ML20072K764

Rev 1 to Palisades Plant Restart Plan from 1994 Forced Outage

ML20072K764
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	07/06/1994
From:	Fenech R CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML18059B167	List: ML20072K764 ML20072K774
References
PROC-940706, NUDOCS 9408300277
Download: ML20072K764 (32)

Text

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PALISADES PLANT i RESTART PLAN from the 1994 FORCED OUTAGE Revision 1 l

Approved b dI A Vice President, Nuclear Operations Depar,tment

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PALISADES PLANT RESTART PLAN .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. BACKGROLWD H. RESTART PLAN OBJECTIVES HI. METHODOLOGY IV. PROCESS IV.A Plant Systems Review >

IV.B Plant Program Review l

IV.C Plant Depanment Review ,

l IV.D Safety Function Review I

IV.E Palisades Performance Enhancement Plan Objectives Review I

IV.F Work Order Backlog Review IV.G Corrective Action Backlog Review IV.H GOP-2, Plant Heatup (Cold Shutdown to Hot Shutdown)

GOP-3, Hot Shutdown to Critical in Hot Standby V. ASSESSMENT AND OVERSIGHT VI. CLOSURE AND DOCUMENTATION ATTACHMENTS:

Attachment 1: Systems and Pregrams Impodant to Safety Attachment 2: Depadment Review List , l Attachment 3: Hestup, Stadup, and Power Escalation Hold Points l I

I. BACKGROUND On February 17, 1994, a through wallleak was discovered on the body of the containment sump outlet check valve, CK-ES3166. The reactor was taken off-line with l i

no anomalies noted during the shutdown. The plant was taken to a condition of less than 325 degrees F and 400 psig and held at that level until February 23,1994 when a l l

decision was made to take the plant to cold shutdown. Cold Shutdown conditions were met at 1113 brs on February 24,1994.

i During the repair of the check valve, other deficiencies were identified relating to channel separation of signal wires to the Reactor Protection System (RPS) cabinets, inadequate isolation of non-1E equipment on IE power, inverter output harmonic distonion, deficiencies with the Emergency Diesel Generators and their fuel systems, l improper installation of reactor vessel insulation and problems with the Auxiliary  ;

Feedwater System.

These system problems, plus other concerns identified during and after the 1993 refueling outage showed a need for a systematic and programmatic review of plant systems, programs and departments to insure readiness to restart and to provide assurance for a safe, reliable run. l Additional reviews, including a safety function review and multi-disciplinary reviews of work orders and corrective actions were added to the scope of the restan reviews as a result of system, program, and department reviews. 1 l

11. RESTART PIAN OBJECTIVES l The overall objective of the Palisades Plant restart plan is to provide a vehicle by which plant management can effectively assess the plant's readiness for heat up and start-up.

The plan will ensure the comprehensiveness of the restad efforts through an integrat framework of system, program, departmental, safety function, work order backlog, and corrective action backlog reviews.

1 IIL ME'IBODOLOGY dews will be conducted by a Restart Review Team that will consist

'Ibe Restad Plan '

.uclear Operations Department (Chair), Pa!!sades Plant Manager, of: Vice Presideu i Nuclear Engineer . . and Construction Organization Manager, Nuclear Plant Assessment and a Senior Operations Department Representative.

Department Mai 4

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The Restart Plan will provide an in depth look at the s? stems and programs considered important to safe generation of the plant. A list of the programs and systems designated for review is provided in Attachment 1.

Department reviews will be performed to evaluate the organizational readiness across the systems and programs boundaries. The departments identified for review are included in Attachment 2.

Multi-disciplinary reviews of both the work order bacidog and corrective action backlogs will be perfonned.

As a validation and verification of the process, the objectives of the Palisades Performance Enhancement Plan (P'EP) will be reviewed for weaknesses identified to determine if the current status of the identified issues is adequate to support startup.  ;

Also, the system, program, and depadmental weaknesses will be evaluated from a safety function perspective to ensure the cumulative effect of weaknesses in these areas in considered.

The Vice President, Nuclear Operations Department will approve the plan.

IV. PROCESS In order to ar. ire a safe, controlled restart and a safe, reliable power generation cycle the Restad Review Team will evaluate the readiness of plant systems, programs and departments. The team will consider the following:

• Adverse impact on safety system availability or performance For example, potential for causing frequent entry into TS action statements, potential for entry into short term TS action statements, and potential to render a component or system incapable of performing latended design function.

• Significant chaBenge to plant / personnel performa- because of ladividual or aggregate hoped For example, high numben of required compensatory actions, disabled annunciators, high backlog numbers, and degraded or unreliable equipment performance.

• High potential to impact plant operating reliability i

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For example, likelihood of causing trips / transients. common or single failure point weaknesses, necessitates entry into short term TS action statements, and likelihood for hardware failure before the end of the next operating cycle.

• Need for correcting deficiencies prior to restart For example, actions required prior to beatup to enhance safety margin, reduce outage risk, or to reduce operational impact.

Items of concern resulting from these reviews will be noted and transmitted to outage management for tracking and close-out. He resulting Action Item List will be reviewed prior to acommending restart.

IV.A Plant Systans Review Prior to restart, a system readiness review will be conducted by System Engineering and presented to the Restart Review Team. Its purpose is to give plant management an overview of the status of the systems important to safety. He Restart Review Team will lasure that the cumulative effect of a number of marginal aspects of a system and all the. "

i systems are evaluated and considered. The review will also provide direct contact of the-system experts with senior plant management to insure any concerns are communicated.

He system review will include the following items:

1. Review of the Work Order Bacidog

a. How many work orders in each priority i

b. Age of backlog l

c. Discussion of specific work orders which are significant

2. Review of Temporary Modifications (TM)

a. Number of temporary modifications

b. Age of temporary modifications

c. Number of operations sensitive TMs

d. Discussion of significant TMs l

3. Operator Concerns

a. Discuss items on the Long Range Concerns List for the system I

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4. Design Basis Issues

a. Discuss areas where the system approaches limits of compliance with design requirements,

b. Discuss outstanding Safety System Design Confirmation (SSDC) discrepancies on the system.

5. Modifications

a. Discuss modifications that have been identified as being necessary or highly desirable but have not yet been implemented.

b. Discuss modifications implemented this outage and potential vulnerabilities niated to these modifications.

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6. Industry Issues

a. Discuss identified industry issues on the adequacy of how they have been addressed.

7. Diagnostic Evaluation Observations Requiring Action

a. Present DEOs associated with the system and status of action required.

8. Corrective Action Documents

a. Identify outstanding corrective actions associated with the system.

b. Discuss outstanding corrective action document actions that have significance to startup

c. Cover any coerective action documents from this outage that had previously been identified for PRC review but were removed because of this review

9. Preventive Maintenance (PPAC) Issues

a. Discuss any PPACs on the system that have not been performed but should be, and discuss why they have not been performed.

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IV.B Plant Program Review l Prior to restart, a plant program readiness review will be conducted by the Program l l

>!anagers and presented to the Plant Review Team. Its purpose is to give plant l management an overview of the status of the key programs affecting plant safety. The Plant Review Team will insure that the cumulative effect of a number of marginal l aspects of plant performance as determined by the programs are evaluated and considered. The review will also provide direct contact of the program managers with senior plant management to insure any concerns are communicated. ,

The program review will include the following items:

1. Design Basis Issues

a. Discuss areas where the plant approaches limits of compliance with design requirements.

b. Discuss outstanding Safety System Design Confirmation (SSDC) discrepancies on the program.

2. Sfodifications

a. Discuss modifications that have been identified as being necessary or highly desirable but have not yet been implemented.

3. Industry Issues

a. Discuss identified industry issues and the adequacies of how they have been addressed.

4. Diagnostic Evaluation Observations Requiring Action

a. Present DEOs associated with the system and status of actions required.

5. Corrective Action Documents

n. Identify outstanding corrective action documents, l

b. Discuss outstanding corrective action document actions that have significance to startup.

c. Cover any corrective action documents from this outage that had previously been iden+1fied for PRC review but were removed because of this review. r l

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IV.C Plant Dep.utment Reviews Prior to restart. a review of depanmental readiness will be performed by each department manager and presented to the Restart Review Team. The purpose of this l review is to ensure the department's organizational structure, resources and processes i are adequate to support restart and continued safe operation of the plant. The process is intended to help align the management to common objectives.

The department reviews will include the following items:

1. Organizational Structure

a. Departmental Roles and Responsibilities / Defined

b. Outline of Departmental Structure

c. Critical functions defined

2. Department Processes

a. Process Weaknesses Identified

b. Actions to ensure effectiveness of processes

3. Resources

a. Current Resource Status vs. Short Term needs

b. Resource Planning

c. Departmental Work Backlog Status

4. Assessment

a. Performance Monitoring Systems in place IV.D Safety Function Review The Safety Function Review will integrate the various weaknesses identified through the system, program, and departmental reviews. This review will evaluate the cumulative effect of these weaknesses on the Emergency Operating Procedure Safety Functions.

Each of the success paths for fulfilling the following safety functions;

1) Reactivity Control

2) Maintenance of Vital Auxillaries, Electric G

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3) Inventory Control

1) Pressure Control

5) Core Heat Removal

6) Plant Heat Removal

7) Containment Integrity

8) Containment Atmosphere

9) Maintenance of Vital Auxillaries, Water

10) Maintenance of Vital Auxillaries, Air will be evaluated for conditions that could lead to an inability to fulfill the safety function. By reviewing the individual success paths, seemingly unrelated discrepancies will be correlated to the safety function. This will provide the integrated look at the cumulative effect of identified weaknesses on the plant's ability to effectively cope with an accident.

IV.E Palisades Perforinane, Fnhancement Plan Objectives Review 2

Prior to startup the objectives of the Palisades Performance Enhancement Plan (P EP) '

will be reviewed by the Restart Review Committee to assess the overall readiness of the plant for restart based on the areas identified by the plan as needing improvement.

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This review will consist of a preliminary review of all of the P EP objectives by the 2

review commit *ee to identify areas of concern. P EP program sponsors will then be asked to present the current status and plans associated with those areas of concern to the review committee. His review is intended as a validation of the system and l departmental reviews being performed under Section IV.A - C.

l IV.F Wert Order Macklog Review Prior to Restant a multi-disciplinary review of the work order backlog will be performed. De team will, as a minimum, include a member from Operations, System Engineering, Mechanical Maintenance, Electrical / I+C Maintenance, and Reactor Safety and Analysis. The review will focus both on the cumulative effect of the backlog ,

avid the individualimpact of each deficiency. The review will evaluate the work orders l

for the following criteria: .

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• Advense impact on safety system availability or performance

• Significant challenge to plant / personnel performance because of individual or aggregate impact

• Iligh potential to impact plant operating reliability

• Need for correcting deficiencies prior to restart Items of concern resulting from this review will be noted and transmitted to outage management for tracking and close-out. The resulting Action Item List will be review prior to recommending restart.

IV.G Co.Je Action Marklog Reirlew Prior to Restart a multi-disciplinary review of the corrective action backlog will be performed to identify issues which might have significant implications for equipm operability and warrant resolution before plant startup.

of, as a minimum, a member from Operations, Probable Risk Analysis, System Engineering, Plant Safety and Licensing, and Reactor and Safety Analysis. H scope will include all open Deviation Reports and Event Reports that have not be .

subject to the formal, enhanced operability determination process, and all ope Item Records in the Palisades, NPAD, or commitment tracking systems. De review will evaluate the corrective actions for the following criteria:

• Adverse impact on safety system availability or performance

• Significant challenge to plant / personnel performance because of Individua aggregate impact

• High potential to impact plant operating reliability

• Need for corncting deficiencies prior to restart Items of concern nsulting from this review will be noted and transmitted to outage management for tracking and close-out. The resulting Action Item List w prior to recommending nstart.

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IV.H GOP-2, Plant Heatup (Cold Shutdown to Hot Shutdown) and GOP-3, Hot Shutdown to Critical in Hot Standby These documents provide instructions for a normal Plant Heatup from Cold Shutdown to Hot Shutdown conditions, and from Hot Shutdown to Hot Standby conditions. They contain the operational reviews and verincation completed prior to restart and the final authorization to restart from the Plant General Manager. The following specific reviews are included.

GOP-2:  :

1. Checklists required for plant conditions have been completed.

2. Review of:

a. Personal Protective Tagging ,

b. Caution Tags

c. Temporary Modifications and

d. Work Orders for items conflicting with plant heatup

3. Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent verifles vital work completed

4. Electrical - I&C Maintenance Superintendent verifles

a. vital work completed and

b. Restoration of Safety Injection Actuation Circuits

5. If the plant has been in Cold Shutdown for greater than 100 days, then Operations Superintendent verifies that licensed operator refresher training on plant startup has been conducted at the simulator. 1

6. Plant Safety and Licensing Director or designated alternate, verifles ,

n. No outstanding Licensing commitments conflicting with plant heatup.

b. All st sted Corrective Action documents required prior to heatup i

are completed.

c.

PRC has reviewed upward operation condition changes made under Technical Specification 3.0.4 (refer to Admin Proc 3.01).

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7. Engineering Programs Manager serifies

a. Facility Change projects required to be completed prior to plant heatup have been completed to the Operations Authorization signoff.

b. All Specification Changes required to be completed prior to plant heatup have been completed through the Action Completed block.

8. The Technical Specification Surveillance Coordinator verifles all required Technical Specifications surveillance testing completed.

9. ALARA Coordinator verifles that all lead shielding in Contakawnt that is to be removed from components prior to leaving Cold Shutdown per the Shielding Engineering Evaluations, is removed.

10. PCS Chemistry ready for plant heatup by

a. Chemistry Supervisor verifies PCS chemical and activity levels acceptable for heatup (per COP 1) and

b. Primary Coolant Boron measured

11. Heatup approved by Plant General Manager or authorized representative.

GOP-3:

1. GCL 2 completed

2. Insure that Checklists CL 3.9, CL 6.1, CL 6.2, CL 12.6, CL 35 and CL 36 have been completed within the previous ten days or have been waived in accordance with Admin Procedure 4.02.

3. Surveillance completed for all items required above hot shutdown on SHO-1 or D/WO-1.

4. Review:

a. Open work orders

b. Switching and tagging orders for items conflicting with critical approach.

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5. Technical SpeciGcation Surveillance Coordinator verifies all Technical

.c;,ecincation tests required prior to critical have been completed.

6. PCS Chemistry ready for criticality by:

a. Chemistry Supervisor verifies PCS chemical and activity levels acceptable for heatup (per COP 1)

b. Primary Coolant Boron measured.

7. Plant Safety and Licensing Director or designated alternate, verifles:

a. No outstanding Licensing commitments conflicting with critical approach.

b. All related Corrective Action documents required prior to critical approach are completed.

c. PRC has reviewed upward operation condition changes made under Technical Specification 3.0.4 (refer to Admin Proc 3.01) and

d. If plant has been in Cold Shutdown for greater than 100 days, a Nuclear Safety Board operational readiness review has been conducted.

8. ALARA Coordinator verifies that all applicable iead shielding in Containment is remo5ed.

9. Zero Power Mode (ZPM) bypass keys removed (refer to SOP 36).

10. Critical prediction completed (refer to EM-04-24).

11. Radiation Safety Supervisor verifies that:

a. All radiation doon in the containment building are locked and

b. No personnel in containment.

12. Operations Shift Supervisor verifies that:

a. At least two Instrument Air Compressors available.

b. Instrument Air dryer is ready for service (refer to SOP 19).

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c. Instrument Air Header ready for service and

d. High Pressure Air Receiver tanks T-9A and T-9B greater than 260 psia and not crosstied (refer to SOP 20).

13. Critical approach approved by Plant General Manager or authorized representative.

14. Plant requirements, precautions and limitations of SJP 6 and GOP 3 reviewed by Licensed Operators who will perform cruical approach.

Piant readiness will be reviewed and assessed by the action in IV.A, IV.B, IV.C, IV.D, l

l IV.E, IV.F. IV.G and IV.H. The actual verifications and authorizations to bestup and startup the plant will be contained in General Operating Procedures GOP 2 and GOP 3 as described la Section IV.H above. With the exception of the additional authorizations delineated in section VI.

V. ASSESSMENT AND OVERSIGHT

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As part of the restart activities, a number of assessments, reviews and oversight '

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activities are being employed to ensure that key areas for improvement are identified, that the associated restart plan and activities are appropriate to address those weaknesses, and that the restart plan is effectively implemented. Key review and assessment activities include:

1. System reviews referenced in Section IV.A.

2. Program reviews referenced in Section IV.B.

3. Departmental reviews referenced in Section IV.C.

4. A review of the restart plan by the Management Safety Review Committee members

5. A comprehensive program of Nuclear Plant Assurance Department A e====*nt.

6. Nuclear Plant Assurance Department direct oversight and assessment of the restart plan activities and Diagnostic Evaluation Observation (DEO) closcout reviews.

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7. On independent assessment of common causal factors of DEO discrepancies identified. l VI. CLOSURE AND DOCUMENTATION Restart Plan completion will consist of a " roll-up" of a number of interfacing and l overlapping inputs. These include the plant systems review, plant programs review, plant departments review, safety function review, Palisades Performance Enhancement Plan objectives review, work order backlog review,and corrective action backlog review i

performed in accordance with the Restart Plan. The Restart Review Team will also l review the Action Items developed from the above assessments. Completion of the reviews will be dxumented below.

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1. System reviews re renced in Section IV.A.

Completed 6/7/7 Y l Restart Plan Manager

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2. Program reviews referenced in Section IV.B.

Completed

$/7/f/

• Restart Plan Manager

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3. Depadmental reviews referenced in Section IV.C.

Completed  ! b7/8f Restan Plan Manager

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4. Safety Function Review referenced in Section IV.D.

Completed Nl - [h/ 94 Restart Plan NIanag'er

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5. P'EP Objective Review referenced in Section IV.E.

Completed Mw -Restart6Plan/78f Manager

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Work Order Backlog Review referenced in Section IV.F.

'! J /$. -,<- d! /99' Completed ..

Restart Plan Slanager

7. Corrective Action Backlog Review referenced in Section IV.G Completed y3/A - (/7/fI Restart Plan Manager

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A review of the restart plan by the Management and Safety Review Committee members.

Completed -- !7/f 9 Restart Plan Madager

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9. Action items from Reviews.

Completed v- C/[/99' Restart Plan Manager i

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HEATUP RECOMMENDATION The Restart Resiew Team will confirm that the readiness review has been sufficiently completed to support heatup, and upon completion of the action items required prior to heatup, recommend heatup of the Palisades Plant.

S Cl?/fV Ope tions Department Representative N c h/W Nuclear Plant Assessment Depaitmedt Manager y Y Nuclear Engineering and Construction Organization Manager Q/ ) m C/5 h4 Palindes Plant General Manager .

M _ <st Vice Preside:d, Nuclear Operations Department I

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STARTUP RECOMMENDATION The Restart Review Team will confirm that the readiness review has been completed, and upon completion of the Action Items List required for operation, recommend the restart of the Palisades Plant.

h b[fy Optieffs Department Representative 4; &ln Nuclear Plant Assessment Department Manager YV & & &hAoby k Nuclear Engiheering and Construction OrgaYitzation Manager

.'2h/ L'//1hi4 \

Pat (sades Plant General Manager

-i Vice President, Nuclear Operations Department

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ATTACH 3fENT 1 SYSTEMS and PROGRAMS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY SYSTEM 6SPECTS ENGNEER SECTION HEAD TGS EHC JDStafford B*Kubackl DEH TELeva RSWesterhof Main Generator Tusine MFW System Performance CWMain B*Kubecki CV-0606 Failure RSWesterhoff RSWestedof FP Controls FRV Controls Feed Flow Indication RPS Time Response BDMeredith RSWesterhof Cable Separation Reliability Power Supply Pin Engagement TMM Alamns/Pretrips CCW Heat Exchanger WABinnington PJGire Containment Issue ESF Pump Cooling SW Margins WABinnington PJGire Bio-Fouling PCS Inconel 600 BABemis B*Kubackl i CRDM I

Vessel Internals Primary Coolant Pumps SCCedarquist Letdown PABurke B*Kubacki CVCS CCP Packing Heat Tracing 1

EPS Diesel Generator Controls GJSzczypka PJGire l I Fuel Oll i

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l ESS IIPSI EJGrindahl PJGire LPSI Containment Spray SCS JPBroschak B*Kubacki AFW Various Controls DABixel PJGire URPeterson RSWesterhof Reliability LTPhillips B*Kubackl HVAC Design RKMoceri RSWesterhof SPS 4160/2400/480 125V DC RSWesterhof 120V Preferred as RSwesterhof Invertors RSWesterhof AJSoderberg BVVanWagner CIS Airlocks Appendix J BMSova RSWesterhof Electrical Penetrations .

(N2 Purge)

PROGRAMS ASPECTS ENGINEER SECTION HEAD SYSTEM DRDay TABuczwinski EEQ RWPhillips TABuczwinski Appendix R DEEngle TABuczwinski SQUG WTOConn:ll BALow MOV .y BALow Valves Checks JRJohns Air Operated Reuefs RBKasper PPAC BVVanWagner THFouty ISI Erosion /

Corrosion TABuczwinski CCP BCHarsche GSchrader BVVanWanger Pump &

Valve IST .

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Station. RIIamm KAToner Blackout SRPRP Safety Related DRiat B anWagner Piping and Verification l

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ATTACIIMENT 2 DEPARTMENT REVIEW LIST The following list identifies the departments to be included in the departmental review.

1. Operations

a. Operations

b. Chemistry

c. Reactor Engineering

2. Maintenance

a. Mechanical

b. Electrical

c. Instrument and Control

3. System Engineering

4. Administrative

5. Nuclear Training

6. Radiological Services

7. Nuclear Engineering and Construction Organization

8. Nuclear Plant Assessment Department G

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ATTACIIMENT 3 IIEATUP,STARTUP, AND POWER ESCALATION IIOLD POINTS l

l Objectives This attachment outlines the management plan for ensuring the safe, controlled, and deliberate return to service of the Palisades Nuclear Plant from the 1994 Forced Outage. It is intended as a supplement to the comprehensive operating procedures that govern plant heatup, startup, and power escalation and will not duplicate sign offs and verifications alnady existing 'm the General Operating Procedures. It provides for the documentation of the additional management oversight appropriate for a plant startup considering the plant's performance history. He hold point sign-offs will focus primarily on the human performance aspects of the evolutions performed and secondarily on equipment performance.

Management Oversteht To ensure adequate management involvement of the heatup, startup, and power escalation the Plant General Manager shall establish a schedule by which Plant and NECO managers will be assigned to provide management oversight for critical evolutions and periodic general oversight during prolonged evolutions of less critical nature. .

Enmineerine Involvement During the neatup, restart, and power esca!ation of the plant from the outage, engineering will monitor the plant's response from a sys1em, program, and design basis conformance view point. Important equipment transitions and mode changes will be monitored for l i

proper system response. Programs will be verified, where possible, to be meeting the required standards through observations of appropriate evolutions. Design basis assumptions will be verified against actual plant operation to the extent reasonable.

hiaintenance and Sunnort Groun Involvement l

During heatup, startup, and power escalation of the plant from the outage, maintenance and the other support groups will establish a plan by which they will ensure that resources l are available to support emergent work. Plans to support post maintenance testing and required surveys during startup and power escalation will be in place. He support groups are expected to be proactive in their support of the plant and to seek out areas where their support will further the safe and efficient operation of the plant.

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Assessment IIold Points This plan establishes the following assessment hold points at which plant conditions are maintained until a prescribed assessment of site readiness for further progression, as defined by this attachment is completed.

-Prior to leaving cold shutdown

-Prior to Reactor Startup l

-Prior to Synchronization

-Prior to exceeding 35% Reactor Power

-Prior to exceeding 55% Reactor Power

-Prior to exceeding 90% Reactor Power

-Continuing Operation after 10 days of full power operation The hold points for leaving cold shutdown and prior to reactor startup will be controlled ,

through the normal Plant General Manager authorizations required in GOPs 2 and 3. The hold points for prior to synchronization and at the various power levels will be controlled l by Operations Department management through daily orders entries. The Plant General Manager will make the authorizations for proceeding beyond the hold points.

Human Performance Evaluations The human performance evaluations called for in the Hold Point Assessments and l i

Authorizations section of this attachment will be performed with a focus on procedural compliance, attention to detall, communications, and safety sensitivity of the department staff. In order to evaluate this adequately it is expected that each manager will review the performance of their employees comprehensively using various inputs.

He pdmary input for evaluating human performance is the corrective action system. He corrective action documents generated that are applicable to the performance of a department should be evaluated for significance and for trends in perfonnance. This evaluation should be supplemented by observations of work in the field. Inputs received during department standdown meetings should also be considered in assessing the culture existing within the organization.

The effectiveness of communication both within the individual departments and between departments is a critical element of any organization. De safe operation of the plant is dependent upon good communication at and between all levels of the organization. He 24

effectiveness of communication within and between departments should be assessed to determine if the process ensures that safety concerns are being adequately communicated and that the resolution of these concerns is being effectively conununicated back to the concerned individuals. Likewise, communication of directions, actions and alignments must be adequate to ensure that no critical action is missed.

Hold Point Assessments and Authorizations PRIOR TO LEAVING COLD SHUTDOWN The full Restart Review Team shall authorize leaving cold shutdown as documented in Section VI of the Restart Plan. The authorization will be based on the restart plan review results and management observations of work in the field. In addition each plant and NECO department head shall evaluate his departments readiness to support bestup and document that evaluation below.

-Human Performance from the aspect of procedural compliance, attention to detall, conununications, and safety sensitivity has been adequate to justify plant heatup, d iN'LA> > lE Elec./t C/ Comp. Engineering Manager

h. 5.

'Proj. Mgmt, Const.,& Testing Manager h& w+ '

Engineerdg Programs Manager

/ MH Wl4c'h.ifivil, Structural Eng Manager fY

%cto'r and Saf/y Analysis Manager 3

ng Programs-Strat. Issues Manager WA NECO Manager 25

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~ . a <y A .. + , '

n 1j's A Operbfons Stanager 4 Wh.

/ Systems Acmar roe Engineering 5 tanager M

Maintedaloce6fanager j

Radiological Services Sianager 4

Administrat re Sianager uman ResourMirector I n,-

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rn ,.,, m .,e<

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t Ptartf General Nianager 4

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PRIOR TO REACTOR STARTUP l

IIeatup records hase been reviewed for procedural compliance and adequate equipment response. .} ]

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,/ Operations Manager

-System response during heatup has been reviewed by System Engineering and is adequate to support reactor startup.

h0 Ybf Systems Engineering Manager

-Plant material condition and general housekeeping is adequate for plant startup.

Ahrl Plad General Manager

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-Hot shutdown testing has been completed satisfactorily from syste.us perspective.

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f.u.s*a y *cAmun. M _

f.,~ wr my Systems Engineering Manager 79 w .3

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-All plant modifications performed during the outage have been reviewed for adequacy a completeness to support plant startup.

s ,b t k g y r NECO Manager

-Plant Review Committee (PRC) startup meeting is complete and all open items dealing with reactor startup and power escalation have been resolved to the PRC's satisfaction.

9 JiY ! h C4 (44 PRfChairman 27

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-Iluman Performance from the aspect of procedural compliance, attention to detail, communications, and safety sensitivity has been adequate during the hot shutdown testing period to justify reactor startup.

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// g l JJ hb k GbktY Mperations Sianager hSyste (ns Engineering ManagerWY YfY Sialn%dolapIte Manager l

hadiological Services Manager hh s, 4

'Pla[g4neral Manager 7ff -

PRIOR TO SYNCHRONIZATION

-Plant and Human Performance during the reactor staitup met management's ex for quality.

3..k /% N M r/,y Pf'a'nt General Manager PRIOR 10 EXCEEDING 35% POWER

-Plant power escalation records have been reviewed for procedural compila adequate equipment response.

) W bfl9f9Y 6;drations Manager .

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-System response during power escalation has been resiewed by System Engineering and ts  !

adequate to support continued power escalation.

hk

[Systems Engineering '/ i Manager

-Plant operation is consistent with design.

/M4 .

NECO Man'ag#

-Plant material condition and general housekeeping is adequate for continued power escalation.

D d4 v s a Plant General Manager

-Human Performance from the aspect of procedural compilance, attention to detail, communications, a safety sensitivity has been adequate to justify continued power escalation.

A cu - a hr

1. fperations Manager f b 1 f Systems $ngineering Manager N /st A8f 6[/Tk Maintenance Manager

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.i IA WY Radiological S{r))lces Manager QA*/apr1P Plant General Mana(er f-/9-94 23Jo e  %

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PRIOR TO EXCEEDING 55% POWER Plant and IIuman Performance during power escalation to 55% power met management's expectation for quality.

b) , s e bv ISPpevYdeCW

" Plant General Sianager Gi dC N C 545' PRIOR TO EXCEEDING 90% POWER

-Plant and Human Perfonnance during power escalation to 90% power met management's expectation for quality.

b O 77/MmUw Plant Gderal Manager #'" *'" MkW CONTINUED OPERATION FOLIAWING 10 DAYS OF WLL POWER OPERATION

~

-Plant material condition and general housekeeping are adequate for continued operation.

d4 Pla67 General Manager

-Modification performance supports continued operation.

NfCO Ma g

-Fuel perfonnance is adequate to support continued operation. l l

ftor'and Safe / Analysis Manager i

30 l i

-System response during power escalation has been reviewed by System Engineering and is adequate to support continued power escalation.

.7 1 /Y Systems Engineering Manager

-Plant operation is consistent with design.

/ 'NECO Ma de

-Human Performance from the aspect of procedural compilance, attention to detail, communications, apd safety sensitivity has been adequate to justify continued operation.

[ 0- 74bV

< Operations Manager

~

k NY ?Y^l Systeifns Engineering Manager

= 7-6 -ff

?faintedadedfanager

)

l Radiological Services Manager

'Z/

Plaffi General Manager I

i i

31 i

1 I

l l

I I

ATTACHMENT 3  !

Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 PAllSADES PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT PLAN Describing Long-Term Actions to Improve Performance at Palisades August 11, 1994