ML20072J135
| ML20072J135 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 03/23/1981 |
| From: | Dunn B BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-03, TASK-07, TASK-3, TASK-7, TASK-GB NUDOCS 8306290953 | |
| Download: ML20072J135 (122) | |
Text
b/l 603 m
m f~N UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT w
'V' SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _x GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION, JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,
(*
METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY and PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Plaintiffs,
- 80 CIV. 1683
-against-(R.O.)
THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY and J.
RAY McDERMOTT &
CO.,
INC.,
Defendants.
_x Continued deposition of THE DA3 COCK U
s
& WILCOX COMPANY, by BERT M.
DUNN, taken by Plaintiffs, pursuant to adjournment, at the offices of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, Esqs., 425 Park Avenue, l
l New York, New York, on Monday,' March 23, l
l 1981, at 9:55 o' clock in the forenoon, 1
before Joseph R.
Danyo, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public within
-(
and for the State of New York DOYLE REPORTING. IN C.
(
~
(V) crarmtzs sreservor atacartas see i.exi ores Avesu 810323 Ngw Y o m et.
N.Y.
tCCt7 h $hh 05000 g T
7:Lze-c~c 212 - se7 a22o
604 i
1 2
App e arance s:
-3 KAYE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN, HAYS & HANDLER, ESQS.
~
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 4
425 Park Avenue New York, New York
(
5 By:
RICHARD C.
SELTZER, ESQ.
6
-and-ANDREW MacDONALD, ESQ.,
7 of Counsel 8
1 9i i
I
{
10 3 AVIS POLK & hARLWELL, ESQS.~
Attorneys for Defendants 11 ',
Cne Chase Manhattan Plaze New York, New York 12 3
B y. :
ROBERO B.
FISKE, ESQ.
13
-and-l RODMAN W.
BENEDICT, ESQ.,
14 of Counsel 15 2
16 i
17 I
18 l
l 19 20 l
22 l
23 l
24 25
\\
.-. ~.. -
605 1
(-s) 2 B ERT M.
D U NN, resumed, having 3
been previously duly sworn, was examined 4
and testified further as follows:
(
5 MR. SELTZER:
I would like to remind 6
you, Mr. Dunn, that your testimoney today, I
7 of course, continues to be under oath.
8 Are you aware of that?
3 THE WITNESS:
Yes.
10 HR. SELTZER:
I would like to mark 11 as GPU Exhibit 101, a memorandum from Allen 12 i Womack to Mr. Dunn dated April 6,
- 1979, l
t 13 l 4:15 p.m.,
subject, " Loss of Feodwater 4
14 Plus Relief Valve Failure."
15 (Memorandum dated April 6,
- 1979, 16 4:15 p.m.
from Mr. Womack to Mr. Dunn, l
17 subject " Loss of Feedwater Plus Relief i
i 18 Valve Failure" marked GPU Exhibit No. 101 l
l 19 for identification, as of this date.)
r i
20 EXAMINATION (Cont'd.)
21 BY MR. SELTZER:
-(
22 Q
Is GPU Exhibit 101 a copy of a 23 memorandum which you received from Allen Womack
[O) 24 on or about April 6,
1979 in the regular course 25 of business?
I
606 1
Dunn t
,V 2
A I don't recall receiving it.
I have no 3
reason to doubt that I would have.
4 Q
In the upper right-hand corner is
(
5 the notation " Instruction No. 202."
Do you see 6
that?
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
What does that refer to?
9 A
I can't be positive but at this particular 10 J tima, there was a recced keaping system which 11 differed fron our historical cystem.s t Bsw la I?
order te keep track of esients and iactructions O
th coarse of the recovery 13 and results during 14 effort from Three Mile Island.
I would assume 15 that that instruction number was reported in that 16 system.
17 Q
Who maintained those files?
18 A
I don't know.
19 Q
Where did you send materials that i
20 were to be filed pursuant to that system?
21 A
The filing was coordinated by other 22 individuals, people who were essentially 'ssigned 23 to Allen's job 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day, and I would talk
(_
24 to those individuals to find out about response 25 numbers or whether a response number was necessary, i
607 1
Dunn
/"~'s (m
2 et cetera.
3 Q
When you say " response number," do 4
you mean instruction number or are you referring i
{J 5
to a different filing system?
I 6
A No, I think it was all kept in the same 7
filing system.
I don't know if it.was a response 8
number or instruction number or it would have a 1
9 different title.
i-l 10 Q
What is a response number?
11 A
If there was a response that we would write i
12 to an instr-uction.
n-x 13 Q
Last week we marked two exhibits
~
14 that related to notes of activities on the day of 15 the accident.
I believe at the top it indicated 16 the routing to a B&W attorney who had the same 17 name as a golfer.
Who was that that it was routed 18 to?
19 A
Byron Nelson is one individual we i
i 20 identi'fied.
'I don't know that it is a routing.
21 Q
Let me show you a copy of GPU Exhibit C
22 97, the last page, and ask you whether that is 23 your handwriting?
(
24 A-That appears to be my handwriting.
25 Q
could you read that, please?
608 1
Dunn t
'~
I A
"Get notes from Allen's meeting Wednesday 3
to axian Nelson."
l 5
4 Q
Do you believe that means that you
(
5 intended to get the notes from a Wednesday 6
meeting and send them to Mr. Nelson?
7 A
Yes.
O Q
Let me show you GPU Exhibit 96 and 3
ask you if the notation at tne top looks like 10
" Leu, eno copy to Byron Helson"?
11 a
Yes, it does.
12 l
Q What day of the week we.s the Three r
13 l
P.ile Island accident, if you can recall?
I show 14 you GPU Exhibit 96 which says "3-28-79 hob Jones' 15 notes of Wednesday a.m.
Womack meeting."
Do you 16 see that?
17 A
Yes, I see that.
It would indicate that 18 the meeting was on Wednesday, and the accident was 19 the same day as that meeting.
20 Q
What kind of documents or notes 21.
were you asked to send to Byron or Brian Nelson, 22 whichever his name is?
23 A
I don't know whether I was asked to send 24 notes to him or whether I volunteered them, but 25 the notes I was thinking about were Bob Jones' notes.
\\
- -.~.
609 1
Dunn r\\
gv) 2 Q
Are you saying you don't think you 3
had any request to: send notes to Mr. Nelson?
4 A
No, I said I didn't know.
()
i 5
Q Had you had any prior dealings with 6
Mr. Nelson before the Three Mile Island accident?
7 A
Not that I recall.
I' 8
Q Do you have any information about I
9 i whether Nelson was collecting notes or anytning 10 y
else written regarding the accident?
)
~
11 A
YeE.
)
12 C
What is your underutanding of what C:)
1 13 he was coliecting?
14 A
When he met with me 15 MR. FISKE:
I think we had better 16 maybe rephrase the question.
17 MR. SELTZER:
I will be,very clear l
18 so it doesn't impinge on the attorney-cient 19 privilege.
I 20 MR. FISKE:
Yes.
I don't think j
21 Mr. Dunn should have to testify to anything 22 that results from a communication with 23 Mr. Nelson.
That is my only point.
[)
MR. SELTZER:
If Nelson asked him 24
(
%.)
25 to send papers, I would like to inquire
610 1
Dunn
,m (s) 2 what papers, particularly if they are not 3
papers created specifically for Mr. Nelson.
4 If people are sending him notes created
(
fr ther purpose.s, and Mr. Nelson is the 5
6 repository of them, I know we wouldn't 7
claim the attorney-client privilege for 8
these papers.
9 I am just trying to check all the f
maters.als that were sent to Nelson, if 10 11 they are not attorney-client privileged, 12 the ones that we kn-3w about.
understs;nd what you MR. FISKE I
V 13 are trying to find out.
I think we ought 14 to do it in a way that doesn't involve the 15 16 attorney-client privilege.
17 Q
All I am trying to find out is 18 did Mr. Nelson, to your knowledge, collect other 19 writings that were created on or about the day of the accident and which were not created just 20 f r the purposes of attorneys?
21
.MR.
FISKE:
I think you have got 22 two questions built in there.
I don't 23 b
24 know whether Mr. Dunn can answer either QJ ne rb th of them.
Maybe you ought to 25
?
631 1
Dunn
,f y V
2 start with the first part of it.
3 Q
I think you already told me you 4
believed Mr. Nelson was collecting other writings k
5 regarding the accident,.is that right?
6 A
When I answered previously, I didn't 7
really relate to the word " writing."
I iluess I 8
had better have a conference with Bob on this 1
9 g just to be sure.
I)
(Discussion off the record between 10 11 the witness and his counsel.)
l 12 MR. FISKEt Junt so we can cut
' ')
\\
15 through this, cur position is going to be 14 conversations between Mr. Nelson and 15 Mr. Dunn were in the context of an 16 attorney-client relationship.
Mr. Nelson 17 was acting as a lawyer for B&W,in what he 18 was doing.
I would not object if you i
19 wanted to ask Mr. Dunn if he knows whether 20 or not Mr. Nelson received any writings 21 from anyone other than Mr. Dunn.
He can 22 answer chat question.
23 I think when we hear the answer, 24 then we can go on to something else.
s 25 Q
What is the answer?
612 1
Dunn
-(/
2 A
I don't know whether Nelson received 3
writings from anybody else besides myself.
4 Q
Did you supply anything to Brian I
5 Nelson other than a copy.of Jones' notes of the 6
Wednesday meeting in Allen Womack's office?
7 A
I'm not sure.
8 Q
Do you believe you gave him a copy l
9 l of the notes which have been marked as GPU E.chibit
[
10 977 s
11 A
Than would ha the only other possibility P
li and I d:n't recall one way or the other.
13 Q
Co-ycu have any belief that others 14 were asked to submit notes or memoranda that they 15 had created or had in their possession regarding 16 the accident?
17 A
Yes.
18 Q
What is your belief 7 19 A
I don't believe I can t astify to that.
20 MR. SELTZER:
Will you permit him
(
21 to answer just yes or no whether he believes L.
22 that Brian Nelson was receiving or had 23 requested that others submit similar
(-sj 24 writings to Brian Nelson?
25 MR. FISKE:
Yes, I thought he
.n
623 1
1 Dunn V
2 answered that already.
3 Q
Except we are up to a vs.ry similar 4
point where you said you didn't believe you could
(
5 answer.
With your counsel's permission, can you 6
answer the last question?
7 MR. FISKE:
I do object to Mr. Dunn 8
testifying tc any communication that he 9
had with Mr. Nelson but I previously said 10 we wculd not object to Mr. Dunn stating i
11 whether he knows whether Mr. N21 son 12 collected any writings from anybody otner
/'~h d
kl 13 tnan himself.
~
14 A
I still can't answer the question.
15 Q
Why can't you?
16 A
Because the basis for the previous answer 17 of yes, the answer on the belief, was provided me 18 during the interaction with Mr. Nelson.
l l
19 MR. SELTZER:
Since we are merely f
l 20 trying to establish the existence of 21 nonwork product, nonattorney-client l
22 privileged documents in Mr. Nelson's l
23.
possession, could you unfetter the witness f^h 24 so that at least he can disclose what
%)
25 papers he believes may be in Nelson's i
i
6J 4 1
Dunn f\\
/
s 2
file of that type?
3 I think even if he heard it from 4
Nelson, I don't want to call Nelson to
(
5 find out what fil-es he assembled of a 6
nonprivileged type, if Mr. Dunn knows what 7
files Mr. Nelson has of nonprivileged l
8 q
=aterial.
9 MR. FISKE:
I don't think Mr. Dunn 10 knows whether !!r. Melson has any other 11 writings, let alone what the circumstances l
l 12 might have been under which those ether (3
's l 13 hypothetical writings may have been y
14 generated.
15 I think what you are really asking 1
16 Mr. Dunn now is in the context of a 17 communication between himself and 18 Mr. Nelson.
I l
19 MR. SELTZER:
That is exactly L
20 right, except I just want to find out I
21 did Nelson say that " hour notes on the 22 meeting are just one drop in the bucket.
23 I have got thousands of memos like this,
()
24 Mr. Dunn, from everybody in the company."
25 If he said something like that, I t
615 1
Dunn (h
v 2
would like to find out about it.
I don't 3
think there is anything privileged about 4
that.
Jh,
MR. FISKE:
I don't think I am going 5
-6 to let Mr. Dunn answer questions relating to 7
his conversations with Mr. Nelson.
i 8
MR. SELTZER:
I am not inquiring 4
9 as to the substance of the conversations.
I 10 I just want to find out whetner Nelson has other nonprivileged documents.
I can't 11
.i 12 see the prejudice tc you in permitting 13 this.
14 MR. FISKE:
It seems to me there is 15 a very simple way to find that out without 16 getting into Mr. Dunn's communications 17 with Mr. Nelson.
It doesn't have to 18 involve calling Mr. Nelson as a witness 19 either.
20 I will be glad to discuss with you 21 some way-in which we can accommodate you 22.
on that, but I don't think we should have 23 Mr. Dunn testifying on his conversations
[D 24 with Mr. Nelson or his understanding based
\\_)
25 on those conversations.
It seems to me
616 1
Dunn 7 ~)
\\-
2 that opens up a whole problem area.
If 3
you ask him what is your understanding and 4
his understanding is based on something
('
5 that he learns in a privileged 6
communication, basically you are opening 7
up the communication.
8 MR. SELTZER:
I will stipulato it t
9 is not a waiver of the privilege as to any 10 other part of the communication.
11 MR. FISKE:
I understand that, but i
12 I am going to still object.
O 13 MR. SELTZER:
And instruct him not 14 to answer?
15 MR. FISKE:
Yes, on the grounds of 16 privilege.
17 Q
Have you talked with anybody else 18 in the company who has said that they sent any 19 other writing to Mr. Nelson?
20 A
No.
21 Q
Have you talked with Bob Jones 22 about the fact that you sent Jones' memo to 23 Nelson?
24 A
It was Jones' notes, not his memo.
No, 25 I don't believe I talked that over with Bob.
617 1
Dunn 2
Q Do you know whether Bob Jones 3
sent anything to Nelson?
4 A
No, I do not.
'(
5 Q
After the. accident, how soon did 6
you meet with Nelson?
7 A
The best I can do for you is a few days.
8 Q
After the first meeting with him 9
following the accident, did you meen with him 10 again?
11 A
I don't recall any such meeting.
12 Q
In GPU Exhibit 101, Allen Womack 13 asks you to " assemble a team of analysts to wo,rk 14 in a directed and urgent fashion," et cetera.
15 Do you see that?
16 A
Yes.
17 Q
Had Womack previously made such a 18 request to you or was this memo the first you 19 had heard of this?
20 A
I don't know.
21 Q
The event which Allen Womack is 22 asking your team to analyze is a " loss of main 23 feedwater coupled with failure of the relief
/
(
24 valve in the open position following-its actuation 25 by the normal pressure pulse."
- ~ - -
r
~,
N x'
s 618 1
Lunn 2
Th t sequence is.the initiating 3
sequence in the Three Mile Island accident, is 4
that right?
(I 5
A It is part of the initiating sequence at 6
the Three Mile Island accident.
Within the Three 7
Mile Island accident initiating sequence, there 8
is a specific reason for the loss of main 9
10 Q
Loss of main feedwater can be 11 caused by a large variety of events, right?
12 A
I would expect that there is more than one.
)
13 Q
Did you assemble'the~ team of 14 analysts?
15 A
Yes.
16
[
Q Were you the captain of the team?
l 17 Were you heading the team?
18 A
I think that it would be b'etter to.say l
19 that I was on top of the team o) that the team 20 reported to me but that the team was under the 21 direct charge of other individuals.
~,
22 Q
The plays were being called'from i
s 23 the sidelines?
s
)
24' MR. FISKE, I suggest t: hat you 25 rephrase.
]
. \\
s
619 1
Dunn 2
Q What do you mean you were on top of 3
the team?
4 A
There were a number of " teams" in existence
(
5 at that time, a number of jobs we were trying 6
to accomplish simultaneously and to a greater or 7
lesser extent on each job, I was in charge of all 8
of them.
9 Q
Who was on tite team of analysts to I
10 work on the job described in GPU Exhibit 1017 11 A
The main analyst involved was Mr. Bill 12 Bloomfield.
O
\\~
j 13 Q
Who else was on the team?
14 A
At this time, I don't recall specifically.
15 Many people doing many things.
The team existed 16 but its members also had other responsibilities.
17 I could give confusing testimony by speculation.
18 Q
What unit was Bloomfield in at 19 that time?
20 A
He was in my unit.
l l
21 Q
What specifically was the analysis (L
l 22 that Bloomfield and the other teammates were l
23 working on?
-( ))
24 A
I would think that that was characterized 25 reasonably fully by the sentence in Allen's i
l
620 8
1 Dunn
(.
\\
2 memo, a loss of main feedwater coupled with 3
failure in an open position of the PORV," and we 4
did two analyses at that time, one with one high
(
5 pressure injection pump operating and one with 6
two high pressure injection pumps operating, and 7
I believe we also did one with no high pressure 8
injection pump operating.
9 Q
That would be three analyses?
10 A
Right.
The last one might not be exactly 11 in that time frame.
12 Q
What codes did you use for this
(~h
\\_)
, 13 analysis?
14 A
We ut'ilized a CRAFT code.
15 Q
CRAFT-2?
16 A
Yes.
17 Q
How long did it take to run these 18 analyses?
19 A
I don't recall.
20 Q
Approximately.
21 A
I think we were able to achieve these 22 results reasonably rapidly, so I would say four 23 or five days.
(~}
24 Q
What, if anything, was different V
i 25 about these analyses from analyses that had been s
i
-we-m
621 9
1 Dunn emU 2
perfo'rmed prior to the Three Mile Island accident?
3.
I will withdraw that.
4 At the time that Al Womack made this
(('
5 request to you, April 6,.1979, could you have 6
gone back into work files of your ECCS Analysis 7
Unit and found all three of the analyses which 8
you have just said Bloomfield and others on this 9
special team performed?
10 A
I don't believe so.
11 Q
What was there that was different 12 about the special team's analyses that had not O'
13 been perfcrmed before the Three Mile Island 1
14 accident?
15 A
They were computerized evaluations of a
\\_/
16 particular accident which we had previously l
17 considered to be bounded by other accidents.
i 18 Q
Had you previously analyzed this 19 break size with no high pressure injection pumps 20 operating?
l 21 A
No.
That was a new analysis which would 22 not be considered to be bounded by our previous 23 works.
24 Q
For the analyses that were done 25 with one high pressure injection pump operating I
_ _ _ _. _ _ _ _. ~. - - _.. _....., _ _.., _. _ _.. - _ - - ~ _, _... _ _ _ _ _. -. _.. _ _.
622 to 1
Dunn (V) 2 and for the analysis with two high pressure 3
injection pumps operating, did the analyses of the special team show any results which were in
(
5 any respect different from the bounding analyses 6
done before the Three Mile Island accident?
7 A
Your question was were the two analyses 8
mentioned in Allen's memo, Exhibit 101, which 9
loss of main feedwater with a stuck open were 10 PORY and with one or two high presdure injection 11 pumps operating, did the analyses show anything 12 different from the previously performed (3
(_/
13 calculations?
14 MR. FISKE:
The question was did 15 it snow different.results.
16 MR. SELTZER:
That's right.
17 A
The results were different.
They did 18 not show results different from our expectations 19 for those type of events, but the details in the 1
20 evaluations were different.
21 Q
In what respect were the details 22 different?
23 A
The system fluid inventories did not ID 24 deplete remarkably.
The pressurizer filled with
\\_/
25 water which would not generally be the case,
623 1
Dunn
("h V
2 because the previous work was performed for 3
accidents within the piping as opposed to 4
accidents in the pressurizer.
l 5
That was pretty much it.
l 6
Q The bounding analyses that you 7
had done before the Three Mile Island accident 8
showed the smallest breaks occurring in piping 9
which was part of the reactor coolant system, i
10 right?
11 A
The bounding analysis that I talked about 12 earlier placed the accidents or the breaks in the
[D 13 main reactor coolant system piping, yes.
~
14 Q
For all of those breaks, the 15 response of the system was to show a drop in i
l 16 pressurizer water level, isn't that right?
I 17 A
Yes.
18 Q
A rise in pressurizer water level J
l 19 following the loss of coolant accident is 20 uniquely associated with a break in the steam 21 space at the top of the pressurizer, isn't that 22 right?
23 A
I would say that is generally true but I (A) 24 wouldn't pass on it as a law.
25 Q
As you sit here today, do you know
624 2
1 Dunn v
2 of any exceptions to that rule?
3 A
Yes.
4 Q
.It is a fact, isn't it, to the best
(
5 of your knowledgee B&W had never analyzed a break 6
at the top of the pressurizer prior to the Three 7
Mile Island accident?
8 A
Can I have that again?
9 Q
I will rephrase it.
It is a fact, 10 isn't it, to the best of your knowledge, prior 11 to the Three Mile Island accident, B&W had never 12 analyzed a break located specifically at the top 13 of the pressurizer?
14 A
No, I don't believe" that is true.
15 Q
When had B&W cpecifically studied 16 a break located at the top of the pressurizer?
i 17 A
I have been led to understand that a 18 study like that or in some fashion similar had 19 been performed in approximately 1973.
20 Q
Have you ever seen that study?
21 A
I'm not sure.
22 Q
You said you thought there was a 23 loss of coolant accident break location other than 24 the top of the pressurizer that could lead to 25 rise in pressurizer water level.
Where would that
625 1
Dunn 2
break be?
3 A
It is more on the order of a break size 4
dependency than a break location dependency.
I
(
5 believe the break could be anywhere within the 6
reactor coolant system piping except the upper 7
regions of the hot leg.
8 Q
what size break causes a rise in 9
pressurizer water level?
10 A
That would be plant dependent for the 177 11 plants.
It would be on the order of
.01, perhaps 12 as large as.02 square feet.
(~/h What are the mechanics of that 13 Q
s.-
e 14 break size that would cause a rise in pressurizer 15 water level?
16 A
The break is insufficient in size to 17 relieve core decay heat energy directly.
As a 18 result, the steam generator, through a' process of 19 solid or two-phase natural circulation, is used 20 to relieve excess energy.
21 However, excess mass'is being lost 22 during the same time.
The result is that the 23 reactor coolant system depletes liquid inventory, I
24 builds steam inventory during the early phase of 25 the accident.
This steam at some time collects
6'26 24 1
Dunn 2
in the upper regions of the hot legs and blocks 3
natural circulation, removing momentarily the steam 4
generators as an energy removal mechanism, 5
resulting in a repressurization for a period of 6
time until a mode of operation termed boiler 7
condensor can be established.
8 During the repressurization, the 9
steam collecting in the upper regions of the 10 system would form a back pressure causing water 11 to surge into the pressurizer resulting in a 12 rising water level.
O' 13 Q
When for the first time did you 14 become aware of that phenomenon?
15 A
The first time we demonstrated the 16 phenomenon'was after Three Mile Island.
Awareness 17 of the phenomenon predates Three Mile. Island, 18 awareness of it as a possibility.
19 Q
uho brought it to your attention, 20 directly or indirectly?
21 A
It was contained in the report that Carlyle 22 Michelson cave us, and I am not sure whether that 23 was what' brought it to our attention or not.
(
24 Q
You got Carlyle Michelson's report 25 before the Three Mile Island accident, right?
I
627
-5 1
Dunn 2
A Yes.
3 Q
Did you see his report when it was 4
in its handwritten form?
({
5 A
No.
6 Q
Who gave you his report?
7 A
Who gave me?
Bob Jones.
8 Q
How did Jones get it?
Do you know?
9 A
Bob received it from Project Management, 10 from Mr.~ Bob Liehtle.
e.
11 Q
Did Liehtle ask Jones to do anything 12 in response to Michelson's report.as:you have w
)
13 heard it?
i 14 A
As I have heard it, which was from Bob 15 Jones, we were asked to respond to the report.
16 Q
In the transient that you have 17 described which is a break -- did you say
.1 or 18
.017 f
19 A
.01.
t
.01 to.02 square feet, at some 20 Q
21 point in the transient, there is a l
22 repressurization of the reactor ecolant system, 23 is that right?
O 24 A
Yes.
(]
(
25 Q
That means that pressure is rising
628 6
1 Dunn 2
in the reactor coolant system?
3 A
Yes.
4 Q
As a result of that rising l1 5
pressure, water level is forced up in the 6
pressurizer?
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
So there is a point while the loss 9
of coolant accident is still in progress that 10 pressure in the reactor coolant system is 11 rising and pressurizer water level is rising, 4
12 is that right?
13 A
Yes.
14 Q
Did you know that, before the Three 15 Mile Island accident, the procedures drafted by 16 B&W for use in its simulator called for 17 termination of high pressure injection when the 18 operators detected both a rise in reactor coolant 19 system pressure and a rise in pressurizer water 20 level?
21 A
No.
22 Q
From the analyses which your unit 23 has done, what would happen if high pressure 24 injection were terminated at that point in the 25 transient?
s
629 1
Dunn
~
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2 A
The answer would be 3
MR. FISKE:
I am not sure I see the 4
relevance of this.
l 5
MR. SELTZER:
If you don't see the 6
relevance of terminating high pressure 7
injection in response to a rise in 8
pressurizer water level as relates to the 9
Three Mile Island accident, then I don't 10 think words could help.
11 MR. FISKE:
If it relates to the 12 Three Mile Island accident, it is obviously 0-13 relevant, but as I understand, you are
...g 14 asking Mr. Dunn now about an analysis of 15 some other type of accident.
16 MR. SELTZER:
No.
I am trying to 17 find out what B&W knew about the transients 18 involving pressurizer water level rising 19 prior to the Three Mile Island accident.
20 Mr. Dunn has said that Michelson's 21 letter came.in prior to the Three Mile 22 Island accident.
Liehtle asked Jones to 23 follow up on it and get a response back.
(
24 Jones gave the report to Mr. Dunn and 25 Mr. Dunn says he thinks that is when he e
v.-+
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g.,,,,,e.
630 1
Dunn O
2 learned of that particular transient, 3
producing rising pressurizer water level, 4
and I am trying to pursue the extent of
(
5 B&W's analysis of this transient.
6 MR. FISKE:
I don't have any 7
objection if you ask him that question.
8 In other words, what analysis did they make
~
9 back at that time.
But I understood your 10 question to be something which is basically 11 asking for his opinion today.
12 MR. SELTZER:
No.
I think if you 13 hear the question, it is based on the 14 analyses which his unit has done of this 15 type of transient.
16 Q
What would be the effect of i
17 terminating high pressure. injection _at the time 18 that reactor coolant system pressure rose and 19 pressurizer water level is rising?
20 MR. FISKE:
If the question is did i
21 Mr. Dunn's unit analyze what the effect 22 would be of terminating HPI in this 23 particular transient, I have no objection.
/'N 24 MR. SELTZER:
Maybe bounded by
\\_
I 25 other analyses they had done prior to that 1
l
~ -
631 9
1 Dunn (U
2 time.
3 MR. FISKE:
My only point is that I 4
think Mr. Dunn can properly answer if his l
5 answer is based on an analysis of this 6
that he did at that time as opposed to 7
some analysis you are asking him to make 8
now.
9 Q
I am just asking what your knowledge 10 was from analyses performed prior to the Three 11 Mile Island accident.
I will say, limited to the 12 analyses you did prior to the Three Mile Island 13 accident, what would be the effect of terminating 14 high pressure injection based on pressure rising 15 in the reactor coolant system and water level 16 rising in the pressurizer during the transient 17 involving a break of a hundredth to two-hundredths 18 of a square foot?
19 MR. FISKE:
I have no objection 20 to Mr. Dunn answering that if in fact they 21 made that analysis at that time.
22 A
Answering given the state of knowledge 23 in B&W or my state of knowledge between the time
[)
o4 of the Michelson memorandum or letter and
%)
25 March 28, 1979, we would have to review excuse
.,._,,e
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,,.n
632 1
Dunn fx N
2 me.
We had reviewed it, and I would have to know 3
about any follow-on actions that might be 4
accomplished by the operator to answer your k'
5 ques, tion.
6 Q
What follow-on actions.would you need 7
to know?
8 MR. FISKE:
Again, it seems to me f
i 9
the only proper question is what analysis 10
. was made.back at that time.".
11 MR. SELTZER:
Right.
He is 12 answering that.
He'says he needs to know 13 follow-on actions.
14 MR. FISKE:
You mean what different 15 sets of follow actions were analyzed at 16 that time?
That is really what you are 17 asking him.
That would be the,only proper 18 question.
Whether they made an analysis 19 based on different types of hypothetical 20 follow-on actions.
21 MR. SELTZER:
They may have done i
22 analyses previously of the use of high 23 pressure injection to counteract loss of
()
24 coolant accident.
If they have done 25 those analyses previously and had that
_-.-._..,_h___.-__-.__,_._._.__-
633 1
Dunn O
2 analysis to apply to this situation which 3
carlyle Michelson was bringing to their 4
attention, I want to know that also, if it l
5 is an analysis done before the Three Mile
~
6 Island accident.
7 MR. FISKE:
Just so we understand 8
each other, my point is that the only thing g
that Mr. Dunn can properly answer, if he 10 can answer it, is whether they did in fact 11 make the analysis that you are asking 12 about now, not whether they had the
\\-)'
13 ingredients to make that analysis which 14 you are now asking him to make today.
15 MR. SZLTZER:
You are making him 16 look silly.
You are making B&W look 17 silly.
18 MR. FISKE:
That is an improper 19 statement.
20 '
MR. SELTZER:
I think you are being 21 improper, if you will pardon me.
I think 22 B&W and this man sure as heck know what the 23 implications are of terminating high f'5, 94 pressure injection during the loss of
\\-)
~
25 coolant accident.
I am sure that they i
634 1
D u n.t O
2 knew it before the Three Mile Island 3
accident.
4 I am just trying to find out the lf 5
extent of their knowledge.
,6 MR. FISKE:
You have asked him about 7
a very specific situation.
I think --
4 8
MR. SELTZER:
I think it is a 9
subset of a lot of other. things.
Since 10 it is just one example from'a universe 11 that he is very familiar with, and that 12 was thoroughly analyzed before the Three O
13 '
Mile Island' accident, we are not off into 1
14 any Alice in Wonderland area here.
This 15 is fact.
I am trying to' find out what the 16 fact of their knowledge was before the 17 Three Mile Island accident.
18 MR. FISKE:
That is fine.
That is 19 exactly what I am saying.
Either they 20 made this analysis or they didn't.
If they 21 made;it, Mr. Dunn can testify about it.
22 MR. SELTZER:
I will be thrilled l
23 either way.
If B&W didn't know what the
(
24 effect of 1PI was during that type of 25 loss of coolant accident, I will be just 1
I
--... - - _. - -. = -..
635 3
1 Dunn
^
[h v
2 thrilled.
3 MR. FISKE:
The object is not to 4
thrill you.
The object is to have proper
(
.5 questions at a deposition.
6 (The record was read back as follows 7
by the reporter:
" Question:
What follow 8
actions would you need to know?")
i l
9 Q.
Do you want to make any statement 1
i
-10 based on your conference with counsel?
11 MR. FISKE:
No, I think it is 12 appropriate to proceed.
l 13 MR. SELTZER:
I would point out in 14 his answer he said he had reviewed it.
I 15 think it is very pernicious for you to have 16 diverted us for a quarter of an hour about 17 whether you are going to permit the witness 18 to answer questions on what he had reviewed i
19 or not reviewed between the receipt of 20 the Michelson report and the Th'ree-Mile t
21 Island accident.
22 MR. FISKE:
I would be very happy a
23 for him to tell you what it is he had I
(
24 reviewed.
- 25 Q
What are the follow-on actions you g9
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,, -. - ~,,., - -, - - - -, -. - - - - - -. _, -
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636 1
Dunn fb A/
s 2
need to know about?
3 A
Whether or not the operator would have 4
restarted high pressure injection when the I
5 conditions would obviously permit such. action.
6 Q
If high pressure injection were 7
not reinitiated, what did your analysis show or 8
predict would be the result?
9 A
When I indicated " reviewed" before, the 10 record would read as if I were making an admission 11 that we had reviewed the consequences of this type 12 of accident in conjunction with the termination I
13 of high pressure injection.
That is not strictly l
14 correct.
We reviewed the consequences of this 15 accident and determined that this accident was, 16 in our opinion, bounded by the previous licensing 17 basis.
18 I think that means that I don't have 19 a basis for answering your question now.
20 Q
Let me see if I can supply a basis.
/
21 From your ECCS analysis done before the accident, N-22 is a 0.01 square foot to 0.02 square foot pipe 23 break a loss of coolant accident which is within l
()
24 the range calling for response by the high 25 pressure injection system?
637 1
Dunn i
(')N k_.
2 A
Yes.
3 Q
That means according to your Three 4
Mile Island accident analyses that the initiation l
5 and continued operation.of high pressure 6
injection is required to cool the core effectively 7
in conformance with 10 CFR, Section 50.46, isn't 8
that right?
9 A
Yes, I believe so.
10 Q
According to your ana'ly s e s done 11 before the Three Mile Island accident, if high 12 pressure injection were not supplied in response p- )
('~#
13 to that specific size of loss of coolant accident, 14 there would not be effective mitigation of the 15 accident and effective core coolant, isn't that 16 right?
l 17 MR. FISKE:
I think you.have two 18 questions in there.
19 MR. SELTZER:
Linking mitigation to 20 the accident and effective core coolant?
~1 MR. FISKE:
Yes.
n
(_
22 MR. SELTZER:
I think he used those 23 phrases in a conjunctive fashion in prior 24 testimony.
25 MR. FISKE:
I don't know whether he t
633 1
Dunn ex 2
did or didn't but I think they are two 3
separate things.
4 Could we have the question again.
(
5 (Record was read back.)
6 A
Analysis supplied previous to March 28, 7
1979 assumed that at least one high pressure 8
injection system was operating during the course 9
of the transient.' It further assumes slightly 10 larger breaks because these breaks had been 11 identified as the most challenging breaks to 12 the -ECCS system, r%y 13 We did not have an analysis in 14 place which could identify the minimum required 15 emergency core cooling system function or floor 16 rate with breaks size as an independent variable.
17 Q
From your prior analysis, isn't it 18 a fact that you believed that maintenance of high 19 pressure injection flow from at least one high 20-pressure injection pump was necessary to 21 effectively cool the core following a hundredth 22 to two-hundredth of a square foot pipe break?
23 A
I would believe that there would be times 24 during the accident in which some flow from the 25 high pressure injection system was necessary.
I
639 1
Dunn
('T 2
would believe that these break sizes were 3
sufficiently small that flow would not have to 4
he continuous.
(
5 Q
From the analyses that you had 6
done before the accident, did you have information 7
that high pressure injection would be needed after 8
the point at which the hundredth to two-hundredth 9
square foot break would produce repressurization 10 of the reactor coolant system?
11 A
That would have been the extrapolation we 12
.would make.
s 13 Q
So the answer is yes?
14 A
Yes.
15 Q
It is that repressurization which 16 produces the rise in pressurizing water level, 17 right?
18 A
In that particular case, yes.
19 Q
How far in advance of the Three Mile 20 Island accident did you get a copy of carlyle 21 Michelson's. report?
Let me withdraw that and_
22 try to take it in smaller steps.
23 The report that we are referring
]
24 to is one that has a title, as best you can 25 recall it, " Decay Heat Removal During A Very
640 1
Dunn
,n.
J 2
Small Break LOCA For A B&W 205-Fuel-Assembly PWR,"
3 right?
4 A
I don't recall the title.
(
5 Q
Is that generally --
6 A
That sounds similar.
7 Q
Did you receive a copy of that in 8
its typed-up form sometime after January 19787 9
A on the copies of the Michelson report that 10 I have seen, there are dates for re'ception stamped 11 on it.
I would go by those dates.
12 Q
Do you recall that one of the items Ch k/
13 which Carlyle Michelson stated in his report was 14 that a full pressurizer may convince the operator 15 to trip the high pressure injection pumps?
16 MR. FISKE:
Could we have the 17 report?
Could we show that to.Mr. Dunn?
18 MR. SELTZER:
I am asking him first i
19-without showing it to him.
He may have t
20 some recollection of it.
21 A
I recall that at least Michelson got close 22 to that fact, if not identifying it as specifically 23 as you mentioned it.
I said fact.
Let me correct
/~s
~( )
24 that to statement.
25 Q
You were not a stranger to
..,.. ~ -.
643 1
Dunn 2
inappropriate termination of high pressure 3
injection following rise in pressurizing water 4
level, were you?
(I 5
MR. FISKE:.
You mean as of the 6
time he saw the Michelson report?
7 MR. SELTZER:
Right.
8 A
That is true.
9 Q
In fact, you had been very concerned 10 about the termination of high pressure injection 11 following rise in pressurizing water level when 12 that had been reported to you from the 13 Davis-Besse' transient in 1977, right?
14 A
I would rather say I was concerned about 15 the inappropriate termination of high pressure 16 injection and not so concerned about whether that l
17 occurred because of high pressure water level or 18 some other mechanism.
19 Q
The catalyst for your concern had l
20 been the Davis-Besse transient, right?
21 A
That's correct.
22 Q
And the catalyst for your concern l
23 in the Davis-Besse transient was that they
()
24 terminated it following a rise in pressurizer 25 water level, isn't that true?
642 0
1 Dunn
/"N
\\-
2 A
Yes.
3 Q
You knew that they had terminated 4
it at Davis-Besse in response to rising
(
5 pressurizer water level or that had been reported 6
to you, right?
7 A
I would like to back off on that one a 8
little bit.
I'm not sure whether the reason for 9
termination at Davis-Besse was clearly reported 10 as such or whether we assumed that,that was the 11 inst!. gator in the operators to terminate high 12 pressure injection.
13 Q
Do you remember that you wrote a 14 memo to Jim Taylor on February 9, 19787 15 A
Yes.
16 Q
In that memo, GPU Exhibit 78, isn't 17 it correct that you told Taylor, during the l
18 accident the operator terminated high pressure 19 injection due to an apparent system recovery l
20 indicated by high level within the pressurizer?
l 21 A
Yes, that seems to be s quote.
l 22 Q
When you saw in Michelson's report 23 that he was also onto the possibility that the 24 operator might terminate high pressure injection 25 in response to pressurizer water level, did you i
t
4 643 1
Dunn O
2 have any sense of deja vu?
3 MR. FISKE:
I understand what you 4
are getting at but I think you can probably l
5 rephrase the ques. tion.
6 Q
Do you know what deja vu means?
7 MR. FISKE:
I am not sure 8
withdrawn.
A I believe that it refers to the feeling 9
10 that you have been somewhere before.
11 Q
Exactly.
Did you have that feeling 12 when you read Michelson.'.s_ statement about the 13 possibility that the full pressurizer may convince 14 the operator to trip the high pressure injection 15 pumps?
16 A
No.
17 Q
Did you have any association with 18 your previously expressed concern over 19 inappropriate termination of high precsure 20-injectien?
A es.
21 gg Q
What was the' connection that you made when you read Carlyle Michelson's memo?
23
'~'T A
I don't think it was reading the memo.
I
{a 24 was being briefed on the memo or the letter by 25
. _. _. _ _ _ ~. _ _ _ _. _. _ _ _
644 1
Dunn U-s 2
Bob Jones.
We recognized it as similar to our 3
concerns which had occurred earlier.
We agreed
(
4 with him.
lJ 5
Q What do you mean "we agreed with 6
him"?
7 A
We said yes, the condition of the 8
pressurizer should not be a condition for 9
termination of high pressure injection.
1 10 Q
Did you also agree with Carlyle 11 Michelson that the condition of the cressurizer 12 might convince operators to terminate high
("~)
\\/
13 pressure injection?
14 A
At that time, it appeared that that had 15 happened at least once.
16 Q
Did you agree with him that it may 17 convince operators in the future to terminate high 18 pressure injection?
19 A
No.
20 Q
Did you envision it as you discussed 21 it with Bob Jones as a possibility?
22 A
We felt that we had caused to be issued 23 instructions which would not make it a possibility.
()
24 Q
When you say "we" believed, who is 25 the "we"?
I l
I.
+
f 645 43 1
Dunn f
\\~Y 2
A Bob and I.
3 Q
When you say "we had caused to be 4
issued instructions," what instructions are you
(
5 referring to?
6 A
The recipe or the prescription contained 7
in my February 16th memo.
8 Q
At the time that you and Bob Jones g
were discussing the Carlyle Michelson report, i
i 10 this was before the Three Mile Island accident, 11 right?
12 A
Yes.
l(y,/
13 Q
Did you and Bob discuss with one'
~
14 another then the fact.that you believed your 15 recipe had been sent on?
16 A
I don't specifically recall such a 17 discussion so I had better stick to my position l
18 on it.
I believed I had caused such a recipe to l
l 19 be sent out or to have been sent out in tne 20 normal course of business.
21 Q
If I asked you this just three
-(
22 minutes ago, if I have, just remind me that I,
23 have.
Are you saying then when you read 24 Micnelson's statement that a full pressurizer may 25 convince the operator to trip the high pressure
646 s,
1 Dunn OU 2
injection pump and watch for a subsequent loss i
3 of level, are you saying7when you read that you 4
'didn't believe that'it was likely that the 5
operator would trip high. press'ure injection in 6
response to a full pressurizer because you 7
' believed he would have' received your February 1978 8
recipe?
9 A
I believe we had covered the situation 10 and that either my instructions were going to be 11 issued or'had been' issue'd or that they were
~
12 essentially already in place.
O Q~
So was it your belief at the time 13 14 you read Michelson's statement which we just 15 quoted that either your instructions had been sent 16 out or that similar instructions were already i
17 in place and that therefore.the operator would 18 not be convinced by' a full pressurizer to 19 terminate high pressure injection?
s 20 MR. FISKE:
Could I h' ave the 21 question again 22 (Record was read back.)
\\
i 23 A
or that they were going to be sent out 24 very reasonably soon.
25 Q
so it was because you believed that
.-__.-s..%-., - __, - - _, _.,, _.. -. _,
647 45 1
Dunn 2
either your instructions had been sent out or 3
that they were going to be sent out very soon or 4
that very similar instructions were already in I
5 the hands of operators that it was therefore not 6
likely that an operator would be convinced by a 7
full pressurizer to terminate high pressure 8
injection?
Was that your view at the time you 9
read Michelson's statement on page 267 10 A
Yes.
11 MR. SELTZER:
I would like to mark 12 as GPU Exhibit 102, a typed copy of the
\\'
13 Michelson report entitled " Decay Heat 14 Removal During A Very Small Break LOCA 15 For A B&W 205-Fuel-Assembly PWR," January 16 1978.
17 (Typewritten document entitled 18
" Decay Heat Removal During A Very Small 19 Break LOCA For A B&W 205-Fuel-Assembly 20
- PWR, C.
Michelson, January 1978" marked 21 GPU Exhibit No. 102 for identification, 22 as of this date.)
23 Q
Is GPU Exhibit 102 a copy of 24 Carlyle Michelson's report or letter to which 25 you have been referring in your recent testimony?
i 1
Dunn 648 (3
%)
2~
A It seems to be similar.
It is not the 3
copy that I have been referring to.
It may be 8
4 identical.
(I 5
Q Would you turn to the page that 6
is numbered 26 in the upper right-hand corner.
7 Do you see the second full paragraph beginning, 8
"The full pressurizer"?
l 9
A Yes.
10 Q
Does that contain the statement that 11 we were referring to earlier, namely, "A
full 12 pressurizer may convince the operator to trip
(\\-
13 the high pressure injection pump and look for a 14 subsequent loss of level"?
15 A
Yes.
16 Q
In discussing Michelson's report with 17 Bob Jones, did Jones say anything to you about 18 this quoted statement on page 267 19 A
I don't know whether Jones had been 20 referring to this particular sentence or section 21 of the report or to other sentences or sections 22 of the report which we had, but he did mention that 23 Michelson had drawn a connection between
()
24 pressurizer level and termination of high pressure 25 injection.
m
.~.-, _
1 Dunn 649 r~'N 2
Q Was Jones' statement to the effect 3
that Michelson had drawn a relationship such that 4
Michelson was predicting a rise in pressurizer
('
5 water level may induce an operator to terminate 6
high pressure injection?
Is that the substance 7
of,what Jones said to you?
8 A
I believe so.
9 Q
As best you can recall, what did 10 Jones say to you,in words or substance, about this 11 particular point being raised in Michelson's 12 report?
~/
13 A
In substance, it was that Michelson had 14 pretty much uncovered the same concern we had 15 relative to management of high pressure injection, 16 that Michelson saw it in relationship to pressurizer 17 level whereas we saw it a little more globally 18 than that.
19 Q
You already testified that you had 20 talked with Bob Jones about your instructions for
/
21 operating high pressure injection which you also Q
22 called your recipe.
Did Jones say anything to you 23 about your instructions or recipe in connection
(
24 with Carlyle Michelson's expressed concern over 25 termination of high pressure injection?
1 Dunn 650
~T (U
2 A
That is what I was trying to be careful 3
with earlier.
I don't recall whether he did or 4
did not.
k 5
Q After he said to you, in substance, 6
"carlyle Michelson is on to the same thing that 7
we were on to,"
namely, he spotted the proclivity 8
for terminating high pressure injection in 9
response to a rise in pressurizer water level, 10 what, if anything else, did Jones say to you about 11 Michelson having spotted this?
12 A
I think I would like to take out of the O
13 answer the word " proclivity," but-further than l
14 that, I do not know that we discussed it very 15 much.
At any rate, I do not recall.
16 Q
What, as best you can recall, did 17 you say to Bob Jones about Carlyle-Michelson 18 having spotted this same concern that you had l
l 19 identified earlier?
20 A
I do not believe I can recall that either.
21 Q
Did you say anything like, "He is 22 not going to get the Nobel Prize for this, we 23 already discovered that"?
[V 24 MR. FISKE:
I think he is being 25 facetious.
1 Dunn 653
(~)
i U
2 A
To be facetious back, I might have.
3 MR. FISKE:
This is not a time to be 4
facetious.
5 Q
Did you say to Jones that "This is 6
something that we were on to, had known about 7
before Michelson wrote it up"?
8 A
I don't know whether I said that or not.
9 Q
Do you believe that you did?
10 MR. FISKE:
Again, if you are talking 11 about a recollection, that is all right.
12 MR. SELTZER:
Right.
13 A
No, I do not recall.,
14 (Recess taken.)
15 BY MR. SELTZER:
l 16 Q
When you say Michelson's report 17 in which he was concerned about termination of t
18 high pressure injection in response to a full 19 or rising pressurizer, did you take any steps 20 to try to determine whether your instructions had 21 been sent out yet?
22 A
No.
23 Q
Did you talk to anyone about whether rN l
(
24 your instructions had been sent out?
x.-
25 A
Not that I recall.
l -
1 Dunn 652 (3
\\-
2 Q
Did you send a follow-up memo to 3
anyone to see if your instructions had been sent 4
out?
(
5 A
Not that I recall.
6 Q
Before the Three Mile Island 7
accident, did you have any conversations with 8
anybody in Training to tell them about the 9
analysis that had been done of a particular small 10 break which showed rising reactor coolant system 11 pressure and rise in pressurizer level while the 12 loss of coolant accident was still in progress?
O_)
13 MR. FISKE:
I think there may have 14 been a little confusion here and I am happy 15 to have Mr. Dunn clarify it, if it needs 16 clarification, but my notes indicate that 17 he did not say that they had made an 18 analysis of that.
He said that they first 19 demonstrated it after the Three Mile 20 Island accident. -
21 He was aware of it as a possibility 22 before Three Mile Island.
And it was 23 brought to his attention possibly,among 24 other places, by the Michelson report.
25 There was testimony about analyses of
..y
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1 Dunn 653 b)
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various sizes of small breaks in reference 3
to bounding analyses but either they made 4
the analysis or they didn't, and I will be
(
5 happy to have him. answer.
But.there may be 6
a little confusion in the record.
t 7
Q What was there in Michelson's report a
that had brought to your attent' ion the fact that 4
9 a break of the one-hundredth to two-hundredths of 10 a square foot size would result.in repressurization 11 of the reactor coolant' system and rise in 12 pressurizer water level?
g 13 Since you have got the report in 14 front of you, could you show us where in the 15 report that is demonstrated?
16 A
First off, I am not sure that Michelson's 17 report relates to the size.
The testimony I gave 18 relative to the size was based on work following 19 Three Mile Island.
In reviewing this particular 20 report today, it would seem that it is at least 21 mentioned in Section 3.2 titled " Transition from 22 Natural Circulation to Pool Boiling."
1 23 Q
was that statement by Carlyle k)D I
24 Michelson, namely, that there would be 25 pressurization in the reactor coolant system and
1 Dunn 654
/~%
\\
k G
2 rising pressurizer water level consistent with 3
the understanding that you had then of responses 4
in the reactor coolant system?
(
5 (Record was read back.)
6 Q
I will withdraw that question.
7 When Michelson brought to your 8
attention through his report the fact that breaks 9
of this one-hundredth to two-hundredth square foot 10 size could lead to rising reactor coolant system 11 pressure and rise in pressurizer water level, was 12 he bringing certain analyses together that you 13 had previously not seen brought together before?
14 MR. FISKE:
I object to the form 15 of the question.
I think you started with 16 a reference to the break of a specific 17 size which Mr. Dunn said was n o.t referred 18 to, I believe.
19 A
THE WITNESS:
Now I would like a 20 repeat of the question.
21 (Record was read back.)
22 A
As mentioned by my attorney, I do not know 23 that Michelson dwells on the particular break size.
24 Additionally --
25 g
I will modify it to say breaks of 9
m
- y v--ee--e-
-m.,
c
1 Dunn 655 2
about that size.
3 A
Additionally, it does not in my mind appear 4
clear today that the Michelson paper connects the h
l 5
repressurization with rising pressurizer level and, 6
third, our conclusion on the Michelson report 7
was that there was nothing new or unusual about it 8
and that it was consistent when it wasn't wrong 9
with our analysis base line for the 205 plants.
10 Q
.Let me focus on what your attorney 11 has helpfully contributed to the dialogue.
He 12 reminded me that you did not testify that you had xs' 13 done any analysis which showed rising pressurizer 14 water level and rising reactor coolant system 15 pressure in response to certain size small breaks 16 prior to the Three Mile Island accident but merely 17 you testified that it had been brought to your 18 attention before the Three Mile Island accident.
19 Am I correctly rephrasing your 20 earlier testimony?
21 A
My earlier testimony allowed that this was 22 one of the things which could have brought that to 23 my attention or would have brought that to my
[)
24 attention, but that I did not really recall when U
25 we became aware of this type of an event.
t
1 Dunn 656 7
(
/
2 Q
You pointed out where Michelson 3
discusses system behavior in response to small 4
size breaks.
What other sources of information l
5 did you have before the Three Mile Island accident 3
regarding small breaks leading to rising reactor i
7 coolant system pressure and pressurizer water 8
level?
9 A
We had our general state of knowledge about 10 the mechanisms involved in small break loss of 11 coolant accident developed from rather extensive 12 computer analysis generally performed at larger A
13 breaks.
14 Q
Did any of that general knowledge 15 include the knowledge that there ware breaks 16 which would produce rising pressurizer water l
17 level and increasing reactor coolant system l
l 18 pressure?
19 A
I don't believe any of those specific 20 accidents had that as a result but that would not 21 mean that such a result is inconsistent with our 22 methods or understanding.
23 Q
I am not looking for whether things l
24 are merely consistent or inconsistent with prior 1
m/
l 25 understanding.
I am asking now whether you L.
1 Dunn 657 A
%d 2
actually discovered or knew that there were breaks 3
which would create rising RCS pressure and rising 4
pressurizer water level before you got.Michelson's
(
5 report?
6 A
I testified previously that the first time 7
that we had demonstrated such an accident was 8
after Three Mile Island.
I also testified that 9
Michelson's paper alludes to the possibility of 10 these events and that it may have been the first 11 indication.
I don't recall whether it was or not.
12 Q
Whether it was or not, it is your b
13 testimony that prior to the Three Mile Island.
14 accident, you were aware of break sizes which would 15 lead to rising reactor coolant system pressure and 16 rising pressurizez; water level, is that correct?
l 17 A
We were aware of the possibility.
18 Q
When you say " aware of the 19 possibility," do you mean 20 MR. FISKE:
I think it might be 21 helpful if the "we" could be clarified.
l 22 You are throwing this word "we" around.
23 MR. SELTZER:
Don't accuse me of
)
24 throwing it around.
25 MR. FISKE:
I don't know whether it
1 Dunn 658 W
2 started in a question or answer, but it 3
has been batted back and forth a couple of 4
times.
I think it might be clearer to talk
(.'
5 of Mr. Dunn personally first.
6 MR. SELTZER:
I assume he means the 7
B&W Company and any branch -- I assume it 8
is the people that he converses with on 9
ECCS analysis.
10 Let me clear it up.
n 11 Q
You have testified about what 12 could happen.
Isn't it a fact that before the 13 Three Mile Island accident, you had an 14 understanding that you formed from things you 15 read, things you heard, that for a particular 16 range of small break loss of coolant accidents, 17 there would result in B&W type plants a rising 18 reactor coolant system pressure and a rising 19 pressurizer water level at sometime during the 20 transient? Isn't that right?
21 A
The word "we" refers to key ECCS analysis 22 personnel, myself, Bob Jones, lead engineers in 23 the analytical function of ECCS.
Prior to Three
[~)
24 Mile Island, our expectations were as follows for
'w) 25 accidents in this size range.
i 1
Dunn 659 n
v 2
Q Which size range?
I 3
A Let's put it in terms of numbers.
.01 to 4
.02.
(,
5 Q
Square feet?
6 A
Square feet.
The real definition would be 7
associated with energy flow within the system.
8 First, it was possible that mechanisms would set 9
up within the primary system to create a 10 repressurization for some period of' time.
11 Second, that we did not expect 12 those mechanisms to set up.
13 Third, that'if they did set up, they 14 would correct themselves within a finite period of 15 time and there would not be any challenge to 16 the coolant of the core if a repressurization 17 event occurred.
18 Q
You have said that those were the f
19 expectations of the key personnel in the ECCS 20 Analysis Unit prior to the Three Mile Island 21 accident, is that right?
22 A
Yes.
23 Q
You said "We didn't expect those I) 24 mechanisms to set up."
Why didn't you expect --
25 "those mechanisms" refers to repressurization, is
1 Dunn 660
'O1
,\\#
2 that right?
3 A
No.
4 Q
What does it refer to?
(
5 A
It refers to the fluid mechanics which 6
allow repressurization to occur.
7 Q
Why didn't you think that you were 8
going to get the steam blocks in the hot and cold 9
legs that would lead to the repressurization?
10 A
The 177 plants spray the auxiliary feedwater 11 into the steam generator at a very high location.
12 We visualized that at the time that sufficient
/~N
\\-
13 steam had been accumulated in the upper regions 14 of the hot legs to block natural circulation.
15 The inventory at that time would already be 16 conducive to the boiler condensor mode of operation 17 and although we would stop liquid overflow, they 18 would still be exchanging heat to the steam 19 generator.
Thus, the mechanism for energy transfer j
20 would change but not the energy transfer process.
21 Q
You did analyses of this break size 22 after the Three Mile Island accident, right?
23 A
Yes.
24 Q
What, if anything, did those analyses 25 show regarding whether these mechanisms could set i
(
1 Dunn 661 OU 2
up, as you call it?
3 MR. FISKE:
You are talking of the 4
177 plant?
l 5
MR. SELTZER:
No, I am talking of 6
the steam block in the hot leg, as he just 7
testified to.
8 A
Those analyses again showed that it was 9
possible to undergo a repressurization event and 10 that with the present computer simulation 11 techniques and a given physical description of 12 the plant to the computer, a repressurization would O
13 be computed.
4 14 Q
So your post-TMI accident analyses 15 showed that you could have a mechanism by which 16 a one-hundredth to two-hundredth square foot pipe 17 break would lead to system repressurization?
18 A
To answer the question in terms of the 19 plant, we have to deal with the subject of the 20 state of the art in phase-separation.
I would 21 cay that those analyses indicated that if such an 22 event were of critical importance, then it would 23 have to be dealt with as a real possibility.
t 24 Q
Are you saying that the post-TMI i
\\_
l 25 accident analyses.showed that repressurization
1 Dunn 662 0
V 2
was a real possibility and that it would take 3
further analysis to determine whether it would 4
occur and under what circumstances it would occur?
(
5 A
No.
6 Q
Then you lost me.
7 A
What I am saying that those analyses showed 8
was that with the existing state of the art 9
primarily in terms of phase separation, also in 10 terms of the degree of the accuracy > with which 11 we model certain heat sources, it was not possible 12 to show that they did not exist, a repressurization
("%
13 did not exist, and thus the repressurization would 14 have to be dealt with, if it was important.
15 Q
Now you. testified that among the 16 expectations of the ECCS Analysis Group before 17 the accident was the expectation that even if this 18 mechanism did set up and there was repressurization, 19 there would be no challenge to the coolant of the 20 core?
21 A
Yes.
\\.
22 Q
That expectation rested on the 23 continued use of high pressure injection following
)
24 repressurization, isn't that right?
In other words, 25 coolant of the core following repressurization
1 Dunn 663
[h
\\xf' 2
required continued operation of the high pressure 3
injection system, isn't that correct?
4 A
No, I don't believe so.
((
5 Q
Are you saying that if high pressure 6
injection were terminated at the point of 7
repressurization, were not reactuated, that the 8
core would remain effectively cooled?
9 A
No.
You used the word " continuous."
10 Q
That is then the key phrase.
When 11 you said in your expectation there was no challenge 12 to the coolant of the core if repressurization h:2 13 occurred,'isn't it a fact that you were assuming 14 that there would be no termination without 15 reactuation of the high pressure injection system 16 at the point of repressurization?
Didn't you make 17 that assumption either explicitly or implicitly?
18 A
We had in our evaluations the assumption 1,9 that if the critical breaks, those that 20 challenged the ECCS system the most, the high 21 pressure injection flow from one system would be 22 continuous from the point of the initial 23 activation of the ECCS systems.
[^h 24 Q
Prior to the Three Mile Island
\\y) 25 accident, did you ever tell anyone in Training
~ _..
1 Dunn 664
[
2 that you had discovered or learned of a small 3
break loss of coolant accident in which reactor I
4 coolant system pressure rose at the same time that
)
l 5
the pressurizer water level went up?
6 A
Prior to Three Mile Island, we had allowed 7
that condition as a possibility.
i 8
Q Your counsel would probably want 9
to know who is the "we."
i 10 A
I had allowed that condition,.as a 11 possibility.
I had not considered it a 4
12 probability.
I recall I had not made any such N--)
13 communication to people,in Training.
14 Q
Carlyle Michelson's report, which 15 documented that possibility, did not spur you to 16 communicate that state of fact or that phenomenon 17 to anyone in Training?
18 A
No.
19 Q
Prior to'the Three Mile Island l
20 accident, did you communicate that possibility or 21 that state of fact to anybody who was responsible 22 for drafting procedures for operating B&W nuclear 23 plants?
24 A
Not that I recall.
25 (Luncheon recess - 12:30 p.m.)
-m-
,--e
-y
~,, - - - ~. - - -
u.-.--
=
-+--
- 1 665 o
2 (AFTERNOON SESSION) 3 (D ate :
March 23, 1981) 4 (Time noted:
2:30 p.m.)
l 5
B ERT M.
DU N.N, resumed, having 6
been previously duly sworn, was examined 7
and testified further as follows:
8 MR. SELTZER:
I would like to mark 9
as GPU Exhibit 103, a letter from James 10 Taylor to R.
J.
Mattson of the NRC dated 11 April 30, 1979, subject " Babcock & Wilcox 12 Company's Commitments."
There are a number 13 of attachments to the exhibit.
l 14 (Letter dated April 30, 1979 from 15 James Taylor to R.
J.
Mattson of the 16 Nuclear Regulatory Commission re " Babcock &
l 17 wilcox Company's Commitments" with l
18 attachments marked GPU Exhibit No. 103 for I
i k
19 identification, as of this date.)
20 EXAMINATION (Cont'd.)
l l
21 BY MR. SELTZER:
22 g
In the lower left-hand corner of 23 the first page, a bec is indicated for, among
('J I
)
24
- others, B.
M.
Dunn.
If you need to, would you l
25 take a minute to look through GPU Exhibit 103 and l
1 Dunn 666
/"%
2 confirm whether this appears to be a copy of 3
correspondence which you received on or shortly 4
after April 30, 1979?
({
5 A
It is.
6 Q
Were you aware that in April 1979 7
B&W made various commitments to the NRC to perform 8
additional analyses?
9 A
Yes.
10 Q
In the next to the l a,s t line of the 11 first par.agraph of Mr. Taylor's transmittal letter, 12 he refers to "very significant work effort required
'n connection with the small break guidelines and i
(_j 13 14 procedures."
15 were you involved in that very 16 significant work effort?
17 A
I believe so.
l 18 Q
Would you turn to Attachment 1.
(
19 The first page of text in Attachment 1 is entitled 20 "B&W Analytical Commitments Responsive to NRC l
21 Staff Safety Concerns Identified in 'NRR Status 22 Report on Feedwater Transients in B&W Plants' of 23 April 25, 1979."
The first commitment is
/"
24 described as "A.
Perform calculations, worst-case
v 25 break without auxiliary feedwater for 30 minutes."
l l
l t
1 Dunn
- 667 O
2 Did you work on that commitment?
3 A
The commitment was worked on by ECCS 4
Analysis.
((
5 Q
was that under your supervision?
6 A
Probably not directly.
7 Q
In the analyses that you had done 8
before the Three Mile Island accident, had ECCS 9
Analysis analyzed transients involving loss of 10 main feedwater?
11 A
Yes.
12 Q
To your knowledge, before the Os 13 accident, the loss of main feedwater was an 14 anticipated operating occurrence, isn't that 15 right?
16 A
I do not know.
17 Q
From the work that ECCS Analysis 18 was doing, did you expect that during the life of 19 B&W nuclear plants each plant would be subjected l
l 20 to a loss of main feedwater?
21 MR. FISKE:
I wouldn't have any C
22 objection to that if you asked him did he 23 assume that for the purposes of their
(
24 analysis.
25 MR. SELTZER:
I will ask that as a i
1 Dunn 668
\\
2 preliminary question.
3 Q
Did you assume in your pre-TMI 4
analyses that B&W plants would experience a loss
\\
l 5
of main feedwater during their operating life?
6 A
No.
7 Q
Before the Three Mile Island 8
accident, had you seen any reports that showed 9
the frequency of particular transients on B&W 10 plants?
p 11 A
I don't recall any at this time.
- 12 Q
Had you seen any studi*es of the 13 expected frequency of transients occurring at 14 B&W plants?
2 15 A
Again, I don't recall any at this time.
16 Q
To the best of your recollection, 17 your study of transients was unaided by any
/
18 studies on the frequency with which particular
(
19 transients would occur?
20 A
I don't think I testified positively that 21 it was expected transients were ever dealt with 22 in ECCS Analysis.
By and large, we dealt in the 23 licensing basis,with the design basis of the plant, i
(~T 24 and that was specified to us in a number of cases C'
25 in a number of ways and most frequently we would
s 1-Dunn 669 A)
2 take the most limiting assumption.
3 Q
How was that design basis conveyed 4
to you?
((
5 A
In some cases, it.was the historical 6
exchange with the NRC.
In other cases, it is 7
explicitly documented in the rules and regulations 8
such as 10 CFR 50.46, Appendix K.
9 Q
Since the Three Mile Island 10 accident, have you ever expressed to anyone you 11 felt there was excessive emphasis before the 12 accident on studying the design basis accidents i
[~)
~
\\_/
13 rather than on more probable types of accidents?
14 A
Only relative to generation of operator 15 guidelines.
16 Q
What did you say relative to the i
17 generation of operator guidelines?
~
l l
f 18 A
That guidelines should be based on 19 realistic circumstances with realistic expectations 20 for performance of systems and should utilize to 21 the maximum possible,with options in mind, the L
22 hardware that is actually in existence in a plant.
23 Q
To whom did you express that?
I (
24 A
It is a growing expression, and to the 25 people involved in the generation of the small l
1
1 Dunn 670
[~D
\\/
2 break operator guidelines, to the people 3
associated with the ATOG programs.
4 Q
Since the Three Mile Island
((
5 accident, have you seen a development at B&W cf 6
guidelines based on realistic circumstances with 7
realistic expectations for performance of systems?
8 A
Yes.
9 Q
To the best of your knowledge, did 10 any such guidelines for operation of the plant 11 following small break LOCA's exist before the 12 Three Mile Island accident?
(~)
1
\\m/
13 A
I do not know.
14 Q
When you say the guid'elines should 15 be based on realistic circumstances, what do you 16 mean by the phrase " realistic circumstances"?
i l
17 A
There are a number of items contained 18 within the evaluation for the licensing basis that l
19 are rather unlikely.
Although some of these 20 should perhaps be treated as options within i
21 guidelines, some of them are best not treated at 22 all.
23 Q
You are talking of operating 24 guidelines?
25 A
Yes.
I
_. _ _ _. _ -.. _. ~ _ _ _.,.., - - - - _ - _.., _. - -..
Ii 1
Dunn 671
("%)
2 Q
Why did you feel they should not 3
be covered at all?
I -
4 A
The operator guidelines, the operational
(
5 guidelines, should attempt to create the best 6
accident follow-on activities possible with the 7
equipment as it exists that day.
It would be 8
possible to be precluded from taking the best 9
actions if you allowed some of the licensing 10 basis assumptions to play too meaningful a role.
11 Q
Could you give me a good example 12 of what you are referring.to?
/~T 13 A
I can tell you about an assumption that I 14 don't believe should be used in the operating 15 guidelines.
I don't know that I can extract the 16 implications.
I would not recommend the 17 utilization of a 20 percent decay heat factor in 18 constructing operator guidelines.
19 Q
Is the 20 percent decay heat factor 20 something that comes from design basis analysis?
21 A
Yes.
22 Q
Had it been incorporated in earlier 23 operating procedures before the development of
)
24 the small break guidelines?
\\~/
25 A
I don't know.
- ~ _,. -, - - - - -
1 a
1 Dunn 672
-s
\\_/
2 Q
When you were working on the small 3
break guidelines, to what extent did you review 4
any of the prior procedures drafted by B&W7
({
5 MR. FISKE:. I think I object to the 6
form of the question.
7 A
within the task force assigned to generate 8
the operating guidelines, there was represented 9
people who had cognizance of those procedures.
10 The task group itself did not delve, heavily into 11 previously existing procedures.
1 12 Q
From time to time during your work
(~)
(_/
13 with the group that was developing the new small 14 break guidelines, did you see portions of the 4
15 earlier procedures created by B&W?
16 MR. FISKE:
Same objection as to l
17 form.
i i
18 A
I don't recall whether we did or not.
19 Q
At the time you were working on the 20 additional calculations requested by the NRC in 21 the aftermath of Three Mile Island, you knew, did I-C.
22 you not, that the auxiliary feedwater system in L
23 B&W's 177 plants other than Davis-Besse were not
("Sg 24 safety grade systems, did you not?
%/
l 25 A
Yes.
...-_-,-,,,._,,.-.__,.,,-_,y.,
_,,,__m.-.._,._
.y--
,.--.m,e.
1 Dunn 673
/~)
~
2 Q
Had you ever in your unit analyzed 3
worst-case breaks where there was a loss auxiliary 4
((
5 A
would you give me.a time frame, please.
6 Q
During the time you were Manager of 7
ECCS Analysis.
8 A
Yes.
9 Q
What additional work was done to 10 perform the calculations described,in I-A on the 11 third page of GPU Exhibit 103?
12 A
This is one of the analyses I had ~ in mind O
13 in response to your question.
14 MR. FISKE:
I think he meant, and 15 I was assuming he meant, had this analysis 16 been done before.
17 THE WITNESS:
That is why I asked 18 for a time frame.
19 Q
What I was asking is what, if 20 anything, was being added by this I-A calculation 21 that hadn't been done in calculations before the 22 Three Mile Island accident?
23 MR. FISKE:
Would it be helpful f~h 24 to go back and ask the earlier question
\\_/
25 putting it in the time frame before the i
u I
t 1
Dunn 674 O
2 Three Mile Island Accident?
3 I think there was a misunderstanding.
4 Q
Before the Three Mile Island
'N
({
5 accident, had you performed worst-case break 6
calculations without auxiliary feedwater7 7
A I'm not sure.
8 Q
Isn't it [,factthat ' '& W,I on GPU.103 h
s -y. _
4 9
assumed auxiliary feedwater was available?
10 A
The license base available fo,r these plants 11 assumed availability of auxiliary feedwater.
12 Q
Is it also correct that ECCS Analysis 3
13 assumed that auxiliary feedwater was available in 14 its calculations done before the 'Three Mile Island s
15 accident?
Are you saying, in other words, that b
16 because the licensing-basis assumed it was i
17 available, ECCS Analysis assumed it would be 18 available?
/
19 A
For the most part.
We may have considered 20 it and I don't recall considering it today.
21 Q
Prior to the Three Mile Island 22 accident, did you ever question the basis for 23 assuming that a nonsafety grade system would be r
(-]
24 available during any loss of coolant accident?
\\/
25 A
Yes.
i
+w a
t
1 Dunn 675 O
2 Q
With whom did you raise such 3
question?
4 A
At least once with my boss.
(
5 Q
Which boss?
j 6
A Mr. Charles Parks.
7 Q
When was that?
Would it have to be 8
prior to 19757 9
A Yes, it would be prior to 1975.
Sometime
\\
10 between 1975 and 1974.
e 11 Q
What was the context in which you 12 raised that question?
C 13 A
In the context of whether or not we were 14 performing the appropriate analyses.
15 Q
Were you raising a basic concern 16 which you had about whether analyzing ECCS matters I
17 solely in terms of the design basis accident was 18 an appropriate way to proceed?
19 A
No.
20 Q
What was your concern, as you t
l 21 expressed it?
l Pa A
In most all other areas, the design basis l
l 23 for the ECCS systems performance considered only l
O(~T 24 safety grade equipment.
I didn't understand why 25 it didn't here.
1 Dunn 676 i
C' i
2 Q
Did Mr. Parks have any satisfactory 3
response, as far as you were concerned?
l 4
MR. FISKE:
I think I object to the
(
5 form of that question.
I don't, object,if 6
you ask him what his response was.
7 Q
What was his response?
e 8
A That the question had historical precedents 9
at all plants in the United States that the 10 first-round commercial plants of any vendor were i
i 11 in a similar situation and that we would continue 4
12 to license on that basis.
f' 4
\\
13 Q
Had you put your question in writing?
14 A
I don't remember.
I don't think so.
15 Q
It is a fact, isn't it, that you 16 have discussed with others your perception that 17 before the Three Mile Island accident, B&W had 18 been designing nuclear plants with NRC 19 licensability in mind rather than focusing 20 primarily on designing the plants for safety?
21 Isn't that a fact?
22 A
No,,I do not believe so, i
23 Q
Haven't you told others at B&W 24 that you believed there was excessive focus on 25 desfgning B&W plants to meet NRC licensing
\\
~
i
,e,.
-r n
,-r---.
-,,,.,,...a
,w----,-
~,.-n-e--.,,--
--- - - - r
1 Dunn 677
\\
2 criterla?
3 A
I do not believe I have expressed that.
4 Q
Have you ever heard anyone else
{
5 express that or seen that expressed in writing?
6 A
I do not know.
7 Q
Did you ever express the view to 8
anyone that prior to the Three Mile Island 9
accident, you did not believe that B&W had the 10 proper attitude towards safety?
11 MR. FISKE:
Could I hear the question 12 again.
("h.
\\-)
13 (Record was read back.)
14 Q
In other words, the expression can 15 be to anyone at any time but what I want to focus 16 on is did you ever say that the attitude of B&W.
17 asd it existed prior to the Three Mile Island 18 accident. was such that there wasn't a' sufficient 19 concern for safety?
20 MR. FISKE:
The question is whether 21 there was an attitude that there was not 22 a sufficient concern for safety?
23 MR. SELTZER:
Did he ever express N'.'
24 the view to anyone that B&W's attitude 25 toward safety as it existed prior to the
r 1
Dunn 678
[~'N
'")
\\
2 Three Mile Island accident was not as good i
3 as it should have been.
4-A I wrote words to that extent at one time
((
5 but I did not mean them in the confining sense 6
you have used them.
7 Q
What confining sense do you 8
understand I am using them?
9 A
You are specifying B&W.
10 Q
Did you ever talk about that subject 11 with anyone?
12 MR. FISKE:
The subject of what?
O
\\, _,l 13 Q
B&W's attitude toward safety as it
~
14 existed before the Three Mile Island accident.
15 A
Yes.
16 Q
With whom did you discuss it?
17 A
Excuse me.
I talked about the attitude 18 toward safety that I had indicated at one time 19 which I did not mean to be limited to B&W.
I have 20 not talked to anybody with the specific constraint 21 of the limitation to being at B&W, 22 Q
Do you have any personal experience 23 with the ECCS Analysis work done at Combustion fa\\
24 Engineering?
~
25 A
Yes.
1 Dunn 679 O
2 Q
Have you met with people from 3
Combustion Engineering to discuss ECCS Analysis 4
Problems?
l(
5 A
No.
6 Q
Have you met with people from 7
Westinghouse to discuss ECCS Analysis problems?
8 A
Yes.
9 Q
Who?
10 A
Vince Esposito.
11 Q
What is Vince's position?
12 A
I'm not sure I can give you a title but s-13 I think it is similar to mine.
14 Q
Did you think that Vince didn't have 15 a good enough attitude towards safety?
16 MR. FISKE:
I object to that, the 17 form of that question.
18 MR. SELTZER:
I am trying to find 19 out what the basis was for Mr. Dunn's 20 statement two minutes ago that he wasn't 21 limiting his view regarding an insufficient 22 attitude towards safety just to B&W.
I am 23 trying to find out whom else he believed
[V) 24 didn't have a sufficient attitude towards 25 safety.
1 Dunn 680
("2 h
\\-
2 Q
Do you believe Westinghouse didn't 3
have a sufficient attitude towards safety?
4 MR. FISKE:
I don't know you put
{
5 the word " sufficient" into the question.
6 I will let him answer it just so that we 7
can get on with this line of inquiry but I 8
object to the form of the question because 9
I don't think he said that.
10 A
How long has the word " sufficient" been in 0
11 prior discussion?
I thought we started out 12 questioning the attitude towards safety.
13 Q
Why don't we get out GPU Exhibit 12 14 where you wrote to Allen Womack and said something 15 about the attitude towards safety.
16 Let me suggest for openers, since 17 this is your handwriting, in some places where 18 your calligraphy may not be so clear that it would 19 help if you read your memo for the record starting 20 with the box at the top.
21 A
"To:
A.
E.
Womack.
From" 22 Q
To whom?
23 A
Excuse me.
"E.
A.
Womack.
From:
B.
M.
/'S 24 Dunn.
Customer:
Us.
Confidential," hand stamped k.
25 on the memo.
Subject:
Ideas from TMI.
Received
1 Dunn 681 Os 2
June 7, 1979," and a. set of initials.
I do not 2
3 know what they mean.
4 "You asked for our 5 lessons from
)
(
5 TMI.
I've had such a list but have not been 6
totally happy with it as there seems to be very 7
many items 4 and 5 all of about equal importance."
8 Q
Is that 4 and 5 or 4 times 57 9
A That is "and."
10 "In short, this is how I see it 11 today.
Items 1,
2 and 3 are very solid in my 12 mind.
13 '
"1," it is written as "Are" but it S
14 is meant to be our overall attitude toward safety, 15 design philosophy is not conducive to abnormal 16 conditions.
ACRS 'ACRCS and the NRC cannot make 17 the system safe.'
With our present attitude, I 18 would fault middle to top management most, I 19 don't think we can either.
I believe a fundamental 20 change in approach is needed and I don't think it 21 must cost a lot.
We don't need high faluting
(_
22 codes and procedures as much as we need to fix 23 the RCP's running case.
I'm not against you on
(~
24 that one.
I just want to move slower.
In short, C
25 then, we need positive actions to create an
. ~....
~
1 Dunn 682 l)'\\
\\~
2 atmosphere in which LOCA and safety analysis are 3
taken very seriously.
We need to make safety 4
a commercial issue, i.e., worth money and
(
5 saleable.
I still do not perceive a feeling 6
of guilt in B&W over TMI and I think there should 7
be one.
8 "2.
I believe we need positive single 9
entity ownership of ECCS systems and RP systems 10 as we have now for the ICS.
This organization 11 should be oriented toward system function so that 12 the necessary compromises tend to side.on safety 13
'rather than cost.
I believe right now ' we choose 14 cost over performance in our safety hardware.
15 "3.
I don't believe that our operators 16 are as ignorant of physical laws as is portrayed.
17 I believe we should be doing a lot more in 18 education so that they can respond to the 19 off normal situation, the one we haven't thought 20 about, with logic and a high probability of t
21 success.
This means education in the basics of L
22 water, heat exchanger, steam, pumps, etc.
23 "4.
A less complicated, independent decay
(~
24 heat cooling system designed for positive N..T
.)
25 performance 5 minutes after trip is required.
l
a 1
Dunn 683 h
2 This could be as simple as RCS vents or as 3
complicated as a high pressure decay heat system.
4 I prefer the open system, however, it is easily
(
5 controlled and managed because the fluid involved 6
is stable.
I believe the continued reliance on 7
unstable pressurized water is not best for 8
emergencies.
9 "S.
NRC should not be put on line during 10 the early crisis stage of an accide,nt.
Rather 11
.the vendors should and they should have a highly 12 trained team in place to make all decisions.
n I
)
13 Management, you and I should not be involved or in v
14 control except at that team's request.
15 "6.
(I know this is cheating) Accident 16 follow-up instrumentation needs drastic 17 improvement in both quality and quantity."
18 Q
Whose handwriting appears below 19 that?
'20 A
I do not recognize it.
21 Q
Have you seen that handwriting on 22 this document before?
23 A
I have seen that handwriting c copies of
('s 24 this document before.
(J 25 Q
Have you discussed that handwriting
1 Dunn 684 9
2 with any nonlawyer?
3 A
No.
4 Q
Do you have any idea whose
(
5 handwriting that is?
6 A
That would be privileged.
7 MR. FISKE:
I don't think you can 8
qualify him as a handwriting expert by 9
asking him does he have any idea.
10 MR. SELTZER:
Since Iiwant to find.
I 11 out eventually what the thoughts are behind 12 the person who wrote it, if he has some
(' ';
'\\ j 13 idea who wrote it, I think that would be 14 constructive.
15 Q
Do you have a good idea who wrote it?
16 MR. FISKE:
I object to that.
17 Q
Do you recognize the handwriting 18 at the bottom of the page?
19 A
No.
20 Q
You are not familiar with that 21 cursive style from any memos that you have seen 22 at B&W?
23 A
I do not make a study of recognizing
[
)
24 people's handwriting.
m/
25 Q
I just asked if you recognize it.
1 Dunn 685
(~)
l 2
A I said no.
3 Q
When you said on the front page 4
that the customer is "Us," do you normally write
\\
({
5 after customer the name of some client of B&W 6
for other memoranda?
7 MR. FIS KE :
I object to that unless 8
he can generalize like that.
9 MR. SELTZER:
Fine.
10 A
I think we can generalize.
Jf a unique 11 customer can be identified, it is normally the 12 procedure at B&W to write the customer there.
s,)
13 Q
Why did you write "Us" on the 14 customer line of GPU. Exhibit 127 15 A
I don't recall.
16 Q
By "Us,"
did you mean B&W?
17 A
In this circumstance, yes.
18 Q
In the first sentence, you said to 19 Allen Womack, "You asked for our 5 lessons from 20 TMI."
Who else besides yourself was asked to 21 submit lessons learned from TMI to Allen Womack?
22 A
The request went to all unit managers 23 within the Plant Design Section.
24 Q
Did you send your lesson-learned 25 memo to anybody in addition to Allen?
7--,w..
1 Dunn 686 (3
2 A
No, I did not.
3 Q
Did you see copies of any of the
'4 other unit managers' lessons learned?
l 5
A Not to my, knowledge.
6 Q
Did you ask any of your unit 7
managers to submit their ideas of lessons learned 8
from TMI?
9 A
No, I did not.
10 Q
Have yop seen anyone else's TMI 11 lessons-learned memos?
12 A
Not any B&W papers.
b 13 Q
Have you seen any other lessons 14 learned-generated by B&W employees?
i 15 A
I do not believe so.
16 Q
In the second sentence you told 17 Allen Womack, "I've had such a list but have not i
18 been totally happy with it,"
et cetera.
Prior to 19 writing GPU Exhibit 12, did you have such a list i
20 written somewhere else?
21 A
No.
22 Q
What were you referring to when you 23 said "I've had such a list"?
[a) 24 A
A list in my head.
25 Q
You said in item 1 that "Our l
1 Dunn 687
['V) 2 overall attitude toward safety, design philosophy 3
is not conducive to abnormal conditions."
4 What did you mean by " abnormal
(
5 conditions"?
6 A
I don't recall the specific of what I had 7
in mind at the time I wrote this in terms of the 8
choice of a given set of words here or a given 9
set of words there, but I recall the overall 10 picture that I was trying to communicate.
11 Q
With the overall picture in your 12 mind, what meaning'does it lend to your phrase
~
13
" abnormal conditions" in that sentence that I
~
14 just read?
15 A
Accidents.
16 Q
What did you mean by an, attitude 17 toward safety and design philosophy being "not 18 conducive" to abnormal conditions?
What did you l
19 mean by the phrase "not conducive"?
l 20 A
Within the entire structure of people 21 responsible for the final, quote, safety state of 22 a plant which would be measured by many things, 23 one of them being the actual set of hardware
(
24 that existed, how it really could perform, I had 25 in some of my experiences found some reluctance
1 1
Dunn 688 A~/
2 to do any more in the area than the strict 3
requirements of the NRC.
4 Customers did not wish to pay for
(
-5 any added material.
B&W.in responding to 6
customers was reluctant to surface issues 7
considered beyond the present agreements with the 8
NRC and this is'a culminated personal opinion borne 9
out of, at this time, nine years interacting on 10 this subject.
11 Q
You follow that first sentence with 12 something that you put in quotes, namely, "ACRCS
(~%
'_)
(
13 and the NRC cannot make the system save."
14 Why did you put that in quotation 15 marks?
i 16 A
I believe I had heard that at one time I
l 17 from a member of the NRC.
That is the reason I I
i 18 put that phrase in quotes.
19 Q
Is that something you had heard, 20 to the best of your recollection, before the 21 Three Mile Island accident?
22 A
I'm not sure.
23 Q
In the next sentence, you say, i
24 "With our present attitude, I would fault middle 25 to top management most."
.,,,--i..------_,--- - - -
1 Dunn 689 w
gJ 2
I think when we were discussing 3
this entence earlier, you said that middle to top 4
management referred to managers at B&W from your l
5 level and higher.
Is that right?
6 A
Yes.
Q Why did you say you faulted that 7
8 echelon of management?
9 A
I would think this should be viewed in 10 terms of the overall thought but I was indicating 11 that within Babcock & Wilcox both thoughts, that 12 overall situation, was focused by middle to top (h
13 management.
14 Q
What do you mean "was focused by"?
15 A
Middle to top management provides 16 generally provides the interface with the 17 customers.
They provide the interpretation of the l
l 18 general way things are done or will be done or l
l 19 what will be done.
That I think is a focusing 20 mechanism.
21 Q
You said earlier that B&W in 22 responding to customers did not wan t "to surface 23 issues beyond the present agreements with the (nv) 24 NRC."
l 25 What do you mean by the phrase
I g
Dunn 690
(-
2
" surface issues"?
3 A
I said they were reluctant.
I think I 4
want to also relate that to the design basis.
When l
5 I said " surface," I meant put forward an idea.
6 Let it be known by other people.
7 Q
Were you indicating that your 8
phrase "beyond the present agreements with the 9
NRC" referred to the understandings between B&W 10 and the NRC with regard to the design basis 11 analysis?
12 A
No, I believe I was speaking more
/~'s (msl 13 generally.
14 Q
What is the more general meaning?
15 A
" Design basis analysis" re f ers to just 16 analysis.
I would think in terms of design basis 17 hardware.
18 Q
Did you ever hear anyone from B&W 19 speak up and tell a customer, "You know, we 20 really should go beyond what the NRC is requiring 21 if we're going to make this plan safe"?
22 A
I have never heard someone say "We should."
23 I have heard someone say "We have."
I~h 24 Q
"We have" what?
NY 25 A
Gone beyond what the NRC has required.
--,--.w.
1 Dunn 693
(~h V
2 Q
But have you ever heard anyone 3
from B&W confronted with the reluctance to do more 4
than is requiied by the NRC say in the face of l
5 that reluctance, "We should do more to make this 6
plan safe"?
7 MR. FISKE:
I think I am going to 8
object to the form of the question.
I don't 9
think I understand it.
10 MR. SELTZER:
Mr. Dunn previously 11 testified there was a reluctance to do 12 more than is required by the NRC.
I am b
13 asking if he ever heard someone from B&W l
14 address that reluctance and say, "We 15 really should do more than is required by 16 the NRC if we're going to make this plan 17 safe."
l 18 MR. FISKE:
In other words, without 19 all the parenthetical phrases, has he ever 20 heard anybody from B&W say "We ought to 21 do more than is required by the NRC"?
22 MR. SELTZER:
In order to make the 23 Plan safe.
()
24 I would also like to limit the 25 question to the period before the Three l
1 Dunn 692 C'
2 Mile Island accident.
3 A
I don't recall anybody saying "We should."
4 I do recall people saying "We have."
f 5
Q In what context do you recall 6
somebody saying that "We have"?
7 A
In the context of the small breaks.
8 Q
Who said what to whom?
9 A
I have said it.
The requirements for 10 the NRC for performance of the high, pressure 11 injection system are that the peak cladding 12 temperature be limited to 2200 degrees Fahrenheit.
13 In actuality, at a B&W plant, the peak cladding 14 temperature is limited to 1100 degrees Fahrenheit 15 and only exceeds the initial operating temperature 16 for a very small class of potential accidents.
17 All that is relative to the 177 plants.
18 Q
On the second page of GPU Exhibit 19 12, do you see the sentence that begins at the r
l l
l 20 end of the fifth line with the words, "In short"?
21 A
Yes.
l l
22 Q
You said there, "In short, then, we 23 need positive actions to create an atmosphere in
(
24 which loss of coolant accident and safety analysis 25 are taken very seriously."
I 1
Dunn 693 (3
\\/
2 What did you mean by "taken very 3
seriously"?
4 A
This is an impression or constructed from
(
5 an impression I again received from my overall 6
interaction in the field which measures the 7
attitude toward the believability of.LOCA's or 8
certain highly improbable safety analysis events 9
relied on the probability of the occurrence of 10 those events and that they were viewed as 11 extremely unlikely within the industry in general.
12 Q
Did the fact that they were viewed
~
13 as being extremely unlikely lead to their not 14 being taken very seriously in your view?
15 MR. FISKE:
I think you are taking 16 that phrase in the memo and turning it 17 in reverse and I am not sure it has the 18 same meaning in the negative as it does 19 in the positive.
I am not sure it has the 20 opposite meaning is what I meant to say.
21 Q
Who is right?
22
'M R. FISKE:
I am not sure it is a 23 question of who is right.
I think it is
(~)'$
24 more of wha is the answer to the question.
25 Q
What is the implication of viewing
?
1 Dunn 694
~T (J
2 loss of coolant accidents as highly unlikely 3
events in the context of this sentence?
4 A
That, again, I believe relates to the
(
5 overall tone of the entire paragraph which is one 6
of a sense of some reluctance to raise certain 7
issues, difficulties at times in forcing issues 8
through and that the feeling that in part some of g
that difficulty or reluctance would be reduced 10 if the accidents were considered more seriously 11 than they are today or then or considered without 12 view of their probability.
b
\\/
13 Q
Is the reluctance to raise safety 14 issues something which you had seen previously 15 within B&W7 16 A
Reluctance is, of course, a relative term,
)
17 and there had been times when to do the preparatory 1
18 work to identify a concern I had perhaps had to 19 have been more forceful than I thought was 20 necessary.
21 Q
You had to be more forceful than 22 you thought should have been necessary?
l 23 A
Yes, measuring it myself.
)
24 Q
Measuring what yourself?
25 A
The force I had to exert as to its
1 Dunn 695 1
2 appropriateness.
3 Q
In whom did you perceive relucte.nce 4
to raise safety issues at B&W7
(
5 MR. FISKE:
I object to that 6
question.
I do not think that is a proper 7
question.
And the same grounds that have 8
been stated previously.
9 MR. SELTZER:
My previous question 10 was had you perceived a reluctance within 11 B&W to raise safety issues.
Your answer 12
- was a little roundabout.
( s,
\\~
13 I will rephrase that first question 14 then.
15 Q
Did you perceive a reluctance within 16 B&W to raise safety issues?
17 MR. FISKE:
I think that_is the same 10 objection that I have that I stated before.
19 MR. SELTZER:
I don't think that 20 is appropriate any more because in 21 discussing what he meant by taking loss of 22 coolant accident and safety analyses very 23 seriously, he said that this was a
()
24 perception which he had against the V
25 background of years of seeing (1) a
... ~..... _,,
,. ~.
-~
l 1
Dunn 696
("N
\\-
2 reluctance to raise safety-issues and (2) 3 difficulty forcing issues through.
4 In trying to understand that
(
5 answer, I want to. find out whether he had i
6 observed at B&W a reluctance to raise i
7 safety issues.
l 8
MR. FISKE:
I think you have 9
overstated his testimony in your summary 10 of that.
11 MR. SELTZER:
We can have the 12 reporter read it.
(" s 13 MR. FISKE:
First of all, he was 14 talking about the design basis and, 15 secondly, he has not said that he had years 16 of difficulty in raising safety issues.
17 MR. SELTZER:
This was from his
-18 years of involvement at B&W, I think he i
19 referred to his nine years at B&W.
This 20 is a view that emerged.
I 21 Q
Was that not your testimony?
22 MR. FISKE:
I think your question i
23 has to be limited to the memorandum and
(
24 I have allowed you to ask him what he 1
25 meant by a phrase in the memorandum but it i
e I.._,
.., _ ~ -.. _ _ _., _ _
1 Dunn 697 2
seems you are now going well beyond that.
j 3
MR. SELTZER:
If I am, I am.
I am 4
just exploring what he says words in this 5
memorandum meant, and I intend to push it to 6
its limit.
7 Do you direct him not to answer?
8 MR. FISKE:
Let me hear it.
9 (Question read.)
10 MR. FISKE:
I think he $1 ready 11 testified as to what he meant by that.
12 You asked him that question, and he told you.
~
~
13 MR. SELTZER:
I will move to strike 14 as nonresponsive what he told me.
15 BY MR. S E LTZE R:
16 Q
Could you answer the question?
17 MR. FISKE:
You can answer.
18 A
Safety issues relative to the intended 19 design basis of the plant were raised at B&W and 20 that I know of were legitimately surfaced and 21 considered.
Within that overall process, there
{
22 was at times resistance, and I would like this 23 section to be read and interpreted as a comment
()
24 o n th e community in which we were a single member.
25 I think that should suf fice.
1 Dunn 698 f'h G
2 Q
You said there were at times 3
resistance.
You meant there were at times 4
resistance within B&W; is that righ t?
(
5 A
within and without.
6 Q
what resistance had you experienced 7
within B &W to raising safety issues prior to 8
the Three Mile Island accident?
9 A
Again, resistance is a relative term; and e
10 what is resistance to me could very well be 11 proper procedure to someone else.
12 Q
All I can do is work with you and
~-)
13 what you understood.
All I can ask for is your 14 recollection, your impressions.
15 A
with that statement in mind --
16 MR. FISKE:
I think he is just trying 17 l
to put some perspective on it.
18 A
(Continuing)
The relative nature of this, 19 in the case of the pump discharge break, obtaining 20 the funds necessary to examine the situation was
(
21 somewhat difficult.
22 Q
Is that what you were referring to 23 near the top of Page 2,
regarding "need to fix the 24 RCP's running case"?
25 A
No.
1 Dunn 699 2
Q From whom had you had difficulty getting the funds for the pump discharge work?
3 A
In that particular case, we secured funds 4
from the generic project team.
5 6
Q From whom had you trouble getting funds?
7 8
A The individual was Mr. Al Cobb.
^
9 Q
What was Cobb's position?
10 MR. FISKE:
You mean his title?
11 Q
No, what position did he take in 12 resisting giving you the fund 57 13 A
That we had an NRC reviewed license for 14 these plants.
15 Q
S why rock the boat?
16 MR. FISKE:
I object to that.
17 Q
Is that what Cobb's attitude was as 18 expressed to you?
19 MR. FISKE:
I object to that, unless 20 you are talking about what he said.
MR. SELTZER:
That is what I am 21 22 talking about.
23 Q
What do you mean when Cobb said his 24 view was you already had an NRC license for these 25 plants?
What was the significance of that?
l 1
Dunn 700
(~)g.
%~
i 2
MR. FISKE:
I object to that.
I do 3
n t know that Mr. Dunn should opine as to what 4
the significance of it was.
5 Q
What did you understand was the 6
significance of his telling that to you?
7 MR. FIS KE :
No objection if you ask 8
him what he said in words or substance.
9 MR. SELTZER:
I want to know what 10 meaning that had to the hearer.
- 11 MR. FISKE:
I think that is irrelevant.
12 de has told you abopt the incident.
,s
~
13 MR. S ELTZE R:
I know you think it is 14 irrelevant.
I think that is your position.
15 I also heard lawyers say the document 16 spe ak s for itself; and try to block all l
17 examination on what words on a written sheet 18 mean.
19 I think that is jus t nonsense, if you 20 will pardon my saying so.
I don't think
(
21 documents speak for themselves.
I don't 22 think spoken words have unambiguitive 23 meaning.
(
34 I think it is highly relevant to ask 25 recipients of the memoranda and hearers of l
y
--,--r
,.y
-,4e 9m
,--,.r.,
y
-g,-,.9,
1 Dunn 701 OV 2
words to explain the implication of these 3
words as they perceived them.
4 MR. FISKE:
With respect to this 5
conversation, Mr. Dunn has told you what he 6
said, and he told you what Mr. Cobb said.
7 MR. SELTZER:
I don't care.
I will 8
go to court with you on this right now, if 9
you direct him not to answer.
10 MR. FISKE:
On what he u'nderstood --
11 MR. SELTZER:
Cobb was saying; that's 12 right.
The significance of what Cobb said i
N 13 vis-a-vis whether they would fund further 14 their work on pump discharge. breaks.
15 MR. FISKE:
This question is premature 16 until you have exhausted the conversation.
l 17 I think you should exhaust the conversation.
18 I don' t even think you have done that.
19 Q
Did Cobb say anything more to you by 20 way of explanation as to why he didn't want to 21 authorize additional funding for studying the 22 pump's discharge case?
l 23 A
He requested a detailed explanation of why I
24 I was concerned and a kind of crystal-balling of 25 what the consequences might be, kind of again, j
\\
.wi
.F t
4 i
4 i
i 1
Dunri 702 V,O 2
why you are concerned, whathahpened.
Ikrovided 7
g 3
that and funds were eve ntually se' cured fo r the' s
4 exploration work.
5 (Reces:s taken. )
6 Q
What title did Cob $ have at Ehe time
-('y s
s -
7 you were askingshim~for funds?
8 A
I could be wrong \\on thisd b'ut Manager, Project Man agemEt ts t.
9 Generic Projects ;,, (
s.-
s s
10 yQ Was he some,dontdofler of the purse
(-
k
'N, A 7
11 strings?
, f-g N,
w 12 A
Yes.
He had purse strings h'e' contrc11ed.
(
u s
s' 13
' Q' You asked him for funding to analyze 14 breaks in the pump discharge line in or about
+
a' 15 early 1977, right?
J,
,N %
16 A
I have to go back and;look at the record 2
17
.to find out when it started.
It was a c-uple o'f[
nths before the PSC was 'writkten.
18 5
1 a
19 Q
It was about ayearbeforgthe J
l 4
{
20 April 1978 PSC was written, isn't it?
i 1
MR. FISKE:
He is trying to place the
{.
21 22 time.
1 23
(-Q Was it almost a year before, April
(.
24 19777 i
25 5
MR. FISKE:
You fixed it as April
'77.
k s
1
-w c
--w..
,.,s
.v,,
---.-m
--n,,
~, -,. -
- W.,
,.,------.,---,,---.v.--+w,.,.
~
1 Dunn 703 2
MR. SELTZER:
I am asking.
3 MR. FISKE:
It is a fact he went to 4
Mr. Cobb for the funds in April 1977; is 5
that the question?
Yes.
7 A
I hadn't thought so, but I don't recall.
8 Q
I show you your April 1977 activities 9
report, Page 2,
Item E, Pump Discharge Break.
10
" Funds have been requested through disk to perform 11 the analysis."
12 Does that refresh your recollection 13 as to when you sought funds for this analysis?
14 A
This seems to indicate the subject.
15 0
Does that refresh your recollection 16 that you did seek funds in April 197 7 for the 17 analysis of a pump discharge line, small break?
18 A
No.
19 Q
No, it does not indicate that?
20 A
No, it does not rrfresh my memory.
(
21 Q
It does indicate that as of April 22 1977 you were seeking funds for analysis of a 23 0.04 square foot break in the pump discharge line, 24 righ t?
25 A
It indicates that ECCS is, yes.
l 1
Dunn 704 D
(%.)
2 Q
You wrote that report, right?
3 A
I do not know.
4 Q
Whose name is in the "From" box?
5 A
Mine.
6 Q
Do you have any reason to doubt the i
7 integrity of the statement that funds were
.8 requested to perform the analysis of the pump 9
discharge break in the 177 plants as of April 10 19777 11 A
No.
I don't have any reason to doubt that.
12 MR. SELTZER:
I would like to mark O
13 thi,s document of undoubted veracity as GPU 14 Exhibit 104.
It is Mr. Dunn's Ap.ril 15 Activities Report to Dr. Roy, April 29, 1977.
16 (Covering memorandum dated April 29,
17 1977 from B.
M.
Dunn to D.
H.
- Roy, 18 attaching April Activities Report, was 19 marked GPU Exhibit 104 for identification, 20 as of this date.)
(
21 Q
When you went to Mr. Cobb to obtain 22 funding for analysis of the pump discharge line 23 break, you said he told you, "We had an NRC 24 reviewed license for these plants. "
That was the 25 basis on which he was initially denying funding.
1 Dunn 705 eg
~
2 What did that statement by Mr. Cobb 3
mean to you in terms of your request for funds?
4 MR. FISKE:
This is precisely why
(
5 earlier I thought it was desirable that you 6
elicit the whole conversation.
7 What he said was that Mr. Cobb said 8
that there was an NRC reviewed license, 9
and that Mr. Cobb requested a detailed 10 explanation of why Mr. Dunn wa's concerned, 11 and as Mr. Dunn put it, a crystal-balling 12 of the consequences of his concern.
That is
\\-)
13 the complete statement by Mr..Cobb -- at 14 least, as I understand Mr. Dunn's 15 testimony.
16 Q
What was the significance to you of 17 Cobb's statement that we had an NRC reviewed 18 license for these plants?
19 MR. FISKE:
I don't know -- I don't l
20 think this question is proper in the first 21 place.
But I don't think you can dissect 22 what Mr. Cobb said and pick out half of it 23 and ask him what the significance of that
()
24 was.
i 25 MR. S E LTZE R : I will pick out a
1 Dunn 706 Od 2
quarter of it.
I don't have to ask for the 3
significance of all of Tolstoy's " War and 4
Peace."
4
(,
5 MR. FISKE:
I think this is improper.
6 MR. SELTZER:
I don't think you and I 7
should be quibbling over it.
I think it is 8
a proper qaestion.
If you want to object to 9
form, you may.
10 MR. FISKE:
I think ik is mor.e than 11 an objection as to form.
This is not the 12 firs t time that this has come up.
I don't f~\\
\\-
13 think that you are entitled to ask Mr. Dunn 14 what the significance is of somebody elsd's 15 answer.
16 You have the whole conversation.
You 17 have got what happened.
I think that is as 18 far as you can fairly go.
19 MR. SELTZER:
I press the question.
20 MR. FISKE:
I press the objection.
You instruct the 22 witness not to answer?
23 MR. FISKE:
Yes.
1 24 BY MR. SELTZER:
25 g
Had anybody ever told you on any
1
~
Dunn 707 2'
other occasion before the Three Mile Island i
3 accident as a basis for refusing funding for your 4
unit --
5 MR. S ELTZE R:
You want to say 6
something in the middle of my ques tion?
7 MR. FISKE:
Yes, because I think it 8
will save time in the end.
I do not think 9
Mr. Dunn has testified that Mr. Cobb 7
" 10 refused him funding.
11 He certainly didn' t ge t it in that 12 first conversation, but I don't think he
. O).
u j
13 ever said he was refused.
If you take that i
j 14 into account in phrasing the question, it l
15 would help.
16 Q
On any other occasion, did anyb ody ever 17 say to you as a basis for refusing or delaying 18 funding that there already was an NRC reviewed 19 license for the plants in question?
20 A
Yes, but on that circumstance there was a
(
21 clear need to explain the inappropriateness of the l
l 22 s,ituation as reviewed by the NRC.
And once that
)
23 explanation was made, the funding was made s_/
24 available.
I was also in a design stage effort.
25 Q
Did you make any immediate response
-,_,_.~m
a
1 Dunn 708 (D
U 2
to Mr. Cobb's statement that there already was an 3
NRC reviewed license for the 177 plants?
4 A
Yes.
5 Q
What did you say in words or 6
substance?
7 A
One thing, as I recall, was that at the time 8
for requesting funds we had not believed that the j
g condition was as serious as it turned out to be 10 after we had done the exploratory ca'1c ul atio n s.
11 I did inform Mr. Cobb that I did not 12 believe I could maintain the credibility of that 13 license basis without establishing that we had 14 been conservative previously or that I could not i
15 stand behind the license without doing this 16 exploratory work.
17 Q
You explained that to Mr. Cobb?
18 A
Yes.
19 Q
What was his response to that?
20 A
I don't recall.
21 Q
You ended your first point in GPU 22 Exhibit 12 with the statement, "I still do not 23 perceive a feeling of guilt in Babcock & Wilcox 24 over Three Mile Island, and I think there should 95 be one."
l
1 Dunn 709 2
Why, at the time you wrote GPU 3
Exhibit 12, did you feel there should be a feeling 4
of guilt in B&W over Three Mile Island?
(
5 A
We had had an opportunity to release 6
instructions which may have assisted the 7
operations crew that day in responding to the 8
accident in a fashion which would have mitigated
- 9 most of the undesirable resul?.s of that accident.
10 I had not observed people feeling soiry, or at 11 that time I had not observed people expressing
~
12 regret that, for whatever reason, those s
13
-instructions had not left B&W.
14
.Q You used the phrase, " mitigated mos t 15 of the undesirable results of that accident."
16 Do you mean by that prevented the 17 core uncovering and fuel melting?
18 A
Yes.
I don't believe we could have 19
. prevented the rupture of the quench tank.
l l
20 Q
You don't believe if the operators had 21 the benefit of the instructions, they could have 22 presented fuel melting?
23 MR. FISKE:
That is not what he said.
24 He said that the instructions may have 25 assisted the opeations crew in responding to
1 Dunn 710
[~
\\-)/
~
2 the accident.
3 Q
If they had responded in accordance 4
with your instructions, they would have been
(
5 able to prevent core uncovery and fuel' melting; 6
is that right?
7 MR. FISKE:
You mean if they had 8
not terminated EP I in accordance with his 9
instructions?
Is that what you mean?
10 MR. SELTZER:
Yes.
11 A
Yes.
12 Q
You say in Item 3 of Page 3 of yo'ur 13
- memo that "I don't believe our operators are as 14 ignorant of physical laws as is portrayed."
15 By "our operators," are you referring 16 to the operators of B&W nuclear plants?
17 A
Yes.
18 Q
At the time you wrote GPU Exhibit 12, I
i 19 was it your view that if the operators at B&W l
[
(
20 nuclear plants had had your instructions on l
21 operation.of high-pressure injection, they would l
I I
22 have been able to understand those instructions?
I 23 MR. FISKE:
I object to that.
That l
~
24 is total speculation.
s.
l 25 MR. SELTZER:
I am viewing it in terms
1 Dunn 751 0
2 of what he said about things that the 3
instructions may have helped the operators 4
mitigate the undesirable results of the 5
accident; and his statement that "I don't 6
believe our operators are as ignorant as 7
is portrayed."
8 MR. FISKE:
You are asking about these 9
particular four' operators that were on duty 10 at that time?
11 MR. SELTZER:
No.
I am talking of 12 operators in the more general sense that he O
13 refers to "our operators" in Item 3 in i
14 GPO Exhibit 12.
15 MR. FISKE:
.I think it is complete 16 speculation.
17 BY MR.-SELTZER:
i 18 g
I am driving at:
I want to understand 19 what he is intending by Item 3.
I will take it 20 in smaller steps.
(
21 You s aid that you don ' t believe that 22 the operators at B&W plants are as ignorant of 23 physical laws as is portrayed.
)
\\~/
24 Portrayed by whom?
25 A
out of the work ior the small break operating
,9
._-.+-,-e--
=r'"
1 Dunn 7J 2
(~\\
5
/'
2 guidelines, I had received the impression that 3
instructions to the operators and procedures had l'
4 to be written to a level of detail wherein
(
5 actions based on those instructions or procedures 6
could be taken by people with very little 7
understanding of the physics or the physical 8
essence behind the instructior.s.
They had to be 9
extremely literal.
10 Q
On what did you bas ~e your belief 11 that the operators are not so ignorant as is 12 portrayed?
-, __/
13 A
Two things.
I had had some cont'act after 14 Three Mile Island with operators and I have had 15 contact with similar personnel in other 16 experiences.
I believe with proper education, 17 they could be made to understand the basics of 18 what would happen to their plant.
19 Q
At the end of item 2 on GPU Exhibit 20 12, you said, "I believe right now we choose cost 21 over performance.in our safety hardware."
22 What did you mean by the phrase 23
" choose cost over performance"?
/~h 24 A
This whole paragraph deals with an idea O
95 that I believe would be useful to place the entire t
1 Dunn 713
(')
l 2
ECCS system under single point ownership.
3 The last sentence is a comment on 4
an issue involved in the design of a 205 plant
- (
5 at that time wherein given two options, we were l
l 6
tending to side or prefer the less expensive 7
of the two.
8 Q
Were you compromising safety in order 9
to save cost, to use words that you have used in 10 this memorandum?
11 MR. FISKE:
I don't object to the 12 first part of that question but I do object 13 to the second part.
14 MR. SELTZER:
The word " compromise" 15 is his word.
16 MR. FISKE:
The word " compromise" is 17 in the memo at some point and so at one point 18 is the word " safety."
~
l l
19 MR. SELTZER:
They are right in the 20 saue paragraph.
Let's just ask the 22 question without the characterization so l
23 we won't have a problem.
I g
24 MR. SELTZER:
I will rephrase the J
25 question.
1 Dunn 734 Ok-2 Q
In the example you have just given, 3
had D&W to some extent compromised on safety in 4
order to reduce cost?
(
5 A
No.
6 Q
In what way had B&W, in the example 7
you were giving, chosen cost over performance?
8 A'
I mentioned that we were siding in one 9
direction.
We had not made a decision.
10 Q
Were you siding in th,e direction of 11 saving some cost at the expense of trimming the 12 margin on safety?
Isn't that 'the point of your 1%
()
13 paragraph?
14 A
Yes, but I would like to explain it 15 accurately.
16 MR. FISKE:
I am sure Mr. Seltzer l
17 will give you that opportunity.
18 MR. SELTZER:
Why don't you save 19 that for cross-examination.
20 Q
Tell me exactly what you would like 21 to say.
I am sure your counsel has gone over this 22 very carefully.
23 MR. FISKE:
I am sure you want the l
<%g 24 whole story, not just a part of it.
d 25 A
We had a choice of creating the required
1 Dunn 715
.O 1
2 level of safety one of two ways.
It was my 3
opinion when I wrote this that we were tending 4
towards a system whose performance would not be
(
5 as straightforward or as-clear as the other 6
alternative and I had a personal preference for 7
the other alternative, and neither system would 8
compromise safety.
9 Q
You said that at the time you wrote 10 GPU Exhibit 12 and you said you felt there should 11 be a feeling of guilt in B&W over TMI, nobody 12 else in the company had expressed that view to
(~)N
\\_
13 you.
Subsequent to your writing GPU Exhibit 12,
~
14 has anyone in Babcock & Wilcox said to you, in 15 words or substance, that they think that there 16 should be a feeling of guilt in the, company e
17 regarding Three Mile Island?
i.
18 MR. FISKE:
We got into this 19 problem once before.
I do not have any l
20 objection about asking about the 21 conversations but you are asking him to l
22 make a characterization of what was said.
23 MR. SELTZER:
He said in his answer f')N 24 that up until this time he hadn't heard i
25 such an expression.
I am asking him simply L
i
l
'l Dunn 73 6 2
whether after he wrote this did he hear i
3 such an expression.
j.
4 I have already gone your route.
We I
(
5 examined him at some length about 6
individual conversations.
7 MR. FISKE:
Then are you asking-him 8
about a conversation in which someone used i
9 the word " guilt"?
4 10 MR. SELTZER:
No, not necessarily.
t 11 I said-in words or substance.
12
'MR.
FISKE:
That is the problem when O.
13 you talk abou't words or substance.
14 PUR. SELTZER:
I won't hold him to i
15 a characterization of a conversation.
If 1
16 he says to me, and I will offer this very l
17 openly, "We may have had a conversation
~
l 18 that touched on that with so-and-so," I i
l 19 will ask-him "What did so-and-so say to 20 you and what did you say to him?"
21 I won't hold him to the f
C 22 characterization.
23 MR. FISKE:
Exactly what is the i ()
24 question now?
25 (Record was read back.)
i m
__..._-,,_...,,._._,,.._,~._,,...-.____....___,______,....,.,__..,.-,_,,_._....____.m_..
1 Dunn 717 2
MR. FISKE:
I will let Mr. Dunn 3
answer this question as long as it is 4
understood that the question isn't i
(
5 requiring him to characterize statements 6
as to whether they reflect a feeling of 7
guilt as opposed to some other emotion 8
and I will let him answer it in terms of 9
any conversation he has had with anyone i
10 that might by its broadest definition 11 include the subject you asked him about 12 and then ask him to tell us what those 13 conversations were.
14 MR. SELTZER:
Fine.
15 MR. FISKE:
So we avoid all 16 elements of suggestions of characterizations.
17 A
Yes.
18 Q
Who?
19 A
Jim _ Taylor, John MacMillan.
20 Q
Anyone else?
I 21 A
In terms of specific conversations that
(.
22 I recall, no one else.
I L
23 Q
I don't mean to take advantage of l
[
{~}
24 the fact that you are sitting there thinking for
'v 25 a while before you answered, but do you have any
- - - - - -. - - ~ - - - - -
1 Dunn 7J8 7%
2 other recollection of such a conversation even if 3
it is not a specific conversation that you can 4
recall?
(
5 A
No.
The rest of it is a deduction from 6
all sorts of stuff.
7 Q
What do you mean a " deduction"?
8 MR. FISKE:
You asked him about 9
conversations after he wrote his memo 10 which is GPU Exhib it 12, right?
I don't 11 think a deduction about conversations is 12 very helpful.
O 13 MR. SELTZER:
I want to know what 14 he means by " deductions."
15 Q
What did you mean when you used 16 that word?
17 A
Feelings generated within me from the l
18 total response people make to me.
The feelings l
l 19
. I get.
I I
20 Q
Do you get a feeling now of guilt i
21 within B&W?
l N-22 MR. FISKE:
I won't let him answer 23 that question.
(~N 24 '
Q Is that the feeling you were
%-]
I 25 referring to?
l
1 Dunn 719
(')N
\\_
2 MR. FISKE:
I won't let him answer 3
that question for several reasons.
4 Q
Did you have any conversation with
)
('
5 MacMillan on this subject other than the meeting 6
in your office that you already testified about?
7 A'
No.
8 Q
Did you have any conversation with 9
Jim Taylor on this subject other than the 10 conversation with counsel present that you have 11 described?
12 A
No.
Let me say I don't believe so.
[\\
(,)
13 Q
Is there anybody,else with whom you
~
14 have had a conversation since the accident in 15 which they expressed any views to you regarding 16 the responsibility, if any, that B&W bears for 17 the Three Mile Island accident?
18 A
Short of communications with co'unsel, 19 I do not believe the word " responsibility" in 20 the context of Three Mile Island has been 21 discussed.
CL 22 Q
Have you discussed with anybody i
23 the consequence of B&W's apparently not having 7-%
24 sent out your February 1978 instructions other than
)
\\ _/
25 the people you have already described?
For
t 1
Dunn 720 2
example, you never testified so far that I can I
3 recall that you and Bob Jones talked since the 1
4 accident about the effects of B&W apparently
- (
5 having failed to send out-the February 1978
'i 6
instructions.
i 7'
A We have been very much in tune to specific l
8 issues of recollection.
9 Q
.Maybe I haven't asked you exactly 10 this question before so I wasn't meaning to --
11 MR. FISKE:
I think it is fair to say 12 the subject has been exhaustively covered
(^h
(_,/
13
.but I won't object if you want to ask him 14 again.
15 MR. SELTZER:
I was just responding 16 to what the witness said.
l 17 Q
Have you talked since the accident i
18 with Bob Jones about B&W apparently not having 19 sent out your February 1978 instructions?
20 A
I testified earlier that I informed my.
21 unit about that.
Other than that recolle-tion, 22 I do not recall having such conversation with Bob i
23 Jones.
I 24 Q
I don't mean to exclude that 25 conversation within your unit.
In the context of
1 Dunn 72J t\\/
2 that conversation, what, if anything, did Bob 3
Jones say to you about the report that B&W had 4
apparently not sent out, the February 1978 high (i
5 pressure injection instructions?
6 A
I was talking to the unit as a whole and 7
it was more an attempt to inform the unit that we 8
had been aware of circumstances like this, we 9
had recognized them and that we had attempted to 10 do something about them but that, f r whatever the 9
11 reasons, the information had not gotten.to the 12 utilities in time to be of whatever use it might
/~
(_,h
~
/
13 have been to the operators at that plant.
14 Q
When you say "we had been aware of 15 circumstances like this," do you mean that "some 16 of us in ECCS Analysis" had been aware of 17 circumstances like Three Mile Island which occurred l
18 sometime before Three Mile Island?
I 19 A
Circumstances which involved, in our 1
i 20 opinion, mismanagement of the high pressure 21 injection system, yes.
sl 22 Q
And you told your unit that "we,"
23 meaning you and others, had tried to do something 24 about that type of mismanagement of high pressure I
25 injection?
t
1 Dunn 722 2
A Yes.
3 Q
Y u were referring to your attempts 4
to get the company to send out your February 1978 5
instructions, is that right?
('
6 A
I was referring to the issuance of my 7
memos and negotiations with customer Service prior g
to the issuance of the February 16th memo.
9 Q
At the meeting with your unit where 10 you explained all this, was everyone or almost 11 everyone from your unit in attendance?
12 A
Most of them were.
()
13 Q
How soon after the Three Mile Island 14 accident did you have this meeting?
15 A
I believe it was within a couple of 16 weeks.
I'm not sure.
17 Q
At the meeting or prior to the 18 meeting or shortly after, did you show people in 19 the unit your February 1978 memoranda?
20 A
I d n't recall whether I did or did not.
21 Q
What, as best you can recall, was L
22 the reaction of individual members of the unit 23 to the information that you were giving them at 24 the meeting?
N,J MR. FISKE:
Again, I object to this 25
,s
-m4
_,.g
,_,v.,.
3 -,-, - - -,. - - -
4,
1 Dunn 723
(,l 2
unless it is testimony as to what people 3
said in words or substance.
4 MR. SELTZER:
Fine, that is exactly 1
{'
5 what I mean.
Thank you.
6 Q
What, in words or substance, was the 7
response of the individual members of your ECCS 8
Analysis Unit when you told them what you' related?
9 A
I don't remember it.
10 Q
was there any discussion coming 11 from the members of the unit?
12 A
Again, I don't remember it.
13 (Time noted:
5:00 p.m.)
14
/W 16 Bert M.
Dunn 17 Subscribed and sworn to before me 18 this 49 day of O 19 87-r S&@ &- 05i 18 SM O.QA ao bY' 1 19 8 S 20 1
21 22 23
(]
24 v
25 i
I
1 724
/~'i I
V CERTIFICATE STATE OF NEW YORK
)
3
- ss.:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
)
4 l
I, JOSEPH R.
DANYO
, a Notary Public of the State of New York, do hereby certify that the continued deposition of BERT M.
DUNN was taken before 8
me on Monday, March 23, 1981-consisting of pages 603 through 723 I further certify that the witness had been previously sworn and that the within
~
transcript is a true recor'd of said testimony; 13 That I am not connected by blood or 14 marriage with any of the said parties nor 15 interested directly or indirectly in the matter in controversy, nor am I in the employ of any of the counsel.
18 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my 19 hand this 13th day of April
,1981.
20 21 18 AM/@
i 23 JOSEPH R.
DANYo 25
-^
725 IN D EX e
WITNESS PAGE r-Bert M. Dunn (resumed) 605 l
4.,
E X H I B.I T S 3
GPU i
NUMBER
- FOR IDENT.
101 Memorandum dated April 6, 1979, 4:15 p.m.
from i
Mr. Womack to Mr. Dunni subject " Loss of Feedwater Plus Relief Valve Failure" 605
(~'
102 Typewritten document entitled " Decay Heat Removal During A Very Small Break LOCA For A B&W 205-Fuel-Assembly PWR, C.
Michelson, January 1978" 647 l
103 Letter da':ed April 39, 1979 from James Taylor to R.
J.
Mattson of the Nuclear i
Regulatory Commission re-t I
" Babcock & Wilcox Company's Commitments" with attachments 665 i
104 Covering memorandum dated April 29, 1977 from B.
M.
Dunn to D.
H.
Roy, attaching April Activities Report 704 t
e
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9 4
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