ML20072J083
| ML20072J083 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 05/05/1981 |
| From: | Joseph Kelly BABCOCK & WILCOX CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| TASK-*, TASK-01, TASK-02, TASK-03, TASK-1, TASK-2, TASK-3, TASK-GB NUDOCS 8306290915 | |
| Download: ML20072J083 (145) | |
Text
r cal 170 UNITED S '4' AT E S DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK y:\\
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l t
x GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORPORATION, a
{(.
JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY and PENNSYLVANIA ELECTRIC COMPANY, a
Plaintiffs, s
-against-80 civil 1683 (R.O.)
THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY and J.
RAY McDERMOTT & CO.,
INC.,
2 Defendants. t
x M
Continued deposition of The Babcock &
I Wilcox Company, by JOSEPH J.
- KELLY, JR.,
i' J
taken by Plaintiffs, pursuant to adjournment, at the offices of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, Esgs., 425 Park Avenue, New York, New York, on Tuesday, May 5,
- 1981, at 9:35 o' clock in the forenoon, before l
Joseph R.
Danyo, a shorthand reporter and Notary Public within and for the State of New York.
i bl 8306290915 010505 DOYLE REPORTING, INC.
\\_/
PDR ADOCK 05000 8 CERTIFIED STENOTYPE REPORTERS 369 LaxlNGTON AVENUE
[
j WALTER SHAPlRO. C.S.R.
New YomK. N.Y.
10o17 i
CHARLES SHAPIRO, C.S.R.
TgLEPHONE 212 - 867 8220 I
171 2
Appea ranc e s :
3 KAYE, SCHOLER, FIERMAN, HAYS & HANDLER, ESQS.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 4
425 Park Avenue New York, New York 5
BY:
RICHARD C.
SELTZER, ESQs, 6
-and-ANDREW MacDONALD, ESQ.,
7 of Counsel 8
9 DAVIS, POLK & WARDWELL, ESQS.
n.
10 Attorneys for Defendants One Chase Manhattan Plaza 11 New York, New York 12 BY:
DANIEL F.
KOLB, ESQ.,
13 of Counsel 14 15 Also Present:
16 PATRICIA VAUGHAN 17 DAVID TAYLOR 18 I
l 19
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20 (x
21 l
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22 23 g-()
25 t
I 172 6
2 JOS E P H J.
K E L LY J
R.,
3 having been prcviously duly sworn by a Notary 4
Public, was examined and testified further 5
as follows:
6 EXAMINATION BY MR. SELTZER:
7 Q
I would like to remind you that your 8
testimony today continues to be sworn testimony.
9 You are under oath to tell the truth.
10 Do you understand that?
11 A
Yes.
12 Q
Would you take a look at the document 13 that has been marked GPU 133, the site problem 14 report for the Davis-Besse September 1977 transient 15 transmitted october 11, 1977.
In that, would you 16 turn to the page numbered 15 of 85.
q 17 Just before we broke yesterday, Dan t
18 Kolb suggested, and you accepted the suggestion, 19 that it would take you some time to review the 20 items on that page to determine whether what was 21 recorded here as the basic sequence of events on s
22 September 24, 1977 was consistent with your best 23 understaading and re >11ection of what had happened O
24 on September 24, 197~
25 Have you had an c.'ortunity since we i
u L_
~
t 9
s 1
Kelly 173 2
suspended the deposition yesterday to review this 3
page?
e 4
A No, I did not review the page since yesterday.
5 Q
Do you still believe you would like 6
to review the page before answering the question 7
whether the basic sequence of events shown here 8
is consistent with your recollection of what 9
happened or your understanding of what happened on s
10 September 24?
11 A
I would like to take a little time to read 12 it, yes.
13 Q
Let me know when you are ready.
14 A
I have reviewed it.
15 Q
Do you remember the question?
16 A
No.
Would you restate it?
17 Q
Page 15 of 85 is a page from site 18 problem report 372, right?
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
Site problem report 372 is the B&W 21 prepared site problem report on the Davis-Besse 22 transient of September 24, 1977, right?
23 A
Yes.
%.)
24 Q
GPU Exhibit 133 which is that site 25 problem report is the site problem report which you m
t 1
Kelly 174 2
relied upon in preparing your sequence of events 3
which is attached to your memo to Lauer, GPU 151, 4
right?
5 A
It was one of the inputs, yes.
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x.
6 Q
Included in that input was page 15 7
of 85, is that right, in GPU Exhibit 133, is that w
8 right?
9 A
I can't remember now particularly seeing this t
10 page when I was reviewing it.
11 MR. KOLB:
As I said yesterday, in (a) 12 terms of verifying that this is _the document, 13 the site problem report in fact, and indeed 14 now also verifying that all of it was 15 available in its full text at the time, it 16 seems to me the best the witness can say is 17 some general account.
I dor.'t think that either 18 of us has tried to determine that every page 19 of the SPR was part of,the document at the 20 time, necessarily all prepared by B&W and
(-
21 so on.
I simply note that because your 22 question encompassed more than this page.
23 I don't mean to address this page in A) t 24 any way but the total document before us is
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25 quite thick.
The page I am referring to 9
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1 Kelly
'175 s
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2 is 15 of 85 3
4, s
3 g
Take more time and flip througiz-th@ \\
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4 s
4 whole thing and tell me whether you think the,re are 5
any pages there which are not part of the consecutive-f s
pages which wer'e in the SPR when it was ordginally 6
c
/
s4 x
7 distributed.
1
'i wt 8
MR. KOLB You mean when he first t
T 9
reviewed it?
10 MR. SELTZER:
Yes.
y 11 While he is looking through it, I would c
12 like to state that the pages are consecutively 13 numbere'd, 1 of 85 through 85 of 85, in the 14 copy that w'a's turned over to us by the LP illustrious Babcock & Wilcox Company, It
,16 was also sequentially numbered by.a duplicating IE firm' employed by Babcock & Wilcox and GPU,
'IBk with consecut5ve numbers that run sequentially
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19
\\1 rom the 1 of,85 through 85 of 85, so there j
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20 is every indication that this is a complete
^
21
'e document in ghe-form in which we hr.ve handed
't to-the witness.
i 22 i
23 MR. KOLB:
I think you made an l
d i
,4' observation in one of your questions suggesting 2
l 25 that it was necessarily all prepared by B&W.
i
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.n.
l l
Kelly 176
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2 That is another point.
By no means am I 3
questioning you.
I am simply trying to avoid 4
a situation where the witness possibly 5
without the knowledge that is necessary is 6
indirectly verifying something that he really 7
doesn't know.
8 A
I have looked at all the pages in the site 9
problem report.
t site problem repo'rt?
10 Q
What is a 11 A
It is a form that B&W Nuclear Service 12 Organization uses to track and get internal 13 resolutions to problems discovered at'the various 14 start-up sites.
15 Q
Is the data that is contained and 16 reported in a site problem report data that has 17 been gathered by B&W from sources inside B&W and 18 outsido B&W7 19 A
They are internal documents, so in that 20 sense, everything that is in them has been gathered (m
21 by B&W from internal and external sources.
22 Q
So it follows, does it not, that GPU 23 133 being a site problem report for the Davis-Besse
)
' ~ '
24 September 24, 1977 transient, is a report prepared 25 and assembled by B&W personnel, is that right?
r i
1 Kelly 177 9
2 MR. KOLB:
When you say it follows, are 1
3 you asking him to deduce or tell you whether 4
ft is true or not?
5 Q
Isn't that a fact?
6 MR. KOLB:
Do you know that?
7 Q
Let me take it in smaller pieces if you 8
are going to be that way.
9 Is GPU 133 a site problem report?
(
10 A
Yes.
11 Q
Do you believe that it was prepared in
()
12 the way that site problem reports are generally t
13 prepared by B&W, to the best of your knowledge?
14 A
I have nothing to say that it didn't happen 15 that way.
16 Q
From your participation in gathering 17 certain data on this transient and your contribution 18 to GPU 133, do you believe that it was prepar,ed 19 in the normal manner that B&W prepares site 20 problem reports?
21 A
Again, I believe so.
22 Q
Do you believe GPU 133 was prepared from l
l 23 data collected and assembled by B&W personnel?
24 MR. KOLB:
Exclusively?
Nothing that i
25 came from anybody else?
9 I
Kelly 178 t
2 MR. SELTZER:
I said collected and 3
assembled, and as we have established in 4
prior questions, it can be collected and 5
assembled from sources both within B&W and 6
outside B&W.
7 MR. KOLB:
So you mean to include that?
8 MR. SELTZER:
Of course.
9 A
Yes.
(
10 Q
You said that the. site problem reports 11 are created in order to resolve problems; is that 12 right?
Are you asking him whether 14 he testified to that?
15 Q
Is it a fact that the site problem 16 reports are created in order to resolve problems 17 that are occurring or have occurred at B&W designed 18 nuclear plants?
19 A
That is one of their functions, yes.
20 Q
Are the site problem reports and the h
21 contents in them relied upon in the regular course 22 of business at B&W for the resolution of problems?
23 Is there something you don't understand in my
[,h 24 question?
25 A
Yes,-not all problems are solved as a result
I Kelly 179
(~}J.
2 of site problem reports.
J 3
Q You said that the site problem reports 4
have as one of their uses the resolution of 5
problems which have occurred at B&W designed nuclear 6
plants.
7 In the resolution of those problems, 8
are the site problem reports relied upon by B&W 9
personnel in the regular course of their business?
t 10 A
Normally, yes.
11 Q
Is it your understanding that GPU
()
12 Exhibit 133 was relied upon in that way at B&W?
13 A
I don't know.
14 Q
You relied upon it that way, didn't you?
15 For example, in preparation of your sequence of 16 events which is part of GPU 1517
~
17 A
In that sense, yes.
18 Q
Subsequent to the Davis-Besse event, 19 did you discuss the contents of GPU Exhibit 133 20 wi th' o thers ?
(i 21
'A I don't recall.
22
-Q You may have or you may not have?
You 23 just don't. recall one way or the other?
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- 24 A
- Yes, e
t 25 MR. SELTZER:
I would like to mark for A
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--y.
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1 Kelly 180 o
2 identification as GPU Exhibit 152 another or 3
later issue of site problem report 372 for 4
the Davis-Besse September 24, 1977 transient.
5 The date of transmittal is November 9,
1977 i
6 signed by Doug Halsted.
7 (Site problem report 372 dated 8
November 9,
1977 signed by Doug Halsted 9
marked GPU Exhibit 152 f'or identification, t
10 as of this date.)
11 Q
What, if any, role did you continue to
[\\
12 play after returning from Davis-Besse in resolving 13 any of the action items that developed out of the 14 Davis-Besse transient?
15 MR. KOLB:
Objection as to form.
16 A
My assignment was to develop the sequence of 17 events of the transient.
~
18 Q
Were you consulted at all about any of 19 the work that B&W did following the transient?
20 A
I don't remember being consulted.
21 Q
Did you receive a copy of GPU Exhibit 22 152 in or about November 1977?
Take a moment to 23 look through it.
I don't want you to just look at
(
)
24 the cover sheet to answer the question, unless it
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25 is obvious from the cover sheet that ysu did receive it.
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Kelly 181
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2 A
I don't remember receiving a copy of it.
3 Q
Bruce Karrasch did not forward it to 4
you?
5 A
I don't remember.
6 Q
In GPU Exhibit 133 which is the earlier 7
version of this same site problem report and a 8
version which you have testified you did receive, 9
would you look at page 3 of 85.
Would you also look the"immediately 10 at the continuation of that text on 11 following page.
O)
(
12 On pages 3 and 4,
there is.a description 13 of the problem that occurred on September 24, 1977, 14 right?
15 A
Yes.
16 Q
And it contains a sequence of some of
~
17 the events, right?
'18 A
Yes.
19 Q
Do you see the initials that appear 20 at the bottom of page 47 k
21 A
- The typed initials?
22 Q
Yes.
23 A
YeS-
-~
(L 24 Q
Is CCE Charlie England?
25 A
I don'_t know.
i f-)
Kelly 182 1
GI 2
Q Do you know if Charlie England's middle 3
initial is C7 4
A That is what I don't know, 5
Q Do you know who NLF is?
The secretary 6
who typed it.
7 A
No.
8 Q
Would you look at page 2 of 85 in 9
Exhibit 133.
Do you see the box at the top where 10 it says " problem contact" over on the r"ight-hand 11 side.
(
12 A
Yes.
13 Q
Would you read the name that is typed 14 underneath that?
15 A
C.C.
England.
16 Q
That is Charlie England?
17 A
Yes.
18 Q
Would you agree with my inference that 19 it was Charlie C.
England who wrote pages 3 of 85 0
20 and 4 of 85?
21 MR. KOLB:
Again you are asking him to i
22 deduce?
23 MR. SELTZER:
'Yes, please.
O pi 24 MR. KOLE:
Ask him-if he knows.
25 Q
Do you believe, based on the evidence in
~
m
l 1
Kelly 183
~
A-2 the document, that pages 3 of 85 and 4 of 85 were 3
written by Charlie England?
4 MR. KOLB:
If he knows.
He is not 5
going to speculate on what you think is 6
evidence.
7 MR. SELTZER:
I think you are out of 8
place.
I think I am asking the witness 9
about a document that he' received in the t
10 regular course of business, relie'd upon la 11 the regular course of business, and I am a
(h 12 entitled to find out from him whether from
()
13 the document itself which he has~used he 14 would conclude and does conclude that Charlie 15 England wrote pages 3 and 4.
16 MR. KOLE:
I am not out of place, It 17 is very appropriate for me to make, objections 18 where you ask questions that are wholly 19 inappropriate, and I will continue to do that.
1 20 As far as the witness' testimony is
(.
concerned, he can testify, if he knows.
21 22 MR. SELTZER:
Fine.
23 Q
Do you agree that Charlie C.
England is.
24 to the best of your knowledge the author of pages 25 3 and 47
1 l
Kelly 184
~
ss 2
MR. KOLB:
Do you know?
3 A
I don't know.
4 Q
What is your opinion?
5 MR. KOLB:
You.are not entitled to his 6
opinion.
Ask him fact questions.
These 7
depositions are over long because you ask 8
questions that are inappropriate and take a 9
long time to answer because of your inability t
10 to put specific fact questions.
'P u t fact 11 questions to the witness, and let's get on.
D()
12 Q
Is it your opinion that charlie C.
13 England wrote pages 3 and 4 of Exhibit' 133?
14 MR. KOLB:
Only answer if you know.
15 g
I am asking for your opinion.
16 MR. KOLB:
You are not entitled to his 17 opinion.
18 MR. SELTZER:
You can instruct him --
19 MR. KOLB:
You are entitled to his 20 knowledge and you will get'nothing more.
(--
MR. SELTZER:
Please keep your voice 21 22 down.
You are the first person that was to 23 raise your voice on this record.
(e 24 MR. KOLB:
My voice was just a little 25 higher than yours.
1 I
Kelly 185
,J 2
MR. SELTZER:
Stop yelling at me.
I 3
don't need your tone of voice either, 4
MR. KOLB:
If you know.
5 Q
Do you know any other CCE employed by 6
Babcock & Wilcox other than-Charlie C.
England?
7 A
I can't recall any.
8 Q
Do you know anybody else with the 9
initials CCE who had any involvement in analyzing i
10 the Davis-Besse transient?
11 A
I don't recall any.
(
12 Q
Is it your opinion that Charlie C.
13 England wrote page: 3 and 4 of GPU Exhibit 1337 14 MR. KOLB:
Answer the question, if 15 you know.
4 16 Q
I am asking for your opinion.
17 MR. KOLB:
Only answer the question if 18 you know.
If you have knowledge or you 19 believe that to be so based on your knowledge.
20 Q
Your knowledge can include the fact 21 that Charlie C.
England is listed as the problem 22 contact, and you saw Charlie C.
England at meetings 23 at the Davis-Besse site when you arrived there.
O\\',)
24 MR. KOLB:
Answer if you know.
25 A
No, I don't know.
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f
,?
1 Kelly 186
,<-)
2 Q
You are saying you just don't know for 3
sure that he wrote it?
4 A
Yes.
5 Q
From your knowledge of the way documents 6
are prepared in the regular course of business at 4
7 B&W, it is a fact, is it not, that somebody whose I
8 initials are CCE wrote pages 3 and 4?
9 A
That is the formal pract* ice.
t 10 Q
would you look at the secon'd paragraph 11 of page 3.
Is it your understanding from what is A) 12 written there from any independent rec.ollection you
(
13 have that in the Davis-Besse transient'on 14 September 24, there was a loss of main feedwater.
15 MR. KOLB:
Are you asking for his 16 independent recollection or are you asking 17 for what is written here or both?.
18 MR. SELTZER:
Both.
19 A
Yes.
'20 Q
Do you see the references in that same
(-
21 paragraph to auxiliary feedwater?
22 A
Yes.
.3 Q
It says there, " Number 2 auxiliary feedwater
( ')
24 pumps started but only came up to 2600 revolutions 25 per minute, insufficient to' supply enough feedwater
,n.-
1 Kelly 187 1
2 to steam generators."
3 In your sequence of events which is 4
part of GPU 151, you also refer to number 2 auxiliary 5
feedwater pump only came up to 2600 RPM, insufficient 6
to feed its steam generator.
7 MR. KOLB:
Could you direct us to the 8
paragraph?
9 MR. SELTZER:
The first paragraph, last i
10 sentence.
11 A
Yes.
12 Q
Was there following the loss of main 13 feedwater also a loss of auxiliary feedwater?
14 A
A partial loss of auxiliary feedwater.
15 Q
What do you mean by partial?.
16 A
One pump worked correctly.
17 Q
The pump supplying which steam generator?
18 A
The number 1 steam generator.
19 Q
Was the number 1 steam generator able 20 to continue cooling the water in the reactor 21 coolant system?
22 A
Yes.
23 Q
At any time during the transient, was 24 feedwater flow restored to the number 2 generator?
25 A
I don't remember.
188 1
Kelly 2
Q What caused the number 2 auxiliary 3
feedwater pump to pump at a rate that was 4
insu!ficient to feed its steam generator?
5 A
I don't recall.
6 Q
Would you turn to page 2 of your 7
sequence of events in Exhibit 151, 8
Do you see the first paragraph at the 9
top of the page in which you discuss the operators i
10 taking manual control of the number 2 auxiliary
~
11 feedwater pump?
12 A
Yes.
13 Q
Does that refresh your recollection 14 that the operators restored auxiliary feedwater 15 flow to the number 2 generator during the transient?
16 A
Yes.
17 Q
At what time did they do that?
18 A
My sequence of events says time 2150.
19 Q
The transient started at 2134, is that
~
20 right?
21 A
Yes.
2'2-Q In other words, sixteen minutes after 23 the start of the transient, the operators restored
%,J 24 auxiliary feedwater flow to the number 2 generator?
25 A
Yes.
--e
189 1
Kelly 2
Q There was a loss of auxiliary feedwater 3
for eight minutes during the Three Mile Island 4
Unit 2 accident, right?
5 A
complete loss of auxiliary feedwater for 6
eight minutes, yes.
7 Q
So it took the Davis-Besse operators 8
twice as long to restore auxiliary feedwster for 9
their number 2 generator as it" took the Three Mile 10 Island operators to restore auxiliary feedwater 11 to both of their generators, is that right?
[
12 A
Yes.
\\ ))
13 Q
Would you look at page 3 of 85, which 14 is the description of problem prepared by somebody 15 with the same initials as Charlie C.
England.
16 MR. KOLB:
We are back on 1337 17 MR. SELTZER:
Yes.
18 A
Yes.
19 Q
Turn to page 4.
You see the item 20 at the top of the page which states the following
(.
21 design problems contributed to this incident?
22 A
Yes.
23 Q
The first item states, "A steam and O'
24 feedwater rupture control system actuation does 25 not trip the reactor.
1 Kelly 190 V.
2 pressure greater than 2255 psig could probably 3
(have) been avoided had the reactor tripped
?
4 simultaneously with the bottling up of the once 5
through steam generators."
4 6
I have read what abbreviations in the 7
text mean.
They have been spelled out.
I have 8
inserted a missing word "have" in brackets.
9 What does it mean that the steam and 10 feedwater rupture control system actuat' ion does 11 not trip the reactor?
12 Let me break it down into pieces.
You
?
13 have now gotten an item in your plant known as fogg, t
14 right?
15 A
Yes.
16 Q
Is that something that now performs the 4
rukture 17-function that the steam and feedwater 18 control system was performing in your plants in 19 September 19777 20 MR. KOLB:
Is the question applicable 21 to all plants?
22 MR. SELTZER:
The plants in which the 23 fogg is installed.
24 A
Yes.
25 g
. steam and feedwater rupture control
.i.
~
~
9 1
Kelly 191 O
2 system is an automatic safety system, is that 3
right?
4 A
Yes.
5 Q
It takes control of the plant when 6
there is an upset condition of certain types?
7 A
Yes.
I 8
Q At the time of the Davis-Besse transient, 9
the start of steam and feedwater rupture control i
i 10 system taking control of the plant did'not 11 automatically take the reactor off line, did it?
)
12 A
Correct.
13 Q
And the point of this first sentence 14 is to say exactly what I just said, right?
15 A
Yes.
16 Q
There is a reference there to 2255 psig, 17 do you see that?
18 A
Yes, I do.
.O 19 Q
What is the Pilot Operated Relief 20 valv'e set point?
1 21 A
2255 psig.
22 Q
In other words, when the reactor 23 coolant system pressure becomes greater than 2255 24 psig, the Pilot Operated Relief Valve is triggered 25 to open, is that right?
1 Kelly 192 O
2 MR. KOLB:
As of the time of this memo?
3 MR, SELTZER:
Exactly.
4 A
Yes.
5 Q
Do you understand this description of 6
the problem to be sayxng that if the reactor had 7
been automatically taken off line when the steam 8
and feedwater rupture control system took over, 9
Davis-Besse would have probably been able to t
10 avoid opening the Pilot Operated Relief' Valve?
11 A
That seems to be the author's contention.
12 Q
Have you ever drawn a contrary conclusion?
13 A
No.
14 Q
At the time of the Davis-Besse transient, 15 the reactor trip set point was higher than the 16 Pilo t Operated Relie f Valve set point, right?
17 A
Yes.
18 Q
In fact, it was designed that,way, 19 right?
20 A
Yes.
21 i Q
Designed by B&W, right?
22 A
Yes.
23 Q
Why did B&W design it that way?
s.
/
24 A
The design allows the plant to undergo a 25 load'rejo.: tion, electrical load rejection, and run
r i
1 Kelly 193 2
back to a lower power level while maintaining the 3
reactor critical.
4 Q
In other words, there can be a turbine 5
trip without scramming the recctor?
6 A
That is one form of load rejection, yes.
7 Q
What does keeping the reactor critical 8
mean which was your phrase?
9 A
Maintaining the neutron reaction at a 10 self-sustaining level.
11 Q
By maintaining the neutron reaction
(
12 level in the nuclear core at a self-sustaining 13 level, is it easier to. bring the plant up to 14 full load following the incident that had created 15 the earlier reduction in power?
16 Let me simplify it.
If you lose criticality 17 starting up the plant again is more difficult than 18 r e s to ri n g the plant to full power from part load, 19 isn't that right?
20 A
It is slower.
k 21 Q
You have to go through more steps?
m 22 A
Yes.
23 Q-Since the Three Mile Island accident, O
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24 B&W has recommended to all of its operating 25 utilities that the Pilot Operated Relief Valve set
.. ~. _
1 gelly 194 O
\\
2 point be changed, right?
i 3
A I don't know.
4 Q
Do you know that on some, if not all, 5
B&W plants operating in the United States today, j
6 the Pilot Operated Relief Valve set point is now 7
higher than the reactor trip set point?
8 A
Yes.
9 Q
Do you believe it is higher on all s.
10 plants operating in the United States d'esigned by 11 B&W?
(}
12 A
Yes.
13 Q
Isn't it a fact that that is a change 14 in reactor trip set point following the Three Mile 15 Island accident?
16 A
Yes.
~
17 Q
That is a change that was recommended 18 by B&W, isn't it?
19 A
I don't know.
20 Q
What is your understanding as to why 21 the reactor trip set point has now been placed 22 lower than the PORV set point?
23 A
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission wanted to f_.
k, 24 reduce the number of-times the.PORV was called upon 25 to open.
I Kelly 195
/~}
V 2
Q You said that the Pilot Operated Relief 3
valve set point was 2255 pounds in riptember 1977.
4 What was the reactor trip set point?
5 A
I don't remember exactly.
6 Q
What do you think it was, approximately?
~
7 A
2300 or 2350 8
Q Do you know of any instance in which 9
a B&W designed plant had a trip from full load
(
10 where the Pilot Operated Relief Valve f'unctioned 11 as designed and the plant was able to remain critical?
()
12 A
Yes.
13 Q
Ilow many instances of that'are you 14 familiar with?
15 A
One.
16 Q
At what plant?
17 A
Crystal River Unit 3.
18 Q
When did that one occurrence take place?
19 A
Spring of 1977.
20 Q
Was any testing going on at the time?
(,
21 A
That was a test.
22 Q
What was being tested?
_ 23 A
The capability of the plant to run back from 24 100 percent power with a turbine trip I am 25 sorry -- with a full load rejection and run back to
~
l l
l 1
Kelly 196
\\_
2 self-sustaining electrical loads.
3 Q
Am I correct that the design is to 4
take the reactor down to 15 percent of full power?
5 A
Yes.
6 Q
Is that what was done at Crystal River 7
in the spring of 1977?
8 A
Yes.
9 Q
Were you there?
r 10 A
Yes.
11 Q
Do you know of any instance other than
()
12 during a test when a B&W pl, ant was able to survive 13 a trip from full load and keep its r e a'c to r critical?
14 A
I don't recall any.
15 Q
Have you ever participated in any other 16 test of another reactor or of the Crystal River re5,ect 17 reactor to test it for the ability to full 18 load and remain critical?
19 A
No.
20 Q
Did they ever try at any.other time 21 at Crystal niver that you are aware of?
For 22 example, while you were there, did they try it wc 23 any other times other than the one time it t
24 succeeded?
25 A
we tried it going to power escalation sequence t
).
-i
1 Kelly 197 2
at lower power levels, and 1t succeeded.
3 Q
At full power you just tri.ed it once?
4 A
That I remember, yes, 5
Q Do you know of.any attempts that were 6
made at any other plants to reject load at full 7
power and keep the reactor critical?
8 A
I don't recall any specific instances at 9
other plants, no, t
10 Q
Had Crystal River been oper'ated for 11 very long at full load before the test that you
(
12 have described was attempted?
13 A
on the order of days, I don't know how you 14 are defining very long.
15 Q
I was really asking you to tell me 16 how long.
17 As a plant is operated at fuil load, 18 there is increasing burnup of the nuclear fuel, 19 right?
]
20 A
Yes.
21 Q
The increasing burnup causes greater 22 residual heat when the power is reduced in the 23 reactor, right?
',j 24 A
Yes.
26 Q
Crystal River had much less burnup of its
i Kelly 198 gg V
2 nuclear fuel on the day that you ran the full power 3
load rejection test than a plant would have that 4
had been running for a longer period of time at 5-full power, right?
6 A
Yes.
7 Q
The greater the heat generation by 8
the core following a load reduction, the more 9
difficult it will be for the r'eactor to be kept 5
10 on line, isn't that right?
~
11 Let me break it up.
I 12 There is a physical relationship between V) 13 temperature and pressure in a pressurized water 14 system, right?
15 A
Yes.
16 Q
As a general rule, other things being 17 equal, if you increase the temperature, the pressure 18 goes up, right?
19 A
Yes.
20
-Q If the pressure in a B&W designed
(.
21 pressurized water reactor exceeds the reactor 22 trip set point, the reactor is automatically 23 tripped off line, right?
s
\\
\\
24 A
Right.
25 Q
It is a fact, is it not, that it'would e.-,
-1 Kelly 199
-)
G 2
be easier to avoid tripping the reactor off line 3
due to high pressure in a reactor that has minimal 4
burnup in contrast to a reactor that has much 5
greater burnup, isn't that true?
6 A
No, it is just the opposite.
7 Q
Why?
8 A
As effective full power days are built up into 9
the core, the negative temperature coefficient and
(
10 power coefficient become more and more' negative.
11 This means as the temperature goes up, the
()
12 reactor physics of the situation in a core with 13 more burnup tend to drive power down faster, and 14 you will have a higher probability of getting all 15 the way down to 15 percent power faster and 16 therefore higher probability of staying on the 17 line.
18 A new core such as Crystal River, the 19 negative temperature coefficient is practically 20 zero.
In other words, it has no value, and it is 21 harder to keep a plant like that critical during 22 this transient.
23 Q
In the test that you ran at Crystal s
24 River to see if you could keep the reactor critical, 25 the operators controlled when they rejected load,
i Kelly 200
~g J
2 electrical load, is that right?
3 A
They started -- they initiated the transient, 4
is that what you mean?
5 Q
Yes.
I 6
A Yes.
7 Q
Had you and the operators reviewed what 8
would need to be done in order to control the j
9 plant, to keep it critical?
l 10 A
Yes.
l 11 Q
Had you reviewed it immediately before
()
12 the intan?.ional initiation of the transient?
l 13 A
Yes.
14 Q
So everybody was prepared for the 15 transient and knew what they should try to do in 1
16 order to keep the reactor critical?
17 A
But you don' t do anything.
The design runs 18 it back automatically.
19 Q
Have you heard of instances where l
20 plants have tripped from full load and the l
)
g{
automatic features in the design have not been able 22 to keep the reactor critical?
23 A
I don't recall.
,s.
- \\(_/
24 Q
It is a fact, is it not, that the 25 water volume in the once through steam generators
.=
~
1 Kelly 201 2
of B&W is less than the water volume in competing 3
Pressurized uater reactors sold in the United 4
States?
5 MR. KOLB:
You.are referring to all 6
competitors?
7 MR, SELTZER:
There aren't that 8
many.
i 9
MR. KOLB:
You are' referring to all t
10 competitors?
11 MR. SELTZER:
Both of them.
12 A
I don't know.
13 Q
How many years have you been with B&W?
14 A
Since 1971.
15 Q
Have you ever looked at the designs 16 of Combustion or Westinghouse?
17 A
No.
i 18 Q
You have never had anybody discuss with 19 you the fact that the water volume in your b
20 company's steam generators is substantially less
(
21 than the water volume in a Westinghouse steam 22 generator?
23 MR. KOLB:
Objection to the form.
24 A
No.
25 Q
What is the bucking bronco syndrome?
1 Kelly 202
~
s_/
2 A
It is a reference to the responsiveness of 3
e&W plants.
4 Q
Responsiveness in what way?
5 A
The ability to maneuver through transients 6
such as we were discussing on this load rejection.
7 Q
What does the phrase bucking bronco 8
have to do with the responsiveness of B&W plants 9
as you understand the reference?
t 10 A
Whoever made the reference, whoev'er said 11 that, to my understanding was referring to the 12 pressure oscillations during the Three Mile Island 13 transient, the initial part of it.
14 Q
When you say responsiveness of the 15 B&W plant, are you referring to the responsiveness 16 of the reactor coolant system to changes in 17 feedwater flow?
18 MR. KOLB:
Do you mean did he, include 19 that within his statement or is that the 20 meaning of his statement?
(m 21 Q
Is that what you meant?
22 A
That is part of-it, yes.
23 Q
As you understand the reference, 24 bucking bronco syndrome, do you understand it to I
mean that rapid infusions or losses of feedwater 25 l '
1 1
Kelly 203
%J.
2 create rapid reactions in the reactor coolant 3
system?
4 A
Would you read that back?
5 (Record read by the reporter.)
6 A
Yes.
7 Q
And the reactions that are created in 8
the reactor coolant system are rapid rises or falls 9
in pressure?
(
10 A
Yes.
11 Q
Are you familiar with the concept of
}
12 inertia?
13 A
Yes.
14 Q
If the steam generators had greater
]
15 water volume in them, there would not be,such a 16 rapid response or as rapid a response to changes 17 in feedwater, would there?
18 A
That seems reasonable.
19 Q
would you look at page 4 of GPU 20 Exhibit 133.
21 (Recess taken.)
22 BY MR. SELTZER:
23 Q
Does the phrase "all rods out" mean
~'
24 anything to you as a running mode for certain B&W 25 Plants?
n.
n,
.a-,----
i 1
Kelly 204
)
rg 2
A Yes.
3 Q
What does it mean?
4 A
It means you control the boric acid content 5
in the reactor coolant system.
Boric acid is 6
neutron poison, such that you can replace with 7
boric acid the poison equivalent of the rods, and 8
as a result withdraw the rods all the way out they are not al'1 the way out.
They 9
and operate t
10 are practically all the way out.
And o'perate that 11 way.
()
12 Q
Only some of B&W's plants are designed 13 for operation in that all rods out fashion, isn't 14 that right?
4 i
15 A
Yes.
16 Q
The rest of the plants operate even
~
17 at full load with the rods partially inserted, is 18 that right?
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
To your knowledge, is it easier to 21 keep the reactor critical in a load reduction i
22 transient on the plants that have the rods 23 partially inserted in contrast to the plants that
%)
24 are running with all rods out?
. 55 A
There is a higher probability of successfully m
e y
v----
y 6
r, y
1 Kelly 205 f -)
.( /
2 running back, if the rods start out in the core.
3 Partially inserted.
)
4 Q
It is a fact, is it not, that Three 5
Mile Island Unit 2 is a plant that was designed 6
for all rods out operation?
7 A
I don't know.
8 Q
Is Three Mile Island a 2772 MWT plant?
9 A
I don't remember.
t 10 Q
Do you know that it is the '2772 MWT 11 plants that are the all rods out plants?
)
12 A
Yes.
13 Q
So if Three Mile Island 2 'was a 14 2772 MWT plant, it would be an all rods out 15 design, right?
16 A
Most probably, yes, 17 Q
MWT means megawatts thermal?,
18 A
Yes.
19 Q
Would you look at page 4 of GPU 20 Exhibit 133 which is the second page of what l
(,
21 appears to bc Charlie England's notes.
l 22 Do you see item 2 at the top of l
23 the page under "The following design problems-gg
~
l 24 contributed to this incident"?
25 A
Yes.
l b
.m..
..~_
... ~. - - - _ - - - -, _. -
'I 1
Kelly 206
'V 2
MR. KOLB:
Objection as to form.
3 Q
Item 2 says, "The operators have no 4
indication that the electromagnetic relief valve 5
is lifted.
It took them approximately 20 minutes 6
to realize that the valve was still relieving.
7 By that time, reactor coolant system pressure had 8
dropped to less than 1600 psi and SFAS actuated."
9 SFAS Is what?
t 10 A
I d o'n ' t remember the exact words.'
11 Q
That is safety Features Actuation 12 System?
13 MR. KOLB:
Do you know?
14 A
I don't remember.
15 Q
Does it refer to safety features?
16 A
Yes.
17 Q
Take a look at your sequence of events, 18 paragraph 2,
second line from the bottom.
Do you 19 see where you have got the SFAS in parenthesis?
20 A
Yes.
21 Q
Does that refresh your recollection 22 as to what SFAS stands for?
j r
23 A
Yes.
24 Q
What does it stand for?
25 A
Safety Features Actuation System.
l
~-
.. I
i 1
Kelly 207 fsC 2
Q The statement "The operators have 3
no indication tnat the electromagnetic relief valve 4
is lifted," refers to the lack of direct indi, cation C
5 of whether the valve itself was open or shut, is 1
6 that right?
7 MR. KOLB:
You are asking what he 8
understood it to mean?
9 MR. SELTZER:
Righ*t.
10 A
Did you say direct indication?
I's that the 11 word?
O 12 Q
Yes.
gg) -
13 A
Yes.
14 Q
Electromagnetic relief valve is the 15 same as the Pilot Operated Relief Valve?,
16 A
Yes.
17 Q
Item 4 under " Corrective Actions" has 18 as its second sentence, "TECO also considering 19 taking action to correct design problems mentioned 20 above."
(.
21 Do you know what actions Toledo Edison l
22 Company was considering taking to correct the 23 second design problem listed above, namely, that
(
i 24 the operators have no indication that the Pilot r
25 Operated Relief Valve is lifted?
l l
1 Kelly 208 fs 2
MR. KOLB:
Objection to the form.
3 A
No.
4 Q
Item 6 under " Corrective Action" 5
states, "B&W Engineering aid in reviewing events 6
that led to incident and consequences of incident 7
and identify further action required."
8 Do you know what work B&W did to 9
identify further action required?
t 10 MR. KOLB:
Objection to the' form.
11 A
No.
! ~.)
12 Q
In the training that you r.eceived at
(<
13 B&W on reactor operation including the~ training 14 on the simulator, were you ever trained on a 15 transient in which pressurizer water level moved 16 in a different direction from reactor coolant 17 system pressure?
18 A
I don't recall.
19 Q
You don't recall any such transient?
20 A
No.
(
21 Q
No, you do not?
22 A
No, I do not recall being trained on transients 23 where pressurizer water level and pressure were f.
24 going in different directions.
1 25 Q
You said that you were surprised-to learn i
209 1
Kelly b
2 of the boiling in the reactor coolant system at 3
the Davis and Besse plant.
4 In your experience with B&W, had you 5
ever heard of boiling or saturation occurring j
6 in a reactor coolant system of a B&W designed plant?
7 A
No.
8 Q
In the fall of 1977, how many people 9
were in Eric Swanson's group?
10 A
Five ~ or six.
~
11 Q
Did Eric hold periodic meetings of his
(
12 group?
t 13 A
Yes.
I I
14 Q
How frequently?
15 A
Approximately every couple of months.
16 Q
Did Bruce Karrasch hold periodic meetings 17 of his plant integration group in or about 1977?
18 A
Yes.
19 Q
Were all the engineers in the section 20 invited to those meetings?
(
21 A
From his unit, yes.
22 Q
How frequently did Bruce Karrasch 23 hold mee'ings of the Plant Integration Unit?
c O
24
.A He tried to do them annually.
25 Q
He didn't hold meetings more frequently?
-a
~ _ _ - - -.
1 1
Kelly 210 c,,
(
2 A
No.
3 Q
Would you go out to some country club 4
or hotel for the annual meeting?
5 A
No, 6
Q Where was it held?
7 A
One of the conference rooms, 8
Q Was it sort of a combination Christmas 9
party, annual meeting?
t 10 A
No.
11 Q
Was it a pure business meeting?
[~
12 A
Yes.
M) i 13 Q
How long did it last?
14 A
They usually lasted about two hours.
15 Q
When in the course of each year were 16 those meetings generally held?
17 A
I don't remember a pattern.
18 Q
You think there was a pattern?
19 A
No, that is why I said approximately annually.
20 Q
Between Davis-Besse's September 1977
(-
21 transient and the famous Three Mile Island accident, 22 how many, if any, meetings of the Plant Integration 23 Unit were held?
O 24 A
I don't remember.
25 Q
You think at least one was held?
)
1 Kelly 211 sm-l 2
A
- Yes, 3
Q was there an agenda generally prepared 4
for these meetings?
5 A
No.
6 Q
What was the purpose of the meetings 7
as you understood?
8 A
Bruce Karrasch would call the unit together 9
to evaluate how we had performed as a unit in t
10 the past year and what the goals were for the 11 current year and then pass along any information
(
12 that he had obtained that he thought was 13 appropriate from higher level manageme~nt meetings 14 that he was involved with.
15 Q
Did you discuss the Davis-Besse transient 16 at any of the Bruce Karrasch annual meetings?
17 A
No, not that I recall.
18 Q
Did you discuss your concern about 19 inappropriate termination of high pressure injection a
20 at any of the Bruce Karrasch meetings?
(
21 A
Not that I recall.
22 Q
At any of the meetings that Eric Swanson's 23 group had, did you discuss the Davis-Besse transient?
O f
N ~Y 24 A
Not that I recall.
25 Q
At any of Eric's bi-monthly meetings,
. -. - ~..
4 l
1 Kelly 212 V
2 did you discuss your concern and Eric's concern about inappropriate termination of high pressure 3
4 injection?
5 A
Not that I remember.
6 Q
Why not?
7 I will withdraw the question.
8 In GPU Exhibit 152, would you take a 9
look at page 7 and the pages like it which follow.
(
10 What is the heading at the top of page~7 in the 11 third column?
N_)/
12 A
" Event from Cocputer Alarm Printer."
13 Q
What do you understand that refers to?
14 MR. KOLB:
We have a problem.
He said 15 earlier he didn't actually remember whether 16 he got this particular exhibit.
I think it 17 would be inappropriate to ask him to 18 comment unless he had a recollection.
On the
)
19 other hand, I am not intending by this to 20 prevent you from developing factual information,
(
21 if there is an appropriate way to do it.
I 22 no tice, for example, at least at this point t
I 23 the information you are referring to on 152 b
~'
24 appears to appear also on 133.
25 MR. SELTZER:
They are slightly different.
l l
1 Kelly 213 2
MR. KOLB:
I understand there is going 3
to be some differences too.
If you can put 4
the question so you were not calling upon 5
him to answer as if he had read this, because 6
he appears to be uncertain as to whether he 7
ever did.
8 MR. SELTZER:
All I want to do is 9
understand the document.'
I think Mr. Kelly e
10 who is one of the more knowledgeable people 11 on sequence of events on Davis and Besse is
()
12 probably as good a person as any.just to tell 13 us what the document means.
We can call 14 Faist and Bruce Karrasch and Lee Rogers and 15 a lot of the other recipients of it, if 16 we have to understand this.
1 17 MR. KOLB:
You have Mr. Rogers listed 18 as a person you are going to examine.
19 MR. SELTZER:
We probably have Bruce 20 listed also.
21 MR. KOLB:
I think it is appropriate 22 to ask people about documents when they 23 receive them, not when they are not sure
- f I
'~'
24 they have received them.
25 MR. SELTZER:
You did say this is a
l
(~
Kelly 214 V
2 document containing information which appears 3
in a document which he has read --
~
4 MR. KOLB:
Which I have here and put 5
before the witness.
6 Q
What do you understand the reference 7
to event under computer alarm printer means?
8 A
It means of everything that is printed out-9 on the computer alarm printer, these particular i
10 events were for some reason extracted o'ut and listed 11 here.
()
12 Q
Would you turn to page 8 of Exhibit 133.
13 At 21:40:22, what do you understand was happening 14 in the plant?
15 MR. KOLB:
Are you asking for his 16 understanding of the event that appears next 17 to that hour, or are you asking for the total 18 condition of the plant?
19 MR. SELTZER:
That is exactly what I 20 want.
21 MR. KOLB:
Just the event that is
- I 22 listed next to that hour, right?
23 MR. SELTZER:
Yes.
%J 24 A
To me it means that the containment sump has 25 a pump in it that when the level comes up to a
1 Kelly 215 i
s.
2 certain point, the pump will turn on and start 3
pumping the water out of tne sump.
4 Q
The sump pump is a pump that is at a 5
very low point in the containment building, is 6
that right?
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
Do you see the comment to the right?
9 A
Yes.
t 10 Q
That comment says " Rupture' disk had 11 broken."
Do you understand that is the. rupture disk
(
12 on the reactor coolant drain tank that is being 13 referred to there?
14 A
Yes.
15 Q
Do you understand this to be. stating 16 that the water which the containment sump is 17 pumping out of the containment building is what that has 18 come from the reactor coolant drain tank?
19 A
That is the inference, yes.
20 Q
The reactor coolant drain tank draws 21 its water from where?
22 A
There are several contributors that will dump 23 into the drain tank.
gg
(_)
24 Q
What are they?
25-A Either of two mechanical primary code relief y
y
1 Kelly 216 b
V.
2 valves on the tcp of the pressurizer can dump to the drain tank.
The Pilot Operated Relief Valve when 3
4 it is open can dump to the drain tank.
5 Q
In other words, the only source of water 6
for the reactor coolant drain tank is the pressurizer?
7 A
That is all I remember now, yes.
8 Q
That is the same in Three Mile Island 9
Unit 2 as in Davis-Besse, ri gh t?
10 A
Yes.
11 Q
What is the event that is described 12 as taking place at 21: 40:34?
13 A
It says high pressure injection turned off.
14 Q
Do you understand that to mean that 15 is the point in time at which the operators 16 manually terminated high pressure injection?
If 17 it helps, in your sequence of events, you wrote 18 at time 21:40:34, "The operator stopped the high 19 pressure injection pumps."
So you agree that the 20 entry on page 8 of 85 for 21:40:34 indicates that
(.
21 is'the time at which the operators manuallp i
22 terminated high pressure injection?
23 A
Y'S-24 Q
Is it correct that, shortly after 25 receiving the computer alarm printout that the U l
i 1
Kelly 217 V
2 containment sump was pumping water, the operators 3
at Davis-Besse manually terminated high pressure 4
injection?
5 MR. KOLB:
When you say is it true, 6
are you asking him?
7 Q
Is that your understanding from the 8
data?
9 A
Yes.
i 10 Q
How long was it before the' operators i
11 turned high pressure injection back on?
(~)h 12 MR. KOLB:
Are you asking him to read 13 these documents and answer the question, or 14 do you have something else in mind?
15 g
Yes, please.
16 A
My sequence of_ events says at 22:23 the 17 operators started the high pressure injec, tion pump.
4 18 MR. KOLB:
That is Exhibit 151.
19 Q
From 2140 to 2223, the high pressure 20 injection pumps were off at Davis-Besse?
(,
21 A
High pressure injection is off.
22 Q
so for approximately 43 minutes, the 23 operators had manually throttled out high pressure 24 injection?
Turned it off?
25 A
Yes.
s Kelly 218 1
O J
t 2
Q And all of those 43 minutes were after 3
they had received the signal that there was water 4
being pumped out of the containment building from 5
the containment building sump pump, right?
6 A
It was after that signal was available to 7
them from the computer, yes.
8 Q
What is the difference between a 4
9 makeup pump and a high pressure injection pump?
i 10 A
They are physically the same pump.
It is 11 the function that is being used that determines the
('))
12 difference.
13 Q
When did the operators begin pushing 14 water in with makeup pumps on the Da'vis-Besse 15 transient?
16 A
Again my sequence of events says at 2215 the 17 operators started a second makeup pump to try to 18 stop the precsurizer level decrease.
19 Q
That is approximately 25 minutes after 1
20 they had gotten the signal on their alarm printer
(
21 that the sump pump-was pumping water out of the 22 containment building, is that right?
23 A
Yes.
IT) 24 Q
You say that makeup pumps and high j
1 25 pressure injection pumps are the same thing but it
{
1 Kelly 219 2
refers to a different function being performed.
3 What are the different functions?
4 A
During normal reactor operation, the makeup 5
pump is used, is running continuously, to pump 6
water into the reactor coolant system, and through 7
the reactor coolant pump seals, and as reactor 8
coolant is continuously being let down to the 9
makeup system and purified.
That is going on 4,
10 continuously during operation.
Even when you 11 shut down.
That is going on.
(~'}
12 On the high pressure injection function is-
%)
i 13 required an additional makeup-pump is started, and 14 four high pressure injection line valves are 15 opened to provide additional paths into the 16 reactor coolant system.
17 Q
Have you ever talked with John 18 MacMillyan?
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
When?
k 21 MR. KOLB:
Do you mean ever?
22 MR. SELTZER:
Yes, ever.
23 A
Most recently, it was_in Atlanta at the B&W i
\\#
24 operating experience seminar given at tl.e beginning 25 of April of this year.
-r-r-
(
4 1
Kelly 220 OV 2
Q When prior to that had you epoken to 3
him?-
4 A
At a similar conference in Atlanta given 5
in March of 1980.
6 Q
When prior to that?
Is there one 7
in between that you missed?
8 A
No.
I am scrry.
Did I say that previous 9
conference was in Atlanta agai'n?
t 10 Q
Yec.
11 A
I meant New Orleans.
12 Q
When prior to March 1980 had you spoken 13 with John MacMillyan?
14 A
In the summer of 1979 at Old Forest Road 15 in Lynchburgh.
16 Q
Where in the B&W headquarters did you 17 have that conversation with him?
18 A
That was at my desk.
19 Q
How long a conversation was that?
20 A
Approximately 15 minutes or 20 minutes.
(_
21 Q
was that after the Kemeny Commission 22 hearings?
23 A
Yes.
d 24 Q
As best you can recall in words or-25 substance, what did you.say to Jo'hn MacMillyan, and d
g s-
,, ~ <
r,-
--r->--
1 Kelly 221
(~1 v.
2 what did he say to you on that occasion?
3 A
He told me that he was talking to all of 4
the individuals involved with the sequence of 5
memos starting with mine that had recently come 6
out in the public hearings at the Kemeny Commission, 7
and he wanted each one of us to know that he 8
didn't feel.that there was any blame involved 9
or any individual responsible, and he had no 10 intentions of pursuing the matter along those lines 11 at all, and that although it was unfortunate that
(~}
12 the instructions never got out, he wanted to
%j 13 reassure me that I should not-in any way worry about 14 it and just continue on with business.
i 15 Q
In what way did you understand he 16 meant it was unfortunate?
17 A
He didn't explain why he thought it was 18 unfortunate.
19 Q
How did you understand it when he used 20 that word?
(
21 A
He may not have used the word.
We were 22 talking about what I. remembered about what I 23 thought the impressions were.
It may have been 24 regretful or something like that, but my feelings 25 again --
1 Kel3y 222 d
2 Q
What was your understanding of what 3
he meant when he indicated to you in substance 4
that it was unfortunate that the instructions had 5
not gone out from B&W7 i
6 A
I don't recall any impressions, thinking 7
about that one way or another.
Q Was it your feeling at that time that 8
9 it was unfortunate that the instructions had not i
10 been sent out?
11 A
Yes.
['}
12 Q
Why did you think it was unfortunate?
v 13 A
I agreed with the things that Frank Walters 14 told me about it which was that the operators 15 hadn't followed the instructions they al, ready had 16 and that if our prescription would have gone out, 17 they probably wouldn't have followed that any way, 18 but I felt like if it would have gone out, then 19 there could have been no question of any responsibility 20 or nothing to make an issue out of.
None of this 21 would have come up.
This was my feeling.
22 Q
None of what would have come up?
23 A
Right here, now.
,I [ #
24 C
What had Frank Walters said to you that 25 you were just referring to?
223 1
Kelly
)
J 2
A What I told you was as close as I can come 3
to quoting him.
It was words to the effect of 4
it wouldn't have made any difference if the 5
prescription went out, because they already had 6
procedures there and didn't follow those.
I 7
didn't ask him any details.
8 Q
When did Frank say that to you?
9 A
That was in a meeting I'had with Frank and 10 Don Hallman around June of 1979, 11 Q
Was Frank referring both to the (T,
12 instructions that you had drafted and the
\\,_.)
~
13 instructions that Bert Dunn had drafted when he 14 made the statement that he did to you?
15 MR. KOLB:
I take it you are, asking 16 whether Mr. Kelly understood him to be 17 referring to the instructions, rather than 18 your asking him to actually read Mr. Walter's 19 mind?
20 MR. SELTZER:
You bet.
(.
21 A
I don't remember him making a distinction, 22 nor do I remember making a distinction in my mind 23 either.
We were talking about the whole sequence n.
t 1
'w/
24 of memos.
25 g
so you weren't just talking of your e
l l
l 224 1
Kelly OO 2-memo, but Bert Dunn's two memos also, correct?
3 A
During the context of the conversation, that 4
came up, yes.
5 Q
Do you believe that Frank Walters was 6
saying that it wouldn't have made any difference 7
if they had sent out your memo or Bert Dunn's 8
February memoranda.
Is that what you understood 9
he was saying?
10 A
Yes.
11 Q
Bert Dunn's February 16, 1978 guidelines 12 included a 50 degree subcooling rule, didn't they?
13 A
could I look at a copy of it, please?
14 Q
Sure.
I would like to show you 15 Exhibit 79 for identification.
16 (Record read by the reporter.)
17 A
Yes.
~
18 Q
You are not aware of B&W communicating 19 a 50 degree subcooling rule to any of its operating 20 utilities before the Three Mile Island accident, (s
21 are you?
22 A
No.
23 Q
That was a new instruction that Bert O
24 was suggesting, right?
25 A
I don't know.
~
l i
i I
'l 225 l
Kelly
(~
V 2
MR. KOLB You are asking to the 3
extent he knows?
1 4
MR. SELTZER:
Yes.
5 Q
Was it your understanding that the 6
Davis-Besse operators had also ignored. procedures 7
that they had when they terminated high pressure 8
injection at the time that pressurizer water level 9
was first rising?
t 10 A
No,
'I don't know that.
11 Q
You have never looked into that?
12 A
No.
J 13 Q
At some point in time, you were put in-
^
14 charge of the ATOG program, right?
15 A
Yes.
Would you define in charge?,
16 Q
What did you mean when you said yes?
17 A
I was project engineer for the technical ma g fof the program.
18 r
19 Q
one of the objectives that you j
20 outl'ined for the ATOG program was to simplify the 21 procedures for operating nuclear plants, is that 22 right?
23 MR. KOLB:
Just so we can be clear, because his position is a position in 24 25 relation to others.
When you say you outlined, s
n.-
,. -. - _. ~. - - -. -
L 1
226 1
Kelly Nsi 2
are you talking about the company or Mr. Kelly 3
personally or both?
What do you mean exactly?
4 MR. SELTZER:
J.J.
Kelly.
pr
-X 5
(Record read by the reporter.)
G A
Yes.
7 Q
You recognized, didn't you, that before 8
the Three Mile Island accident, the procedures 9
that the plants had were proce'dures that had been i
10 drafted with the assistance and participation of 11 B&W, isn't that right?
[O')
12 MR. KOLB:
You are talking about the 13 procedures as a whole?
You are not talking 14 about every single procedure, am I right?
15 MR. SELTZER:
The operating procedures, 16 the emergency procedures, the abnormal transient 17 procedures which the B&W designed plants 18 were working with.
19 A
We supplied them with draft material to 20 write those procedures, yes, 21 Q
And B&W in some cases supplied engineers s
22 pursuant to contract to assist the utilities in 23 completing the drafts of those procedures, isn't r
24 that right?
I don't mean in every case, but you 25 are familiar with the fact that some utilities did
_.. _ - - - - _.., _ ~.. ~
}
1 4
227 1
Kelly
(,, \\
v 2
pay for additional engineering services from B&W 3
to complete the drafts of their procedures, am I 4
correct?
5 A
Yes.
6 Q
You have noted in your ATOG work that 7
the procedures that had been drafted before 8
the Three Mile Island accident tended to require 9
the operators to identify what the upset event was t
10 in order to find the emergency procedures with 11 which to respond to the upset event, isn't that
("]s 12 correct?
13 A
Yes.
14 Q
You believed that that was unduly 15 cumbersome, didn't you?
That it should be simplified?
16 MR. KOLB:
There are two questions there.
17 One is unduly cumbersome, and another should
,J e 18 it be simplified.
19 MR. SELTZER:
'Let's take them in pieces.
i s.
l 20 Q
You recognized as the technical director i
I l
S 21 of th( ATOG program that a procedure which required 22 that the operator identify the cause of the upset 23 before he could turn to the emergency procedure to
\\'
24 deal with the upset was unduly cumbersome, didn't you?
25 A
I thought it was cumbersome.
My hesitation is
~
1 Kelly 228 O'
v 2
the word unduly.
I don't know what that means.
3 Q
You thought it was unnecessarily 4
cumbersome, didn't you?
5 A
Yes.
6 Q
You felt that the procedures could be 7
simplified so it would be easier for the operators 8
to make the appropriate operating response to a 9
Y 10 A
That was at the time a desired objective.
I 11 didn't know at the time that it could be done.
That j
12 was an objective to try to do something like that.
L 13 Q
Why did you think that was desirable?
14 A
Anything that could be done to assist the 15 operator or make his task any easier would have to 16 be an improvement.
17 Q
What you were saying was desirable as 18 the director of the. technical side of the abnorma3 19 transient operating guidelines program was that 20 the operators should only have to recognize the
'\\.
21 symptoms of the upset event. in order to know what 22 the correct emergency response was, isn't that true?
23 A
That was a desired cbjective, yes.
/~)
2 24 Q
Would you take a loox at the famous
}
25 J.J.
Kelly November 1,
1977 guidelines, GPU Exhibit 76.
i
1 Kelly 229
%)
2 You stated about two-thirds of the way 3
down "I recommend the following guidelines be 4
sent."
Do you see that?
5 A
Yes.
6 Q
You had two guidelines for the conditions 7
under which an operator could appropriately decide 8
whether to terminate or bypass high pressure 9
injection, right?
t 10 A
Yes.
11 Q
High pressure injection is a system 12 that automatically actuates, right?
1 13 A
Yes.
14 Q
So it doesn't require any operator action 15 to actuate high pressure injection, right?
16 A
Right.
17 Q
When reactor coolant system pressure 18 falls below a certain point known as a trip point 19 or set point, high pressure injection automatically 20 comes on, right?
21 A
Right.
m 22 Q
What is that pressure at the time you 23 were wri ting your f amous memo?
24 A
In some of our plants, it was 1600 pounds, 25 and in some of our plants it was 1500 pounds.
1 Kelly 230
\\.)
4 2
Q You have two prescriptions here or 3
guidelines on when an operator could terminate high 4
pressure injection, right?
s 5
A Yes.
Well 6
Q The first one says 7
A The first one is not a prescription on when 8
he could stop it.
It is an sdmonition to not stop 9
it under given circumstances.
a 10 Q
Never interfere with its actuation, in 11 fact, right?
12 A
Yes.
13 Q
So that it is only the second guideline 14 which tells the operator when he could terminate 15 following its automatic actuation?
16 A
Yes.
17 Q
Under your.second guideline shich you
\\
18 recommended be sent, and I take it sent means sent 19 to all operators of B&W plants?
Is that what you 20 meant by sent?
(
21 MR. KOLB:
Are you asking him whether i
22 he meant that B&W should send it directly to 23 op3rators?
i
~]
24 MR. SELTZER:
No.
Just that it should i-25 be supplied to those who operate B&W plants.
~d
l 1
1 Kelly 231
/~N U
2 MR. KOLB:
Operate doesn't mean the 3
operator in the control room.
It means in 4
the general sense of supervision or running 5
the plant.
6 MR. SELTZER:
Let him tell us what he 7
meant instead of you and I.
8 MR. KOLB:
Ask him that question.
9 Q
To whom did you recommend these be sent?
10 Whom were you thinking of when you said you recommend l
11 they be sent?
12 A
If they were re' quired, I intended they be 13 sent to our operating plants.
14 Q
So that they would get into the hands 15 of the people that operate the plants?
16 A
Yes.
17 Q
You said that item b is the only guideline 18 that you were recommending be sent and given to 19 the people who operate the plants that would tell 20 them'when they could properly shut off high pressure
/
b(.
21 injection, right?
22 A
Ye8-s 23 Q
Am I correct there is nothing in b that
(~T
\\
m 24 requires the operators to identify what the source 25 of the upset event or transient is, is that correct'?
T
.\\s n..
y'
I Kelly 232 O-2 A
That's correct, f
3 Q
In order to follow your guideline b, 4
all the operators have to do is know the high f
\\x 5
Pressure injection has automatically actuated and 6
then proceed to watch for the three conjunctive 7
signals that you have listed there, is that right?
8 A
Yes.
9 Q
By conjunctive, I*mean they are three 10 conditions which all have to be met, right?
11 A
Yes.
12 Q
In many ways your guideline b is like 13 the simplified procedures that you were proposing 14 be developed when you were director of the technical 15 side of the ATOG program, isn't that right?
16 A
The current ATOG recommendation is different, 17 but insofar as they are both a symptom type, yes.
T s
18 Q
Bert Dunn's February 16, 1978 guidelines also symptom' type guidelines, aren't they, of 19 are the simp ified form.you said was desirable when you 20 were head of the ATOG program?
f
';(
21 s
22 A
Yes, in that respect, that's right.
s Z3 Q
Prior to the Three Mile Island accident,
' ~
s
~
[/]
s N-24 B&W had never communicated to the operating utilities 25 Procedures for handling high pressure injection which-ss
~
\\^
s
':L'g
i l
1 Kelly 233 s
2 were stated in this simplified symptom format, had 1
3 B&W?
4 A
I don't know.
5 Q
Not to your knowledge?
6 MR. KOLB:
He didn't say that.
He said 7
he didn't know.
8 Q
To your knowledge, had they?
9 MR. KOLB:
Do you know?
(
10 A
No.
11 Q
When you were developing the more 12 desirable symptom format guidelines in the ATOG
~
13 program, did you find any procedures for controlling 14 high pressure injection which had previously been 15 transmitted to utilities which were in t,he format 16 of either your November 1,
1977 recommendation or 17 Bert Dunn's February 16, 1978 recommendation?
By J
18 previously, I mean before the Three Mile Island 19 a c c.'. d e n t.
20 MR. KOLB:
What do you mean by format?
21 MR. SELTZER:
I mean that the operators 22 would not have to identify the source of the 23' transient before they were given guidance on O
5
/
24 how to make an emergency response.
~'
25 A
I don't remember finding any procedures like
i Kelly 234 7_y 2
that, no.
3 Q
It is a fact, is it not, that as part 4
of your work on the ATOG program, you did review 5
the procedures that were ir4 place prior to the 6
Three Mile Island accident?
7 MR. KOLB:
When you say in place, are 8
you talking about in place at all of the 9
individual operating plants?
10 MR. SELTZER:
No, I mean as drafted by 11 B&W.
b[~
12 MR. KOLB:
The drafts that B&W prepared, 13 A
I did not personally.
The people who worked 14 for me did.
15 Q
Did people working on the ATOG program 16 review some of the procedures that were actually 17 in place at some of the operating plants?
18 A
Yes.
19 Q
Did they review the procedures that 20 had'been actually in place at Three Mile Island
(-
21 Unit 27 A
Not to my knowledge.
22 23 Q
Do you know which plants' procedures
)
t were actually reviewed?
24 25 A
Only the members of the ATOG program.
Three
,.--.--,,-,e
-.n-,
r
1 Kelly 235 j.s
+
2 Mile Island Unit 2 was not a member.
3 Q
Was Unit 1 a member?
4 A
Yes.
5 Q
Did you review Unit l's procedures?
i 6
A Again, not personally, but the people working 7
for me would have reviewed those.-
8 Q
When Frank Walters told you that he 9
thought the operators would ha've disregarded your t
10 guidelines or Bert Dunn's guidelines, had they had 11 them, did you point out to Frank that your guidelines
/'T 12 and Dunn's were simplified instructions, more b
13 simple to follow than the other procedures that i
14 operators had?
15 A
No.
16 Q
In June 1979, when you had this 17 conversation with Frank Walters, had you yet developed 18 your ideas on simplified symptom oriented procedures?
19 A
No.
20 Q.
When Frank told you what he did, did
(
21 it occur to you that your procedures that you had 22 drafted November 1977 were simpler to follow than 23 the event oriented procedures that B&W had 24 previously drafted?
25 MR. KOLB:
Objection to the form.
e 1
Kelly 236 2
A No.
3 Q
It didn't occur to you?
4 A
No.
5 Q
When did you learn that you were goir.g 6
to be asked to address the large group of people in 7
training room B on your return from Davis-Besse?
8 A
While I was still at the site.
9 Q
Who gave you the invitation?
t 10 A
I don't remember.
11 Q
Have you ever heard anybody else other 12 than Frank Walters express the opinion that if 13 the operators at Three Mile Island had had either 14 your simplified instructions or Bert Dunn's 15 simplified February 1978 instructions, they would 16 have ignored those also?
17 A
I can't remember.
18 Q
When you drafted your November 1,
1977 19 guidelines, you sent a copy to Norm.Elliott, right?
20 A
Yes.
(,
- 21 Q
It was your intention, wasn't it, that 22 if your guidelines were sent to the operating plants, 23 they would also be incorporated into the training
)
l
'N
/
24 that Norm Elliott's department was giving to 25
. operators, isn't that right?
i l
i i
1 Kelly 237 2
MR. KOLB:
Incorporated anew?
3 MR. SELTZER:
Incorporated in any way 4
whatsoever.
5 A
No, because this is what I thought they were 6
teaching the training people.
7 Q
You learned from the Davis-Besse transient 8
that pressurizer water level and reactor coolant 9
system pressure had been going in opposite directions
(
10 simultaneously, right?
11 A
Yes.
("N 12 Q
You also learned there had been the G) 13 surprising occurrence of saturation in the reactor 14 coolant system, right?
15 A
Yes.
16 Q
Did you discuss with anybody in the 17 Training Department whether either of those two 18
. events had previously been included in any of the 19 training that was being given to operators?
1 20 A
I don't remember asking those questions then.
(,
21 Q
From the training that you had received f
I 22 at B&W, I think you testified yesterday, but I will r
23 ask it again because your counsel doesn't like l
. O 1
f i
Nm/
24 when I ask you to confirm what you testified to j
25 yesterday, do you recall receiving any training from 1
e 6
y y
I Kelly 238 2
B&W on the significance of saturation occurring in the 3
4 A
I don't remember that.
5 Q
Even though you had.never received any 6
training in the course of your B&W operator training 7
on either the occurrence of saturation or the 8
movement of pressurizer water level in an opposite 9
direction from reactor coolant system pressure, is e
10 it correct that you never suggested following 11 Davis-Besse that either of those events be included
(
12 in the training of operators?
13 A
I don't remember making those suggestions, no.
'4 Q
From your ATOG experience, are you 15 familiar with the fact that now both of those 16 occurrences are taught in the B&W training program?
17 MR. KOLB:
Objection to the f}orm.
18 A
I know our Training Department is using ATOG 19 information in their training programs, but I don't 20 know if they are highlighting those things that you
(.
21 are mentioning or not.
22 Q
Are you still involved with the ATOG 23 program?
[~'t 24 A
Yes, I am.
25 Q
Does the ATOG program-stress the importance
9 b
1 Kelly 239 2
of recognizing the significance of saturation in t
3 the reactor coolant system?
4 A
Yes.
5 Q
Does the ATOG program also include 4
6 preparing the operators for the possibility that 7
reactor coolant system pressure can go in a 8
direction opposite pressurizer water level?
9 A
That subject is covered in detail in ATOG E
10 manuals, yes.
11 (Luncheon recess taken at 12:30 o' clock.)
12 13 14 15 16 17
~
{
18 19 20 21 22 23 O
24 25
,. ~..
.,s
I Kelly 240 I
2 AF T E RN O O N S E S S I O N 3
(2:00 o' clock P.M.)
4 J OS E P H J.
KE LLY J
R.,
5 having been previous 1'y duly sworn, resumed, 6
and testified further as follows:
7 EXAMINATION (continued)
O BY MR. SELTZER:
9 Q
What time of day was the training room
(
10 B meeting following your return from Da'vis-Besse?
11 A
It was in the afternoon.
12 Q
How long did the meeting last?
13 A
Perhaps an hour.
In that order.
14 Q
There has been testimony from varioud 15 attendees at the meeting placing the number of 16 attendees at between 30 and 50.
Is that the range 17 that you would place it in?
18 A
Yes.
19 Q
Have you ever attempted to reconstruct 20 or participate in any attempt to reconstruct who
(_,
21 was at that meeting?
22
-A I.have attempted to reconstruct who was at 23 that meeting when asked similar questions in previous 24 testimony.
That is the only time I can remember.
25 Q
You have never tried to reconstruct who
~
1 Kelly 241
\\,)
2 was at that meeting at any time except when asked 3
that question when you were under oath?
4 A
That's correct.
5 Q
You have previously testified that the 6
following were at the meeting:
Dunn, Jones, Roy, 7
Hallman, Faist, Montgomery, Karrasch, MacMillyan 8
for part of the meeting.
9 Any other people you believe were there?
t 10 MR. KOLB:
Objection as to form.
11 MR. SELTZER:
I am just reiterating
()
12 sworn testimony.
13 MR. KdLB:
I am not questioning you, I
14 but it is just that I don't have the sworn 15 testimony before me, we are not going to 16 assume that to be correct.
17 A
I can't remember anybody els6 who sas there 18 during the meeting.
19 Q
what about Eric?
20 A
I don't remember Eric being there.
21 Q
Do you have any women engineers at B&W?
22 A
Yes.
23 g
Do any of them work in Integration?
i I
SM Did any of them work in Integration?
25 A
No.
)
1 Kelly 242
,_[J
\\
2 Q
Were there any women present at your 3
presentation?
4 A
I don't remember.
5 Q
How much of the time were you speaking 6
and how much of the time was Faist speaking?
7 A
I don't remember.
8 Q
You testified at your Kemeny deposition 9
that you showed the attendees at the meeting the t
10 trace of primary pressure.
Is it correct you 11 showed a trace of primary pressure?
12 MR. KOLB:
Objection to the form.
13 A
Yes.
14 Q
was there any other plant parameter 15 shown on that trace?
16 A
I don't remember.
17 Q
Did you show the people in the room 18 any plot or trace that showed temperature?
19 A
I don't remember.
20 Q
You described to the people in the
(
21 room the fact that the reactor coolant system i
22 began to boil at one point in the transient, right?
l 23 A
Yes.
' )
i
\\
's 2 24 Q
As best you can recall, what did you I
25.
say to them about the occurrence of saturation or
1 Kelly 243 m
2 boiling in the reactor coolant system?
3 Let me be more specific.
4 Did you let the attendees in the room 5
know that you believe you had discovered something 6
unusual or surprising in your discovery that 7
boiling had occurred in the reactor coolant system?
8 A
No, not that I remember.
9 Q
Was it more a ho-hum by the way, we also
(
10 had some b' oiling?
Is that the sense that you 11 conveyed to the people in the room?
{a^}
12 A
No.
13 Q
Did you point out the occurrence of 14 boiling as being a key or significant event in 15 the Davis-Besse transient?
16 A
Yes.
17 Q
Why did you believe it was a ~ key or 18 significant event?
19 A
one of the questions we had to answer before 20 restarting Davis-Besse one was whether or not 21 boiling-in the core had any deleterious effect 22 upon the fuel, and similarly, whether running the 23 reactor coolant pumps in cavitation had any O
\\l 24 deleterious effects on the reactor coolant pumps.
25
-Q I take it Bert Dunn and Bob Jones quickly y_._
s
i 1
Kelly 244 NJ 2
allayed any concern you had on both of those 3
points?
4 A
on one of them, yes.
5 Q
on the fuel damage point?
6 A
Yes.
7 Q
who, if anybody, allayed your concerns 8
regarding whether cavitation had harmed the reactor 9
coolant pumps?
(
10 A
I don't remember.
11 Q
Did someone?
rw 12 A
Yes.
13 Q
Have you ever seen any reports on the 14 ability of reactor coolant pumps to operate with 15 void fractions in the primary system?
16 A
No.
17 Q
You have never seen any report on that?
18 A
Not that I remember.
19 Q
Have you ever seen anything in writing 20 on that?
t 21 A
Not that I recall.
22 Q
As you sit here today, do you know 4
23 that in fact the reactor coolant pumps supplied by G
24 Babcock & Wilcox are capable of continuing to run 25 with very high void fractions?
l l
l
)
f 1
Kelly 245 b\\d 2
A Would you repeat the question?
3 Q
Do you know, based on your present 4
knowledge, that the reactor coolant pumps supplied 5
by Babcock & Wilcox are capable of sustaining 6
effective core cooling while there is a very high 7
void fraction in the reactor coolant system?
8 A
Yes.
9 Q
Do you know that they are capable of i
10 sustaining effective cooling with up to and including 11 a 100 percent void fraction?
m i
12 A
Yes.
Y 13 Q
When did you first come to know that?
14 A
I don't remember.
15 Q
Approximately when?
16 A
The fall of 1979.
17 Q
You did not know that before the Three 18 Mile Island catastrophe, is that right?
19 MR. KOLB:
Objection to the form.
20 A
I don't recall knowing it.
(,
21 Q
How did you learn it in the fall of 1979?
22 A
During the development of the abnormal 23 transient operating guidelines we provided in
'^'
24 those guidelines instructions on running the 25 reactor. coolant pumps both in. saturated conditions
1 Kelly 246
%)
2 and super heated conditions, lo somewhere during 3
the developments of those, I found it out.
4 Q
From whom did you find it out?
5 A
I d,o n ' t remember.
6 Q
What unit was that person in?
l 7
A I don't remember.
4 8
Q Do you know Bob Jones pretty well?
9 A
Professionally, yes.
t 2
10 Q
Bert Dunn?
11 A
Yes.
4 12 Q
Do you think it was either of them 13 that gave-you this information?
14 A
I don't remember.
15 Q
You think you ever talked to.either of 16 them about the ability of reactor coolant pumps 17 to continue to supply effective cooling with a 18 100 percent void fraction?
19 A
I don't remember.
20 Q
Based on your present knowledge, are you
(,
21 aware that reactor coolant pumps supplied by 22 Babcock & Wilcox can continue to function effectively 23 for a matter of days with a 100 percent void i
n 24 fraction?
'~
25 A
No.
r.,-
,..n.-
,n.
--...+-m,~
I Kelly 247 s
j 2
Q What is your understanding about how 3
long reactor coolant pumps supplied by B&W can 4
continue to function effectively with a 100 percent 5
void fraction?
6 A
I don't remember having considered how long 7
they would last in that state.
8 Q
In the present ATOG instruction, is 9
it B&W's thinking that it is better to run the
(
unc'overy?
10 pumps to destruction than risk core 11 A
Yes.
12 Q
But you have no idea how long the 13 pumps can continue to function effectively with 14 a 100 percent void fraction?
15 A
No.
16 Q
You just have been told that they can 17 function effectively with a 100 percent void fraction, 18 and you don't know how long?
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
Are you aware that at the time of the 21 Three Mile Island accident, there were instructions 22 from B&W on what was the maximum permissible 23 vibratioa for operation of reactor coolant pumps?
(.,/
24 MR. KOLB:
From B&W to whom?
25 MR. SELTZER ' To the.. operators at the
1 Kelly 248 plants supplied by B&W.
2 3
MR. KOLB:
I object as to form.
4 MR. SELTZER:
I will make it easier.
5 Q.
What does the phrase " limits and 6
precautions" mean to you?
7 A
It is a draft document that we produce and 8
supply to each of our base NSS customers.
9 Q
Those are the people who own B&W designed e
10 nuclear plants?
11 A
Yes.
(
12 Q
Do the limits and precautions state 13 the boundaries beyond which the plants and 14 components in the B&W NSS should not be operated?
15 MR. KOLB:
Under all conditions?
16 Q
Under the conditions stated in the limits 17 and precautions.
18 A
In general, yes, they supply values,for 19 normal equipment operation.
20 Q
For example, there is a value in there
(_
21 above which the pressurizer is.not supposed to be 22.
filled except under hydrostatic test conditions, 23 right?
7-1 t
4 I
\\_/
24 A
Yes.
[
25 Q
There is also a value in there for the
l n.
1 Kelly 249 b) 2 maximum permissible shaft vibration on the reactor 3
coolant pumps, right?
4 If you are thinking and you are not 5
sure whether it is shaft or frame, my next question 6
was going to be frame, because I think it is 7
stated both for shaft and for frame.
8 MR. KOLB:
Is there a purpose in 9
testing his memory on this?
You do have a t
10
- document, 11 MR. SELTZER:
Right.
t()
12 A
That is my hesitation.
I am trying to 13 remember if that particular limit and precaution is r
do remember seeing once%
14 stated.
I on normal j
15 pressurizer water level requirements.
I' am trying 16 to think of similar recommendations for. shaft and 17 frame vibration.
18 Q
As the void fraction increases in the 19 reactor coolant system, if the reactor coolant pumps 20 are still on, the vibration on those pumps increases
(,
21 as the void fraction increases, isn't that right?
22 A
Yes.
23 Q
You said that the ATOG instruction given
%..)
24 to operating utilities now is to continue running 25 the pumps regardless of increasing void fraction, right?
w,
e
,e
1 Kelly 250 f s; 2
A Under some very specific circumstances, yes.
3 Q
Under those circumstances, the ATOG 4
instruction would be now to continue operating the 5
reactor coolant pump regardless of shaft or frame 6
vibration, isn't that right?
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
Do you explain to the people who receive 9
the ATOG instructions that the'se ATOG instructions
(
10 supercede any other instructions previo~usly received 11 from Babcock & Wilcox?
Do you instruct the people
/~
12 who receive the ATOG instructions that these ATOG (h-13 instructions supercede any prior instructions 14 received from Babcock & Wilcox?
15 MR. KOLB:
Do you mean have they 16 actually done that?
17 MR. SELTZER:
Yes.
I will break it up.
18 Q
The ATOG instruction is inconsistent 19 with previous instructions that say you can't operate 20 the pumps with vibration on shaft and frame above
(.
21 a certain number of mils, right?
22 A
I think they are compatible in usage.
For 23 the intended usage.
/~'T t.
i 24 Q
You mean you believe there is an i
25 exception stated in the B&W instructions on maximum l
l 7,
1 Kelly 251 f3U 2
permissible shaft and frame vibration?
3 MR. KOLD:
Which B&W instructions, 4
current or ATOG?
Which ones are you talking 5
about?
Or past?
6 MR. SELTZER:
I am trying to find out 7
if ATOG has superceded prior B&W instructions.
8 If it has superceded them, then it is not 9
inconsistent because one has replaced the
(
10 other.
11 Q
Focusing on the past ones, the ones
(}
12 that existed at the time of the Three pile Island 13 accident, is it your understanding that there were 14 exceptions to that instruction that would permit 15 operation with higher than the stated permissible 16 shaft and frame vibration?
17 MR. KOLB:
Could you read the question 18 back?
19 (Record read by the reporter.)
1 20 A
Yes.
(,
21 Q
Where were those exceptions listed, if 22 anywhere?
23 A
I don't remember.
U 24 Q
Do you think you have ever seen them 25 in writing in something that was given to utilities
1 Kelly 252 l
f 2
before the Three Mile Island accident, and if so, 3
where?
4 A
No, I don't remember seeing them in writing.
5 Q
Did you ever tell any utility or utility 6
representative before the Three Mile Island accident 7
that there were conditions under which they should 8
feel free to operate the reactor coolant pumps 9
with vibration above the stated maximums?
(
10 MR. KOLB:
When you say you, do you 11 mean --
12 MR. SELTZER:
J.J.
Kelly.,
t 13 MR. KOLB:
-- Mr. Kelly personally?
14 A
I don't recall that.
15 Q
Did you ever hear anybody else telling 16 any representative of an operating plant or an 17 operating utility that they could run th ir reactor 18 coolant pumps with vibration levels above the 19 stated maximums?
20 MR. KOLB:
Is your question whether he j
(,
21 ever heard of it or whether he over heard of 22 it actually being done?
23 MR. SELTZER:
I want to know whether C\\
24 he was ever present when he heard it ~ being 25 done.
m
I Kelly 253 g3 V
2 A
I don't remember.
3
,Q Have you ever been told that B&W had 4
advised representatives of operating utilities 5
before the Three Mile Island accident that the 6
reactor coolant pumps could be operated with levels 7
of vibration above the stated maximums?
8 A
I don't recall that either.
9 Q
so as you sit here today you don't t
10 have any basis for believing that the operating 11 utilities had been advised by B&W before the Three 12 Mile Island accident that they could run their-13 reactor coolant pumps with vibration levels above 2
14 the stated maximums, is that right?
15 A
I don't remember any, 16 Q
You testified that you now understand 17 that there can be effective core cooling'with the 18 reactor coolant pump running and a 100 percent 19 void fraction.
What is the mechanism by which the 20 core remains effectively cooled with no liquid
(.
21 water in the_ reactor coolant system?
22 MR. KOLB:
Objection to the form.
23 Q
If there is a 100 percent void fraction, 24 does that mean that there is no longer any liquid 25 water in the-reactor coolant system?
i L...
+
1 Kelly 254 V\\
\\_/
2 A
Yes.
3 Q
what is your understanding as to how 4
the core is effectively cooled with reactor 5
coolant pumps running with a 100 percent void 6
fraction?
In other words, with no liquid water in 7
8 A
As long as there is steam being pumped through 9
the core, the core heat will be picked up by the
(
10 steam.
The decay heat will be picked u'p by the 11 steam.
()
12 g
with the reactor coolant pumps on, is 13 the steam forced through the steam gen'erators?
14 A
Yes.
15 Q
Do the steam generators continue to 16 perform a cooling function under those circumstances?
17 A
I don't know.
18 Q
In your ATOG instructions on running a 19 plant under these conditions, do the instructions 20 call for maintaining feedwater flow to the steam 21 generators?
22 A
Yes.
23 Q
Do you understand from that that the g3
(_ '
24 purpose in maintaining feedwater flow to the steam 25 generators under those conditions is so that th'e
r 1
Kelly 255 steam generators will continue to perform a 2
cooling function?
A Yes.
4 Q
Prior to the ATOG instructions on e ntinuing to run reactor coolant pumps with very 6
high void fraction, are you aware of any prior 7
instructions which B&W gave to any of its operating 8
utilities on the ability of the reactor coolant g
l pumps to continue to perform effective service with 10 high void fractions?
gg A
Yes.
12 Q
Are y u aware f any such instructions 13 being given by B&W before the Three Mile Island g4 accident?
g A
16 Q
Have you ever asked anybody at what g7 point in time B&W first knew that the reactor coolant yg pumps could continue to help provide effectfve 19 core cooling with a 100 percent void fraction?
A No.
Q other than the trace of primary pressure, did you show the training room B group any other charts, diagrams?
A I don't recall.
.~,
f 1
Kelly 256 2
Q Bert Dunn came up to you after the 3
training room B sessLon and told you that he was 4
very concerned about your report that high pressure 5
injection had been/ turned off when pressurizer 6
water leve'l was f i'r s t rising, is that correct?
I 7
MR. KOLB:
Is your question whether
/
abtually said the words "very 8
Mr. Dunn
/i 9
concerned"?
I 10 NR. 6FLTZER:
Non
/
11 A
I don't/ remember thos9 exact words.
/
(
12 Q
/I certain?y wasn*t meaning,that.
I 13 meant Dunn came up and expressed great concern to 14 you about/your report that the operators had 15-terminat;d high pressure injection at a time when l
16 presser.1zer water level was first rising, isn't
/
17 that true?
18
/
MR. KOLB:
You are asking him to verify 19 that Dunn's expression could be viewed as 20 of great concern?
Is that the import of j
(
21 the question, whether it is word or substance?
/
/
22
/
MR. SELTZER:
Yes, in substance.
./
23
/
Q Is that what you understood Dunn was
(%.
l Q
~ expressing?
/
24 coming up and 23 /
A He was concerned about the turning off high'
.i l
l
1 Kelly 257 7,
(.
2 pressure injection with water level going up, yes.
3 Q
You had reported to the training room B 4
group that high pressure injection had been
(: '
5 terminated by the operatcrs as pressurizer water 6
level first rose, is that right?
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
Do you know whether a memorandum had 9
been circulcted announcing your training room a 5
10 show?
11 MR. KOLB:
Objection as to form.
(~h 12 I don't recall it being characterized as a V
13 show.
14 A
No, I don't know.
15 Q
DO you know how your presentation was 16 announced?
17 A
No.
18 Q
How would you characterize, if you can, 19 the type of people that were in attendance?
What 20 areas of the company, what levels of company
~(_
21 management were in attendance?
22 A
The ones I remember were mostly management.
23 Q
Did you consider yourself at that time
/~T 24 management?
.j 2r A
No.
1 Kelly 258 2
Q At what level above you did management 3
start?
4 A
In my mind, it is unit manager and above.
r s
5 Q
So Bruce Karrasch's level and above?
6 A
Yes.
7 Q
You have testified previously that John MacMillyan attended part of the session.
How 4
9 do you know he only attended part of it?
t 10 A
During my sequence of events, whe'n I was 11 giving the sequence of e, vents at Davis-Besse, I
[v')
12 looked up, and he was standing in the back of the 13 room.
By the time I finished, he wasn't in the 14 room anymore.
That is what I meant by partially.
15 Q
What did Fred.Faist talk about at that 16 same session?
17 A
Fred discussed the mechanics.of hod he had 18 come to understand the reasons for the failure of
.~
~,
1S
,'the PORV valve, and he also went over a l i~s t of 20 concerns of the transient he and I had 21 accumulated at the site.
22 Q
Did either you or Fred mention TECO's 23 desire to get a more accurate indication off.th'e
[) _
N_/
24 Position of the Pilot Operated Relief Valve?.
25 A
I don't remember.
jf a
k s
1 Kelly 259 2
Q
.Did either you or Fred Faist discuss 3
in front of the training room B group Toledo 4
Edison's request to get an automatic interlock to 5
close the block valve if the Pilot Operated Relief 6
Valve stuck open?
- s 7
A I don't remember.
', \\
s 8
Q You don't remember eitherryou or Fred
- ^
9 saying that?
10 A
Right.
s 11 Q
Who, if anyone, to your knowledge was s
\\
(}
12 taking notes during that session?
13 A
The only one I remember taking notes was Don 14 Montgomery.
r
~,
15' Q
Were there any questions from the floor 16 other than Don Montgomery's question on PORV 17 circuitry?
18 MR. KOLB Objection to the form.
19 A
I remember a question and answer period, but 20 I don't remember any of the. questions.
21 Q
llow long was the Q and A period, 22 approximately?
i.
q,.
g 7g -
23 A
I don't remember.
s s.
r kJ 24 Q
Just approximately?
i
'\\(S -
25 '
A Ten minutes.
t.
n s^
, - - ~
pr
. e
-,g
(.'
s
-s -
. - ~
2 a
~'
N y
4 1
Kelly 260 s
(j
~
s 1
' ' ~ ~
\\
2 Q
Who fielded the questions, you or S
3 Fred?
t i
4 MR. KOLB:
Objection to the form.
5 A
I don't remember.
6 Q
Did you answer some of the questions?
7 A
I don't remember.
r y'e 8
Q In GPU 151, is there a copy of the trace 9
of primary pressure which you displayed to the x
10 people in the training room B?
11 A
No, h) 12 Q
Did you prepare the chart especially u
~'1*o r.hh e training room B show?
3 13 14 MR.'KOLB:
Objection to the form.
15 A
No.
Q Who had prepared it?
16 17 N
I prepared the chart that was shown, but I 18 didn't prepare it for the training room B show.
1 Q
Do you still think you ha e the chart 20 that'you prepared that showed pressure, temperature,
.,x k
21 pressurizer level and saturation temperature?
22 MR. KOLB:
Objection to'the form.
,. p\\
g-
. 23 A
I don't know.
~\\
)
4. y 4
u
~
24 1
'Y "
^
Q save you seen it recently?
s s
1
- %' ' ' 25 A
Yes, I have,seen~ copies of it.
'E r.
1 Kelly 261 2
Q How recently?
3 A
This morning.
4 Q
When I said do you still have a copy --
5 A
I didn't hear the word copy.
I thought you 6
were asking me if I still had the original document.
7_
Q No.
Could you show me the chart, please.
8 A
GPU Exhibit 133, page 30 of 85 looks like 4
1 9
one of them.
(
10 Q
Are there others?
11 A
29 of 85.
1
(
12 Q
Is that all?
13 A
That is all I remember.
14 Q
Were these sheets connected end to end?
15 A
At one time, yes.
16 Q
After the meeting, you had a discussion 17 with Dunn and Jones about the significanc,e of 1
18 operator termination of high pressure. injection, 19 right?
20 A
Yes.
i 21 Q
Did you also have a session with.Lauer 22 about operator termination of high pressure 23 injection?
'24 A
No.
a 25 Q
Did you have a discussion with Eric y-y..
..__,.,,--_r-_.
c,
~s
,,m..
m y.,
[
1 Kelly 262 v
2 Swanson after the meeting about the significance 3
of operator termination of high pressure injection?
J 4
A Yes.
Are you talking about immediately 5
after the meeting or any time after the meeting?
6 Q
After the meeting and before you wrote 7
the famous November 1,
1977 memorandum.
8 A
Yes.
9 Q
Eric specifically encouraged you to
(
10 write the November 1 memorandum, didn't' he?
11 A
Yes.
().
12 Q
would you take a look at page 22 of L,s 13 your President's Commission deposition of July 7,
14 1979 previously marked as GPU Exhibit 150.
At t'he 15 top of page 22, you are being asked a question 16 about your conversation with Eric Swanson regarding 17 the operators termination of high pressure 18 injection, right?
19 MR. KOLB:
You are' basing that on the 20 context.
where are you starting the k.
21 conversation?
22 MR. SELTZER:
I don't know where he 23 had the conversation.
D.
24 MR. KOLB:
I am just talking about the 25 page.
e.
p w
w m,
.--w-w v
--a
1 Kelly 263 g-2 Q
It is correct, isn't it, that the 3
conversation you are being asked about on the top 4
of page 22 is a conversation with Eric Swanson?
5 A
Yes.
6 Q
You were asked this question and you 7
gave the following answer, "Do you remember the 8
substance of the discussion?"
- Answer, "I told him 9
that Bert Dunn had expressed a concern over the
(
10 first transient.
I said that they just' recently 11 had a second transient and it bypassed high 12 pressure injection and I was concerned.that perhaps 13 we hadn't given them specific enough instructions 14 on when to terminate high pressure injection.
Eric 15 listened to this and said why don't I write a 16 letter on it and see if we can't get.some action."
17 were you asked that question and did 18 you give that answer?
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
When Eric said why don't I write a
(,
21 letter on it, is the "I"
in that sentence Mr Kelly?
22 A
Yes.
23 Q
You said to Eric Swanson "I
was
'~
24 concerned that perhaps we hadn't given them 25 specific enough instructions on when to terminate
264 Kelly
[v) 2 high pressure injection."
3 Why were you concerned?
4 A
Because of Bert Dunn's concern over the 5
first statement of the first transient, the 6
Davis-Besse transient, and what Fred Faist had 7
recently told me about another transient at 8
Davic-Besse, where the operators had bypassed high 9
pressure injection and had not allowed to come on, t
10 Q
Were you concerned that unfess mor-11 specific instructions were given on when to I
{~
12 terminate high pressure injection, operators at s-13 Davis-Besse and at other B&W supplied plants might 14 terminate high pressure injection improperly in 15 the future?
16 A
No.
17 Q
You told Eric that you were c,oncerned 18 that perhaps "we hadn't given them enough instructions 19 on when to terminate high pressure injection."
20 Who is the "them" that you were referring 21 to?
22 MR. KOLB:
Just to correct that.
It 23 says "We haven't given them specific enough
\\ ')
24 instructions."
You left out specific.
25 Q
You told Eric, "I was concerned that
I Kelly 265
(~}'
%d 2
perhaps we hadn't given them-specific enough 3
instructions on when to terminate high pressure 4
injection."
5 Who is the "them" in that sentence?
6 A
I was referring to operators of B&W plants.
7 Q
All B&W plants, right?
8 A
Yes.
9 9
You were concerned about whether B&W
(
10 had given them specific enough instructions 11 because at one B&W supplied plant the operators I i 12 had twice interfered with the operation of high
%j' '
13 pressure injection at a time when you believed it 14 was inappropriate to have terminated or blocked 15 high pressure injection, isn't that right?
16 A
Would you read that back?
17 (Record-read by the reporter.)
18 A
Yes, I was concerned about our written 19 instructions.
20 Q
Isn't it a fact that you believed that 21 if perhaps B&W could give them, the operators of 22 B&W supplied nuclear plants, specific enough 23 instructions, it would help the operators know when 7-()
24 to terminate high pressure injection?
25 MR. KOLB:
It seems to me the question y
y w-r
=
+g p-T v'
m
- 'w'
=
=
~*'
t e
1 Kelly 266 v
2 multiple implications to it that really 3
ought to be addressed one at a time.
One 4
thing is move the "perhaps" to his oft-5 quoted statements to another point in the 6
sentence.
It seems to me you ought to break 7
it down and take each element one at a time.
8 Q
Was it your belief when you were speaking 9
to Eric that B&W should give operators more t
10 specific instructions on when to terminate high 11 pressure injection?
,a (v) 12 A
No.
13 Q
was it your belief tha*. B&W should give 14 the operators more specific written instructions?
15 A
No.
16 Q
Was it your belief after you talked 17 with Eric that more specific guidelines should be 18 sent to the operators of BGW supplied nuclear plants 19 regarding when to terminate high pressure injection?
20 A
No.
t 21 Q
Why did you recommend sending specific 22 guidelines on when to terminate high pressure 23 injection in your November 1 memo?
5 x_/
24 MR. KOLB:
Could we have the memo, 25 please?
t 1
g-Kelly 267 U
2 MR. SELTZER:
You have it.
3 MR. KOLB:
It is in this mound here.
4 Let's dig it out.
5 Q
Do you see where you say "I
recommend 6
the following guidelines be sent"?
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
That "I"
is J.J.
Kelly, right?
9 A
Yes.
F.
10 Q
At the time you wrote this, you were 11 recommending those guidelines be sent, right?
O 12 A
No.
xs 13 Q
What does the phrase "I
re' commend the 14 following guidelines be sent" then mean?
What 15 word am I misapprehending if that does not mean 16 that J.J.
Kelly on November 1,
1977 was recommending 17 that the following guidelines be sent to the 18
. operators of B&W nuclear plants?
19 A
I think you are taking it out of the context
-20 of t'h e rest of the memo.
I wasn't sure that
(.
21 guidelines were required or that additional i
22 guidelines were required.
I was saying here if you l
l l
23 read the first sentence where it says that "Perhaps i
t'"h t
\\
/
24 we are not giving our customers enough guidance,"
I 25 what I am trying to say here is if we need more-i
l l
1 Kelly 268 (D
Q) 2 guidance, here is what I would suggest.
I am trying 3
to get the people who should know whether the 4
appropriate guidance has been issued or not.to 5
review what is going out and make some decision.
6 That is what I mean when I wrcte that one sentence 7
that says "I recommend the following be sent."
8 Q
You told Eric that you were concerned 9
that perhaps B&W ha'dn't given the operators of i
10 BOW plants cpecific enough instructions'on when 11 to terminate high pressure injection?
i 12 A
YSE-A 13 0
In the fall of 1977, was it part of your iob 14 responsibilities at B&W to be concerned about whether 15 the: company had given specific enough instructions 16 n when-to terminate high pressure injection?
g7 A
I don't know what you mean by my job 18 responsibilities.
gg Q
People are sometimes critical of the 20 ways Americans think about the work they do because
(
21 s ome people have a tendency to say it is not my 22 job when things go wrong.
I am asking you whether 23 in saying that you were concerned about whether 3
(--)
B&W had given spec'ific enough instruction on the 24 25
. termination of high pressure injection whether your
1 Kelly 269
_s 2
expressing this concern was part of what you 3
considered to be your job at B&W7 i'
4 A
Yes.
5 Q
Following the Davis-Besse transient and 6
prior to your writing GPU Exhibit 76, your November 1 7
memo, did you make any attempt to check the 8
procedures which the Davis-Besse operators had I
9 touching on operation of high pressure injection?
t 10 A
I didn't try to check any of their wri tten 11 instructions, no.
(
12 Q
Prior to writing GPU 76, did you check 13 B&W procedures used for simulator training with l
14 respect to operation of high pressure injection?
15 A
No.
16 Q
You said you were concerned that 17 perhaps B&W hadn't given specific enough' instructions.
18 Did it occur to you at or before the 19 time you wrote GPU 76 that regardless of what 20 instructions had previously been written and what
(.
21 instructions had been previously orally communicated, 22 there must have been something lacking in those 23 instructions if the Davis-Besse operators twice
-p
(~'
24 interf ered with the prope r operation of high pressure 25 injection?
1 Kelly 270 v
2 MR. KOLB:
That is a very long question.
3 Could we have it read back?
4 (Record read by the reporter.)
5 A
That was one of the possibilities.
6 Q
That was a possibility that occurred 7
to you at or about the time you wrote GPU Exhibit 76?
O A
Yes.
9 Q
Your concern that perhaps B&W hadn't
(
10 givea pecific enough instructions on the operation 11 of high pressure injection led to your writing O) 12 GPU Exhibit 76, correcti 13 g
- yes, 14 Q
After you got no rerponse from any of 15 the people who were addressed on your distribution 16 list and only got one handwritten response from 17 somebody who you didn't even send the merno i
~
directly 18 to, you decided to escalate the concern to 19 management level, right?
20 A
Yes.
21 Q
At the time that you decided to escalate 22 the concern to management levels within B&W, you 23 had already spoken with Lind and-Heilmyer in the b
24 B&W training group, right?
25 A
I spoke to them before I even wrote the first
1 1
Kelly 271
("
N-))
2 memo.
3 Q
You spoke to them before you wrote 4
GPU 767 5
A Yes.
6 Q
so you were still concerned about 7
whether B&W had given specific enough instructions 8
to the operators of its plants on when to 9
terminate hign pressure injection even after
(
10 speaking w'ith Lind and Heilmyer, is tha't right?
11 ME. KOLB:
Are you asking about 2
I~D 12 instructions in the sense of written procedures D
13 or are you asking more broadly than that?
14 MR. SELTZER:
I mean in the sense that 15 he used the word instructions in his sworn 16 testimony before the Kemeny staff, page 22, 17 line 8 and a half.
18 A
That testimony is referring to written 19 instructions.
I wasn't concerned about the training 20 at that point in time.
(
21 Q
Am I correct that you were still 22 concerned about whether B&W had given the operators 23 of its plants sufficiently specific written
)
\\'#
24 instructions even after you had spoken with Lind 25 and Heilmyer in the B&W training department?
9 e
e 4
e 1
. Kelly 272 2
A Yes.
3 Q
Lind and Heilmyer told you that they 4
believed the training given-to operators was that 5
you shouldn't terminate high pressure injection 6
until you have checked that both pressurizer water 7
level and reactor coolant system pressure were 8
rising into a normal range, is that right?
9 A
And at average temperature was under control.
1 10 It was conjunctive.
11 Q
When they told you that, did you make
(")
12 the ass'imption that that had been the training
%.,/
13 that had been given to Davis-Besse ope'rators by 14 B&W7 15 A
That wasn't an assumption.
That is what they i
16 told me, that that is the way Davis-Besse was 17 trained.
18 Q
When you walked away from your-19 conversations with Lind and Heilmyer, you knew 20 that the Davis-Besse operators had twice interfered
(,
21-with the operation of high pressure injection 22 contrary to what Lind and Heilmyer said they i
23 had been trained to do by Babcock & Wilcox, is (T) 24 that right?
1 25 A
Yes.
M 1
Kelly 273 fS D.
2 Q
Did you therefore conclude that some more specific written instructions should be 3
4 given to the operators to corroborate or reinforce 5
what Lind and Heilmyer told you the B&W Training 6
Department was imparting?
d 7
I vill refresh your recollection.
You 8
already testified that even after speaking to 9
Lind and Heilmyer you were concerned that B&W had
(
l not given ' specific enough instructions'on when to 10 11 terminate high pressure injection.
Specific
[
12 enough written instructions.
D{
l 13 MR. KOLB:
That is not what he said.
14 He has been very careful about his testimony.
15 That is not what he said.
16 MR. SELTZER:
Just correct it.
Don't 17 make a speech.
Tell me what I did wrong.
18 MR. KOLB:
I simply object.
You get 19 into these colorful discussions on how I 20 object.
It is a mischaracterization of
(-
21 his testimony, and you know it is.
Let's go 22 on and have the testimony.
We don't have 23 to get into a debate.
You know you changed it.
[ T.
\\
/
24 Q
You still had your concern about 25 whether specific enough written instructions had
,m__
._,r
,, -,.i-.-
1 1
Kelly 274
/N
(
1 ys 2
been given on when to terminate high pressure 3
injection even after you spoke to Lind.and Heilmyer?
4 MR. KOLB:
Meaning written instructions?
5 MR. SELTZER:
Right.
6 A
Yes.
7 Q
I take it you still had that concern 8
because notwithstanding the B&W Training Department's 9
training of the Davis-3 esse operators, they twice t
10 had interfered with high prsssure injec' tion *at a
11 time when they should not have, isn't that correct?
12 I
A Yes.
I 13 Q
Old you ever check the draft procedures 14 that had been prepared by B&W and sent out to any 15 operating utilities to see what B&W was drafting l
16 on the subject of when to terminate high pressure 17 injection?
18 A
Not that I recall.
19 Q
At the time that you escalated the 20 concern to management level, do you know whether 21 anybody else had checked to see what the written 22 instructions previously given by B&W contained?
23 MR. KOLB:
When you say anyone had n\\~'
24 checked, do you mean in connection with his 25 writing?
Or do you mean --
I 1
Kelly 275 N/
2 MR. SELTZER:
Exactly.
3 MR. KOLB:
In connection with his 4
writing?
5 MR. SELTZER:
In connection with the 6
concern you are voicing.
That is what I mean 7
by specifically.
8 A
No, I don't know.
9 Q
Did you ever ask anybody to check the t
10 written instructions that B&W had alrea'dy given 11 to operating utilities before you sent your
,I 12 november 1 memo?
13 A
N3.
14 Q
Did you ever ask anybody to check the 15 written instructions that B&W had given to operating 16 utilities before you decided it was time to 17 escalate your concern to management levels?
18 A
No.
that,you didn't 19 Q
Is part of the reason S
20 look at the written instructions before escalating k.
21 your concern and didn't ask anybody else to look 22 at the written instructions before escalating your 23 concern the fact that you believed that n/
t'"'
24 irrespective of what had previously been written 2
25 there was a need to give more specific instructions
1 g-Kelly 276 v
2 on when to terminate high pressure injection?
3 MR. KOLB:
The end of that question 4
means he had made up his mind that there was e
5 a need?
~6 MR. SELTZER:
Right.
7 A
No.
a 8
Q Nevertheless, you recognized at the 9
tine you were writir.g this memo and at the time you
(
10 escale.te.d your concern to management level that 11 with the terminations that had occurred twice at n.
( -)1 12" Davis-Besse, it was possible that irrespective 13 of the written and oral instructions there was a 14 need for more specific instructions to.go out, 15 isn't that right?
16 A
No.
17 Q
I thought you said five minutes ago 18 that that was one of the things that did motivate
-19 you when you wrote GPU 76.
20 MR. KOLB:
I think one of the problems 21 is that your questions are getting longer 22 and longer, and you are building more into i
23 the questions each time.
O' 24 MR. SELTZER:
You are reminding me 25 that I should keep them very short.
m
(g i
Kelly 277
\\-)
2 Q
Davis-Besse had had its operators 3
trained at B&W on the B&W simulator and by B&W 4
instructors, right?
5 A
Right.
6 Q
Davis-Besse had received B&W's limits 7
and precautions and B&W draft operating procedures, 8
right?
9 MR. KOLB:
If you know.
(
10 Q
To the best of your knowled'ge.
11 A
That would be normal.
()
12 g
'2 hey had also received whatever other 13 site instructions are sent ~ out from time to time 14 supplementing operating advice from B&W7 15 MR. KOLB:
I do think it is important 16 to recognize here that at the most you can 17 be asking the witness whether he has heard 18 or understood these things are so, am I 19 right?
20 MR. SELTZER:
Absolutely.
k.
21 A
That again would be normal, yes.
22 Q
Notwithstanding those written and oral 23 communications from B&W to the Davis-Besse owners
~)
24 and operators, the oporators at Davis-Besse had 25 twice interfered with the proper operation of
J l
I Kelly 278 4
s_
2 high pressure injection, right?
3 MR. KOLB:
Objection to the form.
You 4
assume the communications went to the 5
operators.
6 MR. SELTZER:
We'll take it subject 7
to later connection.
8 Q
Notwithstanding the oral and written 1
9 communications from B&W to the owners and opert'. ors I
of the Davis-Besse plant, the Davis-Bes'se operators 10 11 had twice interfered with the proper operation of 12 high pressure injection, isn't that right?
13 A
Yes.
14 MR. KOLB:
Obj e c tio n to the form.
15 Q
Isn't it a fact that one of the things 16 which motivated you to write I could use 17 generated -- isn't it a fact that one of the 18 factors which motivated you to write GPU Exhibit 76 19 was your belief that notwithstanding whatever had 20 been said previously, orally and in writing by
(.
21 B&W, there may be a need for more specific 22 instructions in writing from B&W on when to 23 terminata high pressure injection?
,f g t' '1 24 A
I wanted the specific instructions checked 25 to see if they were clear enough, if that is what
1 Kelly 279 v
2 you are asking.
3 MR. SELTZER:
Why don't you reread the 4
question.
5 (Record read by the reporter.)
6 Q
Whatever the previous instructions had 7
been, both oral and written, they had been 8
inadequate to deter the Davis-Besse operators 9
from interfering with the proper operation of l
10 high pressure injection, isn't that right?
11 MR. KOLB:
Objection to the form.
What
()
12 do you mean by inadequate?
13 l Q
They had failed to deter t'h e Davis-Besse 14 operators from twice interfering with the proper 15 operation of high pressure injection, isn't that 16 right?
17 MR. KOLB:
You mean in fact he 18 operators acted notwithstanding those 19 instructions?
a 20 MR. SELTZER:
That is another way --
21 MR. KOLB:
There are-implications to 22 the words-failed and' inadequate.
I think 23 if we take these things as facts, we'll get
.(~
s_-
24 along much quickly.
25-MR. SELTZER:
I will stand on my
)
,-r
,..rs
1 Kelly 280 7_s 2
phraseology, 3
(Record read by the reporter.)
4 A
Yes.
5 Q
Wasn't part of your motivation in 6
writing GPU 76 that whatever had been said in 7
writing to operators of plants including Davis-Besse 8
had not been sufficient to deter them from
~
9 terminating high pressure injection when it should i
10 have been left on?
4 11 (Record read by the reporter.)
12 l
A I don't remember that as being part of my 13 motivation.
14 Q
When you said in GPU 76 that recent 15~
events at Toledo " pointed out that perhaps we are 16 not giving our customers enough guidance on the 17 operation of high pressure injection s y s t,e m, " did 18 the "our customers" include all the operators of 19 B&W supplied nuclear plants?
20 MR. KOLB:
Do you mean operators in J
21 the control room or people who managed.the 22 plants or both?
23 MR. SELTZER:
Both.
,,s
(
I N~/
24 Q
Does the "our customers" include the 25 people who own and operate B&W supplied plants?
r~
i Kelly 281 N.]g 2
A Yes.
3 Q
That would include the operators of 4
Three Mile Island Unit 27 5
A Yes.
6 Q
You said on September 24, 1977, "After 7
depressurization due to a stuck open electromagnetic 8
relief valve, high pressure injection was automatically 9
initiated.
The operator stopped high pressure t
10 inj ection when pressurizer level began'to recover, 11 without regard to primary pressure."
)
12 Does the second sentence that I read 13 mean that the operators terminated hig'h pressure 14 injection at the time when the pressurizer water 4
15 level first began to rise?
16 A
Yes.
17 Q
What does the phrase "withoukregard 4
18 to primary pressure" mean?
i 19 A
When I wrote it, it meant that the primary 20 pressure was still going down when they did it.
21 Q
At Three Mile Island Unit 2,
the 22 operators substantially throttled high pressure l
23 injection when pressurizer level began to recover
-s i.
V i
24 while primary pressure wac continuing to drop, is 25 that right?
l
[
~__
l Kelly 282 2
A Yes.
3 Q
You say that "As a result, the transient L
4 continued on with boiling in the reactor coolant 5
- system, et cetera."
6 What did you mean "et. cetera"?
You don't 7
recall?
8 A
No.
9 Q
At Three Mile Island Unit 2,
the t
10 transien.t continued after the operators' substantially 11 throttled back high pressure injection with boiling
[ )/
12 cccurring in the reactor coolant system, is that i
L I
13 l
right?
14 A
Yes.
15 (Recess taken.)
4 16 BY MR. SELTZER:
17 Q
Have you ever regretted that,you wrote 18-your November 1,
1977 memo?
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
Has anybody at the company ever told
(.
21 you tha t you shouldn't have written it?
22 A
No.
23 Q
Has anybody said they wished you O
24 hadn't written it in words or substance?
4 t
25 A
Not that I recall.
..w--
w r--
,v
,+ ~
r
-n,
-r
-e-
1 Kelly 283
- i'V 1
2 Q
At any time before the Threc Mile Island 3
accident occurred, did you ever regret that you 4
wrote GPU Exhibit 76, your November 1 memo?
5 A
No.
6 Q
You wrote in the second paragraph of 7
your November 1 memo, "Since there are accidents 4
8 which require the continuous operation of the 9
high pressure injection system," et cetera.
What t
10 accidents are those?
11 A
You are asking what I was thinking when 1
(
12 wrote that?
13 Q
Yes, what does it mean.
There were 14 accidents.
What accidents does this memo refer to?
15 A
I was referring to what Bert Dunn told me 16 after the meeting in training room B.
17 Q
Do you from time to time read,B&W 18 topical reports or abstracts of them?
19 A
Not normally.
20 Q
Are you aware today that there are 21 small break loss of coolant accidents which it is 22 expected, even if every thing is operating as it 23 should, sill uncover or almost uncover-the core?
O-24 MR. KOLB:
Are.you'asking whether such
~ 25 accidents have actually occurred?
o e
.-.y,,-
t 4
j i
i Kelly 284 2
MR. SELTZER:
I said expected.
MR. KOLB:
I think it was less clear 3
j 4
than it'could have been.
I want to know 5
whether you are talking of actual accidents 6
or the possibility.
j 7
Q Do you know, according to the analysis 1
8 which B&W has performed of small break loss of 9
coolant accidents, that there are certain small t
10 break loss of coolant accidents for whi'ch it is 11 expected even with the designed core cooling i
(
12 operating as functioned that there wil.1 be some 13 temporary uncovery of part of the nucl~ ear core?
i i
14 MR. KOLB:
The problem I'm having is i
15 when you use the word " expected," because
]
16 it is not as clear as.it should be, whether 17
.you mean someone actually expects d,uch i
18
'.ac ci de n ts to occur, or if you mean if such i
19 accidents do occur, whether you expected such 20 things to happ'en.
(_
21 MR. SELTZER:
The latter.
1 22 A
I am not aware with all equipment functioning i
23 properly that that would happen under a small break, 24 no.
25 Q
Are there other loss of coolant accidents
=-
(
1 Kelly 285 2
for which you understand the analysis show that 3
to be the expected result?
4 A
Yes.
5 Q
Are those some of the accidents which 6
require continuous operation of the high pressure 7
injection system?
8 A
Not to my understanding, no.
9 Q
What were the accidents you were
(
10 referring tc that required continuous operation of 11 high pressure ir.jection?
(~)
12 A
In my memo of November 1st?
%.J 13 Q
Yes.
14 A
They were not defined in my mind.
That was 15 taken right from Bert Dunn.
16 Q
You knew at the time that he spoke to l
17 you that he was the manager of the Emergency Core j
18 cooling systems Analysis Unit?
19 A
Yes.
20 Q
You accepted what he had stated to
(,
21 you as being accurate?
22 A
Yes.
23 Q
Has anybody told you since you O(_)
24 circulated your memo of November 1,
1977 that you 25 were wrong, there were not accidents which required e
,c
+. -. -
r+----,-,
1 o
t l
\\
l 1
/g Kelly 286 4
\\w) 2 the continuous operation of high-pressure injection?
3 A
No.
4 Q
Under your guideline :B 3 you have three 5
conjunctive conditions.
Is it possible to~foilow 6
your guideline B and take the plant solid?
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
Is it possible with your guideline B 9
to take the plant solid and have a pressure in the E.
10 reactor coolant system above 1600 pounds?
11 A
Yes.
j 12 Q
What type of transient can you imagine J
13 would lead to that?
to mind ib a loss of main 14 A
One that comes 15 feedwater coupled with a loss of emergency feedwater 16 and a PORV stuck open in which case the operator 17 could isolate the PORV after high pressure injection, 18 starts.
However, with no secondary cooling, average 19 temperature will go on in increasing gradient'.
It 20 will continue to increase.
It will never reach 21 my criteria of stable or decreasing, in which case 22 you couldn't-possibly meet all three of these 23 things simultaneously ~and meet.the' necessary
\\',)
24 conditions for stopping highIpressure injection.
25 Q
Between the' time that you wrote GPU 76
y
~
l Kelly 287 2
and the Three Mile Island accident, did you'sver -
3 talk to Frank Walters about the subject of your 4
memo or the subject of his November 10 memo 5
previously marked GPU Exhibit 1327 6
A No.
7 Q
Did you see Frank Walters from time 8
to time during that almost year and a half?
9 A
- Yes, t
10 Q
on what kind of occasions did you see 11 Frank between November 1,
1977 and that fateful
(
12 day in March 19797 13 A
casual occurrences where.we would pass in 14 the hall, meet at a vending machine, something 15 like.that.
16 Q
Did you ever have any professional 17 contact with him during that year and a half?
18 A
Not that I recall.
19 Q
Is he somebody that you knew on a first 20 name basis?
k 21 A
Yes.
22 Q
Would you say hi Frank to..htm when you 23 saw him in the hall?
[-)
24 A
Yes.
. 25 Q
would he say hello Joe?
D
\\,
I O
N s.
g
-,1 Kelly 288 2
A Yes.
3 r
3 Q
Did you discuss with anybody whether 4
you should respond to Frank's memo to you, GPU S
Exhibit 132?
6 A
I told my supervisor that I. received it.
Eric 7
Swanson.
8 Q
What did you say to Eric and what did 9
he say to you, if anything, on the subject of i
10 whether Frank deserved a response of any kind?
11 A
In substance, I told him that I didn't feel
/']
12 that Frank's memo was addressing my original u
13 question and then Eric and I talked about bringing 14 the matter up with Bert Dunn.
15 Q
Escalating it to management _ level?
16 A
Getting Bert involved, yes.
17 Q
Did you show Frank's memo to'Eric?
18 A
I don't remember, s
19 Q
what did you do with his memo after you 20 read it?
(,
21 A
I do'n't remember.
-x 22 Q
Do you see where it says on the top 23 of GPU Exhibit 132 file number or reference?
he
\\'
kJ 24 A
Yes.,
25 Q
Did you write in-the filing instructions,
^ *
- 1 Kelly 289 0
2 X-III-37 3
A No.
4 Q
Do you know who did?
5 A
No.
6 Q
Did you send Frank's memo anywhere to 7
be filed?
8 A
Not that I remember.
9 Q
Do you think you t'hrew it out after
(
10 you got it?
11 A
I don't remember throwing it away.
1 12 Q
After receiving it in November 1977 13 and reviewing its contents with Eric Swanson, 14 when is the next time you saw it?
15 A
After Three Mile Island.
I 16 Q
Who brought it to your attention?
17 A
I don't remember.
18 Q
When you had the meeting with Don 19 Hallman and Frank Walters in June 1979, did you 20 have in front of you your memo, Frank's memo,
(,
21 and Bert's two memos?
22 A
Yes.
23 Q
Had you seen Frank Walters' memo since 73
\\.)
24 the accident prior to that June meeting?
25 MR. KOLB:
TitI accident?
1.
1 Kelly 290 p) tV 2
MR. SELTZER:
Right.
f 3
A I don't remember.
4 Q
Did Bruce show you a copy of Don Hallman's 5
August 1978 memo?
6 A
No.
7 Q
At or about the time he received it.
8 A
No.
9 Q
When is the first time that you learned t
10 that Don Hallman had sent that memo to the head of 11 your unit?
/~N 12 A
At this June meeting that we were referring 13 to with Don Hallman, Frank Walters and myself.
14 Q
The Hallman August 1978 memo is GPU 15 Exhibit 80.
What was your reaction when,you 16 first heard about and saw the Hallman August 1978 17 memo?
~
18 A
I was surprised at the existence of such a I
19 memo.
20 Q
Why did it surprise you?
(
21 A
Because the last I was aware of the whole 22 concern was Bert Dunn's second memo and when I
~
23 finished. reading Bert Dunn's second memo I (3,
'k-24 thought well, there is field service and ECCS have 25 reached essential agreement.
Maybe there is some
., ~
1 Kelly 291
()
~
2 more little work to do, but I thought the 3
guidelines were going to go out following that 4
memo.
5 Q
Prior to the Three Mile Island accident, 6
had you ever met anybody employed by Metropolitan 7
Edison Company?
8 A
Yes.
9 Q
Did you meet anybody from Metropolitan i
10 Edison Company after the Davis-Besse transient 11 and before the Three Mile Island calaaity?
('T 12 MR. KOLB:
Objection to the form.
13 A
Not that I remember.
14 Q
Did you talk with anybody from 15 Metropolitan Edison between the time of $he 16 Davis-Besse transient in September 1977 and 17 the Three Mile Island accident?
18 A
Not that I remember.
19 Q
When had you met with anyone from 20 Met ED prior to the Three Mile Island accident?
l
(,.
21 MR.'KOLB:
Objection to the form.
l l
22 A
When I came to work'for the company I was l
23 assigned to nuclear service.
The firsth i\\
l. /"%
24 trip I made and this was in 1971, was to Three l
25 Mile Island Unit 1 start up for a three-day reactor I
i 1
Kelly 292 2
coolant pump motor test in which case the B&W 3
site -- at which timu the B&W site representative
(
4 introduced me to several Met ED employees.
5 Q
Af ter you had gotten no response from 6
any of the addressees of your November 1 memo, you 7
decided to escalate your concern to management 8
levels.
Did you discuss the need to escalate with i
9 Bruce Karrasch?
10 A
No.
11 Q
Did you ever ask Bruce how come
("N 12 you never got back to me on my November 1,
1977 13 memo, or did he ever tell you?
)
14 A
I don't remember.
i 15 Q
Dia any of the addressees of your 16 November 1 memo ever tell you why they never gave 17 you their thoughts on the memo even though you 18 explicitly asked them for it?
19 MR. KOLB Objection to the orm.
20 Q
You asked them for your thoughts in
(
21 the memo, didn't you?
22 A
Yes.
23 Q
Did any of them ever tell you why they j
24 all failed to give you their thoughts?
25 MR. KOLB:
Objection to the form.
1 Kelly 293
('h y
2 A
Yes, Don Hallman did.
3 Q
Anybody else?
4 A
Not that I recall.
(:,
5 Q
What was Don's excuse?
6 MR. KOLB:
Objection to the form.
I i
7 don't believe he testified that Mr. Hallman 8
gave an excuse.
9 A
Don Hallman told me that' he turned the memo E
10 over to Frank Walters to respond.
J 11 Q
Did Don Hallman indicate that he had 12 discussed with Frank Walters the substance of 13 Frank Walters' response to you?
14 A
I don't remember.
15' Q
Did you ever seek out any of the people 16 on your distribution list and ask them prior to 17 the Three Mile Island accident why they hadn't 18 responded or what their response would be?
19 A
No.
20 Q
You received copies of both of Bert
(
21 Dunn's February memoranda, right?
22 A
Yes.
23 Q
His second one is GPU Exhibit 79 dated D.
k- '
24 February 16, 1978.
You had no reservations about 25 Procedures such as Bert Dunn was recommending in i
l
~
1 Kelly 294 2
GPU 79 being sent out to operators of D&W plants, 3
did you?
4 MR. KOLB:
I am not sure I understand 5
the full import of that question.
Are you 6
asking whether he had any reservations 7
about the particular wording of the procedure 8
that is in the February 16 memo, or are you 9
asking about some other procedure?
t 10 MR. SELTZER:
I am asking specifically 11 about the procedure in the February 16 memo.
12 MR. KOLB:
So the question is did 13 he have any reservations about that 14 procedure?
15 MR. SELTZER:
Right, being sent out 16 to the operators.
17 A
Yes.
18 Q
What reservations did you have?
19 A
My impressions at the time reading it when 20 I received it from Bert Dunn was that it was more
(
21 complicated than I would have liked.
22 Q
Did you tell anyone that?
l 23 A
No.
l
'N
~l 24 Q
You didn't tell Bert?
25 A
No.
1 Kelly 295 2
Q You didn't tell Eric?
3 A
Not that I remember.
4 Q
Yet it is your testimony that you 5
believed these instructions were going to be 6
sent out after you received GPU 79, is that 7
right?
8 MR. KOLB:
Are you asking whether that 4
9 is what he said before?
i.
10 Q
No.
It is your testimony, isn't it, 11 that this memo was going to be sent out?
(~}
12 MR. KOLB:
Just as it was?
N_/
13 MR. SELTZER:
In substance.
14 MR. KOLB:
Do you mean by that exactly 15 as it is worded?
16 Q
You believed, didn't you, that 17 substantially what is contained in the recommended 18 procedures in GPU 79 was going to be sent out to 19 operators, didn't you?
20 A
Obviously, I thought something had to go
(,
21 in there where X is, but other than that, I thought 22 it was going to go out substantially like this, yes.
23 Q
What was it in there that you thought
\\_/
24 was too complex?
25 MR. KOLB:
Objection to the form.
-y_
y
1 Kelly 296 t
s 2
Q What adjective did you use?
3 MR. KOLB:
What did he say before?
)
4 MR. SELTZER:
You are objecting to 5
form.
6 MR. KOLB:
You are trying to find out 7
now what his' characterization is so you can 8
use it in the question?
9 A
I believe I said it was' complicated.
e 10 Q
What in GPU 79 did you find too complicated?
11 A
Paragraph 2 talks about the references to 12 instrumentation errors being
" termination is 13 allowed provided the hot leg termination indication 14 plus approximate instrument error is more than 15 50 degrees below saturation temperature corresponding 16 to the reactor coolant system pressure less 17 instrument errors."
18 I thought the "plus instrument errors" and 19 the "less instrument errors" was complicated.
20 Q
Is that the only part that you thought
(
21 was unnecessarily complex?
22 A
That is all I remember.
23 Q
Other than that, you had no reservations D
(_)
24 about the instructions in GPU 79 being sent out to i
25 operators?
1 Kelly 297 2
MR. KOLB:
He said a few minutes ago 3
the X would have to be taken care of.
4 Q
Other than those two things, did you 5
have any other reservations?-
6 A
Not that I recall.
7 Q
Did you ever talk to anybody about 8
GPU 79 after you received it?
9 MR. KOLB:
Prior to the Three Mile 10 Island accident?
11 MR. SELTZER:
Right.
"3 12 A
Not that I recall.
%_)
13 Q
Did you see Bert Dunn from time to 14 time between February 16, 1978 and the Three Mile 15 Island accident?
16 A
I don't remember a specific case.
17 Q
You never said to him "I
guess that 18 ought to do it for high pressure injection, Bert"?
19 A
I don't remember that.
20 Q
Do you know that there was a meeting
(
21 with representatives of Toledo Edison to discuss 22 pressurizer level indications sometime in late 1978?
23 A
I don't remember any such meeting.
')
(N /
24 Q
In 1978, who in your estimation was 25 the most knowledgeable person at Babcock & Wilcox
I 1
Kell'y 298
,_s
(/)
2 regarding emergency core cooling systems?
3 A
Bert Dunn.
4 Q
Was he the company's greatest expert (i
5 in emergency core cooling systems?
6 MR. KOLB:
What do you mean by 7
greatest expert?
8 Q
The most expert person in B&W on 9
emergency core cooling systems.
t 10 MR. KOLB:
Could you e xp lai'n the 11 difference between that question and the
(~)N 12 one you just asked him two questions back?
(
13 MR. SELTZER:
I was trying to be a 14 little less abstract.
The most knowledgeable, 15 I thought there would be a connotation that 16 this is somebody with a lot of book learning 17 on the subject but perhaps not the person 18 relied upon for greatest expertise in the 19 area.
'20 Q
So now I am asking whether it was your
(,
21 understanding that in 1978 Bert Dunn had the 22 greatest expertise in the company in emergency 23 core cooling systems?
[)
\\/
24 A
Yes.
25 Q
Are you aware B&W was fined by the NRC
-~
1 Kelly 299 2
following the Three Mile Island accident for 3
non-compliance with NRC regulations?
4 A
Yes.
(
5 Q
Are you aware that the NRC regulation 6
for which the company was fined for not complying 7
was 10 CFR part 21?
8 A
I don't remember.
9 Q
Are you aware that the violation dealt 1
10 in part with a failure to report the safety concern 11 arising out of the termination of high pressure 12 injection on the Davis-Besse transient?
13 A
I don't remember.
14 Q
Prior to the Three Mile Island accident, 15 had anybody ever educated you at B&W to any 16 obligation that you might have to report safety
~i 17 concerns pursuant to NRC regulations?
~
18 MR. KOLB:
I am a bit concerned about 19 the word educated.
It could mean to 20 somebody giving him training in a classroom.
(,
21 Do you mean that kind of thing or do 22 you mean more than that?
23 MR. SELTZER:
I just mean imparting b)
\\'
24 knowledge to you.
25 MR. KOLB:
In any way?
(~).
1 Kelly 300
\\_/
2 MR. SELTZER:
Yes.
3 A
We had an administrative procedure covering 4
the subject.
5 Q
Had you ever read it before the Tnree 6
Mile Island accident?
7 A
Yes.
8 Q
Did you have an understanding of what 9
it required prior to the Three Mile Island accident?
e 10 A
I knew it existed.
I don't remember being 11 aware of all of the details involved and the
/~
12 requirements for submitting preliminary safety
\\n)}
13 concerns.
14 Q
What understanding did you have, if 15 any,.before the Three Mile Island accident regarding 16 to whom safety concerns should.be reported?
17 A
Licensing.
18 Q
Jim Taylor's group?
19 A
Yes.
20
.Q Had you ever heard of anybody reporting
(.
21 a safety concern to Licensing prior to the Three 22 Mile Island accident?
23 A
I don't remember.
24 Q
You don't remember hearing of it?
L 25 A
Yes.
I-don't. remember hearing of anyone
~
l i
1 I
l i
1 Kelly 301 7s
)
U 1
2 reporting it, a safety concern, prior to Three 3
Mile Island.
4 Q
Bert Dunn said that the inappropriate 5
termination of high pressure injection could lead 6
to uncovery of the core and possible melting of 7
the fuel, right?
MR. KOLB:
Are you referring to a 8
9 particular memo and particular language?
10 MR. SELTZER:
No.
11 Q
Either in the memos or in the conversation I'N 12 with you.
U 13 (Record read by the reporter.)
14 A
I remember core uncovery in one of his memes.
15 I don't remember possible melting of the. fuel.
16 Q
Take a look at his February 16 memo 17 and see if that refreshes your recollection.
I am If, sorry.
I meant the February 9 memo.
Take a look 19 at Bert Dunn's February 9 memo, GPU Exhibit 78.
20 The last sentence of the second
(,
21 paragraph, does that refresh your recollection 22 that Bert had pointed out to you the possibility 23 of fuel damage if there was inappropriate
/')
\\',.
-24 termination of high pressure injection?
25 MR. KOLB:
It says fuel damage.
It
-+r, r
1 Kelly 302
(^N tj 2
doesn't say fuel melt.
3 A
Fuel damage.
4 Q
You accept what Bert said as reliable, 5
- f. s that right?
6 MR. KOLB:
Are you asking him the 7
abstract or this particular sentence?
8 MR. SELTZER:
That specific sentence.
9 MR. KOLB:
You are referring to the t
10 last sentence, "Had this event occurred"?
11 Is that the sentence you are asking about.
'~h 12 Q
Let me refer,specifically to what Bert 13 Dunn told you after the training room B session.
14 You have testified previously that 15 Dunn said that he could postulate scenarios that 16 would lead to possible fuel damage if they 17 turned the high pressure injection off too soon.
18 When Dunn said that to you, you believed 19 that his assessment was an accurate one, did you not?
20 MR. KOLB:
Would you mind telling us
(,
21 what you are reading from?
22 MR. SELTZER:
Transcript 16-17.from 23 the Kemeny staff deposition.
\\_)
24 A
Did I believe his statement was accurate?
25 Q
Y,e s.
.= -.
1 Kelly 303 s
2 A
I believed what he was telling me, yes.
3 Q
Did you understand that fuel damage 4
included the possibility of melting of the cladding 5
on the fuel rods, and if not, what other kind of 6
damage can you envision?
7 MR. KOLB:
Let's take it one question 8
at a time.
The first question.
9 Q
When he told you and you repeated in t
10 your sworn testimony that Bert had predicted fuel 11 damage, what did the phrase " fuel damage" mean,
(
i 12 as you used it?
13 A
I don't remember what I thought at the time.
14 Q
When a core that is generating 15 residual heat gets uncovered, from your experience, 16 what kind of fuel damage can occur?
17 A
cladding failure, pellet disintegration, 18 release of the radioactive fission products.
That 19 type of thing.
20 Q
Would you agree that those kinds of i
(m 21 things pose a substantial safety hazard?
22 A
Yes.
23 Q
Did it ever occur to you that the I
)
~
24 concern expressed by Bert Dunn, which in b
- 25 substantial part motivated your November 1,
1977
1 Kelly 304
[,_)h i
\\_
2 memo, should trigger a requirement to report 3
that substantial safety hazard pursuant to NRC 4
regulations?
5 MR. KOLB:
I object as to form.
I 6
think that you have not correctly characterized 7
what he said before.
Also, the question is 8
too long, too complicated.
9 MR. SELTZER:
I will still ask it.
10 (Record read by the repo r te'r. )
11 MR. KOLB:
I don't believe he has g
12 testified that he viewed Bert Dunn's
%)
13 expression of concern as an expression of 14 a substantial safety hazard taken in default.
15 You asked him a different question.
16 MR. SELTZER:
He said that Bert Dunn 17 told him that there could be fuel damage if 18 there was inappropriate termination of high 19 pressure injection.
He defined fuel damage 20 as including several things, and he has
(
21 agreed that those things constitute a 22 substantial safety hazard.
Now I am asking 23 whether you ever believed that that substantial iA/
24 safety hazard required you or anybody else 25 at B&W to report that hazard pursuant to NRC
1 Kelly 305 2
regulations.
3 MR. KOLB:
The same objection.
You 4
are making it sound like it was certainly in 5
his mind a hazard taken in the full context.
6 Something like your question earlier about 7
his memo, November 1.
You'are taking 8
something out of context and misusing it.
9 I think the witness shou 1d be able to 10 explain in his own words what his' state of J
11 mind was without your loading the question.
l I^)
12 MR. SELTZER:
I press the question.
D 13 MR. KOLB:
You are free to answer the 14 question in full, expressing it as you think l
15 best.
16 A
I don't remember thinking that this should
~
17 be a preliminary safety concern, because I didn't 18 have a feeling of urgency fron Bert when he was 19
-talking about it after the training room B meeting.
20 When we had talked about it, when Bert and I talked
(,
21 about it, and I said I didn't get any response to 22 my November 1st memo, Bert said he would take care 23 of it, and he wrote this memo of February 9, 1978.
-p
~
24 MR. KOLB:
Peferring to Exhibit-78.
25 A
when he says in the last sentence, "I believe
+-4 e-y y
1 Kelly 306 (v
2 this is a very serious matter and deserves our 3
prompt attention and correction," I thought he 4
was overstating the problem.
5 Q
Did you believe that the problem 6
deserved attention?
t 7
A Yes.
8 Q
You recognized that it was a problem 9
that concerned emergency core cooling systems, t
10 right?
4 11 A
Yes.
12 Q
And you recognized that it was a 13 problem that concerned the proper operation of 14 emergency core cooling systems, right?
l 15 A
Yes.
J 16 Q
And the purpose of emergency core 17 cooling systems is tomaintaineffective} core 18 cooling during loss of coolant accidents, right?
19 MR. KOLB:
Are you asking-if that is 20 the only purpose?
(.
21 MR. SELTZER:
Right.
22 Q
The purpose of emergency core cooling 23 systems is to provide effective cooling of the
(/
b-24 core during loss of coolant accidents, isn't that 25 right?
i
I Kelly 307 O.
2 A
Yes.
3 Q
Didn't you believe that a concern over 4
the proper operation of an emergency core cooling 5
system deserved prompt attention?
6 MR. KOLB:
Would you define prompt?
7 How fast is prompt in your mind as you ask 8
that question?
g Q
I mean prompt in the sense that Bert t
10 Dunn has u' sed it, 11 MR. KOLB:
Mr. Kelly will have some
N 12 difficulty reading Mr. Dunn's mind.
13 MR. SELTZER:
I mean in the sense that 14 Mr. Kelly understood i't.
I am trying to 15 figure out which part of this sentence 16 Mr. Kelly believed was overstating the 17 matter.
18 MR. KOLB:
You are referring t;o the 19 sentence at the end of Exhibit 78?
20 MR. SELTZER:
Right.
We established
(
21 that he agrees with Dunn that it deserves 22 attention.
Now I am trying to find out N
. whether he agrees with Mr. Dunn that it 23
)
24 deserves p romp t attention.
I am trying to 25 suggest by my questioning if a safety concern.
i
r 1
Kelly 308
%)
2 deserves any attention.
He probably 3
agrees as a responsible B&W engineer that 4
it deserves prompt attention.
5 Q
Isn't that true?
6 MR. KOLB:
Do you have any idea vhat 7
the question is at this point?
8 A
Let's start the question again.
9 Q
Dunn had addressed' a concern that you u.
10 had previously raised, right?
11 A
Yes.
"T 12 Q
And he was saying that it deserved (V
13 prompt attention?
14 A
Yes.
15 Q
You didn't disagree with that, did you?
16 A
No.
17 Q
He was citing a concern over the 18 proper use of an emergency core cooling system to 19 keep the core effectively cooled during a loss of 20 coolant accident, right?
21 A
Yes.
22 Q
'Do you agree that is a me.tter that 23 is_very serious?
/\\-
24 A
That what is a matter?
Define that again.
- 25 MR. KOLB:
Could you give him the
1 Kelly 309 2
question slowly too.
You are speeding up 3
here, possibly because we are getting at 4
the end of the day.
These questions are 5
complex.
6 Q
Dunn had articulated a concern which 7
was raised previously by you that the operators 8
were not properly using the emergency core cooling 9
system to effcetively cool the core during a loss t
10 of coolant accident, right?
11 A
Yes.
12 Q
That concern is a very serious matter, 13 isn't it?
14 A
Yes.
15 Q
so you agreed with Dunn that.this was 16 a very serious matter and deserves our prompt 17 attention, right?
18 A
Yes.
19 Q
Do you withdraw your prior, answer that 20 you believe that he had overstated the matter?
k 21 A
No.
22 Q
Do you want to explain the apparent 23 inconsistency?
i 24 MR. KOLB:
If you ask him the question, 25 he will answer it.
i 1
Kelly 310 l'
\\
2 Q
You want to explain the apparent 3
inconsistency?
4 A
Yes.
As I understand what you are saying, C,
5 why did I think that Bert Dunn was overstating 6
this or why shouldn't it have been a preliminary 7
safety concern.
8 Q
No.
Forget the preliminary safety 9
concern.
Bert has said, and you agree with him, t-10 that this 's a very serious matter and' deserves B&W's i
11 prompt attention, right?
That is what the memo
/~*N 12 says, doesn't it?
P i
V 13 A
Yes.
14 MR. KOLB:
Is that the question, is 15 that what the memo says?
16 MR. SELTZER:
Yes.
17 Q
You agreed with that, right?
18 MR. KOLB:
I think you asxed him 19 earlier to explain what you described as 20 an apparent inconsistency.
Let him do that.
(,
21 MR. SELTZER:
Let me do it my way.
22 MR. KOLB:
This is your question.
I 23 am simply urging that he answer your question.
rs 24 You don' t want to take that question any 25 further.. You are withdrawing that question?
e
=~--n
l i
I 1
Kelly 311 d
+
2 MR. SELTZER:
I am withdrawing that 3
question and asking this one.
4 MR. KOLB:
He doesn't want you to 5
explain it.
6 Q
You agreed that what Dunn had articulated 7
was a very s e rio us matter and deserved B&W's O
prompt attention, right?
9 A
Yes.
10 Q
Did you tell anybody that vu thought 11 Bert had overstated the matter?
(']
12 A
Not that I remember.
V 13 Q
I think the world deserves to know.
14 How can it be that you, whom I think started'the 15 ball rolling with your Ncvember 1 memo, and agreed 16 that it is a very serious matter and deserved 17 B&W's prompt attention, how can you think that 10 is overstating the matter?
Cores may be burning 19 up, fuel escaping, radiation contaminating people, 20 people dying. How does this overstate the matter?
(
21 MR. KOLB:
Is this a summation or l
22 question?-
23 MR. SELTZER:
A question, j
q
)
\\
24 MR. KOLB:
Could we just have the 25 question.
Skip the part about the radiation 9e -
1 Kelly 312 cm 2
and the people dying.
3 A
Bert's memo in my mind is one piece of the 4
concern that I had to start with, and in my mind --
5 I already talked to the trainers.
They were 6
already, I was convinced, teaching the correct 7
thing.
I didn't feel any sense of urgency in 8
getting out possibly additional written instructions.
9 I had talked to Bert or Bert talked to me after 5
10 the meeting in training room B, and he'didn't seem 11 alamant.
I just felt that from Bert's standpoint, 12 he wanted to get the ball rolling because I
(')'g 13 didn't have any success, but in the whole picture, 14 this is just in my mind still a follow up of 15 trying to get additional written instructions out.
16 It still was not -- the results of this, to my 17 mind, were not the important part of the puzzle.
18 It was more of what were the operators actually 19 getting.
The only thing I knew they were actually 20 getting was what these simulator instructors told
(
21 ma.
From my perspective, this seems a very' serious 22 matter to be comething that is overstating the problem.
23 (Time noted:
5: 5 o'cl ek P.M )
O
/
24
-p OSE H
- KELLY, R
5 Subscribed'and sworn to be ore me K
- thin /9_ day of QMd 1981.
d q p-cu ~ ty n % /,19 n
~
144 1
313 CERTIFICATE STATE OF NEW YORK
)
3
- ss.:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
)
4 JOSEPH R.
DANYo I,
Nhn Public of the State of New York, do hereby 6
certify that the continued deposition of JOSEPH J.
KELLY, JR.
T"**d"Y'
"*Y me on consisting 3'2 of pages
70 through g
I further certify that the witness had been previously sworn and that the within transcript is a true record of said testimony; That I am not connected by blood or marriage with any of the said parties nor interested directly or indirectly 1'n the matter in controversy, nor am I in the employ of any of the counsel.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my 19 hand this
/f day of 4/
,1981-20
/
21 i
--L 22 M
s
\\
,(APs?.oAsYo /
24 v) 25
~__
j h
i t
I May.5, 1981 314 INDEX
.i 1
WITNESS PAGE 1
Joseph J.
Kelly, Jr. (resumed) 172
(
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!l E.X H I B I TS 1
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GPU FOR IDENT.
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152 Site problem repor,t 372 dated November 9, 1977 signed 180 by Doug Halsted a
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