ML20072R009
| ML20072R009 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 03/24/1983 |
| From: | Nix H GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| GM-83-314, NUDOCS 8304050408 | |
| Download: ML20072R009 (4) | |
Text
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Georgi) Power Company Post Offica B:x 439 e
B:xity, Gecrgia 31513 Telephone 912 367-7781 912 537-9444
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Georgia Pbwer Edwin 1. Hatch Nuclear Plant 63 rGR 30 Pl2 22 March 24 1983 GM-83-314 PLANT E.
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HATCH Special Report Docket No. 50-321 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement
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Region II, Suite 3100 i
101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303 ATTENTION:
Mr. James P. O'Reilly Pursuant to section 3.13.1, ACTION 2 of Hatch Unit One Technical Specifications and section 3.3.6.8, ACTION b of Hatch Unit Two Technical Specifications, please find attached Special Report 50-321/1983-003.
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General Manager HCN/SBT/abb i
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Kelly G.
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Baker Control Room
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SPECIAL REPORT 50-321/1983-003 LICENSEE
- Georgia Power Company FACILITY NAME : Edwin I. Hatch DOCKET NUMBER : 50-321 Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:
Unit 1 Tech. Specs, section 3.13.1, ACTION 2 and Unit 2 Tech. Specs.
section 3.3.6.8,
' ACTION b.,
required this report due to inoperable fire detection instrument's not being restored to operable status within 14 days.
Plant conditions at the time of the event:
Unit 1 was in cold shutdown, and Unit 2 was - in steady state power operation at 1700 MWt (approximately 70 percent power) on February 10, 1983.
Detailed description of the event:
During performance of
" FIRE DETECTOR SURVEILLANCE - SAFETY RELATED AREAS" procedure (HNP-1-3360), plant personnel could not complete the surveillance such that the minimum number of fire detection instruments (detectors) for the following fire detection areas could be considered operable:
1.
CABLE SPREADING ROOM AREA (Control Building 147 ft. El.:
Unit 1 Tech. Specs. Table 3.13-1, item A.3.3) 2.
REACTOR BUILDING AREA 130 ft. EL.
(Unit 1 Tech. Specs. Table 3.13-1, items D.l.1 and D.l.2) 3.
CONTROL BUILDING AREA 164 ft. EL.
(Control Room:
Unit 1 Tech. Specs. Table 3.13-1, items A.4.1,2, and 3) 4.
RPS VERTICAL CABLEWAY AREA (Control Building 130 ft. EL.:
Unit 1 Tech. Specs. Table 3.13-1, item A.2.3: and Unit 2 Tech. Specs. Table 3.3.6.8-1)
Following is the sequence of events:
1.
February 2, 1983:
Personnel performing HNP-1-3360 complained about safety hazzards in performing HNP-1-3360 on fire detectors all over plant.
Plant personnel performed a
safety review and determined that fire detectors that could not be teached by either a ladder or scaffolding (for HNP-1-3360 or HNP-2-3360 to be performed) were not safely accessible.
Personnel were then told to perform HNP-1-3360 and HNP-2-3360 on all fire detectors that were safely accessible.
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'2.
February 10, 1983:
4 a.
Personnel reported (upon completion of HNP-1-3360) that the minimum number of fire detectors as required per Tech. Specs. to make
" CABLE SPREADING ROOM:
CONTROL BLDG. 147 ft.
El. and REACTOR BUILDING 130 Ft.
EL."
operable could not be performed due to fire detectors not being safely accessible.
b.
An LCO (1-83-020) went into effect for sequence of events 2.a.
Also, personnel noted that the fire detectors not being performed for
" CONTROL BUILDING 164 ft.
EL.
"had an outstanding LCO (1-82-279) and a
previous Special Report (50-321/1982-002).
3.
March 15, 1983:
Personnel reviewing HNP-1-3360 completed data package (dated 2/10/83) and comparing this data to Tech. Specs. Table 3.13-1 found that "RPS VERTICAL CABLEWAY AREA:
CONTROL BLDG.
130 ft.
EL." did not have the minimum number of fire detectors as required per Tech. Specs.
to be operable due to the detectors not being safely accessible.
On March 15,
- 1983, LCO 1-83-055 (Unit 1 Tech. Specs, section 3.13.1, ACTION 2) and LCO 2-83-055 (Unit 2
Tech.
Specs. section 3.3.6.8, ACTION b) were written on "RPS VERTICAL CABLEWAY AREA: CONTROL BLDG.
130 ft.
EL." using an event date of February 10, 1983.
Consequences of the event:
Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of each of the events' (fire zones) discovery dates, fire watches or fire watch patrols were assigned to appropriate areas t
of the plant to inspect the inoperable zone at least once per hour as required per Tech. Specs.
The fire watches and fire watch patrols will remain in effect until affected inoperable zones are returned to an operable status.
The health and safety of the public were not affected by this non-repetitive event.
Cause(s) of the event:
1.
Fire detectors not being safely accessible for Cable Spreading Room Area, RPS Vertical Cableway 130 ft.
EL. Area, and Reactor Building 130 ft.
El.
Area was attributed as the first cause of this event.
2.
Control Building Area fire detectors were not accessible for performance of HNP-1-3360 due to modifications being made to the Control Building Area as previously reported on Special Report 50-321/1982-002.
3.
The reporting of RPS Vertical Cableway 130 ft. El inoperable after event occurred was attributed to procedural error.
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. Plans for restoring the instruments to operable status:
The following actions are being taken to make inoperable fire detection instruments operable:
1.
Maintenance personnel are walking down fire detectors presently termed not safely accessible to determine if a safe method of reaching the detectors can be found (expected to be completed by end of April 1983).
l 2.
For remaining detectors not safely accessible, maintenance and engineering personnel will determine which detectors can be reached on a "one-time" basis to be replaced with heat type detectors or move detectors to safely accessible location in their respective fire zones.
3.
As methods are found to safely perf orm HNP-1-3360, the inoperable fire detection system will be made operable.
4.
HNP-1-3360 will be performed on fire detection areas out of service for modifications when they become accessible.
Engineering is continuing to study other alternatives to our present fire detection system to find a lower maintenance, safely accessiole, reliable, and cost effective fire detection system that will minimize our plant's problems.
Other action for cause(s) of this event:
1.
Control Room Area modification completion is now expected to be the end of May 1983.
2.
HNP-1-3360, Table 2 is being revised to include the Tech. Specs.
requirement for RPS Veritical Cableway 130 ft. EL.
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