ML20076B416
| ML20076B416 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 07/02/1991 |
| From: | BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20076B414 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9107110223 | |
| Download: ML20076B416 (10) | |
Text
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NIT &C11 MENT 4 i
Propose l Technical Specification Changes 9
Lisi or Pam Unit i linit]
3/497 3/497 3/4 9-16 3/4 9-16 B 3/4 9-2 113/492 133/493 113/49-3 4
e llaltimore Gas and Electric Company thx:Let Nos. 50 317 & 50-318 July 2,1991 9107110223 910702
REkUEL*NG OPERATIONS
.C?.ANE TRAVEL - SPEtli FUEL 3TORAGE SCOL BUILDING LIMITING CONDITICN FCR OPERATICN 3.9.7 Loads in excess of 1600 pounds shall be prohibited from travel over.
f.ael ,as s emb-lies in the s torage poo .
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, APPLICABILITY: With fuel assemblies in the s: ors;e pool, i
lACT*CN: -
With the requirements of the above specification not satisf4+4, piace-:he crane load in a safe condition. The provisions of Specift:ation 3.0.3 are
< no t appl !:abl e.
hm gm -~y unless such loads are handled by tht, ingle-failure proof Spent Fuel Cask llandi t Crane
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SURVE!LLANCE REOUIREMENTS p . . - .
4.9.71 The weight of each load, ether than a fuel assemoly and CEA, shall be verified to be < 1500 pounds crior to moving it over fuel assamoties. ..
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I 4.9.7.2 Slings and special lifting devices shall be visually inspected and verified operable within 7 days prior to and at least once per 7 days thereafter during Spent Fuel Cask Handling Crane operation .
over the spent fuel storage pool.
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[ 4.9.7.3 in addition to the requirements of Section 4.9.7A pre operational and perio ile testa ,
and preventive maintenance shall be performed per plant procedures.
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3/4 9-7 CAL'iERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1
UELING OPERSTMNS SPEN FUEL FASK wa' CLING CDANE LIMITI JQNQlTION FOR QPLRATION ,
3.9.13 Cr e travel of the spent fuel shipping cask crane shall b restricted prohibit a spent fuel shipping task from travel ov any area within o shipping cask length of any fuel assembly. ' l APPLICABilfTY: 'ith fuel assemblies in ti.e storage pool.
ACTION:
With the requirements f the above specification not tisfied, place the crane load in a safe cc ition. The provisions of "secification 3.0.3 are not applicable.
EURVEILLANCE RE0VIRl!E!!1L__ _ ,
4.9.13 Crane interlocks and ph ical stops hich restrict a spent fuel shipping cask from passing over a area thin one shipping cask length of any fuel assembly shall be demo tra' d OPERABLE within 7 days prier to crane use and at least once per + ys thereafter during crane g I
operation.
- I i
These conditions are mod .ied to permi shipping cask travel to and from the cask pit in the pr ence of fuel wi in one cask length radius of the pathway provided th boric acid concent tion in the spent fuel pool is greater than or <ual to 1000 ppm AND t following criteria are met by all assemblies thin orie cask length radi - of the pathway: ,
- 1) Initial enrichmen ess than or equal to 4.1 w/ U 235 2) Burnup '
greater than or equ i to 28,000 MWD /MTV, ard 3) Grt ter than 440 days elapsed from the .utdowr of the last operating cycle n which the assembly was or ent in the core. Crane interlocks an Dhysical stops which restric a spent fuel shipping cask from pass bg o r any area within one s pping cask length of any fuel assembly not , tisfying the above crit la shall be demonstrated OPERABLE within 24 hou s prior to using th crane for moving a cask within one length of fuel semblies meetin he above criteria. These modifications are applicab only to the s pment of fuel rods supporting the EPRI sponsored hot cel work for the hipment of a reactor vessel weld material surveillance caps e.
I ll CALVERT Cliff" UNIT 1 3/4 9 16 Amendment No. g
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REFUELING CFEEAT*.CN$
2:T:= J2 l3/3.9.6 REFUEL:NG i '4CHiu OH.; ABILITY The OPERABILITY requirements for the refueling machine ensure that:
(1) the refueling machine will be used for movement of CEAs and 'uel assemolies.
(2) the refueling machine has sufficient load capacity to lift a CEA or fuel assemoly, and (3) the core internals and pressure vessel tre protected frem excessive lifting f: rte in the event they are inadvertently engaged :uring
'1ifting c;erations, 3/4.9.7 :RANE ~DAVEL - SPENT FUEL STCUGE E'J".0!NG The restriction on movement of 1: ads in excess of :ne n minal nei;ht of a fuel assemol f and CEA over other fuel assemeltes in the sterage ; col snsures that in the event this lead is drcoced (1) the activity release will M limited to that contained in a single fuel assemoly, and (2) any possible dist;rti:n of fuel in the st: rage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activit/ release assumed in the accident a n a 1 ys e s . +-~~ #^*^"'" ^^~ ~ e
__ /De Spent Fuel Cask llandling Cranc ,which has a critical load -
l,3/4.9.3 COOLANT CIRCULATION j op ch i 125/15 ton, meets the ' single failure. proof criteria of j NUREO (w-0554 and NUREO ww - 0612. ' eW The requirement that at least One shutcown cooling loop be in operati0n ensures that (i) sufficient cooling capacity is availaole to regove dec.ty 9en:
and maintain the water in the rea: or ;ressure vessel below 140 F as recuired during the REFUELING MODE. and (2) suf ficien coolant circulation is maintained through :ne reactor core to minimi:e the ef fects,0f a toren dilution incident and prevent toren stratification.
The re;uiremen to nave two snut:own cooling loc;s OPEDASLE anen :nere i
. is less : nan 23 feet of water above the core ensures that a single f ailure of {
'! the operating shutdown c:oling loop will not result in a ::mplete loss of decay ;
j neat removal :apability. With the reactor vessel hea: removed anc 22 'eet of ,
dater acove the core, a large heat sink is available for core cool.ing :nus i in the event of a failure of the operating snu; town : oling loco, idequa:e i time i: :rovided to initiate emergency pr:cedures to ::o1 ne : ore.
I
' 3/ A.9. 9 CONTA:1 MENT DURGE VALVE !$0LATION SYSTEM The OPERA 3:L:~Y of :his system ensures :Pa :ne :entainmen: : urge < a' ees l
, will te aut:mati: ally isolated u;cn :etec icn O' hign racil:icn leve's witnin
'j:he:entainment. *he OPERABILITY of this system is re:uire: to estr':: *e
- release of radioactive material fr
- m the :entainmen atmos;nere :o :ne environment.
I il CALVERT CL:FF5 - JNIT 1 Amencmen: 1o. 35 j;jCALVERTCL:FF5-UNIT 2 3 3/4 9-2
- Amencmen No. 33
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REFUELING OPERATIONS m
BASES 3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR VESSEL AND SPENT FUEL POOL-WATER LEVEL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assuned 10t iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly.
The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.
3/4.9.12 SPENT FUEL POOL VENTILATION SYSTEM The limitations on the spent fuel pool ventilation system ensure r that all radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorber prior to discharge to the atmosphere. The OPERASILITY of this system and the
- ' resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analyses. ,
'37' ^ 11 SPENT FUEL CASX HANDLING CRANE The restriction o . -* of the spent er g cask within one cask length of any fuel assem , nat"in' the event this load is dropped (1) the *a ' uel assemb i be damaged, and (2 . e distortion of fuel in the storage ra . t in a critical array. l 3/4.9.14 CONTAINMENT VENT !$0LATION VALVES The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions on the containment vent isolation valves are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element ruptu e based upon the lack of containment pressuriza-tion potential while in the REFUELING MODE.
CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 S 3/4 9-3 AmendmentNo.jpg,pps'
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- s REFUELO G OPERATIONS CRANE TUV!L - SPENT FUEL STOPAGE POOL 30!f.0!NG LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
. 3.9.7 Loads in excess of 1500 pounds shall be prohibited from travel ove.r fuel assemblies in the stern 9e poo APPLICA3ILITY: With fuel assemblies in :he st: rage ;ool.
- l ACTION:
With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, place the crane load in a 2afe condition. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicabl e. Sm%
unless such loads are handled by the single.
failure proof Spent Fuel Cask Handling Crane v .
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SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.9.71 The weight of each load, other than a fuel asse-bly and CEA, shall be verified to be < 1500 pounds prior to moving it over fuel assemblie:.
4.9.7.2 Stings and special lifting desicca shall be visually inspected and verified operable within 7 days prior to and at least once per 7 days thereafter during Spent Fuel Cask llandling Crane operation over the spent fuel storage 7001.
mas 4.9.7.3 in addition to the requirements of Section 4.9.7.2, pre-operational and periodic tests and preventive maintenance shallle performed per plant prueedures, s W
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3/4 9-7 CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 1 -
,CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2
- 1
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, b . REkELINGOPERATIONS SPEN UEL CASK HANDLING CRANE LIMITI CONDITION FOR OPERAT10N 3.9.13 Cra e travel of the spent fuel shipping cask crane shall be restricted t prohibit a spent fuel shipping cask from travel over y area within o shipping caak length of any fuel assembly.
- l APPL IC ABI'.ITY: th fuel assemblies in the storage pool.
ACTION:
With the requirements f the above specification not sat sfied, place the crane load in a safe co dition. The provisions of Spe fication 3.0.3 are not applicable.
SURVElllANCE RE0VIREMENTS _ _
-4.9.13 Crane interlocks and ph ical stops wh . restrict a spent fuel shipping cask from passing over y area wit one shipping cask length of any fuel assembly shall be dem strated ERABLE within 7 days prior to crane use and at least once per days . ereafter during crane operation.
- j These conditions are modifie to pern't shipping cask travel to and i from the cask pit in the presen- of fuel w hin one cask length radius of the pathway provided the b ic F.id conce ration in the spent fuel pool is greater than or equa to 1000 ppm AND he following criteria are met by all assemblies with one cask length ra ius of the pathway:
- 1) Initial enrichment le' than or equal to 4.1 'o U 235, 2) Burnup greater than or ecual t 28.000 MWD /MTV, and 3) eater than 440 days '
elapsed from the shut wn of the last operating cyc ' in which the assembly was presen in the core. Crane interlocks d physical stops
.which restrict a s nt fuel shipping cask from passing over any area within one shipp ig cask length of any fuel 4 ssembly no satisfying the above criteria all be demonstrated OPERABLE within 24 urs prior to using the era for moving a cask within one length of fue assemblies meeting the bove criteria. These modifications are applie le only to the St.ipm t of fuel rods supporting the EPRI sponsored hot- 11 work for the ship nt of a reactor vessel weld material surveillance ca ule.
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CALVERT CLIFF 5 - UNIT 2 3/4 9 16 Amendment No.
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I 3,EFUELING CPERAT CNS J
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,3/A.9.6 REFUELING 'tACHINE OPERABILITY .
The OPERABILITY requirements for the refueling machine ansure tnat:
(1) the refueling machine =ill be used for movement of CEAs and fuel assemoites.
(2) the refueling machine has sufficient load capacity to lift a CE.A or fuel assembly, and (3) the core internals anc pressure vessel ses protected from excessive 1 t fting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged :uring
'1ifting operations.
3/4.9.7 ORANE 7:!AVEL - SPENT FUEL ST3 RAGE ?U:OMG The restriction on movement of 1: ads in excess of the nominal nei;ht of a fuel sssemol f and CEA over other fuel assemolies in the storsge pool ensures that in the event this load is droceed (1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assemol /, and (2) any possible distorti:n of fuel in the storage rack.s will not result in a critical array, this assumotion is consistent with the activit/ release assumed in the sccident analyses,
- _ ,f"ent
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l'uct Cask llandling Cranc ,which has a criticalD The Sp l3/a9.3 COOLANT CIRCULATION capacity of 125/15 ton, rnects the ' single failure.proo!' criteria of '
(NUREO.0554 and NUREO-061' ~ ~ +
The requirement tnat at least one shutdown cooling loop be in operation enseres that (1) suf ficient cooling capacity is availaole to regove decay 9 eat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140 F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the reactor core to minimi:e the effects,of a toren dilution incident and prevent boren stratification, 9
The requirement to nave two sr.ut:cwn cooling loops OPED.ABLE anen :nere i
.: is less than 23 feet of water above the core ensures that a single failar e of I
'! the operating shutdown cooling loop will notg result in a complete loss of decay i lheatremovalcapability. With the reactor vessel heac removed and 23 feet of ,
dater acove the core a large heat sink is available for core cool.ing, tnus i in the event of a f ailure of the operating snutdown cooling loep, adequate i time is orovided to initiate emergency procedures to ::o1 :ne : ore.
' 3/4,9. 9 CONTAINMENT ? URGE VALVE ISOLATION SYSTEM L The OPERA 3!LI'Y of this system ensures that tne :entainment ; urge es' <es
!! will se aut:mati: ally isolated upon :etection af at;n racistion leve's wit 9in
'l :ne concainment. *he JPERAB LITY of this system is re:uirec to restr':: :ne l environment, release of radioactive material frem the containment atmospnere to tne i
il
';CALVERT L FF5 - @ !T 1 Amendmen: lo, 35
, j CALVERT CL FF5 - UNIT 2 3 3/4 9-2 1mencmen: lo 33
- ,' +. ,
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9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 1
Ba5ES 3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL-REACTOR VESSEL AND SPENT FUEL POOL WATER LEVEL The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to renove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly.
The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the accident analysis.
3/4.9.12 SPENT FUEL POOL VENTILATION SYSTEM The limitations on the spent fuel pool ventilation system ensure that all radioactive material released from an irradiated fuel assembly will be filtered through the HEPA-filters and charcoal adsorber prior to
- discharge to the atmosphere. The OPERABILITY of this syctem and the resulting iodine removal capacity are consistent with the assumptions of the accident analyses. ,
?>
- 0.13 SPENT FUEL CASK HANDLING CRANE The restriction .-
of the spent fuel shippin one cask length of any fuel assem '
~
... vent this load is dropped (1) the stor 'a ems e
+ e damaged,
+
and (2 -
. stortion of fuel in the storage rac n a critical array. I TTT 3/4.9.14 CONTAINMENT VENT ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY and closure restrictions on the containment vent isolation valves are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressuriza-tion potential while in the REFUELING MODE.
, CALVERT CLIFFS - UNIT 2 S 3/4 9-3 AmendmentNo.)PIpl l - ,
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7
D o I.lST OF REFERENGS (a) Generic letter from Mr. D. G. Eisenhut (NRC) to all Licensees of Operating Plants and Applicants for Operating License and lloiders of Construction Permits, dated P :ccmber 22,1980. Control of licavy leads: Supplemented by Genetic Letter 81-07, dated l February 3,1951 ;
1 (b) letter from Mr. R. A. Clark (NRC) to Mr. A. E. Lundvall, Jr. (13G&li), dated May 27,1983, Control of Ileavy leads . Phase 1 (c) 1xtter from Mr. S. A. McNeil (NRC) to Mr. G. C. Creel (BG&E), dated August 7,1989, Supplement to
- Phase 1" Safety Evaluation of Control of Ileavy leads (d) Generic Letter 8511 from Mr.11. L Thompson Jr. (NRC) to All Licensees for Operating Plants, dated June 28,1985, Completion of Phase 11 of " Control of lleavy leads at Nuclear Power Plants" NUREG-0612 (c) i Generic Licensing Topical Report EDR l(P) A, Ederer's Nuclear Safety Related Extra-Safety And Monitoring (X-SAM) Crancs, Rension 3 (Proprietary) ii Generic Licensing Topical Report EDR !(NP)-A, Ederer's Nuclear Safety Related Ihtra.
Safety And Monitoring (X-SAM) Crancs, Revision 3 (Non-Proprietary)
(f) letter from Mr. R. L Dacr (NRC) to Mr. C. W. Clark, Jr. (Ederer), dated January 2,1980 Review and Acceptance of Topical Report EDR 1, Revision 1 (g) lxtter from Mr. C. O. Romas Jr. (NRC) to Mr. C. W. Clark, Jr. (Ederer), dated August 26,1983, Acceptance for Referencing of Licensing Topical Report EDR l(P),
Revision 3 (h) letter from Mr. G. C. Creel (BG&E) to Director, Division of Industrial and Medical Nuclear Safety Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NRC), dated December 21,1989, Calvert Cliffs ISFSI Application l