ML20072B880

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Proposed Tech Specs & Associated Bases Re Toxic Gas Detection Sys
ML20072B880
Person / Time
Site: Limerick  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 08/04/1994
From:
PECO ENERGY CO., (FORMERLY PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC
To:
Shared Package
ML20072B861 List:
References
NUDOCS 9408160285
Download: ML20072B880 (7)
v • d • e


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l ATTACHMENT Limerick Generating Station Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications Change Request No. 93-11-0 Revised Technical Specifications Pages i

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l 9408160285 940804 PDR ADOCK 05000352  ;

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, . INSTRUMENTATION l l

T0XIC GAS DETECTION SYSTEM l

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.3.7.8.2 Three independent toxic gas detection system subsystems shall be OPERABLE with their alarm setpoints adjusted to actuate at a toxic gas concen-tration of less than or equal to:

MONITOR SET POINT CHEMICAL _ com)

(

Ammonia 25 Ethylene Oxide 50 Formaldehyde 5 Vinyl Chloride 10 Phosgene 0.4 APPLICABILITY: All OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS.

ACTION:

a. With or.e toxic gas detection subsystem inoperable, place the inoperable subsystem in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
b. With two toxic gas detection system subsystems inoperable, place one inoperable subsystem in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, restore one inoperable detection subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or initiate and maintain operation of at least one control room emergency filtration subsystem in the chlorine isolation mode of operation.
c. With three toxic gas detection subsystems inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> initiate and maintain operation of at least one control room emergency filtration subsystem in the chlorine isolation mode of operation.

SVRVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.3.7.8.2 Each of the above required toxic gas detection system subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performar,ce of a: ,

a. CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />,
b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and
c. CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 24 months.

1 LIMERICK - UNIT 1 3/4 3-91 l

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INSTRlfMENTATION BhSES 3/4.3.7.7 TRAVERSING IN-CORE PROBE SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the traversing in-core probe system with the specified minimum complement of equipment ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this equipment accurately represent the spacial neutron flux distribution of the reactor core.

The TIP system OPERABILITY is demonstrated by normalizing all probes (i.e.,

detectors) prior to performing an LPRM calibration function. Monitoring core thermal limits may involve utilizing individual detectors to monitor selected areas of the reactor core, thus all detectors may not be required to be OPERABLE. The OPERABILITY of the individual detectors to be used for monitoring is demonstrated by comparing the detector (s) output in the resultant heat balance calculation (P-1) with the data obtained during a previous heat balance calculation (P-1).

3/4.3.7.8 CHLORINE AND T0XIC GAS DETECTION SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the chlorine and toxic gas detection systems ensures that an accidental chlorine and/or toxic gas release will be detected promptly and the necessary protective actions will be automatically initiated for chlo- 4 rine and manually initiated for toxic gas to provide protection for control room personnel. Upon detection of a high concentration of chlorine, the control ,

room emergency ventilation system will automatically be placed in the chlorine  !

isolation mode of operation to provide the required protection. Upon detection of a high concentration of toxic gas, the control room emergency ventilation system will manually be placed in the chlorine isolation mode of operation to provide the required protection. The detection systems required by this speci-fication are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.95, " Pro- l tection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators against an Accidental Chlorine Release," February 1975.

Specified surveillance intervals and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with GENE-770-06-1, " Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to R. D.

Binz, IV, from C. E. Rossi dated July 21,1992).

There are three toxic gas detection subsystems. The high toxic chemical concentration alarm in the Main Control Room annunciates when two of the three subsystems detect a high toxic gas concentration. An Operate /Inop keylock switch is provided for each subsystem which allows an individual subsystem to be placed in the tripped condition. Placing the keylock switch in the IN0P position initiates one of the two inputs required to initiate the alarm in the Main Control Room.

3/4.3.7.9 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION OPERABILITY of the detection instruraentation ensures that both adequate warning capability is available for prompt detection of fires and that fire suppression systems, that are actuated by fire detectors, will discharge extin-quishing agent in a timely manner. Prompt detection and suppression of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety-related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.

LIMERICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-6

INSTROMENTATIQN BASES FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (Continued.1 Fire detectors that are used to actuate fire suppression systems represent a more critically important component of a plant's fire protection program than detectors that are installed solely for early fire warning and notification.

Consequently, the minimum number of OPERABLE fire detectors must be greater.

The loss of detection capability for fire suppression systems, actuated by fire detectors, represents a significant degradation of fire protection for any area. As a result, the establishment of a fire watch patrol must be initi-ated at an earlier stage than would be warranted for the loss of detectors that provide only early fire warning. The establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY.

The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the fire detectors are based on the recommendations of NFPA 72E - 1990 Edition.

3/4.3.7.10 LOOSE-PART DETECTION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the loose-part detection system ensures that sufficient capability is available to detect loose metallic parts in the primary system and avoid or mitigate damage to primary system components. The allowable out-of-service times and surveillance requirements are consistent with the recom-mendations of Regulatory Guide 1.133, " Loose-Part Detection Program for the Primary System of Light-Water-Cooled Reactors," May 1981.

3/4.3.7.11 (Deleted) - INFORMATION FROM THIS SECTION RELOCATED TO THE ODCM.

3/4.3.7.12 0FFGAS MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION This instrumentation includes provisions for monitoring the concentrations i of potentially explosive gas mixtures and noble gases in the off-gas system.

3/4.3.8. TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION SYSTEM This specification is provided to ensure that the turbine overspeed protection system instrumentation and the turbine speed control valves are OPERABLE and will protect the turbine from excessive overspeed. Protection from turbine excessive overspeed is required since excessive overspeed of the turbine could generate potentially damaging missiles which could impact and )

damage safety related components, equipment or structures.

3/4.3.9 FEE 0 WATER / MAIN TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION The feedwater/ main turbine trip system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate action of the feedwater system / main turbine trip system in the event of failure of feedwater controller under maximum demand.

LIMERICK - UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-7

, INSTRUMENTATION T0XIC GAS DETECTION SYSTEM LIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION 3.3.7.8.2 Three independent toxic gas detection system subsystems shall be l OPERABLE with their alarm setpoints adjusted to actuate at a toxic gas concen-tration of less than or equal to:

MONITOR SET POINT CHEMICAL (com)

Ammonia 25 Ethylene Oxide 50 Formaldehyde 5 Vinyl Chloride 10 Phosgene 0.4 APPLICABILITY: All OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS.

ACTION:

a. With one toxic gas detection subsystem inoperable, place the inoperable subsystem in the tripped condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
b. With two toxic gas detection system subsystems inoperable, place one inoperable subsystem in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />, restore one inoperable detection subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or initiate and maintain operation of at least one control room emergency filtration subsystem in the chlorine isolation mode of operation.
c. With three toxic gas detection subsystems inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> initiate and maintain operation of at least one control room emergency filtration subsystem in the chlorine isolation mode of operation.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.3.7.8.2 Each of the above required toxic gas detection system subsystems shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of a:

a. CHANNEL CHECK at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />,
b. CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and
c. CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 24 months.

LIMERICK - UNIT 2 3/4 3-91

l

. , INSTRUMENTATION l BASES 3/4.3.7.7 TRAVERSING IN-CORE PROBE SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the traversing in-core probe system with the specified minimum complement of equipme1t ensures that the measurements obtained from use of this equipment accurately represent the spacial neutron flux distribution of the reactor core.

The TIP system OPERABILITY is demonstrated by normalizing all probes (i.e.,

detectors) prior to performing an LPRM calibration function. Monitoring core thermal limits may involve utilizing individual detectors to monitor selected areas of the reactor core, thus all detectors may not be required to be OPERABLE. The OPERABILITY of the individual detectors to be used for monitoring is demonstrated by comparing the detector (s) output in the resultant heat balance calculation (P-1) with the data obtained during a previous heat balance calculation (P-1).

3/4.3.7.8 CHLORINE AND T0XIC GAS DETECTION SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the chlorine and toxic gas detection systems ensures that an accidental chlorine and/or toxic gas release will be detected promptly and the necessary protective actions will be automatically initiated for chlo-rine and manually initiated for toxic gas to provide protection for control room personnel. Upon detection of a high concentration of chlorine, the control room emergency ventilation system will automatically be placed in the chlorine isolation mode of operation to provide the required protection. Upon detection of a high concentration of toxic gas, the control room emergency ventilation system will manually be placed in the chlorine isolation mode of operation to provide the required protection. The detection systems required by this speci-fication are consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.95, " Pro-tection of Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Operators against an Accidental Chlorine Release," February 1975.

Specified surveillance intervals and maintenance outage times have been determined in accordance with GENE-770-06-1, " Bases for Changes to Surveillance Test Intervals and Allowed Out-of-Service Times for Selected Instrumentation Technical Specifications," as approved by the NRC and documented in the SER (letter to R. D.

Binz, IV, from C. E. Rossi dated July 21,1992).

There are three toxic gas detection subsystems. The high toxic chemical concentration alarm in the Main Control Room annunciates when two of the three subsystems detect a high toxic gas concentration. An Operate /Inop keylock switch is provided for each subsystem which allows an individual subsystem to be placed in the tripped condition. Placing the keylock switch in the INOP position initiates one of the two inputs required to initiate the alarm in the Main Control Room.

3/4.3.7.9 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION OPERABILITY of the detection instrumentation ensures that both adequate warning capability is available for prompt detection of fires and that fire suppression systems, that are actuated by fire detectors, will discharge extin-quishing agent in a timely manner. hompt detection and suppression of fires will reduce the potential for damage to safety-related equipment and is an integral element in the overall facility fire protection program.

LIMERICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-6

,1dGRUMENTATION BASES FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (Continued)

Fire detectors that are used to actuate fire suppression systems represent a more critically important component of a plant's fire protection program than detectors that are installed solely for early fire warning and notification.

Consequently, the minimum number of OPERABLE fire detectors must be greater.

The loss of detection capability for fire suppression systems, actuated by fire detectors, represents a significant degradation of fire protection for any area. As a result, the establishment of a fire watch patrol must be initi-ated at an earlier stage than would be warranted for the loss of detectors that provide only early fire warning. The establishment of frequent fire patrols in the affected areas is required to provide detection capability until the inoperable instrumentation is restored to OPERABILITY.

The surveillance requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the fire detectors are based on the recommendations of NFPA 72E - 1990 Edition.

3/4.3.7.10 LOOSE-PART DETECTION SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the loose-part detection system ensures that sufficient capability is available to detect loose metallic parts in the primary system and avoid or mitigate damage to primary system components. The allowable out-of-service times and surveillance requirements are consistent with the recom-mendations of Regulatory Guide 1.133, " Loose-Part Detection Program for the Primary System of Light-Water-Cooled Reactors," May 1981. l 3/4.3.7.11 (Deleted) - INFORMATION FROM THIS SECTION RELOCATED TO THE ODCM.

3/4.3.7.12 0FFGAS MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION This instrumentation includes provisions for monitoring the concentrations of potentially explosive gas mixtures and noble gases in the off-gas system.

3/4.3.8. TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION SYSTEM This specification is provided to ensure that the turbine overspeed protection system instrumentation and the turbine speed control valves are OPERABLE and will protect the turbine from excessive overspeed. Protection from turbine excessive overspeed is required since excessive overspeed of the turbine could generate potentially damaging missiles which could impact and damage safety related components, equipment or structures.

3/4.3.9 FEEDWATER/ MAIN TURBINE TRIP SYSTEM ACTVATION INSTRUMENTATION The feedwater/ main turbine trip system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate action of the feedwater system / main turbine trip system in the event of failure of feedwater controller under maximum demand.

LIMERICK - UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-7

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