Text

Response to Second Set of Interrogatories & Request for Production of Documents.Related Correspondence
	ML20073Q073
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	04/20/1983
From:	Eddleman W; EDDLEMAN, W.
To:	; CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
References
	82-468-01-OL, 82-468-1-OL, ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8304280143
	Download: ML20073Q073 (22)
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'%Po:s UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION v.

A oril 20~, 1983 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOdHDPR 26 s;o g Glenn O. Bright Dr. James H. Carpenter James L. Kelley, Chairman.--

...y 4 i ' -

,k In the Matter of

)

Dockets 50 400 OL CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT CO. et al.

)

50 401 OL (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant,

)

Units 1 ani 2)

)

ASI!BP No. 82-h68-01

}

OL Wells Eddleman 's Response to Applicants '

Second Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents This desponse is being filed under extensions of time negotiated with Applicants' counsel Flynn and O'Neill.

Docur*ents requested by Applicants, and other documents responsive to the con-tinuing interrogatories of Applicants ' first set, will be delivered to Applicants at a mutually convenient time, probably April 8, 1983, l

l based on my discussions with O'Neill.

I plan,to continue my present practice of making available longer documents for inspection and cooying on lo'an to CP&L, and giving them copies of most shorter documents.

(

RESPONSE TO GENERAL INTE9ROGATORIES re Eddleman 29 and 37B:

1. a b c : resuonses 1,ncluded with answers to specific interrogatoMe s.

Generally, the persons whose work is cited in each contention would have firstahand knowledge of the facts in their work, and for sone of these persons I have an address, usually in the documents cited.

2.

My objection to General Interrogatory 2 in.the Av.nlicants',

ist set is incornorated here es if fully set out at this niace.

8304280143 830420 PDR ADOCK 0b000400 0

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- With respect to. radiation health effects, nuclear industry and government ef, forts to de-fund, fire, and otherwise trouble experts who find worse health effectsLthan formerly claimed by government and' industry _are well-documented.

Drs. Gofman and Tamulin had their funding cut off because of their work showing higher risks

-to the oublic. from allowed levels of radiation from. nuclear industrv See 'Ponulation Control' Through Nuclear Pollution,1970, pp 225', 221-and military nuclear activities.A ee For soned Power (1979 edition)227, S

and 117-120 and 153-155 ppL6-9,77-80,114-118,169,238-240 (Gofman & Tamplin), also " Population Control" through Nuclear Pollution (Tamplin & Gofman); "An Irreverent, Illustrated View of Nuclear Power"(Gofman) pp 62-63,130, 160-161,192-193 (the last 3 being mostly about the defunding of Dr. Thomas Mancuso See n af ter his studied showed increased radiation risks). ye, Yksgp' g pp s -tfl.

Other examples include the funds cut-off to the Tri-State (Leukemia)

Study (IDJ Baross, R. Berte11, et al),.the elimination of Dr. K.Z.

Morgan from the nuclear engineering dent-at Georgia Institute of Technology,: and quite possibly the incident in which Dr. Berte11 was forced off the road by an object dropped in front of her car tire, and then questioned by an " official" looking Yehicle's occupants, l

who it turned out weren't officials at all, and who haven't been 1.

identified (all this occurring after_ a death threat fron an official

~

of a New York electric utility against her, according to Dr. Bebtell).

The firings of Dr. Carl Johnson in Colorado (who had exuosed plutonium deaths around the Rocky Flats weapons plant) and of the public health official in Pennsylvania (Dr. McLeod)who agreed that Three Mile Island had had more health effects than the nucienr industry and the government claimed, are further documentation of industry /

government retaliation against experts who disagree with them on radiation' risks.

Because of this extensive record of such intinida-tien (only partly described above), nonwitness experts ' names must b e protected in this proceeding if I am to have any access to expertise.

a

-2A-

Further evidence of such a pattern of industry intimidation (of ten with g,overnment assistance) is discussed in (A) "The Texas Syndrome" describing the loss of jobs, income and job security by Charles Atchison, who revealed defects in pipe whin resfaint welds at the Comanche Peak nuclear plant (copy attached as nage 2B).

While the NLRB administrative law judges have ruled that Atchison was " properly reporting safety violations", an activity urotected by law, and that he was being fired from other jobs as a result of being fired for such reporting of violations " perpetuating a violation" of the 1978 whistleblower law "ad infinitum" Atchison is about to lose his house and faces years of appeals of these rulings, by the nuclear contractors and subcontractors who had been found in violation of the law protecting people who expose construction errors in nuclear plants.

Note that Atchison was fired for the second time after he testified under subpoena for intervenors in the Comanche Peak case before tha NRC.

One wonders, in the light 6f the case of William Smart at Callaway, and I

this case, how much the NRC is doing to protect peonle who bring such defects to light.

As I uhderstand it, the only way problems found by such persons ("Whistleblowers") can be litigated before the NRC is if they are made the basis of a contention by some intervenor, the NRC having basically told Boards to not consider such issues sua sponte.

If intervenors like me are to have access to information from people working at Harris, we have to have the ability to urotect the identities l

of sources who are otherwise unwilling to present information or detail where and when defects were incornorated into the plant.

I've already talked to more than one who was unwilling to say anything if they were going to be identified, due to fear of job loss and be$ ng

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unable to find comparable paying work, much like Atchison.

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g positions. But ast Aprilt.he TNRC if they,QQ';Mi;eg ',.the day; he was.schedu!ed.to. I.; But, the casss'are fn'fr'om J

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, closed lsinci allthree!cori@an-ef "oyerinspecting and witch--

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. tot,te repert on vendor wclds pratecte i under a;197h whis-b.: fore the NRC. He told his fottrteen year oldsda'ught4I

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firamediate boss at Thompkins-t who wants to ijuit.' school and

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.. Atchison.'is.currentificini "Kaen the defects popped

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- pidyed by a small militarycon) tractor in Fort Worth..f,Tni.

l told to keep ' hands'off,' but I wiud the company of mak-T!,e events smacked of a making about, half..wh'at'I' W.

I coc:dit they were te, ob i mg anvincings uaMicv-compiracy to prevent Atchison lt' l

Gus." <ays Atdison.

....a irrational d:.a ges' fr. in giving his testimony.

would make in the nuclear in-il

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.cauc.t Aidason. Oh. or-die day of. hiring of Mr. At-dustry and my new bossis restM

.had discovered that since 1977, aaed thoan & Ro:n ta scia-chidon directly. corresponded less 'cause I'm off so ~mucri C

ta the d te of hearing at which / dealing with these case's,".he 6 ic p@e, wHp restndrits had l u.at. Ahl. ism wiu. te p.o.

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ber "imta:1ed to the wrm.e e.g..ws,.nd n:l;14caehis and see this all the way. Others t.:sn1," wrote NLH h regional s;c. ~' tw NRC [Nu.:a i

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. -The ranid loss of business by our security expert (Hawkeye) after qualificationq were put into the record here- (and not otherwise publicized or indeed mentioned to anyone excent my attorney, by intervenors, so far as I an aware -- and I checked on this -af ter this security firm withdrew, asking each security intervenor),

shows the chilling effect on free access to information and views that the nuclear industry can and does exert.

In order to develop a sound record, informed views (including those which may-not agree with Applicants or NRC) are necessary; and I can make effective use of such views in filings, locating and interpreting information, cross-examiningx, and in other ways, w* thout having to ernose experts O( p1WrS who have developed such views and information to the well-known nuclear j

nw industry pattern of trying to squelch (or worse) its scientific eritics.

j 3

None at this coint.

4 These documents, to the extent not noted in the contentions, will be identified for each constention below and made available to Applicants for insnection and conying under nutually agreed conditions.

5 Such documents will te indentified & made available per 4 above.

6.

Objection to #2 above incorporated here by reference as if fully set out herein.

7 I' have not identified any documents yet which I plan to offer as exhibits or use in cross-exanination.

I do rely on documents, as noted above, but have not yet planned exhibits or cross-examination to the extent of identifying which documents included above, oE others I ihtend (or plan) to use in these ways.

, _ ~ _ -

-4 '

RESPOUSE TO INTERROGATORIES ON.EDDLEMAN 229 G1 (a)

Bruce Molholt, Ph.D., Director, Center for Environmental Health, 1315 Walnut St., Suite 1832, Philadelphia,. EA 19107, has direct knowledge of his testimony in TMI Restart, his cross-examination of Dr. Tokuhata therein, and his opin' ions concerning certain findingms of fact nade in a partial initial decision by the ASLB in that proceeding.

Please note that Dr. Molholt informed ne orally in April or May 1982 that he might be moving fron this address.

In addition, the authors of the documents listed below have first-hand knowledge of the oreparation of those documents, 'and of those facts which they personally determined.

(b)

In addition to the documents referenced in Eddleman 29 (one of which, it' appears, addresses TLD8s (Joint Contention

, Steucek et al letter 3-30-82 to Heslth Physics Journal, at pp 6-9), underestimate of I-131 releases in " normal operation" of nuclear plants is shown in TO~rlARD A REALISTIC FISSION DOSE ESTIMATE (IAND Educational Associates of relevant table Foundation, 3368 Oak Ave, Stevens Point, WI 54h81) (cony nrovided to Applicants). Dr. John Gofman was chief consultant on this study.

The relevant fact is that the whole body and bone doses from 1-131, Sr-k90 and Cs-137l is much higher than NRC estimates.

This data was derived from milk nonitoring data.

Since NRC has discontinued the requirement for milk monitoring around nuclear plants (I filed timely comments against this change), it is much harder to get the data now

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for a similar sxtudy of Harris or CP&L8 s existing n-plants (or the VC Sumner and N Anna plants, which are operating (so to sneak) and are similar to Harris per the FSAR).

The higher dose from tho levels of 1-131 in Wisconsin, 1963-76, combined with the study's analysis of radiation levels rising with nuclear power develonment (more plants) which. is not attributable to nuclear weanons test $ ng, shows that nuclear plants have emitted er.cessive levels of 1-131 to the environment.

-5

There is also a. one-page letter-fron Dr. Mo3 holt to ' ne which mostly identifies th,e documents below, but also nanes at least one nerson

' not ' consulted (to the best of My recollection) in nrenaring this cont ention.

If I cannot negotiate this point successfully with Applicants',fI-object here to disclosure of this document because

-it provides no information not in the disclosure below except for 2

the identity of persons referred to 'above and some information NOT each provided to me, and the identity of kha nerson ir privileged under my objection to General Interrogatory 2 above (incopzorated here as if

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d fully set out at this point).

The information I have not used'o names NOTE: cony of letter w/

or identification of it, is not relevant.

sent ti O'Neill k-15-83 TMI-restart-copy lent to Applicants (2) Molholt testimony outline p.19 shows continued evidence of excess hypothyrodidism downwind of the Peach Bottom reactor after the 1-131 released from TMI had decayed away to insignificance, i.e. in the first 8 months of 1980.

Note also on page 19 underestimation of. delivered I-131 dose by ignoring inhalation pathway.

P.18 covers fetal hypersensitivity to 131-I.

(3) Letters by Kirk, and by *._._. _?ield, Field, Zegers & Steucek, the latter,'pp 6-9 (Health Physics)-detailing reasons to use vole or other animal thyroids to monitor I-131 in the environment (seek also Kirk letter pp 3-h).

See also~ Field et al Table 1, n.12.

Note the statement (Field et al p.8) that the dose to vole thyroid at Site III was much above that estimated for humans (NURBG-0558, p.75)..

This indicates-that underestimates of radioiodine levels in biota may well be taking pla'ce under non-accident conditions also.

l (4) "NRC's GROSS UNDERESTIMATION OF THE RADIOACTIVE RELEASES AND POPULATION DOSES DURING THN TMI-2 ACCIDENT" (excernts from review published in Nuclear Engineering, vol. 26, no. 3) 6y Seo'Takeshi, Kyoto University Nuclear Reactor Laboratory, Kyoto, Japan.

a

. This shoup, first, that NRC TLD's through h-6/7 1979 at TMI came un with doses ovgr 60% higher (5300/3300)'and 75% higher (2800/1600) than utility TLDs.

Given a TLD accuracy of 30%, the probability of such discrepancies being random is negligible, given the sanele sizes (1st ration: NRC 37, utility 20),(2d ratioK NRC 30, utility 15).

Note that these are collective dose estimates, not summations of the TLD readings.

This discrepancy in monitoring is substantial, but relates more to the joint contentions on TLDs.

Second, re radiciodines (see pn 2-h),

the graba samples and estimates from TLD data agree well (Figure 2), but the vent monitors are not functional for about 3 weeks after the accident (ibid).

The noble gas underestimate (for release) is h.5 times (given at top of p.4, evidently omitted at top of p.3), based on the TLD data and Seo's analysis of it, ppl-2.

Third, Seo's analysis of radioiodine levels in filters (up 3-k) points to the lack of a decay curve prior to the quicker change of 1h filter cartridges 4-12-79 through 4-20 (and continuing to be often 4

more frequent than before 4-12, thgouth h-J30.

Seo states (p.3) average "It is clear that during the period before Anril lh the/ sampling intervals were seven to eight times longer than those during the period after April 14.

Also it should be noted that after the sampling intervals became shorter, the declining gradient of the release rate was at a higher level by several tendfolds from that for the period between March 28 and Anril 1k).

Seo connutes an underestimate of 364 times in radiciodine releases, due to the failure of filters (cartridges) to tran all the radioiodine g61ng through them.

By estimating the gradient of release backwards at the Anr lh-20 rate, or at the halflife of 131-I (8 days) the initial release

5 level comes out, at a minimum, at over 100 uCi/sec, (halflife extran) to 2500 u Ci/sec (decay' curve extrapolation). Seo indicates that as na'y as 64000 Ci of I-131 may have been released. Dose estimates n

made by the NRC do not appear to follow the available data on I-131 releases.

(5) there is testimony (NCUC Docket E-100 sub 35, witness Smith or Dominoski, both residents near TMI) of a " metallic taste" one of them felt during the accident.

Iodine, as I noted in testimony in the same hearing, has a metallic taste.

I have not determined the minimum amount of iodine that can be taded, 'particularly if it is (r borne, but given the intense radioactivity of 131-I (halflife around 730,000 seconds) even a minuscule amount could be-a significant o.uantity of radioactivity in curies.

(6) The tendency of epoxy (typo in contention 29,"exposy", i.e.

epoxies) to dissociate under conditions of heat, moisture, pressure or radiation (or any combination of these) is documented by the Union of Concerned Scientists re containment penetrations.

I have not located this document, but recall using it in ureparing Eddleman 29.

l (7) The tendency of PVC to embrittle under radiation is documented et a1 by Gillen and ClougE~ e g. in NUREG/CR 266677 (SAND 81-2613) p.1-2 (test descriptions pp 2-9) conclusions pp 14-28. Tables I and II (pp2h-25) show that radiation exposure followed by elevated temperature produces the worst effect of reducing tensile elongation (i.e. embrittling)

PYC, and that gamma radiation and heat in air likewise produce the worst effect on PVC in this respect.

I used a Science News article concerning this work in preparing Eddleman 11 and this is where the PVC problem in Eddleman 29 (1st paragraph, supplement 5-lh'-82, p.93) came from. See also (6) below for supplement to (a) and (c) re this.

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_ Authors here: Gillen, Clough, Lowell H. Jones.

(8) Further work on the degradation of PVC is in NURPG/CR 2763,

. 8-14, Table k',

Figure 2, and SAND 82-1071, see pp iii, 1-2, and especially 21-24 The swelling effect shown.for PVC _where oxygen levels lower (p. iii, p.11, ppl3-Ik and figure 3.)

The large changes in PVC material volume would ureclude its use as a' tight sealer in general, for if it were not enclosed

-on all sides, such an expansion could readily distort or crack open gaps in the opening or fittings being sealed, and if it were totally i

enclosed, if the expansion occurred it would totally distort the enclosure.

All these have the potentiel to create leaks bypassing the relevant filters, as alleged in Eddleman 29, at p.93 and 94 (item F).

So do the eventualities in the reference-under-7. above, through embrittlement, cracking, separation of PVC sealers from edges they seal between or along, and so on. (a) Sunplement: authors are Gillen, Clough, Ganouna-Cohen, Chenion, & Delmas re 8.

($)

The difficulty caused by the conditions cited in (7) above is that if normal radioiodine releases are indeed low, they can be systematically degrading the sealers (PVC, epoxy, and the other materials in ref. &7 (uolyethylnene) -- as well as those in NUREG/UM 2157 (1981) which demonstrate the same type problems with more ranid degradation in lower-radiation environments, per amount of radiation received, than if the radiation is given all at onace, for ehtylene propylene rubber, cross-linked polyolefin insulations, chloroprene and chlorosulfonated polyety19 ene), as can exposure to other radioactive materials in the gas stream through the filters and other radioiodine absorbers, and from an particles (radioactive) deposited around sealers or due to velocity dbop ahead of the filters, vixbration shaking them off filber surfaces, or leaks around the seals that hold the filters in place, or around non-sealing filter mounts. Embrittled sealers cannot seal as well as more flexible sealing material; it may crack, pull away from the sides l

or surfaces of the section(s) being sealed, leaving gaps; it may develop holes, or warp and rwell so as to open gaps beside it; ends under tension 1

. may simply retract, leaving holes and gaps, as tensile elongation and resiliency are reduced; selective embrittlement of edges or faces of a sealer facing the airstream or exposed to radioactive material as particles deposited, dripping lionids (in the case of high humidity or of liquid droplets of radioactive materials, e.g. organic iodines) may cause those sections of sealer to twist.or warp or swell, any of which can impair the seal effectiveness by opening holes or gaps around it -- in the extreme case, embrittled and stiffened sections could lift the sealer out of its normal path, leaving a hole.

Finally, all these forms of embrittlement increase the' likelihood of gavs being formed when filters or other iodine trapping mechanisms are replaced, since the embrittled sealer's tendencies to warp, twist, or stick to the exchanged piece of filter or equipment as it is being removed, can all create gaps, and the motion of removal may open cracks in embrittled sealers or allow a tensioned sealer or portion thereof to move freely, opening cracks or gaps, or pulling away from the surfaces to be sealed.

I have observed the effects listed in the last sentence in air conditioning and air handling systems (nonradioactive) and can attest to how difficult it is to maintain a seal when the sealer around a filter being changed is embrittled.

(9) PSAR TMI-62 states that (item 3) there is no capability of sampling vacuum pump effluents for particulates and radioiodines

" duos to the high humidity".

The effect of humidity on the other earticulate and radiciodine monitors for release points 1,2,5 and 5A is not discussed there.

Thus, it anpears Applicants concede an inability to detect radiciodine releases in normal operation.

Moreover, p. TMI-61 states (item 3) that the condensate vacuum pump l

effluent stream noble gas monitors w!11 have " details on these monitors... provided in a future FSAR amendment."

Further, at n.

TMI-63, it is stated that a reliable method of mbndtoring the

s

, 31 atmospheric steam dump valves, stean generator safety relief valves, power operate,d relief valves (such as stuck open at TMI and Ginna, see NUREG-0600 and NUREG-0909), and release coints of secondary steam from the auxiliary feedwater pump turbine.

CP&L states it will continue to review these potential release points, which number 31 per unit (62 for 2 units, or 124 for 4 units at the FSAR says).

Note that these are steam release valves, so humidity should be a definite problem in monitoring these release points for radio-iodine and for particulates (per p TMI-61, referenced above, FSAR).

(c) facts soecified are stated above.

Other facts may be-included in one or more documents I have not yet located, or in documents I beliefewere used in preparing Eddleman 30, and which are identified in the Molholt letter I sent a cony of to O'Neill (Aunlicants' counsel) on 5 4-15-83 2(a) information provided above. (3) None se far. (4) identified below if not already identified above. (5) identified below. (6) identified below except for names of any persons providing information --

on this point, my objection to general interrogatory 2 above is incorporated here by reference as if fully set out here including the objection to general interrogatory 2 in resnonse to the Annlicants' first set of interrogatories to me.

(7) none so far.

29-1: The FSAR and the ER, and possibly others not known to me.

29-2:

I can't be sure without more information from Applicants, on which I am now conducting discovery.

29-3:

Basis so far is the basis of the contention 29, that Applicants cannot detect ra81oiodine releases from numerous Doints, and radioiodine filtering and trapoing devices may not be able to 4

continuously trap radioiodines to the le vels Auplicants state, due to not enough filters /traus, and due to enkspastthefilters/trahs, e.g. due to seal failure.

See above re G1-b and c.

I 29-4. Yes.

29-5.

Thepe are stated (ER amendment 5, section 5.2.7 4L) to be maximum values calculated from a diffusion model for annual average.

This model does not take into account rainout. snow, or the tendency t

of plumes in the lee of powerolant structures to be much more cohesive than models had indicated.

(The' data of Pisiello et al on Kr-85 releases from TMI-2 are also -relevant here -- they found the plume touching down on the ground, with concentrations much higher than NRC had predicted by its modeling, which is no doubt similar to Applicants' modeling for Harris).

Further, these values depend on the Harris source term, which has auparently been revised, and on which I am-sending interrogatories.

Radioiodines occur as elemental I, organic iodine, hypoiodous acid and possibly in other forms.

The earticulate and soluble forms of Maese (including the element, organic, and HOI forms) can readily be captured in the nucleation ozf rain or snow, or by falling snowflakes'or rain drops, or in the nucleation or fall of ice crystals and hail, including accretion on hail or ice crystals or snowflakes.

Thus, rainout and snow can bring considerably greater concentrations of radioiodines to earth than Applicants predict.

I need considerably more data to quantify this relationship, but the burden of proof is not on me.

s The source term may not take into account variations in plant radiciodine releases, releases through release points Applicants do not or have not monitored, and so on.

The revised source term c'ame to me as numbers without an explanation or basis so I cannot answer

~

this question in more detail without discovery of Anplicants.

29-6.

I do not know how accurate Auplicants ' meteorological data is.

I presume this question really asks, am I challenging their use of this data.

I will recuire discovery on the data itself; the method

of use of the data is. deficient as noted above; further, I do not believe daat there is a sufficient period of data for Harris to include all the variations that could be expected during the term of the Harris license.

The site data tells nothing about rainout,

- snow and other precipitation offsite (indeed, for rain, in this area, the data may -differ for points as little as 100 yards anart; for snow and other precipitation, I do not know the variability to be expected with location around the Harris plant. -Applicants have indicated in one of their filings to me that the hilly terrain around Harris would be expected to introduce considerable variation in wind and weather. (b) see above. (c) see above.

29-7(a) as noted above, the source term.has recently been revised i

uoon what basis I don't really know.

I am conducting discovery on the new source tera-and its basis. (b) see (a). Table 5.2.2-2, as I understand it, does not concern normal concentrations of radio-iodines at the plant boundary, but maximum ones. (c) see (a) 29-8.

It appears that Table 5.2.2-3 has been deleted from the ER, by amendment 5 I require discovery to answer this question, for' both (a) and (b).

j 29-9: See above.

29-10(a) I'm not sure which of the models this guide auproves I'll conduct discovery on this.

that Applicants usedib)Howevey, the cooling pond models described on pages 1.113-26 through -37 are stated to apply best to long half-life materials (which I-129 is, but I-131 and most other radio-i todines are not), and none of these models allow nonuniform con-(-

centrations at the surface, or stratification / turnover which is to

'be expected in a lake as ddep as the. Harris lake.

As t'o the numerical models, pp 38 through 41, only one-dimensional diffusion is addreseed (ref. 57) and the applicability is stated to be less if there is stratification and turnover. In sum, no model in that reg guide

..for impoundments' appears to be appropriate for Harris's reservoir.

(b) to the extent I have the info now, see above.

(c) I have not determined this, but the ability to handle short-halflife substances like I-131 is a preprequisite to the adequacy of any such model for radioiodine levels.

Flow patterns and evanoration and chemical interations of iodine with other material (e.g. decaying organic matter, water, chlorine and hydrazine and ammonia, etc) should also be modeled, as dispersion amounts to a spread of the chemical.

29-11(a) To the extent I now know Applicants' analysis, I think my prinf@ pal disagreements are stated above, but I am conducting discovery on a number of issues relating to this contention and may well find that other disagreements arise from the information so discovered, e.g. the source term, Applicants ' analysis and experiments, their definition of normal operation, and so on. (b) see (a) above.

29-12(a) ER section 5.2 4 consists of one page stating that for both Iquid and gaseous pathways the " usage factors and dose calculational models were taken from NRC Regulatory Guide 1.109", and that atmospheric dispersion anddeposition rate factors were used for gaseous nathways from Table 5.2.2-1.

I have discussed my disagreements with the model and assumptions by which these dispersion rates were derived, above, re 29-3, 29-5, 29-6; deposition models are probably wrong if they rely on the AEC experiments which were discussed in the 11-11-79 / Washington Post, which stated NRC was still using the results of fraudulent AEC experiments in which deposition and uptake or radionuclides were l

at 400 F

. determined in sterilized soil (baked and irradiated with UV, so no microorganisms) which had been selected for its low adsorption and absorption of radionuclides, further using full grown plants and transplanting them into such soil and then assessing radionuclide,

uptake af ter only 3 days.

The problems with such an approach are legion and Ig1 try to lay out the major ones: killing the microorganisms renovos the first biological level of concentration (and maybe several levels) for radionuclides; baking removes water from the s, oil, and water is the means of much chemical acitivity and the basis of microorganism motion and life in the soil; transulanted plants of ten go into shock and thus do not take up chemicals from the soil the way a plant grown in place would; three days is far shorter than the growing life of most plants, especially most plants eaten by humans and animals that humans eat.

In addition, the work of Franke et al (NRC translation 520) shows that transfer factors used by NRC are much less than those reported in the literature (see p.33,45,59,65,67,70-73, esp note re goat milk on 72,80,87-88,97,99 (see 98), 100-106,108-109, 110,113, 114-115,.

and refernences dited therein).

The statement about direct radiation in 5.2.h.3 gives no basis; since I-131 and other radioiodines in the plant are gamma enitters, direct radiation from daem should be calculated and included, and the shielding of the resins, filters and other items absorbing radio-iodines in the plant, as well as the sites of such in operation and when they have been renoved and are stored as radioactive waste, should be analyzed.

As to regulatory guide 1.109, I assume Apolicants used Anvendices C and E for radioiodines.

The C (r,$) therein appears to ignore rainout and precipitation (in section 1); ditto for X (r,9) in section 2.

i At p. 1.109-26, the use of 1.1 for 10,000/8760 gives about a h% under estimate. (10,000 is 10

/10 ); sane page, wet deposition is not included for radioiodines; the nuclide concentrations in milk annear to depend on a decesition rate and a C{

that also ignore rainout /precinitation, and NRC aopears to be using the lower transfer factors critiqued

' in NRC translation $20, above.

There are a number of other defects, e.g. Table E-7 says no data for iodine dose to the lung, daough this air pathway would be critical for dose to the lung, and iodine can forn tiny particles that deoosit well in the deen lung, and is a gamma emitter for I-131 and other isotopes.

However, the major problen from ER 5.2.h is that there is nothing that tells me what and how the data CP&L used were applied.

I need discovery to answer this, as a one page " description" of such a complex calculation is hopelessly inadecuate to even evaluate.

I do not maintain that I have here gotten all the problems with Reg. Guide 1.109 down, just the main ones I have identified so far.

I do not believe that my disagreements with calculation of maximum doses to individuals from all pathways are relevant to this contention; but most of the criticisms above acoly to' nuclides besides I-131, as you can see by reading NRC translation 520 in full.

" analytic" (b) basis is provided above ::2x2?

i.e. it's my analysis or the analysis of. the authors of the cited works.

29-13(a) Yes, although that doesn't mention Appendix I.

(b) see above.

29-14(a) Yes. (b) I have not prepared a dose estimate of my own, but the radioiodine doses are clearly underestimated for the reasons given above.

29-15(a)Yes, it appears to not comuly with the $1000/rerson rem rule for reducing exoosures -(Anpendix I, see II.D; it does not annear to comply with Sec 10 B thereof; sorry, it annears Harris is exempt from II.D if it comnlies with the staff position in RM $0-2.

This concede ~

doesn't mean I mandad that Harris does comply to that standard for radioiodines or anything else. (b) If Harris exposures are calculated for nresent uses, the vanid ernansion of-Cary and other towns down-wind, and the tendency of peonle to grow nove vegetables for themselves,

, and Tablo (.2.5-2 are not sufficiently taken into account, and section 5.2.4 makes no' reference go such monitoring programs as App I, III B, requires.

I also disagree in that the use of " dose" in Table 5.2.5-2 se is oroner where Annendix I requires " doms or dose commitment".

Table 5.2.5-2 does not anpear to consider dose commitments, for radio-iodines or anything else.

Nothing in this resnonse should be taken to mean I agree with any calculation or number given for SENPP in Table 5.2.5-2.

Finally, if the realistic estimate of radio-iodine or other doses exceeded the Staff Rm-50-2 guidelines, then Harris would have to cormly with section II.D of Appendix I to 10 CFR 50 I am not certain what "the use" of the Apnendix I guidelines is in the 29-16 Table 5.2.5 I don't have a transcript of the special prehearing conference, but I don't recall saying that Applicants "have not demonstrated that normal _ radioiodine releases will not exceed Apnendix I limitations".

I believe that's the Board's rewording of my contention 29, which says that the"ER... C. Underestimates the inenkthat=**mata radioiodine releases in normal operation and the health effects thereof."

I may have referenced Appendix I in across-reference, since a contention may allege a violation of a specific NRC rule.

At any rate, I think the quote means that Apolicants have not validly shown that normal Harris radiciodine releases will not exceed Appendix I linitations.

29-17 Using the maximum amounts of radiciodine which could be i

released durin5 normal operations (non-emergency), demonstrated on a conservative and fully valid basis that radioiodine (all isotones,

-including those dar produced by decay of other isotopes, e.g. noble gases, xenon isotopes, particulates) will not exceed the dose and dose connitment limitations of Appendix I in any event. Conservative basis means that.the largest transfer and deposition factors known are used in the analysis, rainout is fully accounted for, added gardening near

- Harris is fully accounted for, and that the requirements of Anoendix I sections II.D and III.B are fully complied with if such analysis demonstrates that they are required by Appendix I to be ccmolied with.

$ h ke#rYeadiIih, runoff,andevaportransipiration,lungdose,and 0

all possible release and untake pathways RESPONSE RE 37 B should be fully factored into the analysis G1-a I relied on my memory of papers by Bross, Berte11, and others; I believe Berte11 has moved to Toronto; Bross, so far as I know, is still at Roswell Park Memorial Inst. (b), (c) see contention 37B and response to G-5 below.

G02 Objection, same as to G-2 above, incorporated by reference here in fully.

G-3 None yet.

G-4 None G-5(a) The Nuclear Worker and Ionizing Radiation, by Rosalie Berte11, Ph.D., American Industrial Hygiens Assn Jouarnal May 1979 (vol 40, pp 395-401, and comments, ibid,10-79 pp 916-922.

Causes of death therein include homicide and suicide as well as accelerated aging, non-malignant gastrointestinal diseases,.cardio-vascular diseases, bronchitis, other circulatory diseases, diabetes, stroke, hypertension, all cancers, athercsclerosis, allergies, and asthma,. (as well as increased risk of cancer death or leukemia from persons who have acquired asthma, allergies, heart disease, diabetes, l

or bacterial and viral diseases (due to reduced immune resnonse) caused by radiation themselves), " mild mutations in germ cells" (n.399),

pn umonia d

, hives, eczema G 50 Nhl ysen e rheumatic fever, genetic diseases.

(b) see specific {$ GW 78Sff ftt$,fnif,(a)tse M Of f%Q d

responses, besides G-5 and G-1(b) and (c).

6. I recall none, and have, found none so far.

7. None so far.

SPECIFIC INTERROGATORIES: 37-B-1.

See response tog 5(a) above.

In addition, I have attempted to locate lists of the diseases involved.

Gofman 81, Radiation and Human Haalth, ppBh0-8h9, 850-653, refers to 700 doninant genetic diseases (p.851) as well as recessive an iregularly inherited diseases.

I did about a day's library research trying to

. find good lists of these diseases, and although the results were not that good, even with help from reference librarians at the UNC Health i

Sciences Library (Chapel Hill, NC), here are the results:

I also have this title ending "Ihherited Disease i

The Metabolic Basis of Genetic Diseases, 5th ed, 1963, 5 authors and over 100 contribobs 18d. guess, lists, pp 39-59, many genetic See also Tables 1-k (p.14) and 1-5(pp 15-16) diseasesg. All of these may be caused by the radiation mechanisms discussed by Gofman (as cited above) and by Porter, Heredity & Disease, pp _20-29 and 30-76, and An ABC of Medical Genetics (if ny notes are right)31-49 and 5k-60.

Other such diseases are noted and described in Clinical Genetics - A Source Book for Physicians (ed. Jackson & Schimke, 1979) pp 33-2hh, 246-7 (list of pharmacogenetic conditions), 261 (list of vitamin related genetic diseases), and pp 269-59h; list, pp xi-xiv of Genetic & Malformation Syndromes in Clinical Medicine, Nyhan &

Sakati 1976; Genetic Disorders of Man (1970) pp 107-980; Progress in Clinical and Bio. Research volune 32 (1978) pp 27-306 and 523-732; list of Diabetes related dieorders, p 746 ibid; list of HLA related i

disorders pp 746-47; Porter, Heredity & Disease (1968)

(pp 29-29 and 30-76 re causal mechanisms; pp 86-137, 154-242, 243-304, and 309-342

.re genetic diseases, pn 307-308 re ionizing radiation; UNSCEAR 1977, Tables 1-8 (un $1h-519) and 10, n.520, list genetic diseases considered in that report; genetic diseases as mentioned in pp h41-468 of H. Harris, The Principles of Human Bio-Chemical Genetics (1980).

Additional discussion of failure nodes is in Chanter 9, A pn 88-106 in C. Auerbach, F.R.S., Genetics in the Atomic Age (1965) and pp l

9-10 of the 1983 edition of Metabolic Basis of Ihherited Disease (op cit)

(compare Gorman, pp792-796,817-820,826-839,8ho-846, 8h6-47, 848-hE9, 850-53,100-101, 766-69, 790-91,838-9,721-4,773-776, 82-84,401-2, 4 08-9,h10-h11,769,771, 780,8h4, 570, 57P, 832-5, & Chanters 21 and 22 to the extent not cited above).

.~.

. ICRP Publication 18 (1972) pp 28-29 and 32-33 states that there is a constant and paximum REBE for radiation for causing mutation at low dose rates.

Gofman references YA McCusick, 1978, Mendelian Inheritance in Man (sic) and states that reference catalogs 700 autosomal dominant

-diseases (p.850); also references Table 50, p 539 of UNSCEAR 1977 (op cit); (lists of genetic diseases of concern).

Gofman 81, op cit, p. 102: " leukemia and virtually all solid cancers can be caused by radiation" (he states that almost all authorities agree on this point).

ML20073Q073

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