ML20076D517

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Proposed Tech Spec 4.5.6.2.b Re Deletion of Autoclosure Interlock on RHR Suction Valves
ML20076D517
Person / Time
Site: South Texas  STP Nuclear Operating Company icon.png
Issue date: 07/17/1991
From:
HOUSTON LIGHTING & POWER CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20076D515 List:
References
NUDOCS 9107290214
Download: ML20076D517 (6)


Text

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ATTACilMENT 1 PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION FOR UNIT 2 AT 2RE02 l

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0F _ D 3/4.5.6 Ris! DUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) 5Y5i[4 kl$ MOM 2110101AIIEUlM-A --

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3.5.6 Three independent Residual Heat Removal (RHR) loops shall be OPERABLE with each loop comprised of:

4.

Dr.e OPERABLE RHR pump, t.

One OPERABLE RHR heat e>. changer, and

+0ne OPERABLE flowpath capable of taking suction from its associated c.

RCS hot leg and discharging to its associated RCS cold leg."

,APPLIC ABI L ITY:

MODES 1, 2 and 3.

M110m With one RHR loop inoperable, restore the required loop to OPERABLE e.

natus within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in H01 SHUT 00WN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

b.

With two RHR loops inoperable, restore at least two RHR loops to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STAN0BY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTOOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

I With three RHR loops inoperable, immediately initiate corrective c.

action to restore at least one RHR loop to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

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4. 5. 6.1 Each RHR loop shall be demonstrated OPERACLE pursuant to the require-ments of Specification 4.0.5 4.5.6.2 At least once per-18 months by verifying automatic isolation &and inter-lock action of the RHR system from the Reactor Coolant System to ensure that:

With a simulated or actual Reactor Coolant System pressure 6.

signal greater than or equal to 350 psig, the interlocks prevent the valves from being opencJ, and MXr b.

With a simulated or actual Reactor Coolant System pressure signal less than or equal to 700 psig, the interlocks will cause the valves to automatically close.

" Valves HOV-0060 A, B, and C and MOV-006) A, B, and C tr,ay have poner removed to support the FHAR (Fire Hazard Analysis Report) assurptions,

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3/4.b.6 RFSIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SYSTEM The-0PERABIL11Y of the RHR system ensures adequate heat removal capabili-ties for Long-Term Core Cooling in the event of a small-break loss-of coolant accident (LOCA), an isolatable LOCA, or a secondary break in H0 DES 1, 2, and 3.

I lhe limits on the OPERABILITY of the RHR system ensure that at least one RHR loop is available for cooling including single active failure criteria.

overpressure protection system signal.%ystem isolation valves close upon an The surveillances ensure that RHR s k

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SOUTH TEXAS - UN1151 & 2 8 3/4 5-3

9 ATTACllMENT 2 PROPOSED IMPLEMENTATION FOR UNIT 1 AT 1RE04 1

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3/4.5 6-Ris10UAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SYSTEM LIMIUEC_0MLil10! DOR _0?JRA110N 3.5.6 Three independent Residual Heat Removal (RHR) loops shall be OPERABLE with each loop comprised of:

a.

Dr.e OPERABLE RHR pump, b.

One OPERABLE RHR heat exchanger, and

=0ne OPERABLE flowpath capable of taking suction from its associated c.

RCS hot leg and discharging to its associated RCS cold leg.*

APPLICABillTY:

MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With one RHR loop inoperable, restore the required loop to OPERABLE a.

states within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at lesst HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

L'.

With two RHR loops inoperable, restore at least two RHR loops to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

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With three RHR loops inoperable, immediately initiate corrective c.

action to restore at least one RHR loop to OPERABLE status as soon as possible.

LuRVElkkMCIJIq'L11EtiERIL

4. 5. 6.1 Each RHR loop shall be demonstrated OPERABLE pursuant to the require-ments of Specification 4.0.5.
4. 5. 6. 2 At least once per 18 months by verifying automatic hhhen 'm3 inter-lock action of the RHR system from the Reattor Coolant System to ensure that:

With a simulated or actual Reactor Coolant System pressure a.

signal greater than or equal to 350 psig, the interlocks prevent the valves from being opened, Q b.

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a4 naL Isss-than-oe-equal 40-700-pS4,_the 4nter4oeks-wH-t-9 9

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" Valves MOV-0060 A, B, and C and MOV-0061 A, B, and C may have power removed to support the EHAR (Fire Hazard Analysis Report) assumptions.

SOUTH TEXAS - UNITS 1 & ?

3/4 5-11 Unit 1 - A+eneent No. 4 j

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ATTACHMENT 2 I.

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3/4.5.6 Rf 510UAL HEAT R[MOVAL (RHR) SYSTEM The OPERABilllY of the RHR system ensures adequate heat removal capabili-ties for Long-Term Core Cooling in the event of a small-break loss-of coolant accident (LOCA), an isolatable LOCA, or a secondary break in H0 DES 1, 2, and 3 The limits on the OPERABillTY of the RHR system ensure that at least one RHR loop is available for cooling including single active failure criteria.

4 he-s urv e i l l anc e s-ensure-t ha t-RHR-sy s tem 401 a ti on-va l ves-c l os Hpon-a n--

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50VlH IEXA5 - UN1151 & 2 B 3/4 5-3

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