ML20072P811
| ML20072P811 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 03/17/1983 |
| From: | ARKANSAS POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20072P802 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8304040383 | |
| Download: ML20072P811 (21) | |
Text
-.
s ATTACHMENT 1 l
ANO-2 CYCLE 2 REFUELING OUTAGE FUEL EXAMINATION RESULTS MARCH 17, 1983 5
1 8304040383 830330 PDR ADOCK 05000368 P
a 1-1 ATTACHMENT 1 ANO-2 CYCLE 2 REFUELING OUTAGE FUEL EXAMINATION RESULTS
1.0 INTRODUCTION
Arkansas Nuclear One - Unit 2 completed cycle 2 and shutdown for refueling on August 20,~ 1982.
All 177 fuel assemblies in the core were off-loaded to the spent fuel pool.by September 11, and fuel examinations were then initiated.
The examinations conducted may be divided into three types:
(1) leak tests, (2) shoulder gap measurements, and (3) visual-inspections.
The results of each type will be discussed in the following. sections of this report.
Then an effort will be made to correlate the fuel examination'results with those obtained during the cycle 1 outage.
2.0 LEAK TESTS The presence of a few leaking fuel rods in the core was indicated early i
in cycle 2 by.the iodine activity levels in the primary coolant.
This i
was reported to the Commission in reference 1.
Near the end of cycle 2, AP&L estimates for the number of perforated rods ranged from 4 l
(based on I-131) to 14 (based on I-133).
Two testing campaigns to detect the leaking assemblies by the wet sipping method were conducted.
The first took place September 11-16, and concentrated on assemblies to be used in the cycle 3 core.
One hundred and twenty (120) assemblies were sipped including sixty (60) Batch "0" assemblies, fifty-six (56)
1-2 Batch "C" assemblies, three (3) Batch "B" assemblies, and one (1)
Batch "A" assembly.
Based on the activity levels of I-131, Cs-134, and Cs-137 measured in the sipping tests, three leaking assemblies were identified.
These assemblies were reconstituted and one leaking fuel rod was found in each assembly.
The second sipping campaign was conducted November 3-7, and focused on the remaining fifty-seven (57) discharged Batch "B" assemblies.
Since the I-131 level had diminished due to decay, only Cs-134 and Cs-137 activities were used for leak detection.
Two assemblies were identified as probably containing perforated rods.
A visual examination of one of these assemblies revealed a failed peripheral rod.
Based on the activity levels, an estimate was made that each bundle contained one or two leaking fuel rods.
Table I lists all of the leaking assemblies detected and gives further details of the reconstitution effort.
Figures la and Ib present the locations of the leaking rods, and the other rods that were replaced.
Also shown are the locations of two inadvertant rod interchanges that occurred during fuel assembly reconstitution.
3.0 SHOULDER GAP MEASUREMENTS Shoulder gap is the clearance between the top of a specified fuel rod and the bottom of the upper end fitting flow plate.
Measurements of this gap were made on six assemblies selected for characterization after fabrication, but before cycle 1 exposure.
Remeasurement of the
F 1-3 gap following cycle 1 indicated that the closure rate was somewhat higher than expected, and that continued observation was in order.
Accordingly, five assemblies were scheduled for gap measurements after cycle 2.
Included in these five were one Batch "B" and two "C" assemblies that were in the original group of six characterized assemblie's.
The measurements were made on the outside rod rows of an assembly with calibrated optical equipment mounted in the spent fuel pool.
Due to fuel handling limitations, the gaps were usually measured only on two opposing faces of an assembly.
The corner pins, usually poison rods, were also excluded from measurement.
If a small gap size made a fuel rod visible which was in the first four rows, however, its gap could also be measured.
Since the measured gaps did not agree favorably with predictions, the measurement program was expanded to include all 56 Batch "C" assemblies.
Through special handling techniques, all four e
faces on the two characterized Batch "C" bundles were measured.
A conservative application of the available gap closure rate data to the gaps measured on some of the Batch "C" assemblies indicated that the possibility of fuel pin-to-flow plate contact existed before the end of cycle 3.
A fuel assembly modification was devised and discussed with the NRC at a meeting on October 6, 1982.
The material presented at that meeting was documented in our December 10, 1982, communication to the NRC (reference 2).
Essentially, the modification increased the available shoulder gap by one-half (h) inch through the use of spacer shims on the corner guide tubes under the upper end fitting.
Stainless i
1-4 steel sleeves have been used in the upper part of the guide tubes to reduce guide tube wear.
Under the initial modification procedure, these sleeves were to be pulled and new sleeves reinstalled.
Difficulties in pulling the sleeves were encountered in the first few assemblies modified, so the procedure was changed to cut the flared sleeve tops off.
This permitted removal of the upper end fitting and shim insertion without having to de-sleeve the assembly.
Modified upper end fitting posts were then used which allowed for expansion of the upper ends of the cut sleeves.
A statistical methodology was developed to determine which Batch "C" assemblies should be modified.
The acceptance criterion applied was:
"At a 95% probability, the worst rod in the assembly will not have a gap closure at the end of cycle 3."
Thirty of the fifty-six Batch "C" assemblies were modified during the cycle 2 outage.
In the final statistical analysis, six of the thirty assemblies would have been acceptable without modification.
Table II l
l lists the assemblies that were modified.
Following the modification, l
before cycle 3 exposure, all of the modified assemblies have shoulder gaps greater than 0.9 inches.
4.0 VISUAL INSPECTION 9
All sixty Batch "B" fuel assemblies and a combination of twenty-five Batch "C" and "D" assemblies were visually examined in the September 1
1-5 through November, 1982, period.
The fuel examinations were performed to evaluate tuel assembly appearance and overall structural integrity, fuel and poison rod condition, spacer grid wear condition, handling damage, upper end fitting spring and post wear, and crud deposition.
Table III lists the assemblies that were examined.
On October 13, prior to sealing the reactor vessel, the results of twenty-one visuals were verbally communicated to the NRC.
These examinations included the three leaking assemblies which were reconstituted, assemblies selected because of fuel handling difficulties encountered, and assemblies located adjacent to those on which damage had been noted at EOC1.
No serious damage was found on the non-leaking assemblies.
The final results of all 85 examinations indicated that 75 of the assemblies were in good condition and contained no anomalous conditions on either the fuel rods, poison rods, or remaining structural components.
Observations on the other ten assemblies included:
perforated fuel rods, one perforated poison rod, torn grids, non-uniform shoulder gap spacing, and debris lodged within an assembly.
The ten assemblies and the anomalies noted are presented in Table IV.
Of these ten assemblies, six are Batch "B" assemblies which are not included in the cycle 3 core.
One, AKC-401, was reconstituted and two, l
AKD-039 and AKD-040, had shoulder gap disparities which do not pose a l
cycle 3 problem.
The remaining assembly, AKC-303, had only minor l
damage, a missing tab, on the south face of grid 2.
(The third from the bottom).
I L
1-6
~
5.0- COMPARISON OF-CYCLES 1 AND 2 FUEL EXAMINATION RESULTS During the' cycle 1 outage, in April 1981, all 177 fuel assemblies were wet sipped and seven (7) leakers identified.
A total of fifteen (15) perforated rods were found in'the five (5) assemblies that were reconstituted; and three (3) more were believed present'in the remaining two assemblies.
In the case of'two of the assemblies, AKC-203 and AKB-045, it wasl concluded that the perforations were_due to fretting induced by foreign material trappe'd within the bottom Inconel grid.
The cause of the remaining failures could not be. established.
These results were reported in reference 3.
As previously discussed in'section 2.0 of this report, five (5) leaking assemblies were identified when all of the cycle 2 core was wet' sipped.
Table I presented the assemblies in which three (3) leaking rods were found and those in which one or two were suspected, for a total of five (5) to seven (7). perforated fuel rods.
It should be noted from Table I that the seven (7) rods replaced in assembly AKC-401 showed debris related wear within the bottom of the Inconel grid; and that the I
perforated rod observed in assembly AKB-032 could be associated with the perimeter grid strip damage found on that' assembly. kperforated
[
poison rod was found by visual examination of assembly AKB-013.
i The core loadings for cycle 1 and cycle 2 are shown in Figures 2 and 3, l
respectively.
The assemblies which were found to be leaking at the end 4
of each cycle are identified by heavy outlines.
In the case of cycle 1, two of the assemblies, AKC-308 and AKC-203, were located on the
1-7 periphery against the core shroud.
However, the reason for failure of AKC-203, fretting from material trapped by the bottom grid, has already been noted.
In addition, the failed rods in assembly AKC-308 were distributed throughout the assembly and could not be associated with shroud wear with the possible exception of a corner poison rod which had a perforation at grid 8.
Furthermore, none of the leaking assemblies in cycle 2 were located on the core periphery.
Therefore, although some grid to shroud wear has been observed, it has not been a significant cause of perforated rods.
Although there were three out of seven leakers in cycle 1 in adjoining locations, none of the cycle 2 leakers shared a common face or even a corner.
In the fire.t two cycles, then, assembly location has not been a major factor in causing fuel rod perforations.
The total of leaking assemblies by fuel batch for each cycle are:
Cycle 1:
2 Batch "A", 3 Batch "B", 2 Batch "C" Cycle 2:
2 Batch "C", 2 Batch "B", 1 Batch "D" It appears that the fuel batch has not been a factor, so far, in determining which rods will develop leaks.
While the cycle 1 refueling core shuffle was being conducted, fifteen (15) visual inspections were performed on 7 Batch "A", 4 Batch "B", and 4 Batch "C" assemblies.
The results, were communicated to the NRC by telephone on May 12, 1981.
After the reactor vessel had been closed, sixty (60) discharged Batch "A" assemblies were visually inspected.
. 1-8 Significant grid strap damage was found on three assemblies, AKA-042, AKA-106, and AKA-109; and some extremely minor grid damage was found on two assemblies AKA-023 and AKA-041.
Based on the bright metal at the torn interfaces, it was concluded that the damage resulted from grid to grid interaction.with adjacent fuel assemblies following the operation of the first cycle.
These results were reported in reference 4.
The measures that AP&L then decided to implement to prevent similar damage were described in reference 3.
A concern still existed over what grid strap damage might have occurred on the unexamined assemblies and gone into cycle 2 core.
As Table IV shows, grid damage was detected at EOC 2 on five assemblies:
AKB-032, AKB-T04, AKB-049, AKB-052, and AKC-303.
In the case of the last two assemblies, the damage was minor.
Only one of the assemblies, AKB-032, contained a leaking fuel rod.
No bright metal surfaces were detected at the tears and, due to the generally corroded condition, it was believed the damage probably took place during the cycle 1 outage.
All of the assemblies with grid damage, both major and minor; are shown on the cycle 1 core map presented in Figure 2.
The faces on which the damage was found are also indicated.
In one case, between assemblies AKB-032 and AKA-109, damaged grid to damaged grid contact can be observed. As noted in Table I, the grid strip damage to AKB-032 may have contributed to a failed rod in this assembly during cycle 2.
In the eight other cases of grid damage shown in Figure 2, six of the facing assemblies were visually inspected either after cycle 1 or cycle
1-9 2, and no damage was found.
In general, then, damage to the grid of one assembly does not usually mean that the grid of the facing assembly also incurred damage.
The increased awareness of the possibility of causing grid damage while handling the assemblies and the consequent caution of the operators appear to have resulted in a cycle 2 offload without incurring any new damage.
Modifications were made to the refueling machine after the offload, but before the core was reloaded for cycle 3.
These modifications should further assist in preventing future damage by improving the overload trip response.
6.0 CONCLUSION
S Twelve (12) leaking assemblies have been found in two cycles of operation.
In two of these cases, the cause appeared to be fretting from foreign material trapped by the bottom grid.
In a third case, seven of the rods replaced in a reconstitution effort showed evidence of wear from foreign materials trapped by the bottom grid.
In a fourth case, grid damage may have contributed to a rod perforation.
No explanation has been found for the remaining eight cases.
Neither core location nor fuel batch appear to have been a significant factor in causing rod perforations.
Although grid damage probably results from grid to neighboring assembly grid interaction, both grids have not usually sustained damage.
.1-10 Analysis of the grid damaged assemblies locations shows that neither core location or proximity to the shroud have been a factor in causing the damage.
The corroded metal condition of the grid strip tears found at the end of cycle 2 indicates that the damage probably occurred during the cycle 1 refueling.
Therefore, damage to the grids during the cycle 2 offloading was largely avoided.
4 4
l Y
l
~1-11 REFERENCES 1
D.C. Trimble to Robert A. Clark, Docket No. 50-368, Letter No. 2CAN118106, dated November 25, 1981.
2.
J.R. Marshall to Robert A. Clark, Docket No. 50-368, Letter No. 2CAN128207, dated December 10, 1982.
3.
J.R. Marshall to Robert A. Clark, Docket No. 50-368, Letter No. 2CAN058209, dated June 2, 1982.
4.
D.C. Triuble to Robert A. Clark, Docket No. 50-368, Letter No. 2CAN068104, dated June 4, 1981.
e
- - ' ' " ^ * ' ' ' ' ^ ' ~ ~ ^ " ' - - " ' ~ ^ ' ' ' ' '
'l-12 TABLE I LEAKING ASSEMBLIES AND RECONSTITUTION ACTIONS ASSEMBLY PERFORATED REPLACED IDENTIFICATION RODS RODS 1 REMARKS AKD-120 1
2 No visual anomalies observed.
In reconstitution effort, the leaking interior rod separated and a new cage was required.
Two rods were inadvertently interchanged in position with two other rods.
AKC-212 1
8 No visual anomalies observed.
Seven rods removed for diag-nostic samples.
AKC-401 1
10 Rod severed between Grids 7 and 8.2 Found ca visual in-spection.
Leaking rad re-placed with SS filled Zircaloy rod.
Seven of re-placed rods showed evidence of debris related 0.0. wear in the region below the botton.
Inconel Grid.
AKB-032 1 or 2 Not Visual detection of one Estimated Recon-failed rod.
Damage to stituted perimeter strip of Grid 4 may have contributed to rod perforation.
AKB-029 1 or 2 Not No visual anomalies observed.
Estimated Recon-stituted 1 Replacement fuel rods from AKA-005.
2 Spacer grids are numbered from the bottom to the top of the assembly with the Inconel Grid designated as "0".
~
1-13 TABLE II ASSEMBLIES MODIFIED TO INCREASE SHOULDER GAP AKC 1014 AKC 206 AKC 312 AKC 104 AKC 207 AKC 4011 2 AKC 105 AKC 208 AKC 4031 AKC 1062 AKC 2105 AKC 4061 AKC 107 AKC 211 AKC 410 AKC 1082 AKC 2122 AKC 4111 AKC 201 AKC 302 AKC 412 AKC 2021 AKC 309 AKC 4154 AKC 203 AKC 310 AKC 416 AKC 2043 AKC 311 AKC 5041 1 Shoulder gap would have been acceptable in final statistical analysis.
2 Initial procedure of pulling and replacing stainless steel sleeves used.
i 3 Final procedure followed, cutting off sleeve flares, but center sleeve then pulled and not replaced.
No CEA or detector to be inserted for cycle 3.
4As in 3, but the center tube was resleeved, and a CEA used in cycle 3.
5The north-east (near S/N) corner post modified to facilitate insertion.
t
~
1-14
-TABLE III.
ANO-2 FUEL ASSEMBLIES EXAMINED AT E0C-2 (Extracted from' Combustion Engineering, Inc,, System Integrity Services Report TR-SIS-030; Dated February 3, 1983)
NUMBER OF
' ASSEMBLY SERIAL NUMBER FACES EXAMINED EXAMINATION PURPOSE All 60 Batch B Assemblies 4
General Fuel Inspection AKD022 4
Examined for possible handling damage AKD004 4
AKD035 4-AKD006 4
AKD003 4
AKD029 4
i AKD109 4
AKD105 4
AV0114 4
AKD112 4
AKD119 4
AKC311 4
AKC302 4
i AKC103 4
AKC303 4
/
AKD120 4
Failed Fuel Exam AKC212 4
AKC401 4
AKD039 4
DOE sponsored R&D Program AKD040 4
AKD037 1
R&D Program investigating assembly AKD031 1
grid / core shroud interaction AKD016 1
AKD006 1
AKD025 1
-y 3--
r
'l-15 TABLE IV VISUAL INSPECTION OBSERVATION AKB032 A perforated fuel rod and perimeter strip grid damage were observed on the South 1 face of this assembly.
The peripheral fuel rod was number 42, and it contained a mature hydride blister s 2-3 inches above Grid #3.3 Perimeter strip damage was observed on the bottom of Grid #4 between Rods 3 and 5.
The perimeter strip tab between Rods 3 and 4 was torn and folded under toward Fuel Rod 4.
The tab between Rods 4 and 5 was also folded under toward the fuel rods.
The damage on Grid #4 may have contributed to the perforation of Rod 4 on the same face.
In addition, the location of the grid damage on.AKB032 corresponds with grid damage observed on adjacent assembly AKA109 at EOC-1.
Due to the oxidized appearance of the damage on AKB032 and the fact that an adjacent assembly face had damage at E0C-1, it is concluded that the damage to AKB032 was a result of handling during the EOC-1 fuel shuffle.
AKBT04 Perimeter strip grid damage was observed on the West Face at Grid 8.
The torn region extended from the lower left corner of the grid to Rod 4.
Approximately one-third of the perimeter strip width was missing.
Little to no distortion of the grid was discernable.
The torn region and fracture surface appeared crudded and oxidized indicating the damage was a result of handling during the E0C-1 fuel shuffle.
AKB049 Perimeter strip grid damage was observed on Grid 2 of the West face.
The upper lef t corner of the perimeter strip was torn from the grid corner to Rod 2.
Approximately 25% of the perimeter strip width is missing.
The damaged area appears crudded and oxidized indicating the damage was a result of handling during the E0C-1 fuel shuffle.
AKB052 Perimeter strip damage was observed on the North face of Grid 9.
The tab at the top of the grid between Fuel Rods 12 and 13 is missing (torn away).
No other damage was observed on this grid.
AKBT03 A small piece of foreign debris was observed lodged between Rods 9 and 10 approximately 2 inches above Grid 8.
The sources or type of debris could not be identified.
No damage was observed as a result of the lodged debris.
AKB013 A perforated poison rod was observed in this assembly.
The rod was number 16 on the South face (Southeast corner), and it was observed to be heavily hydrided approximately midway between Grids 6 and 7.
The hydriding has resulted in the clad being fractured completely around the circumference of the rod.
No other anomalies were detected on this rod.
I l
I
.1-16 AKC401 A perforated fuel rod was observed on the East face of this assembly.
The-peripheral fuel rod, number 8, was heavily hydrided approximately 5-1/2 inches below the centerline of Grid 8.
The hydrided region extended axially approximately 3/4 to 1 inch and 360 circumferential1y.
The rod was completely separated into two pieces at the damaged region.
No apparent cause of the rod perforation was discernable.
This assembly was reconstituted and re-inserted into the core for Cycle 3 exposure.
AKD039 & AKD040 These two assemblies were examined as part of the DOE sponsored Improved Fuel Utilization Demonstration Program being conducted at ANO-2. The shoulder gaps on three (3) of the test rods in each assembly (6 rods total) were observed to be less than adjacent rods of standard design.
These test rods all contain large grain size fuel pellets of either standard or annular geometry.
The smallest measured shoulder gap for these six test rods was 1.455 inches.
The shoulder gap of standard peripheral rods in the same area of the assembly range from 1.635 to 1.688 inches.
AXC303 Perimeter strip damage was ob:erved on the South face of Grid 2.
A tab at the top of the grid between Fuel Rods 14 and 15 is reissing (torn away).
No other damage was observad on this grid.
1The faces of each assembly are identified North, South, East or West relative to the location of the assembly serial number taken to be the Northeast corner of the upper end fitting holddown plate.
2 Rods are numbered 1-16 from left to right across the face of the assembly.
35 pacer grids are numbered from the bottom to the top of the assembly with the Inconel Grid designated as Grid O.
r
~
l'17 FIGURE la.
REPLACED FUEL RODS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
^
R B
2 c X D
X Assembly AKC 212 E
X F
c X
H X
a X
X K
L M
N 1
0 E
P
{
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 Al B
c
^ U X
Assembly AKC 401 E
F c
- X XX
^
H
'XXX r X
'X X
J K
L N
N O
E Perforated Rod S Replaced Rods
1-18 FIGURE lb.
REPLACED FUEL RODS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 A
m 8
3 C
D L
c Assembly AKD 120 F
c 1
1 H
I J
K L
M N
X E
o p
1 3 Perforated Rod E Replaced Rods W Interchanged Rods
1_19 FIGURE 2 ANO-2 CORE LOADING PLAN CYCLE 1 C909' C308 C311' C30 C911 I
'G7 G8 C913 C20[ C10G BOOG A099 BO0d Cted C211 C912 2
57 52 SG 3
C50[ C2id i' B031 AOS[ 800[ A10[ 805[ A102 C219 C501 3
GG 33 39 96 GS a CMOS 'C215 A006 801E A098 Boo [ A103 (GT5hA030 ST06 6093 C20[ C910 9
39 25 C
26 90 y
j C21G A021 8091' A04 B00[ A0ld BT03)1'09 B02[ A009 8029 A093'C20f 5
99 F
17 M
G 97 C94[ (107 809 [ Aisi 80'11 A02[ 802d A10EM A002 8035 A11[ 800[ C10i C909 6
SG 29 11 6
+
12 27 59 2
C306 B09[ AGO B03[ A010' BT01 A019BOS[ h09[ 801[ A04[803 h[2A B013 C310 7
65 32 16 3
M 19 M;
70; k33 A0id 800 A001 802 [ A00[ B026 A005 B027'903i B098 A038' '9095 A011 C305 8
50 7 51 B
7 i
9 D
53 504 C312 git 09 A090 803[ A028 S038 A039 B008 A03[8025 A008 8015A03[ 8005 C309 3
69
+
Si 15 2
5 20 3G 71J C919 C108 803[ A02[ 8051 A10G B02[ AOS[ 8029 A0 i G' B036 A02[801[C105 C901 iC 55 23 10 S
13 28 60 g
C205 A02G B05i A318 O[$23 A01[ B02[ A33G B019' A017 ST02A051C21[
11 93 E
19 21 H
98 C916 C206 A00[ 8016 6013 BTOS A035 B01[ A10[ 8018 A027 C201 C902 12 38
'. 22
'A
/[N 91 L
l C502 C20 802[ 8096 603[ B092 A105 8099 6095 C208 C509 13 G3 92 30 37,_
g 72 93 C915 C209 C10[ 8009 A025 809 C101 C21[ C903 19 59 50 Gi g
C905 C302 C309 C301 C906 15 G2 g3 g
7 g
A B
C D
E F
G H
J K
L M
N P
R 1
C Leaking Assembly E0C1 Grid Damage Found E0C1 Grid Damage found E0C2
-+-
Side of Grid Damage
~
1-20 FIGURE 3 ANO-2 CYCLE 2 CORE LOADING PLAN A
B C.
D E
F C
11 J
g L
M
!?
P R
l D0163 D0313 000bl D005l D03%
l g
67 68 D033 D02bVC414 C2063 C3,09 C2011 C401 D0377 D0251 I
2 1
57 52 58 k
L D023T C30bVC416 803 2R7 B0011 C2097 BOSP C402 C30ipc031 3~
66 45 33 34 46 69 k
D011Vc306 C503 B017T D106l 80301'D1099 3%JP D10533T067:
4' 501
- 310 D0267 39 25 C
26 40 A
A D0343 C412 B0413 C1013 80091 B006330037 B003380217:103 029' M133 DOOK 5
44 I
F 17 18 C
47 A
0039 C411 3043 D117 B011 D112 8023 J102.Y'049/ alli 3035 D118 B002l 6
56 24 11 8 +
12 27 s
C409 D029 j
59, 0030 C214 C210 503 )
7 65 32
'B042 STol C104 3022 C103 8010 013 3037 C205 C213 3004 15 3
4 19 35 70 C305 B007 D11 B0 0114 B348 105 020 0101 026 DIOS 3045 303 0011 8
501 3:4 8a l
7 1 l 9 I D
/5A 502-s 9
0012 020?
C203 B034 TO 603 C102 IT03 2105 1025 B00 B015 C216 C207 0C01 64 31 IN 2
5 20
- 36 71 E7 c40f 8039 D107 3051 D104 30?S
>116 3024 MI5 X001 ' 120 3012Y405 0040 10 55 23 l
l 10
(
l 6 13 28 60 I
' l:453 CW3 7
7 T
V 7
- 027 -
3054 F107 B052 3004
.8050 h047 B019 C106 ST02 C415 3036 11 --
k43 E /\\ 14 21 H
48 V
F 1
7 7
7 7
7 1
T 12 2009
- 312 C502 3016 3110 3T05 D103 B014 D119 BOIS C504 2304 3022 33 22 A
29 4
g1
- j 13 D035 C302
- 408 3046 C21'1 Bb40 C202 B044 C410 2301 3024 63 g
42 30 37 49j 72 24 0019 D014 C407 C215 C311 C204 C404 D002 D010 54 50 61, 15 0013 D013 D015 D020 3038 62 73
@ Scrisi !: umber Location and Orientation
{
XXXX
<- Fuel Assembly ID 2: umber U
I 0RT'd 4 CL\\,PLCEA, Source ID ::utber l
D Leaking Assembly EOC2
$ Grid Damaae EOC2
-> Side of Grid Damage