action is called for.
()hYELLOW-The Critical Safety Function is not fully satisfied -
operator action may eventually be needed.
(lhORANGE-The Critical. Safety Function is under severe challenge -
prompt operator action is necessary.
llhRED The Critical Safety Function is in jeopardy - immediate operator action is required.
A-1
SB 1 & 2 Amendment 49 FSAR N:y 1983 l
l Table A.5 provides a cross reference which cor^ relates the CSPs by color priorities and other esargency conditions by category with their appropriate emergency classes. For example, if parameters of critical safety function Number 2., core cooling, complete an orange branch of the appropriate fault tree then according to Table A.5, a Site Area Energency classification is reached. However, if an orange branch of the core Cooling status tree is completed in conjunction with a 3 (Rest Sinh) red or orange or a 5 (Contain-ment Integrity) red, then a ceneral Emergency is reached as shown in,C61uan 3 C8F/ combinations of Table A.5.
Combinations of CSFs and other emergency conditions are correlated with emergency classes in column 4.
Column 5 lists emergency conditions which constitute emergency classifications independent of Critical Safety Functions.
- Numbers which have been provided are tentative and will be operationally verified. Numbers which have not been provided are to be calculated and verified, and will be provided at a later time.
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TABLE A.!
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UNUSUAL EVENT CLASSIFICATION l
1 m
Critical Safety Function /
Emergency Status Emergency Condition Emergency Action Level Indicators
- Core Cooling o Core exit TCs less than I2000F, RCS subcooling less than (later)0F, 2 yellow at least one RCP is running and RVLIS wide range is greater than; (later) % 4 RCP (later) I 2 R'CP (later) Z 3 RCP (later) % 1 RCP o No RCPs running, RCS subcooling less than (later)OF, care exit 2 yellow TCs is less than 7000 and RVLIS narrow range greater than (later)t; RCS Integrity o RCS Cold Leg temperature greater than (later)oF and less than 4 yellow (later)0F and RCS coolant system har exceeded 1000F per hour cooldown rate; o RCS pressure greater than cold overpressure limit, RCS temperature 4 yeilow less than 305 F, and RCS temperature decrease less than 1000F per hour; Heat Sink o Pressure less than 1255 psig in all SGs but greater than 1885 psig.
3 yellow o Pressure less than 1255 psig in all SCs with narrow range level 3 yellow not less than 84.5% in all SCs.
o Pressure less than 1185 psig in all SCs with narrow range level 3 yellow less than 20% in all SCs.
m
- n Containment o Containment radiation levels greuter than (later);
5 yellow p-Ne Loss of Plant Process Computer o As indicated or observed; 13.
N Loss of Of fsite AC Power o As indicated or observed; 9.
Radiological Releases o Releases exceeding Technical Specifications 6a.
Fire o Fire within the station protected area which requires outside fire-Ila.
fighting assistance; Control Room Evacuation o With control remaining at remote s>Te shutdown panel; 12a.
Airplane crash, Train Derailment o By observation; 14.
or Explosion Onsite Of fsite Medical Assistance Required o Emergency transport of the worker to local support hospital; 15.
for Contaminated and injured Worker at Local Support Hospital Loss of Onsite AC Power Capability o As indicated or observed; 16.
Severe or Natural Phenomenon o Response spectrum seismic unit triggered; 17a.
E fg o 50 year flood or low water level by observation or receipt of 17d.
warning from offsite authorities;
_g o Tornado observed onsite; 17e.
g, o Hurricane observed onsite (sustained winds of (later) for (later) 17f.
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- period of time; o Security compromises; 17h.
o Technical Specifications surpassed causing shutdown.
18.
- To tu us..t wit h Table A.5 and Figures A.l-4.4.
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TABLE A.2 ALERT CLASSIFICATION I
Critical Safety Function /
Emergency Status Emergency Condition Emergency Action Level Isdicators*
Suberiticality o Intermediate range SUR is zero or positive in power range less than 1 orange 5% when the reactor should be subcritical; RCS Integrity o RCS cold leg temperature is less than (later)0F, RCS pressure-4 orange temperature point to right of limit A (see Figure A.4) and RCS tewperature decrease greater than 1000F per hour; Core Cooling and Containment o When containment radiation is greater thara (later) and, either 5 yellow Integrity No RCPs are running, core exit TCS are less than 7000 and 2 yellow RVLIS narrow is greater than (later)%; or Core exit TCs less than 12000F, RCS subcooling less than (later)0F 2 yellow at least one RCP is running, and RVLIS wide range is greater thans (later)2 4 RCP (later)I 2 RCP (later)I 3 RCP (later)% 1 RCP Containment Integrity and o Failure to isolate containment as indicated by Phase A and 7 and Failure to isolate Containment Phase B isolation indication panels when containment radiation 5 yellow is greater than (later);
Radiological Releases o 10 time Technical Specifications; 6b.
3,.
Ne Fire o Controlled fire which effects only one train of safety-related lla.
y equipment with the potential for af fecting the other train; Severe or Natural Phenomenon o Earthquake greater than containment foundation DBE alara 17b.
initiating a shutdown; o Tornado observed onsite which has degraded safety components.
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- To be used with Table A.5 and Figures A.1-A.4.
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TABLE A.3 SITE AREA EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION l
Critical Safety Function /
Emergency Status Emergency Condition Emergency Action Level Indicators
- Subcriticality o Power range as greater than 5% power when reactor should 1 red be suberitical; Core Cooling o Core exit TCs less than 12000F but greater than 7000F, RCS 2 orange subcooling less than (later)oF, and no RCPs are running, and RVLIS narrow range is greater than (later)%;
o RCS subcooling less than (later)oF, no RCPs running, core 2 orange exit TCs less than 7000, and RVLIS narrow range less than (Inter)%;
o Core exit TCs less than 12000F, and RCS subcooling less than 2 orange (later)0F, at least one BCP running, and RVLIS wide range less than; (later)% 4 RCP (later)% 2 RCP (later)% 3 RCP (later)% ! RCP Heat Sink o Wide range level less than top of U-tubes in all SGs and total 3 red feedwater flow to SGs less than 470 gpm; o Wide range level less than top of U-tubes in all SCs and total 3 orange feedwater flow to SGs greater than 470 gpm and pressure greater than 1255 psig in all SGs; o Wide range level greater than top of U-tubes in at least one SG 3 orange and pressure greater than 1255 psig in all SGs; g
RCS Integrity o RCS temperature decrease greater than 1000F in last 60 minutes and 4 red
[
RCS Pressure-Temperature ratio exceeds Limit A (see Figure A.4) y Containment Integrity o Containment pressure greater than 52 peig; 5 red o Containment pressure less than 52 psig, but greater than 5 psig; 5 orange o Containment pressure less than 52 peig and containment sump not 5 orange less then (later);
Radiological Releases o Radiological releases exceed EPA PACS at Site Boundary; 6c.
Loss of all AC Power o As indicated or observed; 8.
Loss of all DC Power o As indicated or observed; 10.
Fire o Uncontrolled fire which affects safety-related equipment; lib.
Control Room Evacuation o Evacuation of control room without control at remote shutdowa panel; 12b.
Severe or natural Phenomenon o Earthquake with potential impact on SSE.
17c.
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- To be used with Table A.5 and Figures A.1-A.4.
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TABLE A.4 CENERAL EMERCENCY CLASSIFICATION 3
Critical Safety Function /
Emergency Statua Emergency Condition Emergency Action Level Indicators
- Core Cooling o Core exit TCs higher than 12000F; 2 red a Core exit TCs less than 12000F but greater than 7000F, RCS subcooling less than (later)0F, no 2 red RCPs running and RVLIS narrow range less than (later)3; Core Cooling and Neat Sink o Core exit TCs less than 12000F, RCS subcooling less than (later)OF, no RCPs running, core exit 2 orange TCa greater than 7000F and RVLIS narrow range greater than (later)% combined with heat sink vide 3 red range level less than top of U-tubes in all SCs and total feedwater flow to SCs less than 470 gPm; or Combined with wide range level greater than top of U-tubes in at least one SC and pressure not 3 orange less than 1255 psig in all SCs; or Wide range level not greater than top of U-tubes in any SGs and total feedwater flow to SCs 3 orange greater than 470 gpm, and pressure not !ess than 1255 peig in all SCs; o Core exit TCs less than 12000F, and RCS subcooling less than (later)OF, no RCPs running, core 2 orange exit TCs less than 7000F, RVLIS narrow range less than (later)I combined with heat sink wide 3 red range level less than top of U-tubes in all SCs and total feedwater flow to SCs less than 470 g Pm; or Combined with wide range level greater than top of U-tubes in at least one SC and pressure not 3 orange less than 1255 pois in all SCs; or Wide range level not greater than top of U-tubes in any SCs and total feedwater flow to SCs 3 orange greater than 470 gpe, and pressure no less than 1255 peig in all SCs; o Core exit TCs less than 1200*F, and RCS subcooling less than (later)0F, at least one RCP 2 orange y,
running, RVLIS wide range less than:
m (later)I 4 RCP (later)I 2 RCP m-(later)% 3 RCP (later)% 1 RCP be Combined with heat sink wide range level less than top of U-tubes in all SCs and total feed-3 red N
water flow to SCs less than 470 gpm; or Combined with wide range level greater than top of U-tubes in at least one SC and pressure 3 orange not less than 1255 psig in all SCa; or-Wide range level not greater than top of U-tubes in any SCs and total feedwater flow to SCs 3 orange greater than 470 gpe, and pressure not less than 1255 psig,in all SCs; Core Cooling and Containment o Containment pressure greater than 52 peig combined with core exit TCs less than 12000F, RCS 5 red and Integrity subcooling less than (later)OF, no RCPs running, core exit TCs greater than 7000F and RVLIS 2 orange narrow range greater than (later)%; or o With core exit TCs less than 1200 F,~RCS subcooling less than (later)0F, no RCPs running, core 2 orange exit TCs less than 7000F, RVLIS narrow range less than (later)%; or o With core exit TCs less than 12000F, RCS subcooling less than (later)0F, at least one RC 2 orange running and RVLIS vide range less thans (later)% 4 RCP (later)% 2 RCP (later)% 2 RCP (later)% ! RCP Containment Integrity and a Containment pressure greater than 52 psig combined with loss of all ac power as indicated or 5 red Loss of all AC Power observed; and 8.
o Containment pressure less than 52 psig but greater than 5 peig combined with loss of all ac 5 orange power as indicated or observed; and 8.
3 I
Containment Integrity and o Containment pressure greater than 52 psig combined with loss of all a,c power as indicated or 5 red
. E
- jfg, Failure to Isolate observed; and 7.
Containment
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$a e Loss of All AC and DC Power o As indicated cr observed.
8 and 10.
- To be used with Table A.5 anJ Figures A.1-A.4.
N SB 1 & 2 Amendment 49
/
FSAR May 1983
+
4 TABLE A.5 4
i EMERCENCY CLASS CROSS REFERENCE WITH CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTIONS (CSFs)/ EMERGENCY CONDITIONS Emergency Class CSF Singles CSF/ Combinations Complications Miscellaneous General 2 red 2 orange /3 red 5 red /8 10+8 2 orange /3 orange 5 orange /8 2 orange /5 red 3 red /8
~
5 red /7 Site Area 1 red 6c, 8, 10, 2 orange 11b, 12b, 17e 3 red 3 orange 4 red 5 red 5 orange Alert 1 orange, 2 yellow /5 Yellow 5 yellow /7 64, 6b, 9, lla, 4 orange lle, 12a, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17a, 17b, 17d, 17e, 17f, 173, 17h, 18 2
Unusual Event 2 yellow 3 yellow 4 yellow 5 yellow Critial Safety Functions 1.
Subcriticality 2.
Core Cooling 3.
Heat Sink 4.
RCS Integrity 5.
Containment Integrity Miscellaneous Emergency Conditions 6.
Hi Releases a)
Technical Specification b) 10 x Technical Specification c)
Indications EPA PAGs will be exceeded at site boundary 7.
Failure to isolate containment 8.
Loss of all ac power 9.
Loss of offsite ac power
- 10. Loss of all de power
- 11. Fires a)
Controlled-affects only one train of safety-related equipment with the potential for affecting the other train j
b)
Uncontrolled-affects safety-related equipment i
c)
Within plant protected area which requires outside fire-fighting assistance 12.
Control room evacuation a)
With control at remote shutdown panel b)
Without control at remote shutdown panel
- 13. Loss of plant process computer
- 14. Observation of aircraft crash, train derailment or explosion onsite
- 15. Emergency transport of contaminated and injured worker to local support hospital i
- 16. Loss of onsite ac power capability
- 17. Severe or natural phenomenon a )'
Response spectrum seismic unit triggered
)
i b)
Earthquake greater than containment foundation DBE alara levels c)
Earthquake with potential impact on SSE d) 50 year flood or low water level by observation or receipt of warning from offsite autho-ities e)
Obsersation of tornado onsite
}
f)
Observation of hurricane onsite (sustained winds of (later) for (later) period of time) g)
Tornado observed onsite which has degraded safety components h)
Security compromises
- 18. Shutdown-Technical Specifications surpassed 1
l RED ORANGE YELLOW POWER RANGE N
i LESS THAN 5%
y INTERMEDIATE N
RANGESUR MORE NEGATIVE
~~
INTERMEDIATE N
RANGESUR
~
ZERO OR NEGATIVE Y
GREEN N
SOURCE RANGE ENERGlZED YELLOW N
SOURCE RANGE SUR NEGATIVE OR ZERO y
GREEN FIGURE A.1 STATUS TREE FOR CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION NUMBER 1 - SUBCRITICALITY
. -. l
//
RED RED N
RVLIS NARROW RANGE GREATER THAN (2*)%
y CORE EXIT N
l TCs LESS THAN 1200* F y
ORANGE N
CORE EXIT TCS LESS THAN 700*
y ORANGE N
AT LEAST RVLIS NARROW N.
ONE RCP RANGE GREATER RUNNING THAN (2*)%
y y
1 YELLDW RCS N
SUBCOOLING GREATER THAN ORANGE RVLIS WIDE RANGE N
GREATER THAN (3*)% 4 RCP l
(4 l
(5*)% 3 RCP
)% 2 RCP Y
(6,)% 1 RCP YELLOW GREEN
- SEE FOOTNOTES FOR CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES FIGURE A.2 STATUS TREE FOR CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION NUMBER 2 - CORE COOLING
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RED TOTAL FEEDWATER N
FLOW TO SGs GREATER y
THAN 470 GPM WIDE RANGE ORANGE LEVEL GREATER N
THAN TOP OF
^
U-TUBES (1 *)
N IN AT LEAST Y
PRESSURE LESS ONESG THAN 1255 PSIG l
lN ALL SGs y
YELLOW PRESSURE LESS N
YELLOW NARROW RANGE N
LEVEL LESS THAN 84.5% IN ALL SGs Y
YELLOW NARROW RANGE N
LEVELS GREATER THAN 20% IN ALL SGs y
- SEE FOOTNOTES FOR CRITICAL SAFETY GREEN FUNCTION STATUS TREES FIGURE A.3 STATUS TREE FOR CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION NUMBER 3-HEAT SINK
s 8
8 e
~
a.
T1 T2 TEMPERATURE RED RCS PRESSURE TEMPERATURE N
POINT TO RIGHT OF Y
LIMIT A ORANGE RCS COLD LEG N
TEMPERATURE GREATER THAN (1 *)* F Y
YELL'OW RCS TEMPERATURE N
RCS COLD LEG N
DECREASE LESS TEMPERATURE THAN 100* F IN GREATER THAN THE LAST 60 Y
(2*)*F Y
MIN.
GREEN YELLOW RCS PRESSURE I
N LESS THAN COLD RCS N
OVERPRESSURE TEMPERATURE LIMIT GREATER THAN 305*F Y
GREEN
- SEE FOOTNOTES FOR CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES FIGURE A.4 STATUS TREE FOR CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION
_______________ Gd9XIDW3 0 -M DG6iiT@TAUift/
RED CONT INMENT N
PRESSURE LESS THAN 52 PSIG y
ORANGE CONTAINMENT N
PRESSURE LESS THAN 5 PSIG y
ORANGE CO'NTAINMENT N
SUMP LEVEL LESS THAN (1 *)
Y YELLOW CONTAINMENT N
RADIATION LESS THAN (2*)
Y GREEN
- SEE FOOTNOTES FOR CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES t
FIGURE A.5 STATUS TREE FOR CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION j
NUMBER S - CONTAINMENT l
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>=
e SB 1 & 2 Amendment 49 FSAR May 1983 FOOTNOTES FOR CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES Figure A.2 Core Cooling (1) Enter sum of temperature and pressure measurement system errors translated into temperature using saturation tables.
(2) Enter plant specific value which is 3-1/2 feet above the bottom of active fuel in core with zero void fraction, plus uncertainties.
(3) Enter plant specific value corresponding to an average system void fraction of 50 percent with 4 RCPs running.
(4) Enter plant specific value corresponding to an average system void fraction of 50 percent with 3 RCPs running.
(5) Enter plant specific value corresponding to an average system void fraction of 50 percent with 2 RCPs running.
(6) Enter plant specific value correeponding to an average system void fraction of 50 percent with 1 RCP running.
Figure A.3 Heat Sink (1) Actual indicated level corresponding to top of U-tubes is dependent on calibration of wide range channel performed prior to startup.
Figure A.4 RCS Integrity (1) Enter plant specific temperature corresponding to temperature T1 (refer to FR-P.1 background document).
(2) Enter plant specific temperature corresponding to temperature T2 (refer to FR-P.1 background document).
Figure A.5 Containment (1) Enter plant specific level corresponding to the combined volumes of:
RWST + Accumulators + RCS + 1/2 CST (to be calculated at a later date).
(2) Enter plant specific value corresponding to radiation level alarm setpoint for post accident containment radiation monitor (to be set prior to initial plant operation).
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