ML20076J635

Forwards Info to Complete SER Confirmatory Issue 14 Re Design Bases Used to Categorize Containment Penetrations as Essential or Nonessential.Info Will Be Included in Next FSAR Rev

ML20076J635
Person / Time
Site:	Midland
Issue date:	06/30/1983
From:	Dewitt R CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
23229, NUDOCS 8307060059
Download: ML20076J635 (8)

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Consumers Power a-n s. o. win Vice Ivesident Nuclear Operations oeneral offices: 1945 Parnall Road, Jackson, Michigan 49201 e (517) 7881217 June 30, 1983 MFC 09-83 Harold R Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation US Nuclear Regulatory Comaission Washington, DC 20555 MIDLAND NUCLEAR C0 GENERATION PLANT MIDLAND DOCKET NOS 50-329, 50-330 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS FILE: B6.2 SERIAL:

23229 This letter forwards information on the design bases used to categorize systems penetrating containment as essential or non-essential. The information, which was requested by the NRC during a conference call on June 17, 1983, responds to topics related to Confirmatory Issue #14.

This information is being provided in the form of an approved FSAR Change Notice which will be included in the next FSAR revision.

It is expected that this approved FSAR Change Notice will provide the NRC with the information necessary to complete Confirmatory Issue #14.

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RBD/MFC/bjw CC RJCook, Midland Resident Inspector JGKeppler, Administrator, NRC Region III i

MAMiller, NRC Q

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CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY Midland Units 1 and 2 Docket No 50-329, 50-330 Letter Serial 23229 Dated June 30, 1983 c

At the request of the Commission and pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as amended and the Commission's Rules and Regulations thereunder, Consumers Power Company submits information on the design bases used to categorize containment penetrations as essential or non-essential.

CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY By WG/b i B DeWitt, Vice President Nuclear Operations Sworn and subscribed before me this Jc, day of G % f9L1 4 J v' a 4%

Notary Piblic Jackson County, Michigan My Commission Expires _

M P,, / p f y oc0683-0492a100

QUALITY ASSURANCE PROGRAM SAR CHANGE NOTICE

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3. No. N IE JOB NO.

2. DISCIPLINE / COMPANY l

4. ORIGINATOR O

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5. DATF

6. REFERENCED SECTIONS OF SAR FSAR Cross Reference Index has been checked and affected FSAR pages are attached which reflect appropriate changes.

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6. 2. 4. 3

7. DESCRIPTION OF CHANGE Is the purpose of this change for anything other than:

Closing an ACRS/SER open item, correcting an editorial t'yo/g g f

error or providing information already cc::=itted to in

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• f NRC correspondence?

Yes If yes, provide furthur justification for the change in Block 9

8. REFERENCED SPECIFICATIONS OR DRAWINGS NDN E

9. JUSTIFICATION (g3 j7, p g g 47;4 gp: gg,g g g g g 43 g,3 p c~,

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10. BECHTEL DISCIPLINE INTERFACE REVIEW:

INTERFACING STAFF REVIEW:

C ARCH C PLANTOSN C ARCH C MECH CCML C PGAE C CN:i.

C NUCLEAR S CONTROLSYS C STRESS C CONTROLSYSTEM C PLANT OSN C ELEC C OTHER C ELEC C REUASluTY 6NUC E R C GEOTECH C STRESS

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l 11. REVIE'WED BY DATE 12 RE[tEWEDdY DATE

13. REVIEWEDis DATE (Group Supervisor)

(SAR COORDINATOR)

(NUCLEAR ENGINEER)

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h; Ik I 14. CONCURRENCE BY DATE

15. APPROVED BY (CPCol DATE

16. CONCURRENCE BY DATE l

(PROJECT ENGINEER)

(NSSS SUPPUER) l

MIDLAND 1&2-FSAR verification of proper operation of the recirculating air cooling system during normal operation is made by monitoring the

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cesantial service water flow temperature and pressure to the l 32

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racirculating air cooling units and the collection of condensate in the recirculating air cooling unit drain pans.

A rcdiation monitor is installed in the essential service water system, as described in Section 11.5, to detect removal of radioactive contamination from the containment by the essential service water system in the event of a ruptured cooling coil in a racirculating air cooling unit.

6.2.2.2.6 Materials i

1 Tha commercial name, quantity (estimated where necessary), and chemical composition of materials used in or on the recirculating air cooling system are-listed in Table 6.1-1.

Radiolytic and pyrolytic decomposition.is discussed in Subsection 6.1.2.

Materials are selected to resist decomposition and corrosion and to assure the recirculating air cooling system functions under tha environmental conditions specified in Section 3.11.

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6.2.3 SECONDARY CO.NTAINMENT. FUNCTIO DESIGN ug Net applicable to the Midland FSAR.

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3 g, g gg 4,g T))rm I Ce lume n 08p//d R-5*.2.4 ISOLATION SYSTEM The design objective of the contait ent isolation system is to allow the normal or emergency passage of fluids through the containment boundary while preservi g the ability of the boundary to prevent or limit the escape of f ssion products from postulated accidents.

• -Thn containment isolation system consis of isolation barriers required to isolate the containment follo ing a loss-of-coolant accident, steam line rupture, or fuel handlbg accident inside tha containment.

Isolation barriers include va (manual Mid 32 power operated), closed piping systems, and blind f

s. g Actuation of various penetrations encompassed by the contai t,

isolation system is accomplished by signals received from the systems listed in Table 6.2-28 under the actuation signal column A detailed description of the actuation systems and the functions j

they perform in relation to containment isolation is given in l

Subsection 7.3.3.

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6.2.4.1 Danian Bhnnn criteria for the selection of design bases are stated in Subsection 1.1.2.2.

Protection of the containment isolation system from wind and

• tornado effects is discussed in Section 3.3.

Flood design is discussed in Section 3.4.

Missile protection is discussed in Section 3.5.

Protection against dynamic effects associated with the postulated rupture of piping is discussed in Section 3.6.

Environmental design is discussed in Section 3.11.

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6.2.4.1.1 Safety Design Bases yloM l

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS ONE - In the event of loss-of-coolant accident, the containment isolation syste actuated by MSLIS, RBIS I, or RBIS II, provides isolation of lines penetrating" containment. nica are not requirec Ior operation of tTe'%6

()ngineere afety features systems.

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS TWO - Upon failure of a main steam line, the MSLIS isolates the main steam and main feed lines as required to prevent excessive cooldown of the repctor coolant system or_

j overpressurization of.the gontainment..

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-SAFETY DESIGN BASIS THREE - The RBIS-II isolates piping connected a

'to.the containment atmosphere-following any accident resulting in 1

'either a high airborne radioactivity,inside containment or a

. containment atmosphere pressure of 4 psig or greater, or low j_ y 15

. reactor coolant system pres "*

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,500 psig (ECCAS).

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@bi, reuuir J for operanon of Tne eng.2.niaraa materv reature The RBIS-I isolates all.

ping not isolated by RBIS-II or MSLIS.

i The RBIS-I actuates when containment atmosphere pressure reaches 4 psig or a low reactor coolant system pressure of 1,500 psig 15 (ECCAS).

SAFETY DESIGN BASIS FOUR The containment isolation' system is designed in accordance.with 10 CFR 50 Appendix A, General Design Criteria 54, 55, 56, and 57.

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SAFETY DESIGN BASIS FIVE - Each line, including sample 1ines as well.as process lines, which penetrates the containment and which is either a part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, connects directly to the containment atmosphere, or does not meet j

the requirements for a closed system as defined in safety design basis six (below), except instrument sensing lines, is provided with containment isolation valves in accordance with 10 CFR 50 i

Appendix A, General Design Criteria 55 and 56.

A single isolation valve outside containment is used on certain engineered safety features systems when:

a) the system

-reliability is greater with only one isolation valve, b) the system is closed outside containment, and c) a single active i

failure can be accommodated with only one isolation valve.

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Each containment isolation valve equipped with a power operator

, c.ay ba positioned by valve positioning hand switches installed in

, tne control room.

Additionally, in the case of valves isolating

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engineered safety features systems, a manually actuated blocking function is provided in the control room to permit bypassing of

the automatic actuation signals associated with the individual valves.

Containment isolation valves with power operators are provided with valve position indication which is displayed in the control room.

The valve mechanism also provides a local, mechanical indication of valve position.

6.2.4.2.3 System Operation The containment isolationsystemisautomaticallyactuatedby i signals developed by the engineered safety features actuation system, described in Subsection 7.3.3.

The sequence of events

! which culminates in the initiation of various containment isolation modes is discussed in safety evaluations one and two below.

In addition, power operated co'ntainment isolation valves may be controlled manually from the control room.

l 6.2.4.2.4 Control 'and Instrumentation Drawings A.::

Applicable control'and~ instrumentation drawings are listed below and in Tables 1.7-9, 1.7-11,Jand 1.7-15.

a.

Logics - J-009, 011, 012, 014, 015, 020, 021, 027, 029, 044, 058, 138, 167, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 195, 203, 215, 221, 230, 234, 251, 253, 258, 299, 841 2

4 b.

Control boards - J-722, 723, 727, 729, 730, 731, 733, 734, 735, 738, 742, 908, 909, 922, 923 c.

Schematics - E-155, 158, 198, 199, 213, 225, 227, 235, 236, 238, 240, 241,.242, 243, 251, 252, 253, 256, 258, Nw-260, 313, 322, 325, 347, 352, 375, 439, 487 6.2.4.3 Safety Evaluation Safety evaluations are numbered.to corresoond t e safety en design bases.

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SAFETY EVALUATION ONE - Isolation'of fluid and air lines penetrating containmentJwhich =*=,n^t required +nr tha a er:tica) 62-Qe euw w;cred ca taty #aa t'ned<"h :ter:Jis initiated upon heipt of reactor building isolation signals RBIS-I aed-RBIS-II and/ e MSOk g

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'The containment isolation actuation instrumentation is discussed in detail in Subsection 7.3.3.

The loss-of-coolant accident is discussed and analyzed in Subsection 15.6.5.

The testing features included in the design to verify the leakage control capability of the containment are discussed in Subsection 6.2.6.

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up i.t Ta 4.z -u TABI.E 6.2-20 (continued {

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l Barrier Barrier Primary Pene-Location or Isolation Mode Failute closure 17 i

rosition sliut-Post-Time Power tration helative Valve Valve of Actu-Actus S igna l '")

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Sois rce l41 No.8 8 8 to RB'88 TJE Ho.'*3 stion888 til

' pen Open Closed 3

460Vac-A la Z-76 Inside Globe 409-126 Solenoid RBIS/IIS Closed O

(0912)

Outside Dis-409-124 Pneumatic RBIS/HS Closed Open Closed 35 460Vac-B Il9 Open piiraign (0913) cylinder 3-77 Capped gy 3-70 Inside Cate 414-098' Manual 14 LC LC LC Outside Cate 414-097 Motor RBIS/llS As is Closed closed Closed 50 460Vec-B 1 188 (1416)

.f E-79A Inside Closed

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system Outside Globe 4383A081 Solenoid MSLIS/IIS Closed Closed Closed Closed 5

120Vac-A (3897A1)

E-79D Inside closed

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system Outside Globe 4383A100 Solenoid MSLIS/US Closed Closed Closed Closed 5

120Vac-8 (308781) 30 Z-00 Inside Butter-453-013 Motor RBIS/HS As is closed closed closed 3

460Vac-A fly (5324A)

Outside Bu t te r-4h3-014 Motor RBIS/IIS As is Closed Closed Closed 3

460Vac-B fly (53248)

E-81 Inside Butter-453-011 Motor RBIS/Ils As is Closed closed Closed 3

460Vac-A fly (5336A)

Outside Butter-453-012 Motor RBIS/IIS As is Closed closed Closed 3

460Vac-B fly (53368) 2-02 Deleted l

Z-03 Deleted 1

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S-84 Capped 1

2-85 Deleted Table 6.2-28 (sheet 13)

Revision 44 6/02

f MIDLAND IK.2-FSAR I

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'"'This footnot.o has been deleted.

14 4 "I'Normally closed, however, during purging of containment va'Ives are open.

I l'3' Normal power supply ct:annel is shown. Valves may be powered from redundant supply channel by manuai 30 transfer device operated outside containment if required for cooldown. Refer to subsection 5.4.7.1.1.5.

8'*' Safety grade position indication for power operated valves is provided in the control room (refer to Table 7.5-1).

148 8'S'These valves close initially on RBIS and may be reopened for post-accident sampling.

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Oc.)Thue. valvo actuJed by Rs is are ca r s,de r..( now..ssenta l. le.

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