ML20072F234
| ML20072F234 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Harris  |
| Issue date: | 06/20/1983 |
| From: | Eddleman W EDDLEMAN, W. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20072F238 | List: |
| References | |
| 82-468-01-OL, 82-468-1-OL, ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8306270307 | |
| Download: ML20072F234 (32) | |
Text
m UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 20 June.1983 NUCLEAR REGULATOBY COMMISSION
[
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BEFORE THE A'IVMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD Glenn O. Bright i
C?.
Dr. James H. Carpenter
- ON o,,
t James L. Kelley, Chairman k
]%p O 19 g /
. g.
n+g 4
In the Matter of
'Y Dockets 50 40 f
CAROLINA POWER AND LIGHT CO. et al.
)
50 401 OL (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant,
)
Units i ani 2)
)
ASLBP No. 82-h68-01
)
~
Wells Eddlenan 's Resnonse to Staff DEIS This response ip,being filed under the Board's 5-27-83 and 3-10-83 orders, nursuant to en extension of tine granted by l
Judge Kelley 6-8-83 due to my heavy workload (including filing j
i in CP&L's NC rate case 6-17), of which Applicants' attorney Hill l
Carrow and N9C Staff Attomey Charles Barth were informed by phone 6-8-83 1
No contentions are withdrawn herein.
Where an a dnitted or deferred centention is outside the scope of this DEIS, I so state.
Where amended or new ctctentions are stated, "what 's new" in the DEIS (or "what's nissing") is addressed.
It is my view that the DEIS does noth'ing to safety contentions, security contentions ogg managenent capability contentions, or energency n,ianning contentions.
Men.
These include Eddlenan 150 through 161 that have not yet been ruled 0
on; Joint Contentions I, IV, V, VI and VII-; Eddleman kl, h5, 6hr, or i
gg 65, 67, 9,11,116 and 132; deferred Eddlenan contentions P (radiation Na7 monitors for energency plan), 2h (spent fuel transport security),
OE 32 (excent 32(3) self-ionizing by beta emissions, which the DEIS mo.o fails to treat; therefore this part should stand or rennin deferred Tr,D3
O to the energency planning stage); 26 re more spent fuel for terrorists to attack if shipped to Harris (The DEIS does not consider the effect of sabotage or terrorism on the plant or spent fuel -- see nn 5-58, 5-60, and 5-30. Note that Table S-k on nage 5-30 (note h) does not have an estinate of risk fron transport accidents -- this is the subject of Eddleman 64-1 wnich I think has been given full basis by the lack of consideration of accident consequences for spent fuel in this DEIS); Eddleman 29 and 30 re energency planning
(
except as radiciodine effects are in the DEIS, which See beJow.
inadequately describes the nodeling of sane for accidents.),
Eddleman 54 re energency planning; Eddlennn 81 re emergency plans (except as they include Class IX accidents, the nrobability of Wnich M
the Staff has underestinated.
See below.); Fddlenag 57 re emergency planning, except that $7B, like 81, includes the issue of Class IX accidents.
Both 57B and 81 can stand, or remain deferred til the emergency plan is available, because the Staff has underestimated the likelihood of Class IX accidents (see below), and the plans to deal with then have not yet been produced to no or othe r intervenors.
Eddleman 57D, that the cost of energency plans should have been included in the EEIS or NEPA cost benefit balance for the plant, has been given full basis by the Steff's conclete onissien of these costs fron section 5.8 (socioeconomic effects -- two paragrauhs on p. 5-2P) and fron Table 6-1 and the whole of section 6 on cost-benefit balance.
Eddlenan 63 concerns the enerSency plan and should remain deferred.
Eddleman 6kA concerns the risk of sabotage from storage of spent fuel on-site pre-operation, a matter not addressed at all in the DEIS.
This should renain deferred.
Eddlenan 97 concerns the emergency plan's adequacy to deal with very rapid accident s.
The DEIS provides littic if any considerction of the tine in which
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. severe accidents would develop.
The DEIS states, n. 5-82, Obat
" Warning tine before evacuation also has considerable impact on Ude effectiveness of offsite emergency response; this parameter is not precisely calculated because of its dependence on
,,,. other paraneters (e.g. tine of release) that are not precisely known."
In the 2d paragranh of (7) on that page, it says
" Uncertainties arise fren and over-sinplified r.ralysis of the nagnitude and timing of the fission vroduct relense, fron uncertainties in calculated anarggy release..." which is about as good as saying that the effect of very ranid accidents hasn't been included by the Staff with any accuracy. Thus thic contentien should either s tand or remain deferred to the energency plan 's being in ny hands.
7l 99,100,117,- 118 ]and 124 all concern the energency Eddlenan 4
plan which, as noted above, doesn't really get dealt' with $ n th e DEIS (cr. cept there is an unsupported assunption that it'll work, in calculating the cost-benefits frcn severe accidents). Chese should remain deferred.
Eddlenan 133 concerns the security plan l
l and is not treated in the DEIS.
Eddlenan 35, ditto, 6EA ditto. ;
Eddlenan 83, dftto; Eddlenan 103 re counting lab for energency plan, ditto.
Eddlenan 107 concerns the SER and is deferred and should stay so. Eddlenan 137,139 and 1h0 concern energency plans and should remain deferred, like the other energency plan concentions above, until the energency plan is in ny hands.
Jo' int Contention II is not affected by the DEIS, which uses dhe models of NRC regulato ry guides to calculate doses, and uses BEIR-I (which has lower health effects than BEIR-III) or BFIR-III estima See DFIS p 5-28, p3P9;ges for cancer and genetic health effects.
A effects are set about 1h% higher, but this is far fess thdn Jognge There, canc62 risks are set below arIR III gen t
,4 also a t 5-51.
II all ege s.
_h.
Cancer mortality near operating nukes is not covered in the DFIS.
Eddleman 37B (on health effects / pain and suffering) is sir.ilarly unaffected by the DEIS.
See responses to Anplicants and Staff re interrogatories on this contention, 3/21/83, d WeP/83,$/6/83 Again, the DEIS (pages cited above)(e.g. ), uses the models 37B attacks.
Also, the Staff gives no consideration to p_ain and suffering in the cost-benefit balance (DEIS section 6, see table 6-1), or in is discussion of health effects in section 5.
Thus, all the DEIS does is add basis to 37B by continuing the errors and omissions it alleges.
Joint Contention IV isn't rea31y covered in the DEIS, but uncerta$nties in recording radiation exnosure to workers are not addressed in the DEIS, which is based on measured worker exposu*es at other nuclear sites.
See at page 5-27.
Thus the UEIS fails to consider the problem raised in Jof nt Contention IV.
Joint Contention V, re calibration and insnection of monitoring equipment, is not dealt with in the DEIS excent possibly by the pre-statement that the Staff has found the4 operational monitnring program accentable except that the moniters should be located in 2 rings around the plant. (p.5-35).
The following nages do not I
address calibration at all, and only list sannling frequendes from Applicants' ER.
The staff does not say why it found the pre-op monitoring acceptable, or what cr$ teria it used to so find.
The Staff does say, p 5-46, that operational monitoring offsite l
will be reviewed in detail.by NRC staff, and vut into the Technical l
Specifications of the operating license.
This indicates no such review has yet occurred.
Thus, the DEIS does not change the basis of Joint Contention V, in that it has adonted Apolicants' frequencies of monitoring, does not address calibration at all, and if anything adds a criticism of the locations of the nonitors..
.x
-5 Joint Contention VI, re inability to detect specific radio-nuclides, is not addressed in the DEIS, which relies on Applicants' ER.
Since thi:a contention has been admitted with sufficient basis, the DEIS does not affect it.
Eddleman 2 addresses need for radiation monitors, but in the context of emergency planning.
I have not found radiation nonitoring for energencies covered in the DEIS; as noted above, Eddlenan 2 has been deferred.
The Staff doe s appear to give basis for what is not a "new" contention, but a previous 1J rejected one, at page 5-57 Eddienan 88 and 105 addressed 10 CFR 100.11(a). Eddleman 88 was deferred; 105 was rejected because it "does not indicate how the nostulated r;..eleases in Reg. Guides 1.h and 1.70 are insufficient and how the analysis shculd be changed."
However, the Staff at nace $w$7 says it is carrying out " calculations to estinP te (in the SE3) the potential unper bounds for individual ernosures from the initiating accidents listed in Table 5.6 for the nurnose of implenenting 10 CFR 100."
However, the Table 5.6 listing (sane page) is all accidents within design basis.10 CFP 100 requires (100.11(a)(1) footnote 1) an assur:ed accident "to result in substantial meltdown of the co re with subsequent release of appreciable quantities of fission products."
It is clear from the ninimal doses and fron the tynes of accidents listed in Table 5.6 that dais criteri&n is not being co olied with.
This is fully basis for Eddleman 88(A) as can be seen from the releases from serious accidents listed on page 5-59 and figure 5.8 (p. 5-63).
These doces (above the 10 CFE 100 limits) would almost certainly occur within the exclusion area if such an accident occurred.
Note Figure 5.8 uses those linits.
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i The table and severe accident analysis (core melt with substantial release of fission products, e.g. Event V and TMLB) show that the dose inside the exclucion area in these events could and would be above the 10 CFR 100 linits.
Thus these areas should be closed to public use and the5r " benefits" should continue to be extluded from the cost-benefit analysis in section 6 of the DEIS.
88(b) is given basis because the costs it discusses are not listed in the DEIS, even though the use of the Harris lake for snort and commercial fishing is included in the DEIS( see p. 4-25/P6) and because the accident conditions under 10 CFR 100 are severe enough to kill people exposed inside the exclusion area (thus theiv health and safety is not protected unless either (1) they eren't allowed in there, or-(2) a plan able to get then out before plant radiation reaches unen is develooed and maintained (at a cost),
including the nbility to locate, warn, and pick up and evacuate all persons recreationally using the exclusion area or any part of it, in the event of an accident).
Eddleman 105 alleged that the boundaries of the LP2 and exclusion area were innroperly e stablished under 10 CF9100.11.
If the Staff has indeed made its review as described in the DEIS, then these boundarics are necessarily being set irnroperly.
The dose at the boundary of the LFZ is not discuesed by Staff (see p. 5-55) but within this 3 nile LPZnow set at Harris is a nursing hone. (ibid).
The DEIS does not say that CP&L's plan for evacuation of this LPZ is adequate: it says it will be reviewed later.
See 5-55/56.
The Staff's statements on their face say that the analysis required by 10 CFR 100.11 (ref. Eddleman contentions 5-14-82 pp 210 top, 210-11 citing Farley, 211 bottom) has not been done and they're only going to do it for design basis accident:.
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. This is clearly inconsistent with 10 CF9100,11's requirement for setting out the exclusion area and LP1 based on an accident that melts the, core and releases a significant quantity of the radionuclider in the core.
Thus contentien 105 should now be admitted.
"WHAT'S NEW" for 105 and 88: The staff 's statement that it is analysing design basis (not greater) accidents in checking the LPZ and exclusion area (p.5-57) is new.
There 's no way I could have known that that was what they were doing on 5-lh-82.
It provides the specific basis for both these contentiens, including both narts of Eddleman 88, part 3 decending on part A's having basis, Glough 883 does not directly depend on 88A (see the actual contention, Fddlensn 5-14-82 supplement at 198).
The staff f ails to discuss size of the the LPZand exclusion area in die context of nore severe accidents but does state (p. 5-62) E "Early evacuation within and early relocation of peonle outside the plume evoosure nathway zone arm... are considered as essential sequels to severe nuclear reactor accidents involving significe.nt release of radioactivity to the atmosphere."
This nrovides more basis for 883, and also a basis for 8SA and 105 in that this evacuation is not assumed in setting the 10 CFR 100-required LPZ and exclusion area boundaries.
Yet the Staff has assumed it in naking l
its dose probability curves in DEIS section 5 This neans that doses without evacuation / relocation would be higher.
The Staff does not give any meaningful information as to how CP&L would protect those i
in the exclusion area and LPZ, and says tha t such plans have not been evalumated yet. (5-54/55).
The Staff's judgnent and methods were i
not known 5-14-82 and could not have been anticipated unless one assumed the staff wouldn't do its duty. (A contention to this effect l
was rejected.).
Unless I were possessed of extrasensory percention, I could not have anticipated that the Staff would nake the above-cited statements in the DEIS that go against 10 CFR 100.
L
I will now turn to the adnitted Eddleman environnental contentiens (and return to the deferred contenti ons later).
Eddleman 29, concerning radiciodine emissions, is not affected by the DEIS, which states (p. h-10) that the Staff's analysis of the (Harris) ragdwaste systems and the capability of those systens to meet the requirenents of Apnendix I will be presented in chapter 11 of the staff'S Safety Evaluation Report (SER) which is due out in Nov.
1983. Appendix D, adnittedly incomnle te, in the DEIS, still. calculates radioiodine dose maximum of 9.2 mren (p. D-11), close to the 15 mren limit for thyroid dose per year.
This anpendix states, pp D-1 and D-2, that it uses the models of Reg. Guides 1.111, and 1.109.
That means-these calculations are subject to then sane deficiencies (insbility to model rainout, see p.5-82) alleged in Fddlenan 80; and to the underestination resultin6 f rom use of nodels a s described in Eddleman 8-C,D and E (which, since they were not addressed in the 9/22/82 order, I presune are deferred as parts of 8-3).
At any rate, Eddleman 29 goes to what the Ap,licants have not shown, not what the Staff has failed to do, so the DEIS should not affect it.
Eddleman 37B is covered above, 2d and following lines, ton praragranh of page h.
Eddlenan 75 sinply gains basis fron the DEIS.
At page 4-24 Corbicula is listed as one of the species that "doninate" the Harris proposed pumping site.
Corbicula has also been found downstrean of the Buckhorn dam, below Harrist cooling lake.
(sane page ). A t p. 5-20 the Staff states it expects Corbicula to get into the Harris Reservoir throu6h none (unspecified) mechanisms.
While the Staff analysis of these mechanisms is clearly not detailed, the Staff has failed to show that the sane or other nechanisns won't get Corbicula into the Harris auxiliary reservoir, from which it could block the plant's ultimate heat sink.
This latter is a safety concern.
n
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-9 Thus, the only thing to do with 75 in light of the DE'_S is to let it stand.
The staff has lent it nore basis.
+
However, in light of the new information in the DEIS as te where Corbicula has been found near the site, a new contention 75B is aopropriate:
Applicants have not demonstrated the ability to exclude Corbicula from the Harris reservoir and auxiliary reservoir and the heat exchangers needed to keep Harris in cold shutdown.
BASIS:
Applicants have a record of f ailure to chlorinate to orevent narine growth in the RHR systens at Brunswick.
According to the D7IS,p.k-Ph, Corbicula is present in the Cape Fear River (a dominant species at the Harris punping station ), and in Buckhorn creek below the Harris dam.
Corbicula veligens (1ervae) ave tiny and easily transported in water, (e.g. that lef t in boats), fish centainers, or on clothing of persens, anong other neans.
Their presence around the Harris plant means their introduction into bo th reservoirs is virtually inevitable, and the Stafe expects (DCIS p. 5-20) that they will get into the Harris nain reservoir.
D.k-2h WHAT'S NEW:
Data on presence of Corbicula so near the plant; Staff's ooinion (p. 5-20) that Corbicula will get into the Harris lake; no demonstration these mechanisms that will Fet Corbicula into the main lake will not apply to the auxiliary lake.
WHY COULDN'T FILP IT EARLIFR.
This infornation, particularly the Staff judgnent that Corbicula will get into the nain reservoir, was not previously available to me...
NOTE: This contention may be seen as a revision of 75 based on new informatien in the DEIS.
In that case, I note that it will not broaden the issues or delay the proceeding, since the same issue has been admitted for the reservoir; the good cause for not fili ~ng earlier is the knavailability of the info and the Staff's judgment cited above.
There are no other neans to protect this interest since L
without c contention it can't be heard; no other parties are representing ny interest in this particular aspect of Corbicula infestation at Harris; and that my participation on this issue will assist in deseloping a sound record, since there have been CP&L troubles with organisms growing in RER heat exchancess at Brunswick and Corbicula problens at 3 nuclear plants; I have shown the ability to frane interroghtories and cronss-exanino on this issue.
These are the 5 factors or lo CFR 2.71h for 2 ate-riled contentions, and in my view justify admittning Contention 75 B as stated above.
Eddleman 80 alleges deficiencies in mixing and disuersion nodels used by Acolicants and ERC Staff.
The DEIS does not use new models, but the same ones, see e.g. Appendix D pages D-1 through D-3, Anoendix B (entire, 3 pages) Anpendix C, C-2 thro"gh C-8; p.5-51 re health effect estinates; p. 5-28 be the use of BEIR-I, not higher BEIR-III, values.
At page 5-82, the Staff ex,14.citly cerfirns the wenkness of its nodels with resnect to rainout (precipitat'.cn of nuclides fron radioactive emissions, stating that "recent developments in the area of atmospheric dispers'.on nodeling used in CRAC (the co puter code developed in the RSS"(Reactor Shf ety Study <mRannussen Report)
" indicate that an inproved neteorological sannling schene would reduce the undertainties arising f rom this scurce (including the eff(.ct of washout by precipitation", uncertainties remain.
That is an acknowledgenent that the nodeling of rainnut would improve NRC's models of radioactive nr.terial dispersion.
Thus, the DEIS simply confirms and extends a bit the basis of Eddleman 80.
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. Eddlenan 83/8h concern the fbrmation of carcinogenic chenicals as a result of Harris operation and discharges.
The DEIS says the staff hasn't found evidence to indicate uroblens, but is still getting informaticu.
In fact, the DEIS does show a problen:
At pp. 5-6 and 5-7 the Staff refers to a ctudy showing that free cuorine at 0.h ppm or above enhances the formation of trihalonethanes.
Trihalonethanes (e.g. chloroforms, bronoforms, chlorobrnnoforms, iod6* forms, chloroiodoforms, e tc ) are carcinogens.
I have andnded today my answer to Applicants' InterroEntory 83/8h-h based on this information which I had not previously known of.
Chlorine levels of 0.5 ppm in discharge (residual chlowine) and higher 1 evels of free chlorine during treatnent are antic
- pated per the E".
Further, the DSIS at nage 5-8 shows increases in rhinra trihalomethanes at at least one niant with cooling towers (" plant B"),
I and at p. 5-6 higher levels of trihalomethanos than natienally found are noted in North Carclina water systens.
At nage b-11 it is noted that C?&L has no final plan yet for biocides and cleaning of the cooling towers.
Such a plan could incroace chen' cal discharges fron Harris.
Table h-h on page h-P1 does not 9hou any 9nalysis for trihalomethanes in the Cape Fear, though the Staff analysis of the Harris lake shows there will of ten be discharges from its reservoir c
to the Cane Fear.
Page 5-8 says the one-in-9-million chanre of cancer level due to presence of trihalonethanes is 15.7 parts per billion.
l Page 5-6 says un to 15 parts per billion have been found in non-i chlorinated natural surface waters in NC. These rose to 129 to 184 i
parts per billion af ter water treatment including chlorination at or more of cbout halfpthe levels planned for Harris (Ecuris is 3 to 5 epn, water was treated with 5.8 to 6.5 pon free ava'.lable chlorine).
No data for Harris lake trihalomethane levels are in th L
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An additional basis for content
- cn 83/8h, which also concerns mobilization of toxic /carcinngenic ne tals by Harris effluents, is found in Table 4-h on page 4-21, and
- n the discussion on nage 4-20 of the DEIS.
p.h-20: Concentrations above NC or US EPA lim! ts in the Cape Fear occurred at least once for copper, lead,
- nercury, n*ckel and zine.
At least the 1 cst 4 of these ave c9rcinogens.
Iron and nanganese levels above state standards are renorted connen on the sane page.
Cenper is a toxic metal in quantity, i.e. above the standards. (and perhaps it is toxic at lesser levels.)
To the extent that Harris reservo$r water enters the Cave Fear, its discharges of iron and copper will add to levels in the Cane Fear.
Also, its chlorine will be able to nobil$ ze not only iron and conper, but all other metals in the river.
The inadequate nonitoring for metals is shown by the short list included in Table h-k, p. h-21.
In sum, the EEIS adds so mething tc the basis of Eddlenan 83/84 This completes the admitted environnental contentions. To teturn to the deferred contentions, 8B covcas analysis of health effects of effluents in Table S-3 DEIS pages 5-83 and 5-84 provide no analysis of such effects, but state it is in Appendix C, which also covers radon and technetiun-99 emissions fron the nucle ar fuel cycle.
The Staff merely says the inpact of Table S-3 emissions is small compared to background radiatien's impact.
That is irrelevant.
The real que stien is, what are the se iml ac6s and how should they figure into the NEPA analysis?
The Staff admits (p. 5-83) that it used has only certain of the ir. pacts of the Table S-3 effluents in its analysis in Appendix C.
i 7.-
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. The Board's 9/22/82 Order provides (p.38) that when the DFIS is issued, a specific contention re 8B and the rest of contention 8 nay be subnitted. I therefore do so:
8F:
Anpendix C of the DEIS underenti,ates the environnental impact of the effluents in Emihm Table S-3 for the following reasons:
(1) health effects of the coal particulates 1,154 MT new yeat, are not anal.yzed nor given sufficient weight.
BASIS: Carc'.nogenic and other toxic and disease-causing effects (esp for respiratory diseases) are discussed at length in Environ $cntal Health "ersnectives, Vol.33, December 1979, and in National Research Council, Atnosphere-Biosuhere Interactions: Toward a Better Understanding of the Ecological Consequences of Fossil Fuel conbusion.
See especially in the first, Falk & JurSelski 203-226 Health Effects of Coal Minir.g and Conbust* on:
Carcinogens and Cofactors; Van Hook, ibid un 227-247, ?otential Health Effects cf Trace Elenents and Radionuclides f ron Increased Coal Utilization, synergistic effects f n Glass, ibid 2h9-27P re Ecological Effects of Gaseous Emissions frmn Coal Combust *on; Goldstein ibid pp i
191-202 Health Effects of the Gas-Acrosol Conplex; Santhanan et al, i
ibid up 131-158, Health zermatz,ne & Environnental I,nacts or coal ash and FGD (Fluidized Gas Desulfurization) Sludges.
See alsc D.F.S. Natusch, Potentially Carcinogenic Species Emitted to the Atnosuhere by Fossil Facled Power Plants, Env.
Health "crspectives Vn1 22, pn 79-90,1978; Cohen vt al, A sthna and Air Pollution pp 11 81-188 Am J. Public Health 9/72; Aranyi et akn
/Cytotoxit 'ty to Alveolar MacronhEEes of Trace Metals Adsabhed on Fly Ash, Enviro. Research 20, 1h-23(1979); Muutagennicity of Filtrates Chrisn et al Fron Respirable Coal Fly Ash, RzziRing, Science 199, 73-7h; Physical Factors Affecting the Mutagenicity of Fly Ash fron a Coal-Fired Power Plant, Science 20h 879-881; Amanyixat7mtp Garrett et al, Toxicity of
. v..
-1
-lh-
. Particulate Materials II: Partick s from Coal Delated Processes.
Env. Research 2h, 366-376,1981.
The DEIS doesn't deal with these health effects at all.
All it says is, the enissions are about two-tenthe of one vercent of US emissions so they're not nuch (p.C-2). Yet, taking the F0,000 I
estinated deaths per year from coal emissicns in the US, that's 10 deaths a year. Not trivial.
(2)
The DEIS underestimates radiation dose fron nuclides by omitting certain doses fron wastes, taking their effects over a tco-short time, and underestinating the carcinogenic and genetic problems caused by the Tabic S-3 radioactive effluents both by inaccurate nodels as detailed in Eddleman 8C (pp50-51, 5-14-82), 8D and 8E.
BASIS:
Appendix C-2 of the DEIS states that a 100-year dose connitnent was used; however, many of the nuclides in Table S-3 have much longer half-lives, e.g. n diun-226 (1600 years), Th-230 a
(80,000 yr), Uranium (h.6 billion years for U-238), I-1P9 (over 1 million years ), etc.
Thus, these emissions will be innacting persons for far longer than 100 years; their cening to the surface and being released as tarticles, gases and licuids is an irreversible effect i
of the nuclear fuel cycle.
The DEIS ignores the effect cf the 16,000 curies of Icw-luevel waste ta be buried, even though uraniun nines, mills and tailings have contaninated groundwater in the west (e.g. tailings snill into Rio Puerco by United nuclear, radium contanination near Grants, NM, etc) and low-level waste sites in the East (e.g. Maxey Flats, West Vc11ey) 1 have leaked into wells, groundwater and streans.
The staff has not given sufficient information on how its innacts were calculcted to show the details of 211s problem.
The work of Gornan, Morgan, Radford and others shows that NRC is underestima tin 6 radiation health effects.
See Radford's review of Gofman's Radiation and Hunan Health in Bulletin of Atenic Scientists,
. June (?) 1983 issue for the range of underestimates discussed:
5 to 35 tines; Morgan, ibid 9/78, says at least 2 times.
The NRC's reliance on faked experiments is detailed in the Washington Post, 11/11/79; the need to uce higher transfer factors is detailed in URC translation 520.
These sources sinnly document the allegations of Eddleman 80, 8D which are incornorated into the above contention by reference.
(3) The DEIS does not give sufficient informatien about how the NRC calculated the doses from Table S-3 rad'.oactive effluents to enable these calculat?.ons to be verified as accurate.
BASIS : See pages C-2 and C-3 of the DEIS where it sir. ply sgys the staff has made such a calculation of the 100-year dose ecmmitment (involuntary) for these effluents.
No model is given, no reference, no nothing.
Because the NRC has used fudged models in the rast, e.g. those cited in Wash. Post article referenced above, its nodels must be made explicit so they can be checked a to see that the same thing isn't hapnening again.
(4) the DEIS f ails to demonstrate that radioactive materials buried as low-level or high= level waste w'11 not be released to the environment either before burial (i.e. in transit, storage) or af ter burial.
BASIS: DEIS pages C-7 and C-8 sinnly say that the table says there will be no significant releases to the environnent for LLW, and none for HLW.
Because such a release is nossible (Staff has done nothing to denonstrate otherwise, and many studies, e.g.
those of the Sierra Club Radioactive Waste Cannaign, " Salt is No Solution,"," Insecure Landfills: The West Valle y Exnerience', etc,
4 show leaks of LLW occur and HLW renositories can Leak, under NEPA the Ste.ff needs to evaluate the unintended effect of eccidental or inadvertent release of these radionucl$ des to the environment.
l l
. The Board rejected contentf en 220 because the F2S was the only relevant issue for costs exceeding benefits. (9/22/82 Order at 43-44).
However, under my obligation to file when the DEIS is available (and figuring that the FES will likely be cuite similar to the DEIS), I now revive contentien 220 as the DEIS nrovides it basis:
22 0: The Staff has failed to demonstrate that the benefits of operating the Harris plant outweigh the costs.
BASIS: the Staff's cost-benefit " analysis" is highly subjcetive (DEIS section 6) and extremely bvief.
Staff underestinates of the probability and consecuences of reacter acc3 dents, ignoring costs of emergency planting and preparation, and the arbitrary classification of benefits and costs as large, nedium or snall (as if ther were T-shirts) are sono of the flaws invc1ved.
Staff gives no analytical basis for such assignments, nor for its arsignment of"large" to the capacity and energy " benefits" of tLe plant.
The 1790 need for nower rule appears to obviate any consideratien of additionci capacity as a "lar6e" benefit, or any benefit at all, because it says that if the canacity is not needed, the ene=gy cutnut will still be used.
The staff has made no showing that the benefit of additional capacity even exists in this case; quite clearly, conditf ons have changed radically since the CP in this regard.
CF&L row has hl% weather-Public Staff normal reserves (NC Utilitics Connissi on,1983 Load Forecast Renert).
Detailed criticisn of the estimates of nuclear accident probabilities are contained in Unirn of Concerned Scientists, Critioue of Reactor Safety P.tudy, (8/77) wheve they a=e set at
-1/1333 to 1/2000 per reactor year; see also the estimates of Ckrent and Moeller of the Advisory Connittee on Reactor Safeguards, as renorted in D. Ford, Three Mile Island: 30 Minutes to Meltdown, and in UCS, The Probability of a Core Kelt Accident, Nuclexus, Fall,1982;
.. J
n
~. y
. (1/1000 per reactor-year or so).
Critique of accident cost estinates by RSS method is in UCS critinue cited above, siso in worst-case calculations nade by US Congress steff and released to the press in spring 1983:
See Critical Mass Journal, 2/83,3/83,4/83 WHAT's NEW:
The DEIS.
Without it, the Board said that only the FES is relevant to such a ce ntent?cn.
While the DFIS is not the FES, the re is little reason to think that the FES will be substantially DEIS pages 5-5h says accident mitigation feature different.
evaluations will be in the SER; they aren't in the DEIS; nor is consideration of offsite activities; natural and other, that could cause accidents; nor is sabotage considered (5-55), see 5-58/59; at 5-58 the DEIS states that P.S* me&-odology is used; therefore the method is subject to criticisms of that methodology, which, for example, did not predict the Ginna and TMI-P accidents, nor the Browns Ferry one of 1975 WHY COULDN't FILE EARLIFn: no DEIS; some of abeve basis did not co uldn 8 t exist or had nct been published; Unless I were clairvoyant, be sure Staff would fail to make good analysis of accidents; didn't l
know their nethodology; the risk-bcnef! t methodology is a conniete surprise and evidently was changed in April 1983, af ter the Board's conference call on the adedssibility of Eddlenan 15, CHANGE 79c, In that call, the Board Chairnan told Staff counsel Ba-th etc.
they had better be prepared to defend any cost or benefit estinate made in the DEIS.
Evidently, benefits have been deleted and the quantitative analysis deleted from the DTIS cost-benefit analysis as an occurrence after that call, for in it counsel Barth described quantitative assessments and other " benefits" not in the DEIS.
l L
. Eddleman 25 includes spent fuel storage on site as a target for terrorism and sabotage.
But since it also includes alternatives to spent fuel storage at Harris, I note:
P.h-10 Die -
' DEIS does not include analysis of radwat.e systens; The DEIS doesn't consider alternhtivos to spent fuel storage at Harris at all.
This violates NEPA which recuires that alternatJves to the proposed action be considered.
See section 5.9 31.2, one paragraph and a reprint of Table S-4, on page 5-30 of the DCIS.
.Tne DEIS even fails to consider thht F.dditional transnort (to Harris, then to ultimate disnosal) and twice as much handling (for shipment to Harris, load & unload; then fcr stipnent to ultimate disposal, load & unload) is reouired for spent fuel under the ship-to-Ilarris op ti.on.
This is nct adequate analysis ; indeed it provides basis for a new contention 25B as follows:
25B: The DEIS has improperly failed to consider the alternatives to, and radiological impacts and NFPA cost-benefit of shipping spent fuel g
to Harris.
BASIS : DEIS p.k-10 says the NRC analysis of radwaste systen performance (including that for the spent fuel ecol where added waste will be stored) has not been cresented; it "will be in the SER" due November 1983 DEIS nage 5-30 provides no analysis of alternatives to storing scent fuel at Harris, and underestimates spent the environmental impact of additional fuel handling and shipment; f
twice the S-4 values should be used, since 2, shitments are involved (spent fuel) when waste 4 s shinped to Harris and then re-shipned to final d$ snosal.
1 This inpact ought to have been censidered in evsluating other alternatives, as described in Eddleman 225 of 5-14-82.
VH_AT8s NEW:
The DEIS, which inexplicably fails to provide analysis of the performance of the radwaste systens, fa'.le to consider alt ernatives (especially surprising in that deferred Eddleman content 6cn 25 deals with such) to sucr.t fuel shipment to Ecrris, and underestimates -
the environmental innact of such shipments.
g
. WhT THIS COULDN'T HAVE BEEN FILED EARLIED:
The basis, the tis, didn 't exist.
Also, the lack of consideration of alternatives required by NEDA was a conolete surprise, a total failure by NRC Staff to do what the law requires; the lack of analysis of nerfornance of the radwaste systens is also an unexpected onhsion.
Since these are environmental matters one expects then to be in the DFIS.
The Staff underestimate cf transport risks nay be consistent with their earlier position, but was a3so raised earlier as an inadeouscy of their analysis by no.
The contentien wouldn't be admitted without the DEIS since that co vens environmental effects.
I en very surprised that the staff ignored the issues already raised around spent fuel transport in the DEIS -- they considered nany other issues intervenors have raised, including hydrilla, corbicula, chen'en1 pollution, etc.
Eddleman 2h and 26, deferred, still denend sonevhat or 25; as such their basis night be changed to include that of 253 above.
Eddlenan 29 and 30 re radiciodines have a deferred part that addresses energency planning.
The Staff statenent, n. h-10, that not in the DEIS its analysis of the radwaste systems' perform 9nce is
- means that these contentions should remain deferred.
A7.1 the DEIS l
conclusions re radiciodine deses are inadequately sunnorted without that analysis.
The DEIS also assunes for severe s ceidents thet the 5-61) emergency plan will work (p.541and states its evaluatrion of accident-mitigation systens awaits the SFR (p.5-54).
These are key ingredients of Eddleman 29 and 30 still missing fron WRC's available documentation-how do we know the plan will work when it hasn't been evaluated?
Therefore, Eddleman 29 and 30 re emergency planc should stay dcrerred.
Eddleman 29 as admitted gains additional basis from the f act, p.5-57, that N90 calculations for design basis accidents have not been conpleted.
They're supnosed to be in the SER, Nov. 1903*
g m.
.s.,...---
e
~20-L Eddleman 34, as it addresses NEPA consideratf on of the effects of sabotage and terrorism (Eddleman 5-lh-82 supolenent a t 102) was deferred by the Board until the FES (9/2P/82 order at h7-h8).
The Board stated that consideration of these environmental effects would be subject to the rule of reascn as tc their likelihood.
This is the DEIS, not the FES, now availabin, but as noted above, the FES is unlikely to be much different.
And the DEIS states, pages 5-58/59, that no accidents initiated by weather, earthquakes, floods, or sabotage were considered in the Stcff's severe accident analysis.
I can give two reasons why, under the rule of reason, se.botage and terrorisn aEainst the Harris plant dbou]d be considered under NFPA.
First, the consequences of such an act (radiological sabotage) could be equivalent to an extremely severe accident.
Where such great censequences are possible, NEPA recuires censideratf en of even low-probabilitt events.
Second, NRC requires nrotecti on against sabotecc and terrorisn, 10 CFR part 73, etc, indicatint N9C believes it is a credible event.
A number of sabotage event s have been identified by NRC, see I&E Information Notice 83-27 of May 1983 Moreover, the erobabilities for severe accidents identified by the Staff in the DFIS,1.8 x 10 down to 10 for the range of at least one nerson ernosed over Appendix I up to thousande so overexposed, is not very different than the probability of sabotage.
Indeed, tbo nrobabili ty of success-ful sabotage or terrorist attack on a nuclear plant, especially if insiders helped (10 CFR 73 requires guarding agains t this hele too),
may well be higher.
Some of the sabotage incidents identified in the above-cited info notice, e.g. turning off auxiliary feedwater, could have quite serious consequences.
For critique of the exclusion
4.s
..c :- '
- ~.. ::,,-.
= :. ; n
_t.
21 of sabotagp as a cause of nucloar accidents, see UCS criticue of Reaction Safety Study,1977; Perile of the Peaceful Aton (1084) pp 110-111,115-116,(quoting z. Teiler),147.
The basic point is (in these studies & book) that leaving out sabotage underestimates the likelihood of a nuclear accident, and this underest' nation can be.significant.
The DEIS, pp 5-58/59, leaves out this contribution to accidents, and also the contribution of weather, earthquakes and other natural It think this omission gives suf ficient basis to renew causes.
Eddlonan 3ft in a revised form, as follows:
34 The DEIS fails to analyze adeouately the risks of sabotage, terrorian and natural occurrences (includ'ng weather, earthquakes, and offsite ovents initiating -accidents, see pp 5-58,5-59,and $2-55).
This is true for safety and for NFPA cost-benefit analysis.
BASIS : ~ The DEIS says it omits these causes, and it does not include analysis of events offsite that could cause an accident, nor of any of the other above netns of initiating an accident.
NEPA reculves consideration of unintentional consequences of an action, such as creating a target for terrorism and sabotare by licensing Harris (which nakes radiological sabotage of the Harris plant possible).
NFPA also requires consideration of all costs and benefits.
There is no valid reason to exclude weather as a cause of accidents; i
i indeed, earthquakes are a najor possible cause to which NRO devotes time and analysis; water from a severe storn could cause an accident, and severe winds, floods, tornados, hurricanes etc could cause loss of offsite power and oossibly prevent diesels from overating (flooded building, water into con trols, water doun exhaust, water into oil, etc).
There are two reasons to include sabotare and terrorism in EE?A cost-benefit -under the rule of reason: (1) the possible consecuences of radiological. sabotage are so severe that low-probability events H
+.o-m ar
,-t y
--,m-e w-y e
---r
-'W-r
+--~cr--
-w
m x._ _
need to be considered. (2) NRC has rules (lo CFR 73 etc) to protect against sabotage and terrorien, indicating the threat is not inorobable.
A Recent I&E information notice (83-27) contains numerous incident s of plant sabotage, including some that could have seve"e results (serious nuclear accidents or less ability to stop an accident).
The NRC rules assume insid ers may aid in terrorism.
I&E says insiders connitted the sbotage it refers to in the above notice.
Thus, sabotage an'd terrorisn are at least as likely as NRC staff clains nuclear accidents resulti.nc from other causes wculd be, or in the sane range of probability.
NEPA does not require that unintended effects be to be considered, esp for accident risks.
See Calvert Cliffs.
"likely"lly, excluding saboteEe, Fina terrorisn, natural and or: site EKUTET of severe accidents, as the DEI 9 does, underestimates the chance and quite possibly the severity (.
e.g. if complicated by sabotage) of a nuclear accident.
Such underestination results in an erroneous NEPA cost-benefit balance, which cannot be allowed.
WHAT's NDI:
The DEIS's lack cf consideratien of the se causes of accidents, pp 5-55,57,58,59.
This lack is surprising in view of the deferred contention 3h on sabotage and terrorisn, 'and the obvious possibility that offsite events, weather, earthquakes etc will cause an accident.
It was not reasonabic to oroject that TDC so utterly would exclude such causes from its risk-benefit analsysis.
l W12 COULDII'T FILE EAMLIFR:
Without DE S, no basis.
See Beaud 1
9/22/82 order at h7/h8.
Also, part of basis re sabotage, I&E notice, i
did not exist in 1982.
Eddleman 36, re consideration of accident risks, was deferred to the FES's appearsnce (9/22/82 Board order at hB; it refers to the "draf t FES" which I presune is the DEIS.
Eddleman 36 as originally l
stated encoqoasses about 2/3 of the revised 3h. It omits the surovising staff failure to consider weather, offsite events, and other natural or human causes of nuclear accidents in Class IX other dian terrorism
y 7,
. or sabotage.
That omission is what's NEW in the DEIS concerning Eddleman 36.
Eddicman 36 can certainly stand rewording.
I would reword it as Eddleman 3h, above, with the addition of Class I events.(deliberate sabontage or terrorist attack for maxinun radiological inpact) which the DEIS fails to consider, p.5-58/59.
This contention was filed earlier, and does not need to have the question of tine 3y filirs addressed.
Eddlenan 36 can stand, per as reworded above:
The DEIS fails to analyze adequate]y the risks of sabotage, terrorism, including Class X events (deliberate sabotage or terrorist attack for maximun radiological 1 vact) on Harris and/or its spent fuel pool.
BASIS: D.7IS pp5-58 and 59; failure of DEIS to mentien cttacks/ sabotage of sc ent fuel nool; other basis same as Eddleman 3h, including the rule of reason with one additional noint:
A terrorist nay well seek to nake a maxinun radiological ie.nact, and have a high level of technical skill or trainirs, as nicht a saboteur.
Thus, the probcbility of very severe terrcrist-pr sabotage-induced accidents may not be 3 ess, but ore, ther b ss severe ones.
WF.AT's NEW: DEIS total failure to consider sabotacc/terrorisn.
Contention was filed earlier, 5/14/83 This only amends its form.
Eddlenan 57D, as noted above, p.2, has been givm-
- a. sis by the r
Staff's failure to include costs of emergency plannf.ng in Sectf on 6 of the DEIS.
WEAT'S NEN: This f ailure f n the DEIS.
It's a surprise because they'd been put on notice by this contentien that they shoul! do it, and they assume an effective energency plan to reduce the risks / costs of nuclear accidents, p.5-61) This is an inconsistent cpproach.
Contention was filed earlier, and deferred.
7.,.
. Eddleman 57B, as noted above, p.2, is an energency plan centention and dhould rennin deferred.
The DEIS states that KRC review of the energency plan is not conplete, pp 5-55/56.
Eddlenan 61A was deferred, and 61B was rejected as redundant of 61A. 9/22/82 Order at 54-55.
Eddlemr.n 613 stated the long-terr henith effects of radon needed to be considered.
The DEIS, see e.c. pages C-4 and C-5, deals with radon over 100 and 1000 years.
This is far short of the 1.6 mill'on years pointed to in Eddlenan 61 A.
The Staff, in Apnendiz C of the DEIS, relies not on the ALAB-640 record, but on the Perkins record, see at C-4, though it says the numbers are similar.
Gofnan, 9adiation and Human Health,1981, pph50-464 (as cited in Eddlenan 613, and in 61A without nage ref.)
shows there are h50 deaths per GWe-yer.r fren raden during oneration 9
and 55000 tines this amount (.1x h.51 x 10 /0.7 x 115,000) from uraniun left in tailings vilco, which decays eventually to radon.
The Stcff says intervenors get 60 days to challenge the Perkins record (p. C-4 per A* AB-654).
I t is e viden t fre n Go fm.cn 's wo rk cited above that the Perkins record is inadecuate.
It appears fren the abcvc that 61A car s tand, if 613's language about ignoring synergistic effects of radon & tobacco snoke, and be-tween radon and chenical carcinogens, is censidered part of it.
The Staff has simply failed to take these estinates, diseases and effects (as listed in 61A and above) intn account.
WH_A T 's hTd : The DEIS, which, surprisingly, nakes exactly the errors, and ignores analysis by Gofnan et al, just as elleged in B
Eddlenan 61A and the redundant rart of 613.
This contention was filed earlier, on 5-lh-82, as was the B
redundant 613. The only rewording I thirk is required is the addition of the 61B language quoted above.
BASIS: Gofnan has shown the radon risk to smokers is much greater than to nonsnokers: 1981, p.h55 and h56.
1
- .g
. Eddlenan 64D can stand.
Table S-h, a s it states (Eddleman 5-14-02 p.168) aoplies to one LWR.
Fuel fron TH_RFE LWRS is included for shipnent to Harris; fuel from five LWRS (Brunswick 1 and 2, Robinson 2, and Harris 1 and 2) will thus be shipped fron Harris if Apnlicants get the licenses they seek here.
The DEIS, nage 5-30, utterly fails to consider these basic facts.
There are only 3 sentences, 10 lines of type, in the whole DEIS consideratirn of snent fuel transnort environmental risk.
The Staff " analysis" consists basically of the discredited "de nininis" theory that if the risk is ena11 comnared to background it 's autenatically justified.
This is silly.
What if a nurderer clained the number of folks killed by hin/her was sna11 compared to natural deaths in a year in the US? (See C. Kerford, "In Resnonse to the De Minimus (sic) Theory and ALAB-509").
WHAT'S NEW: Nothing.
The DEIS has less analysis in it than the contention does.
Table S-h clearly states that it is for CNE light-water cualed nuclear power reactor, and yet the staff puts it in for 5 This is surprising in view of the existing contentions I and others had brought en this issue, but the Staff appears to be detevninted to mininize estinates of risks fron nuclear activities.
This contention was filed earlier. (5-lh-82).
6hE, like 64 D, was set up earlier, 5-14-82, and deferred 9/22/82.
the DEIS, p. 5-30, gives no consideration to the effects of transcort accidents.
Table S-4 says the probability of such accidents cannot presently be estimated (footnote 4).
Thus 6hE can stand as is.
WHAT'S NEW: Complete ignoring of accidents re svent fuel in DTIS.
Sandia study is identif$ed in f NMa Contention was filed earlier.
% QCyt helear Crambia: Tynongowaka4 &uvena o Resnikoff's book fron CTP, uublished snring 1983, on nuclear waste g
bY transoort and storage risks.
Council on Tconomic "riorities, 5th Ave, NYC, NY 10011.
p.
~. ~.
, Eddlenan 85 and 86 re fish kills were deferred to the EIS (9/22/82 5.5 19 FEIS 5... 2.2.2, page 5-1,, references section at 63, Bd. Order) 5.31.2.1 tn claim there should be no effects on fish from thermal discharge fron Harris.
That section, pr 5-2 and 5-3, sinnly states the results (clained) and references a nethod, by which the staff calculated (or clains to have calculated) such results. However, they state that Apolictnts' calculat$rns innly much larger affected areas, 20 acres above 90 degrees F in sunner, p.5-2.
The DEIS fails entirely to docunent or lay out Staff's analysis.
The Staff does not do the analysis requested by Eddlenan 86 (5-116-82, nn 192-193) of temperature tolerance of fish in the reservoir, does not indicete that neak air tenneratures and solar hecting of the reservoir were factored inte its analys!s (FLIS 5-2 and 5-3), does not analyze "le tine fish can stand certain tenneratures, does not analyze fish tolerance to peuk tennevnturer (though it sets then out at page 5-3), does not consider addition of heat to the reservoir at its peak obserned tenperature (310, FD 9ef. 5.1 3.-5) and (obvious error) claims the naxinum tenpcrature with cooling water discharge will be the same (310) which would nean no heat was being added to the observed lake temperature (p.5-3), and does not consider synergistic effects of tenneratura and chenicals.
EP 2.2.0 which lists tenperature tolcrances of fish, nlus loE c, forms the basis i
for dais contentien, which can stand as is, these que stions WHAT'S NEU: DF.IS's lack of analysis of thixmspaast6nn, up 5-2, 5-3 and 5-19.
l Contention was filed earlier, both Eddleman 85 and 86.
85 alleges inadeauate measures to nrevent fish kills by the mechanism of Eddlenar 86's described problens.
The above *dhet's i
i New and when filed aroly to Eddleman 85, which can stand as is, too.
v v
- =.: :::. u
. Eddlenan 88A and B are covered above, at page 3? tc 5? (sorry about poor reference: cony center says I must hurry if they are to get this done for mailing tonight).
Eddlenan 95, that cost of Ilarris property $ nsurance daould be included in cos t benefit, is validated by Staff DEIS sect.1on 6 which onits this cost, dbus giving basis to Eddlenan 95.
The Staff does consider the availability of nuclear property f nsurance to reduce the cost of a severe accident, p. 5-78, top), but rejects this because it claims the product of the risk probability and the u aynent would
" theoretically balance the $ nsurance prenium".
The prenium is over a million dollars ner year for $300 nilli on of insurance.
That means the staff is here claining a 1/300 risk of a core-destronving (or severely-plant danaging, like TMI-2) accidert ner reactor year.
Since the Staff has estimated the nrobability of severe hccidents liiget sane page, 5-78 at inggg than 1 in 10,000 per reactor yena, gat least 97 percent of the insurance oreniun (1/300-1/10,000)/(1/300) is above the staff's risk estinF.te and diould be included as & Cost.
WHAT'S NEW: Staff claim that insurance preniums times risk p.5-78.
offset the payoff.
But this is clearly inconsistent with other Staff estinates of reactor a ccident risks, e.g. Table 52-7,
- n. 5-59.
l l
This contention was filed earlier, 5-lh-82.
Starr has given it i
basis by leaving the property insurarce costs out of the DEIS rost-benefit balance, section 6, Table 6.1 on pages 6-2 and 6-3 This omission is totally unexpected because it relies on an estimate of risk (see above calculatf on fron Staff nesitj on on p.5-78) of 1/300 ner reactor year, higher and than UCS( and ecual to nine nade in NC Utilities Commissien Docket E-100 sub 3F,1979, for disabling nuclear accidents, i.e. ones that disable the power olant for a long time.)
3
,7
' Eddleman 103 is defferred to the energency nian, and Eddleman 107 is deferred to the SEP's availability.
Eddlenan 110X uns deferred, referring te the ES.
It refers to info nissing from the EIS, e.r. that listed in Eddlenan 108, 'ncluding information on the reliability er various safety systems and connonents of Harris, and infornation concerning var'ous causes of accidents such as ATWS, systens interaction and so on.
It also asks the Es include health effects for die 11 n!315 cn years that the products of the nuclear fuel cycle vennin noro radictoxic than if they had (Ref. T.H. P!c o-d, nuoti rg B. Cohen, r
been 1cft in the Cround.
Nuclear Safety, Jan 1962), spent fuel transnort accidents and sabotage and terrorism, and sufficient information necessary to analyze the basis of such environnental i mpacts.
This Irtter criterion is clearly not met with respe ct to fish kills (Fddlenan 85 and 86),
spent fuel transnort, sabotage and terrorism. (both of the reactor and of spent fuel), and is net incluicf. in the accident g secuences analyzed in DEIS sect'on 5, which are not Harris-snecific but are derived fron the reactor safety study, p. 5-58.
The update does not include licrris specific accident sequencec, and uses Surry probabilities (p.5-60).
(The failures of the EEI3 re fish kills sabotato and terrorisn, and radioactive waste, I don't have tine to tyne o ve r h e*e.
Thev are clearly cited above and are incornorated hcve by reference.)
Thus, the DEIS provides basis for Eddleman 110X, particularly with respect to fish kills, radioactive waste transnort, sabotage and terrorism, and nuclear accidents.
WHAT8S NEW: Failures of the DEIS, cited above, to provide info requested in Eddleman 110X.
These form basis of the contention.
This basis could not have been provided earlier because if I'd said "the DEIS will contain the following language", it could read'ly have been written without the language I wrote, and the basis elin'nated.
n
. It is unreasonable to make intervenors gucen exactly what basic the Staff will orovide through statenents or even omissions in the DEIS, for th&t reason.
This contention was filed earlier.
Only difference is above explication of basis, including the discussion of the D"?S fron +he top of page 28 (line 3 and below).
Eddlenan 126 on the need to consider econonic costs and socio-economic effects (e.g.
di sruption - state govt, the ca, ital beinc directly downwind of Harris,16 niles away at the nearc + ), was deferred.
Those events, and the possible dentr of university students concentrated in area universities, are not considered in the DEIS accident analysis, particularly not in the cost section on onges 5-72 through 5-82.
The ste te capital and gove nnent connlex, and the universities, are well within the distence "F'A states enould be contanincted by the plune of a PUR-1, co"narchie to Event V of the Staff 's analysis (i.e. 25-30 niles downwind f ren the reactor, depending on wind direction. NC State U, NC Central U, Duke University, UNC-Chanel Hill and a nunber of other colleges are in this zone.
Thus, the D"Ic has Provided basis fo" "dalenan 196.
WEAT'S NEW: DEIS's fa' lure to consider thexx socio-ecoronic impacts described in 126 or to f actor then into cost-benefit analysis of severe accidents, in DEIS pp 5-h6 through 5-82 This nrovides N
I basis for Eddlenan 126.
l ylAO uq kF g6 2 p & cv W So O MW &a!Uh *[y%
Why couldn't file earlier: Basis dicn't exist; except for th at,
it was filed earlier, on 5-14-SP.
i l
Eddlenan 126X alleges incomplete consider & tion of spent fuel transport risks.
The Board, deferring it, stated (9/2P/82 p.70) that Table S-b or sone multiole thereof night be the way to assess the impacts of spent fuel transoort.
S!
- =--
. With respect to nultinlying Table S-4, I agree.
With respect to other risks, e.g. accident risks which Table S-4 ssys can't be estinated, I think the consequences (severe, ner Sandia Lab study cited above) should also be considered.
I think 126
- X can stand as it is.
What'S NEW: Staff p. 5-30 of UEIS uses one Table S-h for both Harris reactors end all soent fuel to be shinped to then and stored there and shioped away eventually.
Contention was filed ehrlier.
KEW CONTENTION 162:
The analysis of neltdown ef *ects on ground-water at Harris is incennlete and inaccuarate because the effect of water (from the prinary systen) condensing above the nelt, and of fractures under the plant has not been accurately taken into account.
Stean pressure developed in groundwater / rocks bv a melted core could vent.
BASIS:
The BEIS, pages 5-69 and 5-71 states that its analysis of this is based on a "tynical" setun but which renresented no narticular real sites.
It says fractures are connon to at deeth of 100 feet, and have a permeability of 500 f t per day.
The analysis fasis to denonstrate how the molten core's inventory, once the melt began to l
cool, x would not escape nuch f aster, since it is only 1800 f t fron Unit 1 to the reservoir, and 2h00 feet fron Unit 2 to t he reservoir.
In particular, this analysis is not described in sufficient detail
- to check it, actual groundwater novenont at nuclear waste sites l
(e.g. Marey Flats, West Valley) has been faster than nredicted by i
l factors of 3 to over 10; and the effect of the noiten core fracturing i
l rock itself, by heat, stean formed ahead of the nelt, or by following old faults that are known tc pass under the reactors or nearby.
S aff analysis of grounwater contamination -- it's T
WhAT'S NEW:
l not dealth with in the old RFES; assumption that frsetures won't be
(
caused / exacerbated by the molten core; assunntion noiten core can't vent to atnosphere by stean uressure.
l I
. WHY COULDN'T FILE EARLIER:
Had no analysis of this nhenomenon available except the LPGS would have been available.
The LPGS estimates are not a,plicable to Harris site and give no indication what errors the Staff might nake in its analysis of core-melt contamination.
Parti'cularly, omission of the atmospheric release caused by nressure of and developed by vaporizing water ahead /under the nbiten core is not logical but could not be exnected straightforwardly, since many analyses (e.g. M. Kaku's) assume such ventinE, the "nud volcano effect".
This contention may be viewed as an amended vers?.on of Eddlenan 126 in that the effects and cost / benefit of what would really hauren w* th a noiten core aren't being taken into account here, but it would have been impossible to be this seccific about this problen without the DEIS available.
It sinuly isn't f air, nor conducive to producinE a sound record, to require intervenors to guess daat the Staff will do wrong and hone they'll do it anyway.
This can also be considered a late-filed con tent!cn unde" 10 CPR 2.71k.
It will broaden the issues; it won 't delay the nroceeding since it's prinarily a safety issue and is be' ng filed at the same time as many other contentions (above) which nny conc alive now, including a number of environmental ones.
No other party is representing ny inte=est on this, and no other means are available to get this i
issue heard except a contention.
I can help develen a sound record on db.is issue by discovery, cross-examination, and nossibly bv calling witnesses or having them subpoenaed.
The good cause for not filing on time (5/1h/82) is that the Stafe analysis critiqued above was not available daen.
It would be very difficult to nrovide adecuate basis and specificity for this contention until I had the DEIS in my hands; it arrived on 5-19-83, which (counting that the 19th was Sunday) was 30 days ago, so this is timely, based on when I got the DEIS.
a r_.
The Staff contsideration of accident effects for severe accidents fails to take into account the increasing concentration of pecule and business in the Apex and Cery areas downwind of the plant (Harris nuclear plant).
BASIS : p.5-60 says that oro jected nonulat! ons fn" the year 2010 were used extending 350 miles from the plant, but do nrt identify these pro jections or specify Unc7.
Page b-1 says the land use is the sanc as at the RFES-CP stage, but this isn't so; industrin1 develonient is increasinE in the area. Page L-30 states that the 1930 census data are like those of the 9FFS-CP, but looking at then (compare RFES with the undated ER-OL population estimates) shows that Cary and Apex are growing much faster than thought et the time of the RFES.
It is not stated if this updated data, ce described on pages h-30 and h-31, is that used in the nrojections of accident consequences on page 5-60 and f ollowing.
The Staff sinnly hasn't provided enough data to validate or invalidate its analysis.
This falls far Maort of what HFPA requires.
NEPA doesn't require a state-ment, but an analysis.
WHAT'S NFd:
The basis, above.
I couldn't anticipate that the Staff would so tnoroughly fail to document its analysis, and make so little 'nformation available.
l Why couldn't file earlier: Information, i.e.
the Staff's failure l
to provide its analysis and ifformation, was nct available until the DEIS cane out.
5 factors:
Good cause: Ko DE!S available to see 'he lack of stated analysis.
Basis not available.
Will brzoaden the issues; will not delay proceedings as many other contentions come in now.
No one else is representing this issue to ~y knowledge, end no other means are available to address this inadequacy in the StaffYs statenent, except perhaps to file comments on the DE!S, which have no guarantee of resu&ts. Hearing this issue will develop a sound record--popule. tion and industry estimates are critical to accident cost estica tes.