ML20076B412
| ML20076B412 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 07/02/1991 |
| From: | Creel G BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20076B414 | List: |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-0612, RTR-NUREG-612 NUDOCS 9107110222 | |
| Download: ML20076B412 (29) | |
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' .. 4 SALTIMORE GAS AND-ELECTRIC CHARLES CENTER
- P O. DOX 1475 e BALTIMORE. MARYLAND 21203 1475 GroRoc C CRCcL Vses Patsiothe Nuc6t aat ens mov r
(30s)460-4466.
July 2,1991 ,
U S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington,DC 20555 ATTENTION: Document Control Desk
SUBJECT:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
-Unit Nos.1 & 2: Docket Nos. 50 317 & 50 318 Single Failure. Proof Upgrade and Technical Specification Change Request; Spent Fuel Cask Ilandling Crane Gentlemen:
The Isaltimore Gas and Electric (BG&E) Corrpany hereby requests an Amendment to its Operating
. License Nos. DPR 53 and DPR-69 for Cahcrt Cliffs Unit Nos.1 & 2, respectively, in accordance .
with 10 CFR 50.90 and 50.91, to incorporate changes to the technical specifications. Also included herein, fcr your resiew and approval, is information on the planned upgrade of the Calvert Cliffs spent fuel cask handling crane to a single failure-proof design.
The proposed Technical Specification changes represent revisions to Technical Specifica: ion 3/4.9.7,
" Crane Travel Spent Fuel Storage Pool Building," and Technical Specification 3/4.9.13. " Spent Fuel Cash llandling Crane." The changes.will climinate restrictions on the movement of heavy loads
( >1600 lbs ) over fuel assemblics by the spent fuel cask handling cranc. To effect this, BG&E is in the process of upgrading the spent fuel cask handling crane to " single-failure-prool" status as defined by NUREG-0612, " Control of IIcavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants "
. I. . SINGLE-FAILURE PROOF UPGRADE A. CURRENT LICENSING llASES By a Generic Letter (unnumbered) dated - December 22,1980 (Reference a), ,
supplemented by Generic Letter 8107, NRC requested all licensees to assess and report on the degree of compliance with the defense-in-depth guidelines of NUREG-0612,
" Control of IIcavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The NRC required this isrue be addressed by licensecs int 'wo phases. Phase I addressed NUREG-0612 general guidelines, Section 5.1.1. Phase II addressed .pecific gui<lelines which included ,
NUREG.0612, Section 5.1.2, " Spent Fuel Pool Area - PWR."
!)0l 80 9107110222 910702 PDR ADOCK 05000317 i F' -PDR 4
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' . 4 Document Control Desk July 2,1991 Pagc 2 Section 5.1.1 of NUREG4E12 established seven general guidelines to provide a defense.in-depth approach for the handling of heavy loads. These include safe load paths, load handling prxedures, crane operator training, special lifting devices, lifting devices (not specially designed), crancs (inspection, testing, and maintenanec), and cranc design. By letter dated hiay 27,1983 (Reference b), which was later supplemented by letter dated hiay 7,1989 (Reference c), NRC approve ('. BG&E's Phase I report as having satisfied these guidelines.
As part of the Phase Il evaluation, Section 5.1.2 of NUREG4M12 required, in addition to satisfying the general guidelines of Section 5.1.1, one of the following should also be satisfied by the spent fuel cask handling crane:
- 1. Single failure. proof guidelines of Section 5.1.6 of NUREG 0612.
- 2. Restriction of crane travel through mechanical sto,s and electrical interlocks. Provide analyses to demonstrate that a postu,ated load drop in any location not restricted by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops would not cause damage that could result in criticality, cause leakage that could uncover the fuel, or cause loss of safe shutdown equipment.
- 3. Same as option 2. above, except this option allows movement of a hewy load, such as a cask, into the pool while it contains " hot" spent fuel if the poolis large enough to maintain wide separation between the load and the
" hot" spent fuel.
- 4. Analyze the effects of drops of heavy loads to demonstrate that the evaluation criteria of Section 5.1 are satisfied.
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company chose to evaluate i. spent fuel cask handling crane under Alternate 3 above as follows:
+ Electrical interlocks prevent use of the main hook in areas over the spent fuel pools, llowever, the interkwks will permit use of the main hook only over the cask laydown area. Technical Specification 3.9.13 prohibits a spent fuel shipping cask from travel over any area within one shipping cask length of any fuel assembly. These restrictions are verified to be operable within seven days prior to use and at least once every seven days thereafter, per Technical Specification 4.9.13.
Y v . 4 Document Cantrol Desk July 2,1991 Page 3 I
+ In order to limit crane proximity to the pool area during daily operations, mechanical stops were installed on the crane bridge rails at a reasonable distance outside of the pool boundary. Technical SpeciGcation 3.9.7 prohibits loads weighing over 1600 lbs from bemg handled over stored spent fuel.
+ ne spent fuel cask drop analysis performed in accordance with the guidelines of Appendix A of NUREG-0612 indicates that the integrity of the pool will be mamtained following a 50 kips cask drop into the pool from a maximum drop height of 42.5 ft. (3.5 ft. in the air 39 ft. in the water).
On June 28. 1985, NRC issued Generic Letter 8511 (Reference d) to close out NUREG-0612 issues. In this Generic Letter NRC indicated that
- All licensees have completed the requirement to perform a review and submit a Phase I and a Phase 11 report. Based on the improvement on heavy loads handling obtained from im plementation of NUREG-0612 (Phase 1), further action is not required to reduce the risis associated with the handling of heavy loads . . . Therefore, a detailed Phase 11 review of heavy loads is not necessary and Phase 11 review is considered completed, liowever, while not a requirement, we encourage the implementation of any actions you identined in Phase 11 regarding the handhng of heavy loads that you consider l appropriate."
H. PROPOSED SINGLE 13]l.URE PROOF UPGRADE Baltimore Gas and Electric Company is presently awaiting NRC's approval of its Application (Reference h) for a license to construct and operate a NUllOMS-24P Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI), pursuant to the provisions of I 10 CFR Part 72. NUllOMS 24P is a dry fuel storage system designed by Pacific Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. to provide safe interim rtorage for irradiated fuel assemblies. The fuel assemblics are confined in a helium atmosphere by stainless steel canister. The canister is protected and shielded by a massive concrete module.
The canister containing twenty four irradiated fuel assemblics is transferred from the spent fuel pool to the concrete module in a transfer cask. The maximum weight (loaded) of the NUllOMS-24P cask is 180 kips (90 ton) [ Reference h] which is more than three times the maximum load drop weight analyzed (50 kips) for the existing crane to meet the guidelines of Section 5.1.2 of NUREG4)612 under Alternate 3. Subsequent reanalysis has shown that a cask load drop of 70 kips would produce actual punching shear stress that could compromise the integrity of the spent fuel pool. Therefore, it became necessary to upgrade the existing crane to single-failure proof status to handle the NUllOMS 24P transfer cask. The upgraded crane will be able to safely lift and move the design critical weight of 125/15 ton (main Noist 125 ton, auxiliary hoist 15 ton) without any height or travellimitations except as noted in Appendix C and in accordance with BG&E's commitment to the seven general guidelines of Section 5.1.1 of NUREG4)612. The single failure proof crane will satisfy the guidelines of Section 5.1.2 of NUREG-0612 under Alternate 1 (see Section I-A above).
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5 . 4 Docurnent Control Desk l July 2,1991 Page 4 Baltimore Gas and Electric Company has contracted Ederer Incorporated to upgrade the existing Whiting Corporation (S/N10087) 150/15 ton Spent Fuel Cask Crane, which has been in use since initial commercial operation. The upgrade consists of replacement of the trolley and hoist system with an Ederer-designed system that meets the single-failure proof criteria set forth in NUREG-0554 and NUREG-0612. The existing crane bridge and bridge-mr - ted equipment will be retained with some modifications in order to meet the single-failure proof criteria. Tbc upgrade work is scheduled to begin October 15,1991, with a currently scheduled completion date of December 31,1991.
The Ederer designed trolley and hoist system that will be installed at Calvert Cliffs is comparable to that described in Ederer incorporated generic licensing topical report EDR 1(P) A, entitled "Ederer's Nuclear Safety.Related Extra Safety and Monitoring (X SAM) Crancs," Revision 3 (Reference c). He topical report describes the design and testing of the
- single failure-prool' features which are included in Ederer's X. SAM cranes intended for handling spent fuel casks and other safety related loads in a nuclear plant. By letter dated January 2,1980 (Reference f), NRC issued a Topical Report Evaluation concluding that " . . . the design features described in the topical report l Revision 1) are acceptable for assuring that a single failure will not result in the loss of capability to safely retain a critical load." This was later updated by r. NRC Safety Evaluation Report issued on August 26,1983 (Reference g).
In accordance with the stipulation in the NRC's January 2,1980 Topical Report Evaluation, we have enclosed as Attachments 1 and 2, the Appendix B and the Appendix C supplements to the generic licensing topical report EDR 1(P)-A. Dese supplements provide, respectively, a summary of plant specific information supplied by Ec crer Incorporated and by BG&E for the Calvert Cliffs spent fuel cask handling crime.
l We have also enclosed, as Attachment 3, the summary of a scismic qualification analysis for the existing bridge structure. This analysis was performed by Bechtel Power Corporation. The detailed analysis can be readily furnished upon request.
The following alternative methods are used in upgrading the crane to single-failure-proof and are required since the bridge portion of the crane is an existing structure in the plant. The methods used meet guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6 and NUREG-0554,
- l. In order to maintain the existing designed head room clearance in the spent fuel
- pool building, both the main and the auxiliary hooks are designed with a single load path' attaching point in lieu of the two load attaching points specilled in l NUREG-0554. Ilowever, per Appendix C of NUREG 0612, the safety factor was
! increased to 10:1 to compen; ate for the loss of the single failure-proof feature and to equal the total safety factor for the wire rope. This is consistent with the requirements of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, Paragraph 1(a) and ANSI N14.6, Section 7.2.1 for speciallifting desices.
l 2. Paragraph 2.8 of NUREG-0554 recommends that preheat and post-weld heat treatment temperatures be provided in the weld procedures. The weldments on the existing bridge may not have received heat treatment, therefore, all accessible I
welds whose failure could result in the drop of a critical load will be non-destructively examined. The non-destructive examination will be a surface examination and will look specifically for cracks.
i - 4 Document Control Desk July 2,1991 i Page5
- 3. Since the material properties which determine brittle fracture tendencies are not available for the existing bridge structure, a coldproof test will be perforrned in l accordance with the alternative method proposed m Section 2.4 of NUREG 0554.
The coldproof test will be followed by non-destructive examination of all i accessible welds whose failure could result in the drop of a critical load. The non-destructive examination will be a surface examination and will look specifically for cracks.
' !!. TECilNICAL SPECIFICATION CilANGE REQUEST !
A. DESCRIPTION OF CIIANGES The proposed change to Technical Specification 3/4.9.7 involves modifying the 1.imiting Condition for Operation to allow the use of a single faih.re proof spent fuel cask handling crane to move loads in excess of 1600 lbs over fuel assemblics in the storage '
- pool. He surveillance requirement will_ also be modified to climinate load weight verification when the single-failure-proof crane is in use. New surveillance requirements are added to visually inspect the operability of lifting devices, and to perform pre-operational and periodic tests and preventive maintenance. The bases section of the technical specification is changed to reDect the use of a single-failure proof crane that '
l meets the requirements of NUREG-0554 and NUREG 0612.
Technical Specification 3/4.9.13 and its bases are deleted.
H. REOUESTED CitANGE ,
Change pages 3/4 9-7,3/4 916, B3/4 9-2, and B3/4 9-3 of Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications as shown on the marked up pages in Attachment 4.
C. JUSTIFICATION i The existing technical specification restrictions are no longer required for a single-failure proof crane (see Section I). The . restriction imposed ' by Technical l
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~ Specification 3/4.9.7, prohibiting loads in excess of 1600 lbs from travel over fuel ,
- assemblics in the storage pool, would be unnecessary following installation of a single-failure proof cranc. The addition. of the new surveillance requirement,- Technical
- Specification 4.9.7.2 is in accordance with Section 6.2 of NUREG 0612. Technical Specification 4.9.7.3 is added to assure the maintenance of the single-failure-proof feature of the modified cranc system.
The proposed technical specification amendment in conjunction with the single-failure-_
- _ proof upgrade of the spent fuel cask handling crane will facilitate the inspection and
- transfer of spent fuel to the ISFSI when it becomes operational.
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' 4 Document Control Desk July 2,1991 Page 6 D. 1)ETERMJNATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT IIAZARI)S The proposed changes have been evaluated against the standards in 10 CFR 50.92 and have been determined to involve no significant hazards considerations, in that operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not:
(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
With a single. failure proof crane, the probability of an accidentalload drop while handling heavy loads over the spent fuel has been accepted to be insignificant in NUREG-0612, " Control of IIcavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants." The spent fuel cask crane currently meets the evaluation criteria of Section 5.1 of NUREG-0612 through Technical Specification restrictions, mechanical stops, and electrical interlocks in conjun: tion with a spent fuel cask drop analysis (Alternate 3, Section 5.1.2 of NUREG.0612). Under the proposed amendment, the evaluation criteria of Section 5.1 will be met with a single-failure proof crane that satisfies the guidelines of Section 5.1.6 of NUREG-0612 (Alternate 1). A fault tree evaluation performed by NRC to establish the bases for NUREG-0612 guidelines shows the potential for unacceptable consequences is comparable for these alternatives. Therefore, the proposed amendment will not involve a algnificant inercase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
(2) create the possibility of a new or different type of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
The proposed change will allow the handling of loads in excess of 1600 lbs over the fuel assemblics in the storage poc.! which is an area previously off limits for such loads. It will also allow the movemen: of heavy loads up to the maximum critical load rating of the main hoist (125 ton) which is more than the 35 ton spent -
fuel cask that has been previously shown to cause actual punching shear stress to -
the spent fuel pool Door,if dropped from a height of 42.5 ft. (3.5 ft. in the air,39 ft. in the water) liowever, the single-failure-proof design will climinate the need to address . drops in the previously restricted areas. Further the capability of a single-failure proof crane to handle heavy loads has been accepted as the equivalent in overall risk to the currently established heavy load controls of a non single failure-proof crane. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment, will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.
(3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
The four alternative guidelines provided in Section 5.1.2 of NUREG-0612 for the spent fuel pool area have been shown to provide an essentially equivalent leve.1 of safety. In addition, heavy load handling operations at Calvert Cliffs continues to meet the seven general defense-in-depth guidelines of Scction 5.1.1. Therefore, operation of the facility in accordance with the propo.ed amendment, will not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
. 4 Document Control Desk July 2,1991 Page 7 in the March 6,1986, Federal Register Notice, the NRC listed examples of changes which are considered not likely to involve significant hazards considerations.
Exampic (iv) from this list states:
"A relief granted upon demonstration of acceptable operation from an operating restriction that was imposed because acceptable operation was not yet demonstrated.
This assumes that the operating restriction and criteria to be applied to a request for relief have been established in a prior review and that it is justified in a satisfactory way that the criteria have been met."
The proposed amendment is similar to the above example in that Section 5.3 of j NURE3-0612, " Safety Evaluation" considers restrictions imposed by technical i specifications, camparable to Combustion Engineering Standard Technical Specification 3.9.7 (NUREG-0212), to be interim measures for operating plants without a single failure proof overhead crane in the fuel storage pool area. The proposed change to the technical specification would modify thesc
- interim restrictions" based on the fact that the installation of the single failure-proof crane would make the current !
Icstrictions unnecessary to ensure the safe handling of heavy loads over the spent fuel pool. Accordingly, we believe that the proposed amendments to Operating License Nos. DPR 53 and DPR-69 do not constitute a significant hazards consideration.
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' - . Document Control Desk July 2,1991 Page 8 F. SAFl:Ty COMMflTEE REVIEW
'Ihe proposed change to the Technical Specifications and our determination of significant hazardt have been reviewed by our Plant Operations and Safety Rwiew Committee and Off-Si;c Safety Resiew Committee, and they have concluded that implementation of this change will not result in an undue risk to the heilth and safety of the public.
Very trug yours,
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STATE OF MARYLAND TO WIT COUNTY OF CALVERT :
I hereby certify that on the 2 day of dwIs ,1991 62/vv, before me, the schscriber, a Notary Public of the State of Maryland i6 ar(d for f douch ,
personally appeared George C. Creel, being duly swo.n, and states that he is Vi;c Pr'esident of the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, a corporation of the State of Marj!and; that he provides the foregoing response for the purposes therein set f 9N ' hat the statements made are true and correct to the best of his knowlcdge, informaiion, a .J !std and that he was authorized to provide the response on beht,1f of said Corporation.
WITNESS mylland and NotarialSeah Notary Public My Commission Expires: ~
Mt/ l M 8_
D/ e GCC/GT/gt/ dim Attachments: (1) Appendix B Supplement to Generic Licensing Topical Report, EDR-J (2) Appendix C Supplement to Generic Licensing Topical Report, EDR4 (3) Summary of S:cisn.ic Qualification Analysis for the Existing Bridge Structure (4) Revised Technical Speci6 cation Pages (5) References b
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. s . Documera Control Den July 2 1991 Pagn9 cc: D. A. Enme, Esquire J. E. Silberg, Esqvire R. A. Capra, NRC D. G. Mcdonald, Jr.. NRC T.T. Martin, NRC L. E. Nicholson. NRC F. C. Sturz, NRC R.1. McLean, DNR J. II. Waltu, PSC
A'1TACilMENT 1 Appendix 11 Supplement to Generic Licensing Topical Report, Edit-I llattimore Gas and Electric Company 1)ocket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 July 2,1991
4 l Revision A - 6/19/91 .-L Page B-1 EDR-1 APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT
SUMMARY
OF PLANT SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED SY EDERER FOR CALVERT CLIFFS AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE Topical
' Regulatory Report Information to be Provided Specific Crane Data Position Section C.1.a lit.C iC.1.a) 1. .The, actual crane duty classification of . 1. The crane has a Class A crane duty classification in -
the crane specified by the appligant.- accordance with CMAA Specification #70.'
'C.1.b lli.C (C.1.b) 1. The minimum operating temperature of '1. The ' trolley was designed and fabricated for. a -
the crane specified by the applicant - . minimum operating temperature of 60 degrees F.-
C.2.b lli.C (C.2 b) 1. The maximum extent of load motion and 1. .Both the main and auxiliary hoists were designed Ill.E.4 the peak' kinetic energy. of the' load such that the maximum; load motion following a-following a drive train failure drive train failure is less .than 1 foot and the :
' maximum kinetic energy of the load is less than that resulting from 1 inch of free fall of the maximum critical load.
.2. Provisions for actuating the Emergency ' 2. Provisions for ' automatically ' actuating . the -
Drum Brake prior to traversing with the Emergency Drum Brake prior to traversing with the -
load, when required to accommodate the load are not required since the maximum arnount of load motion fo!!owing drive train failure. load ; motion and kinetic . . energy can be accommodated by the facility design.
C.3.e ill C (C 3 el
. . . 1. The maximum cable loading following a 1. The maximum cable loading following a wire rope
. wire rope failure in terms of the failure in either the main or auxiliary hoist meets the .
acceptance criteria established in Section maximum allowed I/ the ' acceptance criteria ll.C. (C.3.el established in Section Ill.C (C.3.e).
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Revision A - 6/19191 Page B-2 EDR-1 APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT
SUMMARY
OF PLANT SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR CALVERT CLIFFS AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE Topical Information to be Provided Specific Crane Data Regulatory Report Pos; tion Section
- 1. Maximum fleet angte 1. 3.5 degrees C.3.f -
- 2. Number of reverse bends 2. None, other than the one between the wire rope drum and the first sheave in the load block.
- 3. Sheave diameter 3. Per CMAA Specification #70 The maximum extent of motion and peak 1. Both the main and auxiliary hoists were designed C.3.h 111.C (C.3.h) 1.
kinetic energy of the load following a such that the maximum load motion folicwing a lit.E ll single wire rope failure. single wire rope failure is less than one foot and the maximum kinetic energy of the load is less than that resulting from one inch of free fall of it e maximum critical load.
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- 1. The type nf load control system specified 1. Ederer D.C. adjustable voltage with 50:1 micro-C.3.i lit.c IC.3.i) j by the applcant. speed capability.
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- 2. Weather ir.terlocks are recommended by 2. The crane will not be used to lift fuel elements from Regulatory Guide 1.13 to prevent trolley the reactor core or spent fuel racks. Therefore, and bridge movements while fuel interlocks to prevent trolley and bridge movements j elements are being lifted and whether while hoisti7g have not been provided.
they are provided for this application.
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~ Revision A - 6/19/91 Page B-3 .
, EDR-1 APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT l
SUMMARY
OF PLANT. SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER
! FOR CALVERT CLIFFS AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE -
Topical Regulatory Report 'information to be Provided . Specific Crana 'iata
, Position Section C.3.1 Ill.C (C.3.j) 1. The maximum cable and machinery - 1. -The Energy Absorbing Torque Limiters (EATL) were .
loading that would result in the. event of designed auch that the maximum machinery load, a high speed two blocking, assuming a which would r*sult in the event of a two blocking i control system malfunction that would occurs while lifting the rated load at the rated speed l allow the full breakdown torque of the that allows the full breakdown torque of .he rretor
'moto to be applied to the drive motor to be appI5d to the drive shaft, will'not exceed
- shaft. twice th( design rated loading. In addition, the
! - EATL designs do not al'ow the maximum cable >
l loading to exceed . the acceptance ' criteria I
established in Section !!!.C (C.3.el durine the above described two blockings.
- 2. Means of preventing two blocking of 2. The auxiliary hoist has the same X-SAM features as '
auxiliary hoist, if provided. the main hoist.to prevent-two blockings and to-protect the crane and load in the event that one occurs.
C.3.k lif C (C.3.kl 1. Type of drum safety support provided. 1. The attemate design drum safety restraint s.5c.wn in figure Ill.D.4 of EDR-1 is arranged to counter gear and brake forces as well as downward loads. These brackets act on the inside diameter of the ends of '
the drum. The alternate design restrMnt is also used '
for the auxiliary hoist. Since output snaft .of the gear ' case also r.erves as the drum ' shaft, the alternate type of restraint has been extended to completely encircle the drum shell at both ends.
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Revision A - 6/19/91 Page B-4 EDR-1 APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT
SUMMARY
OF PLANT SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR CAL'1ERT CLIFFS AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE Topical Regulatory Report Inform 1 tion to be Provided . Specific Crane Data Position Section C 3.0 --
- 1. Type of hoist drive to provide 1. 50:1 micro-speed is provided as a part of D, incremental motion, adjustable voltage control.
C.3.p -
- 1. Maximum troliey speed. 1. 30 F.P.M.
- 2. Maximum bridge speed. 2. 40 F.P.M. l
- 3. Type of overspeed protection for the 3. Both the trolley and bridge drives are powered by trolley and bridge drives. the AC motors that can inherently not overspeed, since their maximum speed is limited by the 60 HZ ~
Iine frequency.- However, overspeed sensor that . -
actuates the trolley drive brake has been provided.
C.3.0 1. Control station location. 1. The complete operating control system, including the emergency stop buttors, are located on a pendant and on a remote radio control console.
Ill.D.1 1. The type of Emergency Drum Brake 1. A single pneumatically released band brake will be used, includisag type of release used in each hoist.
mechanism.
- 2. The relative location of the Emergency 2. The Emergency Drum Brake engages the wire rope Druni '.$ rake drum in each hoist.
- 3. Emergency Drum Brake Capacity 3. ' The Emergency Drum Brake in each hoist has a minimum capacity of 130% of that required to hold
- the design rated load.
Revision A - 6/19/91 Page B-5 EDR-1 APPENDIX 3 SUPPLEMENT
SUMMARY
OF PLANT SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR CALVERT CLIFFS AUXlLIARY BUILDING CRANE Topical Regulatory Report Information to be Provided Specific Crane Data Position Section III.D.2 1. Number of friction surfacas in EATL. 1. The EATLs have 21 friction surfaces, main hoist as -
well as aux. hoist.
- 2. EATL Torque Setting. 2. The specified EATL torque setting is approximately 130% of the design rated load in each hoist.
lit.D.3 1. Type of Failure Detection System. 1. A totally mechanical drive train continuity detector and emergency drum brake actuator have been provided in accordance with Appendix G Revision 3 of EDR-1 in each hoist.
lit.D.5 1. Type of Hydraulic Load Equalization 1. In both hoists, the Hydraulic Load Equalization System. System includes both features described in this section.
lli.D.6 1. Type of hook. 1. Both the main and auxiliary hooks have a single load path.
- 2. Hook design load. 2. The main hook c .: critical lift load is 125 tons with a 10:1 factor of safety on ultimate.
The auxiliary hook design load is 15 tons with a 10:1 factor of safety on ultimate.
- 3. Hook test load. 3. The test load for each load path of the main hook will be 300 tons.
The test load for each load path of the auxiliary hook will be 30 tons.
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Revision A - 6/19/91 Page B-6 EDR-1 APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT
SUMMARY
OF PLANT SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR CALVERT CLIFFS AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE To alcai Information to be Provided Specific Crane Data Regulatory Repct1 Position Section
- 1. Design rated load. 1. Main hoist - 150 tons.
-- lli.F.1 Auxiliary hoist - 15 tons.
- 2. Maximum critical load rating. 2. Main hoist - 125 tons.
Auxiliary hoist - 15 tons.
- 3. Trolley weight (net). 3. S0,000 lbs. (including hooks).
- 4. Trolley weight (with load). 4. 340,000 lbs.
- 5. Hook lif t. 5. Main hook - 65 feet Auxiliary hook - 68 feet 6 Number of wire rope drums. 6. The main and the auxiliary hoists each have one wire rope drum.
- 7. Number of parts of wire rope. 7. Main hoist - 8 parts per wire rc.
Auxiliary hoist - 4 parts per wire rope.
- 8. Drum size (pitch diameter). 8. Main hoist - 48 inches.
Auxiliary hoist - 15 inches.
- 9. Wire rope diameter. 9. Main hoist - 1 1/8 inch.
Auxiliary hoist - 5/8".
- 10. Wire rope type. 10. 6x37 class (WRC.
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Revision A - 6/19/91 Page B-7 EDR-1 APPENDIX B SUPPLEMENT
SUMMARY
OF PLANT SPECIFIC CRANE DATA SUPPLIED BY EDERER FOR CALVERT CLIFFS AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE Topical Regulatory Report Information to be Provided Specific Crane Data Position Section Ill.F.1 11. Wire rope rnaterial. 11. Carbon Steel - Main Stainless Steel- Aux.
- 12. Wire rope breaking strength. 12. Main hoist - 143,000 lbs.
Auxiliary hoist - 31,300 lbs.
- 13. Wire rope yield strength. 13. Main hoist - 114,400 lbs.
Auxiliary hoist - 25.040 lbs.
- 14. Wire rope reserve strength. 14. Main hoist .563 Auxihary hoist .570
- 15. fJumber of wire ropes. 15. The main and auxiliary hoists each have two ropes.
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A'ITACilMENT 2 Appendix C Supplement to Generic Licensing Topical Report, EI)R I l
t l Ilattimore Gas and Electric Company l I)ocket Nos. 50-317 & 50 318 July 2,1991 i
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Revision A - 6/19/91 Page C-1 EDR-1 APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENT
SUMMARY
OF REGULATORY POSITIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE APPLICANT FOR CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE MODIFICATIONS Topical .
Regulatory Report information to be Provided Specific Crane Data Position Section 4
Ill.C (C.1.b(1)) -1. The extent of venting of closed box 1. Closed box sections are not vented since the sections. auxiliary building that houses the crane is not pressurized.
C.1 bi3) Ill.C (C.1.b(3)) 1. The nondestructive ' and cold proof 1. Cold proof testing will be performed on the existing .
C.t.o(4) lit.C (C.1.bl41) testing to be performed on existing bridge. The cold proof test will be followed by a C.4 d Ill.C (C.4.d) structural members for which nondestructive examination of all accessible welds satisfactory impact test data is not whose failure would result in the drop of a load.
available. The nondestructive examination will be a surface examination and will look specifically for cracks. '
The ambient temperature when the 125%' static load test is peiformed will be the minimum operating temperature for the crane. In the event that the crane must be operated at a lower temperature, another 125% static proof test will be performed at -
the lower temperature.
C.1.c ill.C (C.1.cl 1. The extent the crane's structures, which 1. The crane structures are qualified for both Operating are not being replaced, are capable of Basis Earthquake and Design Basis Earthquake while meeting the seismic requirements of supporting the maximum critical loads. Ref.: '
Regulatory Guide 1.29. Seismic Analysis Report by Bechtel Power s Corporation (attachment 3).
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.s Revision A - 6/19/91 Page C-2 EDR-1 APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENT
SUMMARY
OF REGULATORY POSITIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE APPLICANT FOR CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE MODIFICATICNS Topical Regulatory Report Information to be Provided Specific Crene Data Position Section C.1.d Ill.C (C.1.d; 1. The extent welds joints in the crane's 1. Nondestructive examinations of the existing bridge structures, which are not being replaced, structure were not required by existing regulations were t'ondestructively examiaed, and at the time of bridge construction. However, the X-SAM . system provides additional overload protection, and the inspections of the existing structure described in C.1.b(3) above are adequate to ensure the structural integrity of the existing bridge.
- 2. The extent the base material, at joints 2. The weld joint geometries used in the existing susceptible to lamellar tearing, was bridge structure are not considered to be susceptible nondestructively examined. to lamellar tearing.
C.1.e Ill.C (C.1.e) 1. The extent the crane's structures, which 1. The crane was not used for any over-capacity are not being replaced, are capable of construction lifts. All past and projected use of the withstanding the fatigue effects of cyclic crane, at a maximum loading of 150 Tons, is well loading from previous and projected within the cyclic loading capability of the existing usage, including any construction usage. crane structure and welds.
C.1.f III.C (C.1.f) 1. The extent the crane's structures, which 1. In accordance with NUREG-0612, Appendix C, the -
are not being replaced, were post-weld welds whose failure could result in the drop of a heat-treated in accordance with criticalload will be nondestructively examined. The Subarticle 3.9 of AWS D1.1, " Structural nondestructive examination will be a surface Welding Code.* examination and wi!Ilook specifically for cracks.
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4 Revision A - 6/19/91 Page C-3 EDR-1 APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENT
SUMMARY
OF REGULATORY POSITIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE APPLICANT FOR CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AUXILIARY BUILDING CRANE MODIFICATIONS Topical Regulatory Report Information to be Provided Specific Crane Data Position Section C.2.h lli.C (C.2 b) 1. Provisions for accommodating the load 1. Adrninistrative procedures will be used to assure Ill.E.4 motion and kinetic energy following a that a minimum of 1 foot of clearance is maintained drive train failure when the load is being between the load and surfaces that cannot traversed and when it is being raised or - withstand the kinetic energy associated with 1 inch lowered. of free fall of the load involved. The surfaces, which will support the load, are . designed to withstand a minimum af 1 inch of free fall of the load invc!ved.
C.2.c It!.C (C.2.c) 1. Location of safe laydown areas for use in 1. Drawing "A", Sheet 1, shows the laydown areas the event repairs to the crane are that can be used in the event that repairs to the required that cannot be made with the crane are required that cannot be made with the load suspended. load suspended.
C.2.d ill.C. (C.2.d) 1. Size of replacement components that can 1. The replacement trolley components wi!! be brought be brought into the building for repair of in through the Auxiliary Building, Cask Unloading the crane without having to break its Hatch, in accordance with Drawing "A", sheet 2.
integrity, This means that any trolley component can be Drought in to the Auxiliary Building if needed for crane repairs.
9 Revision A - 6/19/31 Page C-4 EDR-1 APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENT
SUMMARY
OF REGULATORY POSITIONS TO BE -
ADDRESSED BY THE APPLICANT FOR CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT :
A31XILIARY BUILDING CRANE MODIFICATIONS Topical Regulatory Report Information to be Provided Specific Crane Data Position Section ;
C.2.d ill.C. (C.2.d) 2. Location of area where repair work can 2. Repair work, involving heavy lifts by non-single be accomplished on the crane wi!Sout failure proof equipment, can be safely accomplished affecting the safe shut-down capability on the crane when it is positioned over the areas of the reactor, and shor.n in Drawing "A", subject to the provisions therein. There are no nuclear safety restrictions on crane repairs that do not involve handling heavy components.
- 3. Any limitations on reactor operations that 3. There are no limitations on reactor operations that would result from crene repairs. would result from crane repairs.
C.3.b lli.C (C.3.b) 1. The design margin and type of lifting 1. As an alternate to a dual load path system, the devices that are attached to the hook to normal stress design factors have been doubled.
carry cr'tical
- loads. Each lifting devica attached to the hook to carry critical loads will support a load six times the static -
plus dynamic load being handled without permanent deformation. The safety factor. is 10:1 when compared to ultimate. This is in accordance with '
NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, Paragraph 1(a) and ANSI N14.6, Section 7.2.1.
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- Revision A - 6/19/91 Page C-5 EDR-1 APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENT
SUMMARY
OF REGULATORY POSITIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE APPLICANT FOR CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT i
AUX'LIARY BUILD!NG CRANE MODIFICATIONS Topical Regulatory Report Inforrr.ation to be Provided Spacific Crane Data Position Section C.3.t Ill.C (C.3.tl 1. The extent construction requirements for 1. The construction requirements for the crane were the crane's structures, which will not be the same as for plant service.
replaced, are more severe than those for permanent plant service.
- 2. The modifications, and inspections to be 2. No special modifications or inspections were accomplished on the crane following required when the came was converted from , )
construction use, which was more construction use to permanent plant service, since '
severe than those for permanent plant the requirements for both types of service were the service. same.
C.3.u --
- 1. The extent of installation and operating 1. The installation and operating instructions will be !
instructions, updated by Ederer to : fully comply with the requirements of section C.3.u of Regt,latory Guide 1.104 and Sections 7.1 and 9 of NUREG-0554.
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Revision A - 6/19/91 Page C-6 EDR-1 APPENDIX C SUPPLEMENT -
3dMYARY OF REGULATORY POSITIONS TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE APPLICANT F f AtNFRT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ADYILIARY GUILDING CRANE MODIFICATIONS Topic al Regulatory Repot t informatien to be Provided Specific Crane Data Position Sectic n C.4.a --
- 1. The extent of assembly checkout, test 1. Prior to handling critical loads, the crane wi!! be C.4.b procedures, load testing and rated load given a complete assembly and operational checkout C.4.c marking of the crane. by Ederer, and then given a no load test of att C.4.d motions in accordance with updated procedures provided by Ederer. A 125% static load test and a 100% performance test will also be performed at this time in accordance with updated test procedures provided by Ederer. A two blocking test will be performed by Ederer prior to delivery of the crane per Topical Report EDR-1. The maximum Critical Load is plainly marked on each side of the crane.
C.S d Ill.C(C.S.a) 1. The extent the procurement documents 1. The procurement documents for the existing bridge 7 for the crane's structures, which will not structure did not invoke 10CFR50 Appendix B, since be' replaced, required the crane the bridge was built prior to the issuance of this manufacturer to provide a quality federal regulation. However, the bridge was built to assurance program consistent with the the crane manufacturer's quality control process in pertinent provisions of Regulatory effect at the time of construction. Quality Guide 1.28. assurance provisions denoted in procurement specifications for the existing crane covered such items as design control, material selection, . and
- inspection and testing.
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DRAWING A , SW.2 SlHCLE-FAILURE-Pff00F CAPABILITY 1
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Sumniary of Seismic Qualification Analysis for the Existing Ilridge Struc*ure l
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l Ilattimore Gas and Electric Company th>cket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 July 2,1991
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" SEISMIC EVALUATION OF SPENT FUEL CASK IIANDLING CRANE" Calvert Clitfs must modify and upgrade its Auxiliary Building Crane for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). This will be accomplished by replacing the existing Whiting trolley with an Ederer X SAM single failure proof trolley, Compliance with the requirements of NUREG 0554 (Sing!c Failure Proof Crane for Nuclear Power Plants) must be demonstrated through appropriate testing and analysis of the new trolley and modifications to the bridge structure.
Requirements for the upgrade include a scismic analysis to be performed on the existing bridge structure, the trolley main and auxiliary girts, the trolley end trucks and the wire ropes. In order to satisfy these requirements, the following analyses were performed and tabulated as outlined below:
o response spectrum seismic analysis using respmse spectra as outlined in BG&E Specification SP441; o stress analysis of the main and auxiliary trolley girders and end trucks as proposed by Ederer, Incorporated; o stress analysis of the existing bridge structure; o tables of scismic member end forces for the trolley and wire rope loads; and a tables of accelerations along the bridge girders and trolley.
The seismic and stress analyses were performed in accordance with the project's current licensing basis and governing specifications standards and design codes as follows:
o Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR);
l o BG&E Specification SP 601, Modification of Spent Fuel Cask Crane; o NRC NUREG 0554," Single Failure Proof Crancs for Nuclear Power Plants"; and o CMAA Specification No. 70.
Design parameters considered in the seismic analysis include:
o bridge girder positions along the runway girders, including differential building j movements across isolation and expansion joints; i
o trolley positions at the end, quarter span, and mid-span of the bridge girder; l o high hook and low hook lift positions; i
o variat:ons in the lifted load from 0 kips to 300 kips; and o limitations on accelerations based on available wheel friction restraint.
The analysis consists of a three dimensional finite element, spectrum analysis using the verified Bechtel computer g,rogram BSAP. A schematic plan of the trolley assembly, existing bridge girder assembly, and adjacent structural steel is provided.
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The analysis uses an average for the required response spectra (RRS) at elevations 69'-0" and 117*-0" as provided in Bechtel Calculation C 1007.1, Rev.1. Worst case horizontal and vertical directions are assumed to act simultaneously per the project FSAR. Modes have been combined by the square. root of the sum of the squares (SRSS) method except for closely spaced modes, which have been combined by the absolute sum method.
The results of the analysis show that stiesses for all original bridge structure members were determined to be within allowable stresses except for the bridge girders, trolley rail anchorage clips, and end tie bolted connections.
The origina bridge girder was determined to have an overstress at its center span and thus must be moditied. The trolley rail clips and end tie bolted connections were also determined to have overstress conditions and also require modifications. Proposed modifications willi e evaluated and implemented.
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