ML20076H725
| ML20076H725 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 08/25/1983 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8309060153 | |
| Download: ML20076H725 (2) | |
Text
4 t
TENN't$3RR Vki!CAMIAUTHORITY a T, *m.
5 2 O p r.1A dhATTANOOGA. TENNESGEE 374ot l
400 Chestnut Street Tower II l
83 AUG 26 A 8 : 4Agust 25,1983 BLRD-50-438/81-55 BLRD-50-439/81-57 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn:
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - REACTOR BUILDING HATCH COVER -
BLRD-50-438/81-55, BLRD-50-439/81-57
_ REVISED FINAL REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE Inspector R. V. Crlenjak on August 20, 1981 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR BLN BLP 8123 This was followed by our final report dated September 21, 1981, our supplemental report dated September 13, 1982, and our additional supplemental information dated March 15, 1983 Enclosed is our revised final report.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L. M. Mills, Ma ager Nuclear Licensing Enclosure oc (Enclosure):
Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Pecords Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 h
O S
- \\C1sY '
1983-TVA 50m ANNIVERSARY gj%
An Equat Opportunity Employer
ENCLOSURE BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 REACTOR BUILDING HATCH COVER NCR BLN BLP 8123 10 CFR 50.55(e)
REVISED FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency Potential Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) pressures were not included in the design of the reactor building hatch cover at elevation 646. The weight of the hatch cover, as originally. designed, was not sufficient to prevent uplif t due to the potential differential pressure between reactor building doors. The LOCA pressures were not included in the design of the hatch due to oversight.
Safety Implications If pressure differentials became such that the hatch cover could become a projectile or uplift and fall back through the opening to the 622 floor, safety class equipment could possibly incur damage.
n Corrective Action The hatch cover has been redesigned to be of sufficient weight to prevent uplift during LOCA conditions. The deficient design had never progressed to the construction phase, therefore, no hardware corrections were necessary. Fabrication and installation of the now design will be accomplished through the normal construction process.
TVA's review has shown that this is an isolated deficiency, which is not common to all hatch cover designs. The deficiency occurred due to designer oversight. The individual involved in the oversight has been reinstructed in proper design procedures.
l l
l i
i l
i i
a
'M--
_ SM W W,e e.*Gm-.-%%Mh w eg- @ =3 Geme. ht.anWae
- g-M' w v~
4 9elp, e.
e-
=*
- e s
e M
'+ "'+-
-