ML20072D248

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Proposed TS Section 3.5.1,Action C, Including New Action Statement in Event That HPCI Sys & One CS Subsystem & or One LPCI Subsystem Inoperable
ML20072D248
Person / Time
Site: Limerick  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 08/12/1994
From:
PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:
Shared Package
ML20072D230 List:
References
NUDOCS 9408180281
Download: ML20072D248 (5)
v • d • e


Text

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ATTACHMENT 2 UMERICK GENERATING STATION UNITS 1 AND 2 Docket Nos. 50-352 50-353 Ucense Nos. NPF-39 NPF-85 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGE REQUEST No. 93 23-0 UST OF AFFECTED PAGES Unh 1 Unh2 3/45-2 3/45-2 B 3/4 5-2 B 3/4 5-2 i

9408180281 940812 PDR ADOCK 05000352 i P PDR

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION:

a. For the core spray system:

1.

With one CSS subsystems subsystem inoperable,he are OPERABLE, restore t inoperable CSS subsystem toprovid OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

2. With both CSS subsystems inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />,
b. For the LPCI system:
1. With one LPCI subsystem inoperable, provided that at least one CSS subsystem is OPERABLE, restore the inoperable LPCI pump to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
2. With one RHR cross-tie valve (HV-51-182 A or B) open, or power not removed from one closed RHR cross-tie valve operator, close the open valve and within 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> /or s, orremove be in atpower fromSHUTDOWN least H0T the closed valves withinoperator 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
3. With no RHR cross-tie valves (HV-51-182 A, B) closed, or power not removed from both closed RHR cross-tie valve operators, or with one RHR cross-tie valve open and power not removed from the other RHR cross-tie valve operator, be in at least H0T SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
4. With two LPCI subsystems inoperable, provided that at least one CSS subsystem is OPERABLE, restore at least three LPCI subsystems to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
5. With three LPCI subsystems inoperable, provided that both CSS subsystems are OPERABLE, restore at least two LPCI subsystems to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least H0T SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
6. With all four LPCI subsystems inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.*
c. For the HPCI system:
1. With the HPCI system inoperable,1rovided the CSS, the LPCI system, the ADS and the RCIC system are 0)ERABLE, restore the HPCI system to OPERABLE status within 14 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and reduce reactor steam dome pressure to s 200 psig within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
2. With the HPCI system inoperable, and one CSS, and/or LPCI inoperable, restore the HPCI to OPERABLE within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, or be in HOT SHUTDOWN in the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and in COLD SHUTDOWN in the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
  • Whenever both shutdown cooling subsystems are inoperable, if unable to attain COLD SHUTDOWN as required by this ACTION, maintain reactor coolant temperature as low as practical by use of alternate heat removal methods.

LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 5-2

. EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM

,B AS ES' ECCS - OPERATING and SHUTDOWN (Continued)

With the HPCI system inoperable, adequate core cooling is assured by the OPERABILITY of the redundant and diversified automatic depressurization system and both the CS and LPCI systems. In addition, the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, a system for which no credit is taken in the safety analysis, will automatically provide makeup at reactor operating pressures on a reactor low water level condition. The HPCI out-of-service period of 14 days is based on the demonstrated OPERABILITY of redundant and diversified low pressure core cooling systems and the RCIC system. The HPCI and one LPCI, and/or one CSS out-of-service period of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> ensures that sufficient ECCS, comprised of a minimum of one CSS, three LPCI subsystems, and all of ADS will be available to 1) provide for safe shutdown of the facility, and 2) mitigate and control accident conditions within the facility.

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the HPCI system will be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop during reactor operation, a complete functional test with reactor vessel injection requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage and to provide cooling at the earliest moment.

U loss-ofpon failure coolant of the HPCI accident, system to the automatic function properly depressurization after a small system break automa-tically causes selected safety / relief valves to open, depressuriz(ADS) ing the reactor so that flow from the low pressure core cooling systems can enter the core in time to limit fuel cladding temperature to less than 2200*F. ADS is conserva-tively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor vessel pressure exceeds 100 psi This pressure is substantially below that for which the low pressure core cool g.

ing systems can provide adequate core cooling for events requiring ADS.

ADS automatically controls five selected safety-relief valves although the safety analysis only takes credit for four valves. It is therefore appropriate to permit one valve to be out-of-service for up to 14 days without materially reducing system reliability.

3/4.5.3 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER The suppression chamber is required to be OPERABLE as part of the ECCS to ensure that a sufficient supply of water is available to the HPCI, CS and LPCI systems in the event of a LOCA. This limit on suppression chamber minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core. The OPERABILITY of the suppression chamber in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3 is also required by Specification 3.6.2.1.

Repair work might require making the suppression chamber inoperable. This specification will permit those repairs to be made and at the same time give assurance that the irradiated fuel has an adeguate cooling water supply when the suppression chamber must be made inoperable, including draining, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 and 5 the suppression chamber minimum required water volume is reduced because the reactor coolant is maintained at or below 200*F. Since pressure suppression is not required below 212*F, the minimum water volume is based on NPSH, recirculation volume and vortex prevention plus a safety margin for conservatism.

i LIMERICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued)

ACTION 1

a. For the core spray system:

1.

With one CSS subsystems are subsystem OPERABLE,inoperable,he restore t inoperable CSS subsystem toprovide OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

2. With both CSS subsystems inoperable, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
b. For the LPCI system:
1. l With one LPCI subsystem subsbstem is OPERA inoperable, lE, restore provided the inoperable thatpump LPCI at least one CSS to OPERABLE status within 30 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the l next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
2. With one RHR cross-tie valve (HV-51-282 A or B) open, or power not removed from one closed RHR cross-tie valve operator, close the open valve and l within 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> /or s, orremove be in atpower from SHUTDOWN least HOT the closed valves withinoperator 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> I and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
3. With no RHR cross-tie valves (HV-51-282 A, B closed, or power not removed from both closed RHR cross-tie va)ve l operators, or with one RHR cross-tie valve open and power not removed from the other RHR cross-tie valve operator, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. l
4. With two LPCI subsystems inoperable, provided that at least one CSS l subsystem is OPERABLE, restore at least three LPCI subsystems to OPERABLE status within 7 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
5. With three LPCI subsystems inoperable, provided that both CSS subsystems are OPERABLE, restore at least two LPCI subsystems to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least H0T SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
6. With all four LPCI subsystems inoperable, be in at least H0T SHUTDOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.*
c. For the HPCI system:
1. With the HPCI system inoperable, provided the CSS, the LPCI system, the ADS and the RCIC system are OPERABLE, restore the HPCI system to OPERABLE status within 14 days or be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and reduce reactor steam dome pressure to s 200 psig within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
2. and one CSS, and/or LPCI inoperable, With the restore theHPCI HPCIsystem inoperable,hin to OPERABLE wit 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, or be in HOT SHUTDOWN in the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and in COLD SHUTDOWN in the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
  • Whenever both shutdown cooling subsystems are inoperable, if unable to attain COLD SHUTDOWN as required by this ACTION maintain reactor coolant temperature as low as practical by use of alternate lieat removal methods.

LIMERICK - UNIT 2 3/4 5-2

I l

EME.RGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEN l

BASti l

ECCS - OPERATING and SHUTOOWN (Continued)

With the HPCI system inoperable, adequate core cooling is assured by the OPERABILITY of the redundant and diversified automatic depressurization system and both the CS and LPCI systems. In addition, tia reactor core isolation cooling (RCICS system, a system for which no credit is taken in the safety analysis, wil' automatically provide makeup at react 1r operating pressures on a reactor low water level condition. The HPCI out-of-::ervice period of 14 days is based on the demonstrated OPERABILITY of redundant and diversified low pressure core cooling systems and the RCIC system. The HPCI, and one LPCI, and/or i one CSS out-of-service period of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> ensures that sufficient ECCS, comprised I three LPCI subsystems, and all of ADS will be available i of to a 1)minimum of safe provide for one CSS,hutdown s of the facility, and 2) mitigate and control accident conditions within the facility.

The surveillance requirements provide adequate assurance that the HPCI system will be OPERABLE when required. Although all active components are testable and full flow can be demonstrated by recirculation through a test loop during reactor operation, a complete functional test with reactor vessel injection requires reactor shutdown. The pump discharge piping is maintained full to prevent water hammer damage and to provide cooling at the earliest moment.

Upon failure of the HPCI system to function properly after a small break loss-of-coolant accident, the automatic depressurization system (ADS) automa-tically causes selected safety / relief valves to open, depressurizing the reactor so that flow from the low pressure core cooling systems can enter the core in time to limit fuel claoding temper:ture to less than 2200 F. ADS is conserva-tively required to be OPERABLE whenever reactor vessel pressure exceeds 100 psi This pressure is substantially below that for which the low pressure core cool g.

ing systems can provide adequate core cooling for events requiring ADS.

ADS automatically controls five selected safety-relief valves although the safety analysis only takes credit for four valves. It is therefore appropriate to permit one valve to be out-of-service for up to 14 days without materially reducing system reliability.

3/4.5.3 SUPPRESSION CHAMBER The suppression chamber is required to be OPERABLE as part of the ECCS to ensure that a sufficient supply of water is available to the HPCI CS and LPCI systems in the event of a LOCA. This limit on suppression chamber minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to permit recirculation cooling flow to the core. The OPERABILITY of the suppression chamber in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1, 2, or 3 is also required by Specification 3.6.2.1.

Repair work might require making the suppression chamber inoperable. This specification will permit those repairs to be made and at the same time give assurance that the irradiated fuel has an adeguate cooling water supply when the suppression chamber must be made inoperable, including draining, in OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 or 5.

In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 4 and 5 the suppression chamber minimum required water volume is reduced because the reactor coolant is maintained at or below 200*F. Since pressure suppression is not required below 212'F, the minimum water volume is based on NPSH re asafetymarginforconservatism.circulationvolumeandvortexpreventionplus LIMERICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 5-2 l

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