ML20071E185
| ML20071E185 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 02/23/1983 |
| From: | Clark R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20069C333 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8303140082 | |
| Download: ML20071E185 (17) | |
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UT.lTED STAT E3 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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!!CRTHERN STATES PCWER C011PAfiY DOCKET NO. 50-282 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT UNIT NO. 1 AMEND!!ENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 62 License No. DPR-42 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has fcund that:
A.
The application for amendment by Northern States Power Company (the licensee) dated August 27, 1975, as revised by letters dated December 3 and December 22, 1982, complies with the standards and requiren,ents of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Comnission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; 8.
The facility will cperate in confornity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Ccamission; C.
There is reasonable as'surance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendnent can be conducted without endang_ ring the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this anendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
8303140082 830223 PDR ADOCK 05000282 p
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4 2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Scecifications as indicated in the attachment to this' license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. 0?R 42 is hereby anended to read as follows:
(2) Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Anendment No. 62, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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R'obert A. Clark, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #3 Division of Licensing
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: February 23, 1983
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UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-
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NORTHERN STATES POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-305 PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT UNIT N0. 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. 56 License No. DPR-60 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amenament by Northern States Power Company (the licensee) dated August 27, 1975, as revised by letters dated December 3 and December 22, 1982, complies with t.he standards and requirements of the Atonic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act) and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
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B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application,
'the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this amendnent will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this anendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
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. 2.
Acccrdingly,.the license is anended by changes to the. Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachmer.t to this license acendren, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. DPR-50 'is hereby anended to read as follows:
(2) Tecnnical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 56, are hereby incorporated in the license. The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical s
Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
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Robert A. Clark, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #3 Division of Licensing Attachnent:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
February 23, 1983 c
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENTS AMENDMENT NO. 62 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE N0. DPR-42 AMENDMENT NO. 56 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-60 DOCKET NOS. 50-282 AND 50-306
. Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages as indicated., The revised pages are identified by amendnent number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.
Remove Insert 4.4-1 4.4-1 4.4-2 4.4-2 4.4-3 4.4-3 4.4-4 4.4 4 4.4-5 4.4-5
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4.4-6 4.4-6 4.4-7 4.4-7 4.4-8 4.4-8
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4.4-9 Table 4.4-1 pg I cf 5 Table 4.4-1 pg 1 of 5 Table 4.4-1 pg 2 of 5 Table 4.4-1 pg 2 of 5 Table 4.4-1 pg 3 of 5 Table 4.4-1 pg 3 of 5 Table 4.4-1 pg a of 5 Table 4.4-1 pg 4 of 5 Table 4.4-1 pg 5 of 5 Table 4.4-1 pg 5 of 5 I
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4 TS.4.4-1 4.4 CORTAIUMENT SYSTEM TESTS Applicability Applies to integrity testing of the steel containments, shield buildings, auxiliary building special ventilation zone, and the associated systems including isolation valves and emergency ventilation systems.
Objective To assure that potential leakage from containment of either unit to the envircas following a hypothetical loss of coolant accident in that unit is held within values assumed in the accident analysis.
Specification A.
Containment Leakage Tests periodic and post-operational integrated leakage rate tests of each containment shcIl be performed in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix J, " Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water Cooled Power Reactors," as published in the Federal Register, Volume 38, February 14, 1973.
1.
Type A tests shall initially be performed in.accordance with the reduced pressure test program as defined in paragraph III A4(a)(1) of Appendix J.
Periodic tests dhall be in accord with either the reduced or peak pres-sure test program defined in Paragraph III AS. Tests shall include the following conditions:
a.
The absolute method of leakage rate testing will be used as the method for performing the test. The controlled leak-off method of leakage rate testing will be used for verification. Test will be con-ducted in accordance with the provisions of ANSI N45.4-1972.
b.
A Type A test may be terminated in less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> if the procedures of Bechtel Topical Report BN-TOP-1 Revision 1 are followed completely.
c.
An initial leakage rate test will be performed at I
a pressure of 23 psig (P ) and a second test at t
46 psig (P )*
a d.
The design basis accident leakage rate (La) shall I
be 0.25 weight percent per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at pressure Pa-s Unit 1 Amendment No. 6 2 Unit 2 Amendment No. 5 6
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.TS.4.4-2 2.
Initial and periodic type B (except airlocks) and type C tests of penetrations (Table TS.4.4-1) shall be performed at a pressure of 46 psig (P ) in accordance with the provisions of. Appendix J,Section III.B and'Section III.C, and Specification 4.4.A.5..The airlocks shall be tested initially and at six-month intervals at 46 psig by pressurizing the inner volume.
In addition, when containment system integrity l
is required, each airlock shall be tested every 3 days if it is in use by pressurizing the intergasket space to 10 psig.
3.
Type A tests will be considered to be satisfactory if the l
l acceptance criteria delineated in Appendix J,Section III. A are aet.
4.
Type 3 and C rests will be considered to be satisfactory if l
the combined leakage rate of all components subjected to Type B and C tests does not exceed 60% of the L, and if the following conditions are met.
a.
For pipes connected to systems that are in the ABSVZ (Designated ABSVZ in Table TS.4.4-1) the total leakage past
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isolation valves shall be less than 0.1 weight percent per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at pressure P,.
b.
For pipes connected to systems that are exterior to both the shield building and tne ABSVZ (designated EXTERIOR in Table TS.4.4-1) the total leakage past isolation valves shall be less than 0.01 weight percent per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at pressure P,.
l c.
For airlocks, the leakage shall be less than 1% of the L 10 psig for door intergasket tests and 5% of the L, at at 46 psig for overall airlock tests.
5.
The retest schedules for Type A, B, and C tests will be in l
accordance with Section III.D of Appendix J.
Each shield building shall be retested in accordance with the Type A test schedule for its containment. The auxiliary building special ventilation zone shall be retested in accordance with the Type A test schedule for Unit 1 containment.
6.
Type A, B and C tests will be in accordance with Section V of Appendix J.
Inspection and reporting requirements of each shield building test shall be the same as for Type A tests.
The auxiliary building special ventilation zone shall have the sane inspection and reporting requirements as for the Type A tests of Unit 1.
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l Unit 1 Amendment No. 25, 49, 8 3 i
Unit 2 Amendment No. 19, 43, 5 3 I
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B.
F.mercency Charcoal Filter Svstems l
1.
Periodic tests of the shield building ventilation system shall.
.be performed at quarterly intervals to demonstrate operability'.
l Each redundant train shall be initiated from the control room l
and determined to be operable at the time of its periodic test L
if it meets drawdown performance computed for the test conditions with 75% of the shield building inleakage specified in Figure TS 4.4-1 af ter initiation and achieve a pressure 5,-2.0 ' inches of water gage.
2.
Periodic tests of the auxiliary building special ventilation system shall be performed at approximately quarterly intervals to demonstrate its operability. Each redundant train shall be i
initiated from the control room and determined to be operable at the time of periodic test if it isolates the nor=al ventilation system and produces a measureable negative pressure in the ABSVZ within 6 minutes after initiation.
3.
At least once per operating cycle, or once each 18 months, which-ever comes first, tests of the filter units in the Shield Building i
Ventilation System and the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation System shall be performed as indicated below:
a.
Tne pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and the charcoal adsorbers shall be demonstrated to be less than 6 inches of water at systen design flow rate (110%).
b.
Tne inlet heaters and associated controls for each train.
shall be determined to be operable, Verify that each train of each ventilation system automatically c.
starts on a simulated signal of safety injection and high radiation (Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation only).
4.
a.
The tests of Specification 3.6.E.2 shall be performed at least-once per operating cycle, or once every 18 months whichever i
occurs first, or after every 720 hours0.00833 days <br />0.2 hours <br />0.00119 weeks <br />2.7396e-4 months <br /> of system operation or following painting, fire or chemical release in any ventilation j
zone communicating with the system that could contaminate the l
HEPA filters or charcoal adsorbers.
l Prairie Island Unit 1 Amendment No. 25,D Amendment No.19,48,3 g Prairie Island Unit 2
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b.
Cold DOP testing shall-be performed af ter each' complete
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or partial replacement of a RE?A filter bank or. af ter any ar etural maintenance on the system housing that coul,, act the HEPA bank bypass leakage, c.
Halogenated hydrocarbon testing shall be perfor=ed after each conpleta or partial replacement of a char-coal adsorber. bank or after any structural maintenance on the system housing that could affect the charcoal adsorber bank bypass leakage.
d.
Each circuit shall be operated with the heaters on at
.least 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> every conth.
5.
Perform an air distributica test on the HEPA filter bank after any maintenance or testing that ceuld affect the air-distribution within the systems. The test shall be performed at rated flow rate (+10%). The results of the test shall show the air distribution is uniform within +207..
C.
Containment Vacuum Sreakers The air-operated valve in each vent line shall be tested at quarterly intervals to demonstrate that a simulated contain-ment vacuum of 0.5 psi vill open the valve and a simulated accident signal vill close the valve. The check valve's as well as the butterfly valves will be leak-tested during each refueling shutdcun in accordance with the requirements of Speci-fication 4.4.A.2.
D.
Residual Heat Renoval System 1.
Those portions of the residual heat removal system external to the isolation valves at the containment, shall be hydro-statically tested for leakage at 12-month intervals.
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2.
Visual inspection shall be made for excessive leakage from components of the system. Any visual leakage that cannot be stopped at test conditions shall be measured by collec-tion and reighing or by another equivalent method.
3.
The acceptance criterion is that =aximum allowable leakage from either train of the recirculation heat removal system co=ponents (which includes valve ste=s, flanges and pump 1
seals) shall not exceed two gallons per hour when the system is at 350 psig.
4.
Repairs shall be made as required to maintain leakage within the acceptance criterion in Specification 4.4.D.3 a
5.
If repairs are not completed within 7 days, the reactor shall be shut down and depressurized until repairs are effected and the acceptance criterion in 3. above is satisfied.
i Unit 1 A=endment No.17,0 2 Unit 2 Amenement No.11,5 3
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E.
Containment Isolation Valves During each refueling shutdown, the containment isolation valves, shield building ventilation valves, and the auxiliary building normal ventila-tion system isolation' valves shall be tested for. operability by applying a simulated accident signal to them.
F.
Post Accident Containment Ventilation Svstem During each refueling shutdown, the operability of system recirculating fans and valves, including actuation and indication, shall be demonstrated.
G.
Containment and Shield Building Air Temperature Prior to establishing reactor conditions requiring containment integrity, the average air temperature difference between the containment and its associated Shield Building shall be verified to be within acceptable limits.
H.
Containment Shell Temperature Prior to establishing reactor conditions requiring contairJaent integrity, the temperature of the containment vessel wall shall be verified to be within acceptable licits.
4 Basis s
The containment system consists of a steel containment vessel, a concrete shield building, the auxiliary building special ventilation zone (ABSVZ), a shield,
building ventilation system, and an auxiliary building special ventilation system.
In the event of a loss-of-coolant accident, a vacdum in the' shield building annulus will cause most leakage from the containment vessel to be mixed in the annulus volume and recirculated through a filter system before its deferred release to the environment through the exhaust fan that maintains vacuum.
Some of the leakage goes to the ABSVZ from which it is exhausted through a filter. A small fraction bypasses both filter systems.
Thefreestandingcontainmentvesselisdesignedtoaccommodatetheggyicum internal pressure that would result from the Design Basis Accident.
For initial conditions typical of normal operation, 120*F and 15 psia, an instan-taneous double-ended break with minimum safeguards results in a peak pressure of less than 46 psig at 268*F.
The containment will be strength-tested at 51.8 psig and leak-tested at 46.0 psig to meet acceptance specifications.
The safety analysis (
is based on a conservatively chosen reference set of assumptions regarding the sequence of events relating to activity release and attainment and maintenance of vacuum in the shield building annulus and the auxiliary building special ventilation zone, the effectiveness of filtering, and the leak rate of the containment vessel as a function of time.
The effects of variation in these assumptions, including that for leak rate, has been inves'tigated thoroughly. A summary of the items of conservatism involved in the reference calculation and the magnitude of their effect upon off-site dose demonstrates the collective ef fectiveness of conservatism in these assumptions.
Unit 1 - Amendment No. $ g, 6 2 Unit 2 - Amendment No.(/ /, 5G
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TS.4.4-6 1
Several penetrations of the containment: vessel and the' shield building could, in the event of leakage past their isolation valves, result in leakage being conveyed across the annulus-bythepenetrationsthe=selves, thug 5}ypassingthefunction of the shield building vent system.
Such leakage is esti.
mated not to exceed.025% per day. A special zone of the auxiliary building has minimum-leakage construction and con-trolled access, and is designated as a special ventilation zone j
where.such leakage would be collected by either of two redundant i
trains of the auxiliary building specialvent system. This system, when activated, will supplant the nor=al ventilation and draw a vacuum throughout the zene such that all outleakage will be through particulate and charcoal filters which exhaust to the shield building exhaust stack.
The design basis (31less-of coolant accident was initially evaluated by the AEC staff assuming primary containment leak rate of 0.5% per day at the peak accident pressure. Another con-servative assu=ption in the calculation is that primary contain-ment leakage directly to the ASSVZ is 0.1% per day 'and leakage directly to the environs is 0.01% per day. The resulting two-hour doses at the nearest site boundary and-30-day doses at the low population zone radius of 1 miles are less than guidelines presented in 10CFR100.
Initial leakage testing of the shield _ building and the ABSV resulted in a greater inleakage than the design basis. The staff has reevaluated doses for these higher inleakage rates and found that for a primary contain=ent leak rate of 0.25% per day at peak accident pressure, the offsite doses are about the same as thoseinitiallycalculatedforhigherpria3ycontainmentleakage and lower secondary containment inleakage 6, The residual heat renoval systems functionally become a. part of the containment volume during the post-accid'ent period when their operation is changed over from the injection phase to the recirculation phase. Redundancy and independence of the systems per=it a leaking system to be isolated from the containment l
during this period, and the possible consequences of leaka areminorrelativetothoseoftheDesignBasisAccident(ge);
however, their partial role in containment warrants surveillance of their leak-tightness.
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Unit 1 Amendment No. 6 2 Unit 2 Amendment No. 5 6 l
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TS.4.4-7 The limiting leakage rates from the recirculation heat removal system are judgment values based primarily on assuring that the components could operate without mechanical failure for a period on the order of 200 days after a design basis accident.
The test pressure, 350 psig, achieved either by normal system operation or hydrostatically testing gives an adequete margin over the highest pressure within ene system af ter a design basis accident. A recirculation heat removal system leakage of 2 gal /hr will limit off-site exposure due to leakage to insignif-icant levels relative to those calculated for leakage directly from the containment in the design basis accident.
The shield building ventilation system consists of two indepen-dent systems that have only a discharge point in common, the.
shield building vent.
Both systems are normally activated and one alone must be capable of acccmplishing the' design function of the system. During the first operating cycle, tests were performed to demonstrate the capability of the separate and
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combined systems under different wind conditions. During. quarterly operability tests, the drawdown transient of shield building pressure is compared to the computed predicted drawdown transient for non-i accident conditions and leakage equal to 75% of Figure TS.4.4-1 (840 cfm at -2.0 INWG).
The -2.0 INWG setpoint of the recircula-tion dasper must be. reached and the equilibrium pressure in the annulus must be less than -1.82 INWG to den'onstrate' adequate shield building leak tightness.
Pressure drop across the combined HEPA filters and charcoal absorbers of less enan 6 inches of water at the system design ficw rate will indicate that the filters and adsorbers are not clogged by excessive amounts of foreign matter. Pressure drop should be determined at least once per operating cycle to verify operability.
The frequency of tests and sample analysis are necessary to show that the HEPA filters and charcoal adsorbers can perform as evaluated. A charcoal adsorber tray which can accommodate a sufficient number of representative adsorber sample modules for estimating the a7ount of penetration of the system acsorbent through its life is currently under development.
'. shen this tray is available, sample modules will be installed with the same batch characteristics as the system adsorbent and will be withdrawn for the methyl iodide removal efficiency tests. Each module withdrawn will be replaced or w
I Unit 1 Amendment No. 6 2 Unit 2 Amendment No. 5 6 4
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l blocked off. Until these trays can be installed, to guarantee a representa-tive' adsorbent sample, procedures should allow for the removal of a tray containing the oldest batch of adsorbent in each train, e=ptying of one bed from the tray, mixing the adsorbent thoroughly, and obtaining at least twc sa=ples.
One sample will be submitted for laboratory analpsis and the other i
held as a backup.
If test results are unacceptable, all adsorbent in the train will be replaced. Adsorbent in the tray removed for sampling will be renewed.
Any HEPA filters found defective will be replaced. Replacement charcoal adsorber and HEPA filters will be qualified in accordance with the intent of Regulatory Guide 1.52 - Rev. 1 June 1976.
1 1
If significant painting, fire, or chemical release occurs such that the HEPA filters or charcoal adsorbers could become contaminated from the fumes, chemicals, or foreign material, the same tests and sample analysis will be
$ performed as required for operational use.
Operation of each train of the system for 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> every month will demonstrate operability of the system and remove excessive moisture which may build up on the adsorber.
Periodic checking of the inlet heaters and associated controls for each train will provide assurance that the system has the capability of reducing inlet air hu=idity so that charcoal adsorber efficiency is enhanced.
In-place testing procedures will be established utilizing applicable sections of ANSI N510 - 1975 standard as a procedural guideline only.
A minimum containment shell temperature of 30*F' has been specified to provide assurance that an adequate margin above NDTT exists.
Evaluation of data collected during the first fuel cycle of Unit No. 1 shows that this limit can c
be approached only when the plant is in cold shutdown. Requiring containment shell temperature to be verified to be above 30*F prior to plant heatup from I
cold shutdown provides assurance that this temperature bove NDTT prior to l
establishing conditions requiring containment integrity A maximum temperature dif ferential between the average containment and annulus air temperatures of 44*F has been specified to provide assurance that offsite doses in the event of an accident remain below those calculated in the FSAR.
Evaluation of data collected during the first fuel cycle of Unit No.1 shows that this limit can be approached caly when tne plant is in cold shutdown.
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Requiring this temperature differential to be verified to be less than 44*F prior to plant heatup from cold shutdown provides assurance that this para-meter is within accep e limits prior to establishing conditions requiring containment integrity R-ferences (1) FSAR, Section 5, and Appendix 14-C (2) FSAR, Section 24, and Appendix G (3) Safety Evaluation Report, Sections 6.2 and 15.0 (4) FSAR, Section 14 (5) FSAR, Section 14.3.6 (6) Letter to NSP from AEC dated' November 29, 1973 (7) NSP Report, " Prairie Island Containment Systems Special Analyses,"
dated April 9,1976.
Unit 1 - Amendment No.17, 8 /, O 2 Unit 2 - Amendment No. 11,17,50
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. TABLE TS.4.4-1 (p; 1 of 5)-
l' NIT 1 AND UNIT 2 ?ENETRATION DESIGNATION FOR LEAKAGE TESTS Penetration Type Penetration Penetration Designation of Nu-ber Descriotion (Note 3)
Test 1
Pressure Relief Tank A3SVZ C.
to Cas Analyzer 2
Pressure Relief Tank Exterior C
Nitrogen Supply e
i 3A Dead Weight Tester Note (1) 3B Pressure Instrument Note (1)
A Primary Vent Header ABSVZ C
3 RC Drain Tank Pump ABSVZ C
Discharge 6A, 6B Steam lines Note (2)
in Unit 2) 7A, 7B Feedwater lines Note (2) 1 (7C' 7D B 11 vs
- Annulus B
t t it 2)
SA, SS Steam Gen Blowdown Note (2)
in Unit 2) 9 RER Loop Out Note (5) 9 Bellows Annulus B
10 RER Loop Out Note (5) 10 Bellows Annulus B
11 Letdown line ABSVZ C
12 Charging line ABSVZ C
l 13A, 133 RC Pump Seal Supply ABSVZ C
]
14 RC Pump Seal Return ABSVZ C
15 Pressurizer Steam ABSVZ C
Sa=ple 16 Pressurizer Liquid ABSVZ C
i Sample Unit 1 Amendment No. G 2 Unit 2 Amendment No. 5 G l
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TABLE TS.4.4-1 (pg 2 of 5)'
C;IT 1 A';D C;IT 2 PENETRATION DESIGNATION FOR LEAKAGE TESTS Penetration Type Penetration Fenetratica Designation of Number Description (Note 3)
Test 17 Loop 3 Hot Leg Sampic A3SVZ C-18 Fuel Transfer Tube (4)
ABSVZ 3
19 Service Air (4)
ABSVZ B
20 Instrument Exterior C
21 RC Drain Tank ABSVZ C
.to Gas An'alyser 22 Containment Air A3SVZ C
Sa=ple In 23 Containment Air ABSVZ C
Sa=ple Out 24 Spare 25A Containment Purge ASSVZ S
Exhaust (4) 253 Containment Purge ABSVZ B'
Supply (4) 26 Containment Sump "A" ASSVZ C
Discharge 27A-1, Steam Generator Note (2) 27A-2 Blowdown Sample 27B Fire Protection (4)
ABSVZ B
(51 in Unit 2) 27-1, 27-2 OILT Instru=ents ABSVZ 3
(27C-1 and 27C-2 in Unit 2) 9 27D Spare 28A, 2SB Safety Injection Note (5) 29A, 29B Containment Spray AESVZ C
30A, 30B Low Head SI Suction ABSVZ C
4 frem Sump B Unit 1 Amendment No.0,?
Unit 2 Amendment No.5 0 I
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TABLE'TS.4.4-1(Pg3of5:;
UNIT 1 A!~3 UNIT 2 PENETRATION DESIGNATION FOR LEAKAGE TESTS Penetration Type Penetration Penetration Designation of Number Description (Note 3)
Test 31 Accu =ulator Nitrogen Exterior C
32A, 32B CC to RC Pu=ps Note (5) 33A, 333 CC from RC Pumps Note (5) 34 Electrical Annulus B
Penetration 35 SI and Accu =ulator Note (5) 36A,3,C,E Spares 36D (50 Instrumentation Note (1) in Unit 2) 37A,B,C D Cooling Water to Note (5)
Fan Coil Units 3SA,3,C,D Cooling Water fro =
Note (5)
CC to Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger 40 CC from Exces-Let-Note (5) down Heat Exchanger 41A, 41B Containment Vacuum Annulus C
Breaker 41C Spare 42A-1 Fost-LCCA Hydrogen Annulus C
Control Air Supply 42-2 Post-LOCA Hydrogen Annulus C
Control Vent 42-3 Sample to Cas Exterior C
Analyzer Unit 1 A=endment No. G 2 Unit 2 A=end=ent No. 5 3
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TABLE TS.4.4-1 (Pg 4 of 5) l C:IT 1 A ~D U';IT 2 PE::ITRATION DESIC::ATION FOR LEAKAGE TESTS l
l Penetration Type i
Penetration Penetratica Designation of Number Descriotion (Note 3)
Test 423 (53 in Inservice Purge ASSVZ C
Unit 2)
Supply Valves (6) 423 (53 in
- Inservice Purge Annulus B
Unit 2)
Supply Blind Flange (4) l 42C (54 in Containment Heating ASSVZ B
Unit 2)
Steam (4) 42D, 42E Spare 42F-1 (42E-1 He,ating Steam A3SVZ B
in Unit 2)
Condensate Return (4) 427-2 (42E-2 Heating Steam A3SVZ B
in Unit 2)
Return vent (4) 42G Spare 43A (52 in Inservice Purge
'ABSVZ C
Unit 2)
Exhaust Valves (6) 43A (52 in
- Inservice Purge Annulus B
Unit 2)
Exhaust Blind Flange (4)
I 433,C,D Spares 44 Containment Vessel ABSVZ B
Pressurization (4) 45 Reactor Makeup to A3SVZ C
Pressurizer Relief Tank 46A, 463 Auxiliary Feedwater Note (2)
(46C, 46D in Unit 2) 47 Electrical Annulus B
Penetration 48 Low Head SI Note (5) 49A Instrunentation Note (1) 493 (55 in Demineralized ABSV B
Unit 2)
Water (4) l
- Testing required following modification to inservice purge system of each unit during 1983 refuleing outages.
Unit 1 Amendment No. 3 2 l
Unit 2 Amendnent No. 5 0 1
J u
TABLE TS.4.4-1 (Ps 5 of 5)
UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 PENETRATION DESIGNATION FOR LEAKAGE TESTS Penetration Type
?cnatration Penetration Designation,
of Number Descriotion (Note 3)
Test 50-1 Post-LOCA Hydro-Annulus C
gen Control Air Supply 50-2 Post-LOCA Hydro-Annulus C
gen Control Vent 50-3 Sample to cas Exterior C
Analyzer Equipment Door Annulus 3
Personnel Airlock Annulus B
Maintenance Air-Annulus B
lock Notes:
1.
Instrumentation lines.
No Type B or C testing required.
2.
Steam and feedwater lines. Type C testing not required since valves are not relied upon to prevent containment leakage.
3.
Penetration Desienations ABSVZ pipes connected to systems that are located in the Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation Zone Exterior pipes connected to systems that are exterior to the Shield Building and ASSVZ Sealed pipes that will be sealed by water in space between isolation barriers following LOCA Annulus penetration that would leak to the Shield Building annulus following LOCA 4
These penetrations have blank flanges. Penetrations 18, 25A, 25B, 27-1, 27-2, 27C-1, and 27C-2 have blind flanges on the inside only. Penetrations 423, 43A, 52, and 53 have a blind flange in the annulus only.
5.
Safety injection, RER, cooling water, and closed cooling water system valves not relied upon.to prevent containment leakage.
6.
The leakage test for this penetration is only required prior to use of the inservice purge system.
Unit 1 Amendment No. 33 Unit 2 Amendment No. 5 C
.