Rev 1 to Proposed Tech Specs Change,Adding Action Statement to TS 3.7.7 to Provide for Fixed Duration to Be in Tornado Warning Configuration & to Return CREVS to Normal Configuration Upon NotificationML20072T370 |
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Sequoyah |
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Issue date: |
09/09/1994 |
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From: |
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
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To: |
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Shared Package |
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ML20072T339 |
List: |
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References |
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TVA-SQN-TS-94, TVA-SQN-TS-94-0, NUDOCS 9409150187 |
Download: ML20072T370 (11) |
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Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
MONTHYEARML20217F9701999-10-14014 October 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating ARC for Axial Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking at Dented Tube Support Plate Intersections ML20217E4301999-10-12012 October 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Requirements for Containment Penetrations During Refueling Operations ML20211M7341999-08-30030 August 1999 Marked-up & Revised TS Pages,Providing Alternative to Requirement of Actually Measuring Response Times ML20211K1721999-08-30030 August 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Providing Clarification to Current TS Requirements for Containment Isolation Valves ML20209B7731999-06-30030 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Updating Requirmements for RCS Leakage Detection & RCS Operational Leakage Specifications to Be Consistent with NUREG-1431 ML20196F2211999-06-24024 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages for Amend to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,allowing Use of Fully Qualified & Tested Spare Inverter in Place of Any of Eight Required Inverters ML20196G4701999-06-24024 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Re Amends to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,revising TS to Be Consistent with Rev to ISTS Presently Submitted to NEI TSTF for Submittal as Rev to NUREG-1431 ML20196G7961999-06-22022 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Bases,Clarifying Proper Application of TS Requirements for Power Distribution Systems & Functions That Inverters Provide to Maintain Operability & Providing Updated Info on Cold Leg Injection Accumulators ML20195E9841999-06-0707 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Increasing Max Allowed Specific Activity of Primary Coolant from 0.35 Microcuries/Gram Dose Equivalent I-131 to 1.0 Microcuries/Gram Dose Equivalent I-131 for Plant Cycle 10 (U2C10) Core ML20206E1391999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposed Tech Spec Change 99-03, Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation Sys Versus Radiation Monitors. Changes Add LCOs 3.3.3.1 & 3.7.7 to Address Inoperability of Radiation Monitoring CREVS & NUREG-1431 Recommendations ML20206E1611999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposed Tech Spec Change 99-04, Auxiliary Suction Pressure Low Surveillance Frequency Rev. Change Deletes Surveillance ML20204H4081999-03-19019 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating TS 3.8.3.1,3.8.3.2,3.8.3.3 & Associated Bases Associated with Electrical Equipment Protective Devices to Technical Requirements Manual ML20207D6011999-02-26026 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Relocating TS 3.7.6, Flood Protection Plan & Associated Bases from TS to Plant TRM ML20207D6331999-02-26026 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for Consistency When Exiting Action Statements Associated with EDG Sets ML20206S0131999-01-15015 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 3.3.3.3, Seismic Instrumentation & Associated Bases,Relocated to Plant Technical Requirements Manual ML20199K6001999-01-15015 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Adding New Action Statement to 3.1.3.2 That Would Eliminate Need to Enter TS 3.0.3 Whenever Two or More Individual RPIs Per Bank May Be Inoperable,While Maintaining Appropriate Overall Level of Protection ML20195H6111998-11-16016 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Revising EDG SRs by Adding Note That Allows SR to Be Performed in Modes 1,2,3 or 4 If Associated Components Are Already OOS for Testing or Maint & Removing SR Verifying Certain Lockout Features Prevent EDG Starting ML20154H7251998-10-0808 October 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Supplementing Proposed TS Change 96-08,rev 1 to Add CRMP to Administrative Controls Section & Bases of TS ML20238F1091998-08-27027 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for Insertion of Limited Number of Lead Test Assemblies,Beginning W/Unit 2 Operating Cycle 10 Core ML20238F3001998-08-27027 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Replacing 72 H AOT of TS 3.8.1.1,Action b,w/7 Day AOT Requirement for Inoperability of One EDG or One Train of EDGs ML20236G5961998-06-29029 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Typed Pages for TS Change 95-19, Section 6 - Administrative Controls Deletions ML20249C6371998-06-26026 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Lowering Specific Activity of Primary Coolant from 1.0 Uci/G Dose Equivalent I-131 to 0.35 Uci/G Dose Equivalent I-131,as Provided in GL 95-05 ML20248F0051998-05-28028 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs for Section 6, Administrative Controls Deletions ML20217N3511998-04-30030 April 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Modifying Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b to Change Mode Requirement to Allow PORV Stroke Testing in Modes 3,4 & 5 W/Steam Bubble in Pressurizer Rather than Only in Mode 4 ML20203J1681998-02-25025 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising EDG Surveillance Requirements to Delete Requirement for 18-month Insp IAW Procedures Prepared in Conjunction W/Vendor Recommendations & Modify SRs Associated W/Verifying Capability of DGs ML20202J7601998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.7.9 Re Relocation of Snubber Requirements ML20202J7141998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Adding New LCO That Addresses Requirements for Main Feedwater Isolation,Regulating & Bypass Valves ML20202J6961998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating MSIV Requirements to Be Consistent W/Std TS (NUREG-1431) ML20198T4311998-01-21021 January 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re New Position Title & Update of Description of Nuclear Organization ML20199K4571997-11-21021 November 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Adding one-time Allowance Through Operating Cycle 9 to Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b to Perform Stroke Testing of PORVs in Mode 5 Rather than Mode 4,as Currently Required ML20211A3191997-09-17017 September 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Pressure Differential Surveillance Requirements for Containment Spray Pumps ML20137T0871997-04-0909 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Elimination of Cycle 8 Limitation for SG Alternate Plugging Criteria ML20137M8581997-04-0101 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs 2.1 Re Safety Limits & TS 3/4.2 Re Power Distribution Limits ML20137C8421997-03-19019 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Conversion from Westinghouse Electric Corp Fuel to Framatome Cogema Fuel ML20136J0381997-03-13013 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Section 5.6.1.2,revising Enrichment of Fuel for New Fuel Pit Storage Racks ML20134P8631997-02-14014 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Requesting Discretionary Enforcement for 48 Hours Which Is in Addition to 72 Hours Allowed Outage Time Provided by TS Action 3.8.1.1.b ML20134K9981997-02-0707 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Revising TS Change Request 96-01, Conversion from W Electric Corp Fuel to Framatome Cogema Fuel (MARK-BW-17), to Ensure That Core Analysis Computer Code Output Actions Are Consistent W/Hot Channel Factor SRs ML20134L9261996-11-0808 November 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Placing of Channel in Trip for Reactor Trip & Engineered Safety Feature Instrumentation Sys Solely to Perform Testing as Not Requiring Channel to Be Declared Inoperable ML20129D2661996-10-18018 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Removing Existing Footnotes That Limit Application of Apc for Plant S/G Tubes to Cycle 8 Operation for Both Units ML20129G7301996-09-26026 September 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.3.3 Re Fire Detection instrumentation,3/4.7.11 Re Fire Suppression Systems & 3/4.7.12 Re Fire Protection Penetrations ML20113G2691996-09-20020 September 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Change 96-09, Clarification of Work Shift Durations for Overtime Limits ML20117J3391996-08-28028 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Revising Psv & MSSV Setpoint Tolerance from Plus or Minus 1% to Plus or Minus 3% ML20117D1651996-08-22022 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs of SQN Units 1 & 2,deleting Table 4.8.1, DG Reliability, & Revising Section 3.8.1 to Allow Once Per 18 month,7 Day AOT for EDGs ML20117D3121996-08-22022 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Lowering Minimum TS ice-basket Weight of 1,155 Lbs to 1,071 Lbs.Reduced Overall Ice Weight from 2,245,320 Lbs to 2,082,024 Lbs ML20117D3141996-08-21021 August 1996 Proposed TS 3.7.1.3 Re Condensate Storage Tank ML20117D3341996-08-21021 August 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Deletion of Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.1.b ML20112H0431996-06-0707 June 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Section 6, Administrative Controls, to Be More Closely Aligned W/Requirements of STSs ML20101N7071996-04-0404 April 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Allowing Conversion from Westinghouse Fuel to Fuel Provided by Framatome Cogema Fuels ML20096B3761996-01-0404 January 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Extending Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Surveillance Period Per GL 93-05 ML20096C2481996-01-0303 January 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Bases Section 3/4.7.1.2 to Indicate Current Operational Functions of turbine-driven AFW Level Control Valves Modified During Unit 1 Cycle 7 Refueling Outage 1999-08-30
[Table view] Category:TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS & TEST REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20217F9701999-10-14014 October 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Incorporating ARC for Axial Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking at Dented Tube Support Plate Intersections ML20217E4301999-10-12012 October 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Requirements for Containment Penetrations During Refueling Operations ML20211M7341999-08-30030 August 1999 Marked-up & Revised TS Pages,Providing Alternative to Requirement of Actually Measuring Response Times ML20211K1721999-08-30030 August 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Providing Clarification to Current TS Requirements for Containment Isolation Valves ML20209B7731999-06-30030 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Updating Requirmements for RCS Leakage Detection & RCS Operational Leakage Specifications to Be Consistent with NUREG-1431 ML20196F2211999-06-24024 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages for Amend to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,allowing Use of Fully Qualified & Tested Spare Inverter in Place of Any of Eight Required Inverters ML20196G4701999-06-24024 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Pages Re Amends to Licenses DPR-77 & DPR-79,revising TS to Be Consistent with Rev to ISTS Presently Submitted to NEI TSTF for Submittal as Rev to NUREG-1431 ML20196G7961999-06-22022 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Bases,Clarifying Proper Application of TS Requirements for Power Distribution Systems & Functions That Inverters Provide to Maintain Operability & Providing Updated Info on Cold Leg Injection Accumulators ML20196G8071999-06-22022 June 1999 Revs to Technical Requirements Manual ML20195E9841999-06-0707 June 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Increasing Max Allowed Specific Activity of Primary Coolant from 0.35 Microcuries/Gram Dose Equivalent I-131 to 1.0 Microcuries/Gram Dose Equivalent I-131 for Plant Cycle 10 (U2C10) Core ML20206E1611999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposed Tech Spec Change 99-04, Auxiliary Suction Pressure Low Surveillance Frequency Rev. Change Deletes Surveillance ML20206E1391999-04-29029 April 1999 Proposed Tech Spec Change 99-03, Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation Sys Versus Radiation Monitors. Changes Add LCOs 3.3.3.1 & 3.7.7 to Address Inoperability of Radiation Monitoring CREVS & NUREG-1431 Recommendations ML20204E8501999-03-21021 March 1999 Plant,Four Yr Simulator Test Rept for Period Ending 990321 ML20204H4081999-03-19019 March 1999 Proposed Tech Specs,Relocating TS 3.8.3.1,3.8.3.2,3.8.3.3 & Associated Bases Associated with Electrical Equipment Protective Devices to Technical Requirements Manual ML20207D6331999-02-26026 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for Consistency When Exiting Action Statements Associated with EDG Sets ML20207D6011999-02-26026 February 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Relocating TS 3.7.6, Flood Protection Plan & Associated Bases from TS to Plant TRM ML20206S0131999-01-15015 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs 3.3.3.3, Seismic Instrumentation & Associated Bases,Relocated to Plant Technical Requirements Manual ML20199K6001999-01-15015 January 1999 Proposed Tech Specs Adding New Action Statement to 3.1.3.2 That Would Eliminate Need to Enter TS 3.0.3 Whenever Two or More Individual RPIs Per Bank May Be Inoperable,While Maintaining Appropriate Overall Level of Protection ML20195H6111998-11-16016 November 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Revising EDG SRs by Adding Note That Allows SR to Be Performed in Modes 1,2,3 or 4 If Associated Components Are Already OOS for Testing or Maint & Removing SR Verifying Certain Lockout Features Prevent EDG Starting ML20154H7251998-10-0808 October 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Supplementing Proposed TS Change 96-08,rev 1 to Add CRMP to Administrative Controls Section & Bases of TS ML20238F1091998-08-27027 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Providing for Insertion of Limited Number of Lead Test Assemblies,Beginning W/Unit 2 Operating Cycle 10 Core ML20238F3001998-08-27027 August 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Replacing 72 H AOT of TS 3.8.1.1,Action b,w/7 Day AOT Requirement for Inoperability of One EDG or One Train of EDGs ML20209J1631998-08-0707 August 1998 Rev 41 to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Odcm ML20236G5961998-06-29029 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Typed Pages for TS Change 95-19, Section 6 - Administrative Controls Deletions ML20249C6371998-06-26026 June 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Lowering Specific Activity of Primary Coolant from 1.0 Uci/G Dose Equivalent I-131 to 0.35 Uci/G Dose Equivalent I-131,as Provided in GL 95-05 ML20248F0051998-05-28028 May 1998 Proposed Tech Specs for Section 6, Administrative Controls Deletions ML20217N3511998-04-30030 April 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Modifying Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b to Change Mode Requirement to Allow PORV Stroke Testing in Modes 3,4 & 5 W/Steam Bubble in Pressurizer Rather than Only in Mode 4 ML20203J1681998-02-25025 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Pages,Revising EDG Surveillance Requirements to Delete Requirement for 18-month Insp IAW Procedures Prepared in Conjunction W/Vendor Recommendations & Modify SRs Associated W/Verifying Capability of DGs ML20202J7651998-02-13013 February 1998 Technical Requirements Manual ML20202J7141998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Adding New LCO That Addresses Requirements for Main Feedwater Isolation,Regulating & Bypass Valves ML20202J6961998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating MSIV Requirements to Be Consistent W/Std TS (NUREG-1431) ML20202J7601998-02-13013 February 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Section 3.7.9 Re Relocation of Snubber Requirements ML20198T4311998-01-21021 January 1998 Proposed Tech Specs Re New Position Title & Update of Description of Nuclear Organization ML20199F8231997-11-30030 November 1997 Cycle 9 Restart Physics Test Summary, for 971011-971130 ML20199K4571997-11-21021 November 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Adding one-time Allowance Through Operating Cycle 9 to Surveillance Requirement 4.4.3.2.1.b to Perform Stroke Testing of PORVs in Mode 5 Rather than Mode 4,as Currently Required ML20211A3191997-09-17017 September 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Pressure Differential Surveillance Requirements for Containment Spray Pumps ML20203B9731997-08-0505 August 1997 Rev 1 to RD-466, Test & Calculated Results Pressure Locking ML20217J5581997-07-31031 July 1997 Cycle Restart Physics Test Summary, for Jul 1997 ML20210J1671997-04-30030 April 1997 Snp Unit 1 Cycle 8 Refueling Outage Mar-Apr 1997,Results of SG Tube ISI as Required by TS Section 4.4.5.5.b & Results of Alternate Plugging Criteria Implementation as Required by Commitment from TS License Condition 2C(9)(d) ML20137T0871997-04-0909 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Elimination of Cycle 8 Limitation for SG Alternate Plugging Criteria ML20137M8581997-04-0101 April 1997 Proposed Tech Specs 2.1 Re Safety Limits & TS 3/4.2 Re Power Distribution Limits ML20137C8421997-03-19019 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Re Conversion from Westinghouse Electric Corp Fuel to Framatome Cogema Fuel ML20136J0381997-03-13013 March 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Section 5.6.1.2,revising Enrichment of Fuel for New Fuel Pit Storage Racks ML20134P8631997-02-14014 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Requesting Discretionary Enforcement for 48 Hours Which Is in Addition to 72 Hours Allowed Outage Time Provided by TS Action 3.8.1.1.b ML20134K9981997-02-0707 February 1997 Proposed Tech Specs Revising TS Change Request 96-01, Conversion from W Electric Corp Fuel to Framatome Cogema Fuel (MARK-BW-17), to Ensure That Core Analysis Computer Code Output Actions Are Consistent W/Hot Channel Factor SRs ML20138F2581997-01-17017 January 1997 Rev 39 to Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Odcm ML20134L9261996-11-0808 November 1996 Proposed Tech Specs Re Placing of Channel in Trip for Reactor Trip & Engineered Safety Feature Instrumentation Sys Solely to Perform Testing as Not Requiring Channel to Be Declared Inoperable ML20129D2661996-10-18018 October 1996 Proposed Tech Specs,Removing Existing Footnotes That Limit Application of Apc for Plant S/G Tubes to Cycle 8 Operation for Both Units ML20129G7301996-09-26026 September 1996 Proposed Tech Specs 3/4.3.3 Re Fire Detection instrumentation,3/4.7.11 Re Fire Suppression Systems & 3/4.7.12 Re Fire Protection Penetrations ML20134J9991996-09-23023 September 1996 Fuel Assembly Insp Program 1999-08-30
[Table view] |
Text
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ENCLOSURE 1 i
PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE ;
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 5b J27 AND 50-328 (TVA-SQN-TS-94-05, Revision 1)
LIST OF AFFECTED PAGES .
Unit 1 3/4 7-17 Unit 2 3/4 7-17 ,
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9409150187'940909 PDR ADOCK 05000327 P PDR
4 i PLANT SYSTEMS f 3/4.7.7 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM 4
I l LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (CREK5) R16 3.7.7 Two independent control room emergency ventilation systems shall be OPERABLE.
APPLICABILITY: ALL MODES ACTION:
MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 cREV.5 hithonecentr:1 rec: c crgency ventilctica system perable, restore the
~ inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STAND Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following h ur .
' Insert A CREVS
- a. With one contrci rec cmcrgency ventilctica cystem perable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or p~ 'q ~
initiate and maintain operation of the control room emergency ventilation system in the recirculation mode.
c EVS j .R
- b. With both ecntr:1 rec: cmcrgency air vent 41ation systems inoperable, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.
- c. The picvisions of Specificstion 3.0.3 ere not eppliceble in MODE C. 1 Cg The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
l1168 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS , f C R E t/5 4.7.7 Each ccatrci room cacrgency ventilation systeg '
be demonstrated R16 OPERABLE: l
- a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the control room air temperature is less than or equal to 104*F.
- b. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 15 minutes.
- c. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following
_) painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 1 3/4 7-17 Amendment No. 12, 164 November 6, 1992
Insert A
- b. With both CREVs inoperable due to actions taken as a result of a tornado warning, restore at least one train to operable status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
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PLANT SYSTEMS CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM
)3/4.7.7 s
- LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION f
i (CREVS)
{ 3.7.7 Twoindependentcontrolroomemergencyventilationsystems[shallbe
- OPERABLE.
j APPLICABILITY: ALL MODES ACTION:
MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4:
j .Rc E VS hWithonecontrolrec: cmcrgency ventilatica system inoperable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT STAND Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following h urs.
- Insert h 6:
CREKS
- a. With one centr:1 reem c=crgency ventfiction ;ystem perable, restore the inoperable system to OPERABLE status within 7 days or initiate and maintain operation of the control room emergency ventilation system in the recirculation mode. C. ret /5
- b. With both contrcl rec: c=crgency cir ventilation systems erable, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes. !
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- c. The provisions cf Specification 3.0.3 cre act-applicable " u.00E 6. l C., # The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
l R154 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS CR E VS 4.7.7 Each control rec c=crgency ventilction ;y;tc= 1 be demonstrated OPERABLE:
- a. At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by verifying that the control room air temperature is less than or equal to 104 F.
- b. At least once per 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS by initiating, from the control room, flow through the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers and verifying that the system operates for at least 15 minutes.
- c. At least once per 18 months or (1) after any structural maintenance on the HEPA filter or charcoal adsorber housings, or (2) following
) painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation zone communicating with the system by:
SEQUOYAH - UNIT 2 3/4 7-17 Amendment No.154 November 6, 1992
1 1
Insert A
- b. With both CREVS inoperable due to actions taken as a result of a tornado warning, restore at least one train to operable status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in -i COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
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S S
ENCLOSURE 2 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 (IVA-SQN-TS-94-05, REVISION 1)
DESCRIPTION AND JUSTIFICATION 1
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Description of Change TVA proposes to modify the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications (TSs) to revise the action statement of TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.7.7. This revision will add a new action statement to LCO 3.7.7 to indicate that the control room emergency ventilation system (CREVS) must be returned to normal configuration upon lif ting of a tornado warning. Specifically, a new Action b has been added for Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 operation that states:
"With both CREVS inoperable due to actions taken as a result of a tornado warning, restore at least one train to operable status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />."
In addition, the 3.0.3 exemption for Mode 6 operation has been removed.
Other editorial changes have also been proposed for TS 3.7.7.
Reason far Char.;?
This change , necessary to prevent entry into TS LCO 3.0.3 every time a tornado wart t ag is issued by the National Weather Service. The SQN abnormal opex ' ting instructions for a tornado warning require several tornado damp y , in the CREVS to be closed. The tornado dampers are in the pressuri - 6 air supply flow path to CREVS. The pressurizing air supply is required to ensure a positive pressure in the control room during accident conditions. Closure of the tornado dampers makes both trains of CREVS inoperable. Therefore, entry into TS LCO 3.0.3, a possible dual-unit shutdown, and a subsequent follow-up licensee event report are required as a result of a tornado warning. i l
Also, an exemption to TS 3.0.3 is not needed for Mode 6 (or Mode 5) l operation because actions are already prescribed for loss of both CREVS l trains.
Justification for Change SQN's design basis for CREVS is to ensure the control room environment will support the activities required of Operations' personnel during accident conditions. When activated, CREVS provides a mixed flow of i
- outside and recirculated air through devices for temperature, humidity, and air cleanup control. In this mode, the control room is maintained greater than 1/8-inch water gauge positive pressure to outside atmosphere l and slight positive pressure to adjacent areas. CREVS has suf ficient i redundancy to ensure a single failure will not prevent the accomplishment of these safety functions (reference the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (IFSAR], Sections 6.4.1 and 9.4.1).
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The flow path for pressurizing air to CREVS has the ability to be isolated during conditions when tornadoes are likely in the SQN site area. This provision ensures that the effect of a tornado will not damage critical equipment in the CREVS as well as other control building equipment. When these tornado dampers are closed, the fresh air portion of the normal control room ventilation system and CREVS are not available. This requires the systems to run in a recirculation mode that does not provide control room pressurization. During normal operation conditions, this has no impact because temperature, humidity, and air cleanup co-trol are still maintained in the recirculation mode. For accident conditions, the same control functions are maintained, but the pressurization feature is not available. This would increase the potential for inleakage of contaminated air to the control room.
However, the occurrence of an accident creating a contaminated air condition concurrent with a tornado is not postulated for SQN (reference UFSAR Sections 3.1.1, 3.3.2.2, and 6.4.1.2). This is based on the unlikely potential for both to occur simultaneously and the facility design to withstand the effects of a tornado without creating a design basis accident.
Therefore, the only impact to isolating the tornado dampers is the loss of pressurizing air for the control room, which will not impact control room habitability. In the event of a tornado warning, the 1,000 cubic feet per minute (cfm) of outside filtered air would be eliminated from the main control room (MCR) air supply. This condition wou 0 terminate 1
the 1/8-inch water gauge positive pressure in the MCR habitability zone relative to the outside environment. Even if a design-basis accident (DBA) were assumed coincident with the tornado warning configuration, the MCR operator dose would not exceed 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 19 dose criteria. An investigation was performed to determine the inleakage from various air-supply panels, ducts, fans, doors, and dampers into the MCR during normal plant operation (MCR depressurized). The inleakage was determined to be 51 cfm. SQN analysis assumes this leakage is present during accident conditions even though the MCR is pressurized to 1/8-inch water gauge positive pressure. Realistically, the 51 cfm would decrease during accident conditions when the MCR becomes pressurized. This conservative assumption bounds the scenario in question. The operator dose would not exceed the doses provided in FSAR Table 15.5.3-7.
The eight-hour limit to restore the CREVS to operable status is based upon past occurrences in which the normal configuration has been returned within three to four hours plus a four-hour margin. The tornado warning entry and exit is facilitated by Operations being directly notified by the TVA Power Service Control Center of the entry and exit to the tornado wa rning . In addition, a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration l weather radio is available in the MCR to inform operators of the existing l
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1 weather conditions. Thus, CREVS may be returned to normal configuration l promptly following the lif ting of the tornado warning. Normal configuration can be returned well within one hour, which places the plant in a standby condition should a subsequent accident occur, which requires control room habitability.
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Note that the number of occurrences of a tornado in a year results in a probability of 1.65E-4 occurrences. Converting this figure to occurrences per hour gives a probability of 1.87E-8 occurrences per hour. Therefore, for an eight-hour period, the probability of occurrence is 1.49E-7.
The fuel handling accident (FRA) is the most probable DBA that challenges the need for MCR habitability. The probability of an FHA is 7.39E-3.
This value is conservative because it assumes any FRA results in release. The probability of an FRA coincident with a tornado in an eight-hour period is 1.10E-9. Thus, the postulation of an FHA in conjunction with a tornado warning is not a credible event.
The original proposed TS change provided e.n exemption to TS 3.0.3 for Mode 5 operation during a tornado warning. Further conversations with the NRC staff have indicated that not only is an exemption to TS 3.0.3 not needed for Mode 5 when in a tornado warning, but that the current exemption for Mode 6 operation is not needed. The justification for deletion of the TS 3.0.3 exemption is based upon the actions of Modes 5 and 6 operation providing contingencies for one or both trains of CREVS being inoperable.
Environmental Impact Evaluation The proposed change request does not involve an unreviewed environmental question because operation of SQN Units 1 and 2 in accordance with this change would not:
- 1. Result in a significant increase in any adverse environmental impact previously evaluated in the Final Environmental Statement (FES) as modified by the staff's testimony to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, supplements to the FES, environmental impact appraisals, or decisions of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board.
- 2. Result in a significant change in effluents or power levels.
- 3. Result in matters not previously reviewed in the licensing basis for SQN that may have a significant environmental impact.
O Enclosure 3 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327 AND 50-328 (TVA-SQN-TS-94-05)
DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION l
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Significant Hazards Evaluation TVA has evaluated the proposed technical specification (TS) change and has determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration based on criteria established in 10 CFR 50.92(c).
Operation of Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) in accordance with the proposed amendment will not:
- 1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
The control room emergency ventilation system (CREVS) was designed to ensure control room habitability during accident conditions. The design basis of SQN does not include an accident creating a contaminated air condition concurrent with a tornado. The ability of the CREVS to perform its design function has not been affected by this change. The proposed change will not increase the possibility or consequences of an accident.
- 2. Create the possibility of a t.ew or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.
An accident involving a contaminated air condition and a tornado have been analyzed as part of the SQN design basis. Both accidents are assumed to occur independently. This change does not create a new or different accident not previously analyzed.
- 3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. ;
The design basis of the CREVS is not impacted by this TS change.
There is no change in any assumptions made in the Final Safety Analaysis Report. Therefore, there is no reduction in the margin of i safety as a result of this change.
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