ML20072G400
| ML20072G400 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 06/17/1983 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-83 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8306280479 | |
| Download: ML20072G400 (3) | |
Text
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c TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY Yg CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 374of y
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30 June 17, 1983 ro
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eJ1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Conunission j'
Region II Attn: Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2990 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - CHILLER UNIT PIPING COMPONENTS IMPROPERLY WELDED - BLRD-50-438/82-10, BLRD-50-439/82 FINAL REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector R. V. Crlenjak on January 11, 1982 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 1707. This was followed by our interim reports dated February 16, June 23, September 21, and November 29, 1982. Enclosed is our final report. We consider 10 CFR Part 21 applicable to this deficiency.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L. M. Mills, nager Nuclear Licensing Enclosure cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consnission Washington, D.C.
20555 Records Center (Enclosure)
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 150.0 Atlanta, Georgia 30339 OFFICIALCONh 36g{90 e
S FDR f
g An Equal Opportunity Employer
ENCLOSURE BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 CHILLER UNIT PIPING COMPONENTS IMPROPERLY WELDED NCR 1707 BLRD-50-438/82-10, BLRD-50-439/82-10 10 CFR 50.55(e)
FINAL REPORT Description of Deficiency The chiller units listed below, manufactured by Dunham-Bush of West Hartford, Connecticut, exhibit extensive weld deficiencies on welds performed by the vendor. Visual examination revealed undercut, cold lapping, porosity, weld spatter, lack of fusion, mismatched components, numerous are strikes, weld wires protruding from welds, and slag pockets.
Dunham-Bush Chiller Identification Numbers - Auxiliary Building Model Number - IPCX290-0Q PCX Serial Number Location DPW 2013M77X1633C -
Between A2&A3 - R&S Line (610')
DPW 2013M77X1633A -
Between A2&A3 - R&S Line (610')
DPW 2013M77X1633B -
Between A5&A6 - R&S Line (610')
DPW 2013A78X1633H -
Between A5&A6 - R&S Line (610')
DPW 2013A78X1633D -
A10 Between R&S Line (610')
DPW 2013A78X16330 -
A10 Between R&S Line (610')
DPW 2013A78X1633F -
Between A12&A13 - R&S Line (610')
DPW 2013A78X1633E -
Between A12&A13 - R&S Line (610')
Dunham-Bush Chiller Identification Numbers - Control Building Model Number - IPCX230-0Q PCI Serial Number Location DPW 2010M77X1601A -
Between C2&C3 - N&P Line (629')
DPW 2010M77X1601B -
Between C2&C3 - N&P Line (610')
Safety Implications The chiller units are seismic Category I components and are therefore required to be operational to ensure ' maintenance of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and/or to allow the safe shutdown of the reactor. The cited deficiency might result in a loss of function during a seismic event and possibly under normal operating conditions.
Loss of function of the chiller units could result in a condition that would adversely affect the safety of operations of the plant.
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Corrective Action As indicated in the fourth report on this deficiency, TVA evaluated the weld anomalies detailed on the nonconformance report (NCR) and only one anomaly required repair. The pinhole porosity was ground and rewelded per QA procedures. TVA evaluated the other anomalies and determined they are only esthetic in nature and do not affect the seismic integrity, service life, reliability, and operability of the chiller units.
The subject chillers were specified to be built to current industry standards in effect at time of manufacture. These did not include ASME Section III requirements which are now required for safety-related water system components and specify stringent QA weld procedures and inspection and testing. Therefore, the assignable cause is attributed to the lack of specification requirements for QA weld procedures and non-destructive examination (NDE).
TVA's Division of Engineering Design and regulatory requirements dictate that current procurement of safety-related chillers include conformance to Nuclear Industry Standards, specifically ASME Section III and ANSI B31.1, which require QA weld procedures and quality control inspection including NDE. In addition, TVA will specifically require radiographic examination of all safety-related water chiller piping in the technical portion of the procurement specifications for water chillers. The QA weld procedures will also reduce the possibilities of esthetic weld anomalies which require more thorough examination and additional investigation for determination of acceptability.
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