ML20072R215
| ML20072R215 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
| Issue date: | 03/21/1983 |
| From: | Martin T Public Service Enterprise Group |
| To: | Haynes R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8304050490 | |
| Download: ML20072R215 (2) | |
Text
f Thomas J. Martin Public Service Electric and Gas Company 80 Park Plaza Newark, N.J. 07101 201/430-8316 Vice President Engineering and Construction March 21, 1983 bD hb
(
Mr. Ronald C. Haynes, Administrator U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
Dear Mr. Haynes:
LIMITORQUE VALVE OPERATORS SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION On June 19, 1981, a verbal report was made to Region I, Office of Inspection and Enforcement representative, Mr.
R.
- Gallo, advising of a significant deficiency concerning Limitorque valve operators.
Written reports were submitted to your of fice on July 17, 1981, November 19, 1981 and October 21, 1982.
The following information is provided to update the above reports in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e).
1.
As described in our last letter, Bechtel Power Corpora-tion, our Architect / Engineer and Constructor, issued procedure SWP/P-E-18, entitled " Termination Ins tallation!'.
Appendix A of this procedure establishes the criteria for jobsite inspection of Limitorque Operators for the deficiencies identified in our previous repo r ts,
i.e.,
the use of fiber shims, poor wiring practices and the use of unqualified electrical components.
All deficiencies will be reworked in accordance with this procedure.
/
8304050490 830321
/
PDR ADOCK 05000354 S
PDR I
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=
R.
C.
Haynes 2
3/21/83 2.
The scope of our investigation and analysis was expanded to include the motor-to-shaf t key problem as identified in NRC IE Information Notice No. 81-08, " Repetitive Failure of Limitorque Operators SMB-4 Motor-To-Shaft-Key".
The suspect keys are being replaced with 4140 steel keys.
This activity is being controlled and documented on nonconformance reports.
3.
Each of the deficiencies listed in Paragraph 1, above, j
and the steel key deficiency can be postulated as possible causes for operator failure.
Since such failure by safety-related " active" valves could compromise safe shutdown of the plant, we consider the manufacturing deficiencies in the Limitorque Operators to be a reportable deficiency in accordance with 10CFR50.55(e).
Very truly yours, 4
cc:
Office of Inspection and Enforcement Division of Reactor Construction - Inspection Washington, D.
C.
NRC Resident Inspector - Hope Creek P.
O. Box 241 Hancocks Bridge, NJ 08038