ML20076G840

Forwards Draft FSAR Page Changes in Response to Question 210.56 Re Mod to Feedwater Nozzle & Evaluation of Feedwater Containment Isolation Check Valves for Hypothetical Pipe Rupture Condition

ML20076G840
Person / Time
Site:	Limerick
Issue date:	08/29/1983
From:	Kemper J PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:	Schwencer A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20076G843	List: ML20076G840 ML20076G848
References
NUDOCS 8309010131
Download: ML20076G840 (6)

Text

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i PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY 2301 M ARKET STREET P.O. DOX 8699 OI PHILADELPHl, .A PA.19101 55y JOHN 5 KEMPER VIC E PN ESIDf M T -

t o.4pe.s e sessek asuu me ns a sec.oe AUG 291983 Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief Licensing Branch No. 2 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 & 2 Mechanical Engineering Branch Open Items Re f e rence : Meeting with Mechanical Engineering Branch on July 13, 1983 File: GOVT l-1 (NRC)

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

Attached are draft changes to the recponse to Question 210.56.

The information contained on these draft FSAR page changes will be incorporated into the FSAR, exactly as it appears on the attachments, in the revision schedul.ed for September 1983.

Also attached is information or. Feedwater Containment Isolation Check Valves prepared as a result o f discussions at the subject meeting.

Sincerely, S Mf JTR/gra/22 Attachment Copy to: See Attached Service List 0\

8309010131 0829 i\

APDR ADOCK 05000352 PDR l

t cc: Judge Lawrence Brenner (w/ enclosure)

Judge Richard F. Cole (w/ enclosure)

Judge Peter A. Morris (w/ enclosure)

Troy B. Conner, Jr. , Esq. (w/ enclosure)

Ann P. Hodgdon, Esq. (w/ enclosure)

Mr. Frank R. Romano (w/ enclosure)

Mr. Robert L. Anthony (w/ enclosure)

Mr. Marvin I. Lewis (w/ enclosure)

Judith A. Dorsey, Esq. (w/ enclosure)

Charles W. Elliott, Esq. (w/ enclosure)

Jacqueline I. Ruttenberg (w/ enclosure)

Thomas Y. Au, Esq. (w/ enclosure)

Mr. Thomas Gerusky (w/ enclosure)

Director, Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (w/ enclosure)

Mr. Steven P. Hershey (w/ enclosure)

Angus Love, Esq. (w/ enclosure)

Mr. Joseph H. White, III (w/ enclosure)

David Wersan, Esq. (w/ enclosure)

Robert J. Fugarman, Esq. (w/ enclosure)

Mattha W. Bush, Esq. (w/ enclosure)

Spence W. Perry, Esq. (w/ enclosure)

Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board (w/ enclosure)

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (w/ enclosure)

Docket and Service Section (w/ enclosure)

LGS FSAR

( The Limerick feedwater nozzle has been modified. The new configuratior. is the triple-sleeve with two sister-ring seals and an unclad nozzle. This ensures the longest ISI intervals in accordance with NUREG-0619. .

The CRD return line is not part of the Limerick design.

Section 3.9 has been changed accordingly.

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, 210.56-3 Rev. 20, 05/83 l

INSERT A O Eht nes,Me in : truneas t I .%

The below listed inside containment instrumentation lines that are inaccessible for visual inspection during power ascension testing will be included in the vibration monitoring program.

1) R.P.V. level indicator instrumentation lines.

2) Main-steam instrumentation lines used' for nonitoring main-steam flow.

3) RCIC steam supply instrument lines used for monitoring steam flow.

4) CRD lines.

5) Main-steam sample lines.

The vibration monitoring program for the above lines consists of walkdown by stress analysts experienced in vibration assessment prior to power ascension testing. The review is to include proper restraining of the Lines near the vibration source, at elbows and bends, and at the concentratad masses. Prior to walkdown the stress engineer will review the mode shapes and piping analytical responses to normal and upset -

conditions. Any lines found to be inadequately restrained, resulting in the potential for excessive vibration, will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to assean the impact on plant safety that could result from operation of the lines. The evaluation will identify the mode (s) of operation of such lines that cause the excessive vibration. Corrective action to prevent excessive vibration will be taken prior to operating any Lines in the operating mode (s) that cause excessive vibration.

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0 LGS FSAR

, o Systems with flow o Accessible lines (including attached instrument lines) monitored visually or with hand-held instruments. .

car A ;nst.w w,,f.d.sn 1:ne.s o,l l be, o Inaccessible linesAmonitored by remote instrumentation, g_,

Instrument lines connected to . inaccessible process lines 3 kin are not individually monitored. Instrument lines are yg yti considered acceptable from a steady state vibration ,

point of view if the vibration of the process pipe, to i n>(E l which the instrument lines is connected, is within the acceptance test limits. If the vibration levels in the process pipe are above the acceptable test limits, due consideration will be given to che connected instrument lines. .. .. . . _ s

b. NSSS Pipina (Main Steam and Recirculation)

Flow Transients As currently documented in Section 3.9.2.1o.1.4, the main steam and recirculation piping systems are tested for the following operating flow transients:

• Recirculation pump starts

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e Recirculation pump trip at 100% rated flow e 2utu:ne = top valve closure at 100% power e

Manual discharge of each SRV at 1000 psig and at planned transient tests that result in SRV discharge. '

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! Locations of Inspections and Devices Tne main steam and recirculation piping are instrumented with transducers to measure temperature, thermal ecvement, and vibration deflections. During preoperational vibration testings of recirculation i

piping, visual observation and manual measurements by l hand-held vibrograph are made to supplement the remote l measurements.

2. !n compliance with NUREG-0619, the Limerick design has incorporated the resolution presented in NEDE-21821, "BWR Feedwater Nozzle /Sparger Final Report", March 1978.

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o LGS FSAR l

QUESTION 210.56 (Section 3.9.2)

1. It is the staff's position that all essential safety-related instrumentation lines should be included in the vibration monitoring program during pre-operational or startup testing.

We require that either a visual or instrumented inspection (as appropriate) be conducted to identify any excessive vibration that will result in fatigue failure.

Provide a list of all safety-related small bore piping and instrumentation lines that will be included in the initial test vibration monitoring program.

The essential instrumentation lines to be inspected should include (but are not limited to) the following:

a. Reactor pressure vessel level indicator instrumentation lines (used for monitoring both steam and water levels.)

b. Main steam instrumentation lines for monitoring main

steam flow (used to actuate main steam isolation valves during high steam flow).

c. Reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) instrumentation lines on the RCIC steam line outside containment (used to monitor high steam flow and actuate isolation),

d. Control rod drive lines inside containment (not normally pressurized but required for scram). -

2. Please provide a statement as to compliance with NUREG-0619, "BWR Feedwater Nozzle and Control Rod Drive Return Line Nozzle Cracking". t

RESPONSE

1. Vibration Monitorino Procram

a. All safety-related process piping systems and safety-related instrument lines are included in the' vibration monitoring program (Table 3.9-7). A vibration monitoring test specification is prepared to categorize t

the requirements for the testing program. Safet, related systems are categorized as follows:

o Systems or portions of systems having no flow during significant portion of their lines; for

those systems, no testing is required.

l x 210.56-1 Rev. 20, 05/83

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