ML20070J250
| ML20070J250 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Quad Cities  |
| Issue date: | 03/08/1991 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20070J242 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9103150315 | |
| Download: ML20070J250 (3) | |
Text
___-
f raon 1
f
<%,,y o
^g UNITED STATES 8
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION n
E
\\
WASHINGTON, D. C. 205s5 e
j SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED 70 AMENDMENT NO.130 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-29 AND AMEN 0 MENT NO.124 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-30
{
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY AND IOWA-ILLIN0IS GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY v
QUAG CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 00CKE, N05. 50.254 AND 50-265 I
- 1. 0 INTRODUCTION By letter dated May 25, 1989, as supplemented January 25, 1991, Commonwealth Edison Company (Ceco) proposed to amend Appendix A of the Quad Cities Facility f
Operating Licenses, OPR-29 and OPR-30.
These amendments revise certain Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) and surveillance requirements associated with the High Pressure Core Irdection (HFCI) and Reactor Core Isr % tion Cooling (RCIC) systems.
The changes are consistent with similar Technical Specifications (TSs) approved for more recently licensed BWRs and the BWR Standard Technical Specifications (STS).
The January 25, 1991 letter provided an additional surveillance requirement that did not significantly alter the proposed action or change the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination published in the _ Federal Register on August 9, 1989.
2.0 EVALUATIOtt The current Quad Cities, Units 1 and 2, TSs r, squire that other Emergency Core Coollng System (ECCS) subsystems be demonstrated to be operable whenever
?
HPCI or RCIC are inoperable.
The main purpose of the proposed amendments is to remove the requirement to demonstrate operability while still maintaining adequate assurance of system operability.
The requiremant for dergnstrating operability of othe, ECCS subsystems was originally needed because tnere was a lack of plant operating history and equipment failure data.
However, plant operating history now shows that testing of other ECCS subsystems when one subsystem is inoperable is not I
necessary to provide adequate assurance of system operability.
In fact, taking th* other subtystem out of service Yor testing creates the risk of the second system also failing; in some instances, it has been observed that subsystem Tailures are related to the test itself and not an indication that. the subsysten would have f ailed should it have been needed to actually 9103150315 910303
)
PDR ADOCK 0500 l
[
4 o
w 4
.k,
mitigate an accident.
Operability of.hese subsystems can be shown by 1
checking records to verify that valv( ;ineup, e betrical lineups and instrumentation requirements have not een changed since:the last time the subsystem was verified to be operable.
The current BWR STS and the TSs approved for more recently licensed BWR*
accept the philosophy that testing subsystems to demonstrate operability is not required when another subsystem is inoperable (ecept for diesel generator testing).
Instead, operability is based on sat:sfactory performance of monthly, quarterly, refueling interval, post maintenance or 1
other specified performance tests.
Therefore, based on the risk of the other subsystem failing,-past operational experience, and the similarity to the BWR STS and other BWR TSs, we conclude that it is acceptable to eliminate the requirements to test other ECCS subsysterns when either HPCI or RCIC is inoperable.
(A similar change was approved for HPCI for Dresden on August 10, 1989. -Dresden does not have a RCIC system )
The proposed amendments also increase the required reactor pressure for HPCI operability from 90 psig to 150 psig.
Since the-HPCI system is designed to pump 5000 gpm into the reactor _ vessel within a reactor pressure range of about 1150 psig to 150 psig, the operability of the HPCI system cannot be tested at 90 psig (at pressures below 150 psig).
Since the HPCI system is isolated below a steam line pressure of 100 psig, the present LCO requirement of 90 psig for operability is impractical.
Therefore, because this change corrects inconsistencies in the current TSs and does not decrease safety, we find the increase in HPCI operability from 90 psig to 150 psig to be acceptable.
(The same change was approved for Dresden on August 10, 1989.)
The amendments also increase the allowable outage-time for HPCI and RCIC from 7 days to 14 days.
This is consistent with the BWR-STS and more recently licensed BWRs and refiects the availability of low and high pressure core cooling systems for mitigating an accident.
The amendments delete the requirement for HPCI ind RCIC to be operable prior to reactor startup.
These systems cannot be considered operable until reactor pressure is adequate for system aperation.
Thus,-we find this change acceptable.
(This is consistent with the BWR STS, more recently
In reviewing the licensee's May 25, 1989 amendment request, we compared the proposal to the BWR STS, HUREG-0123, Revision 3.
It is our policy that when a licensee wishes to adopt provisions of the STS for a particular subsystem or TS section (in this case, HPCI and RCIC) then the licensee I
must adopt al] provisions of the STS for that subsystem or section unless there is technical justification for not doing se.
We noter; that the 1
a licensee's May 25,19ti9 submittal had not include,i the STS requirement to vent from the high point every tnonth to verify that the cystem piping is filled with water. We informed the-licensee of this omission and, by
4 3
letter dated January 25, 1991, the licensee proposed the appropriate TS changes to include this provision.
Therefore, we find the amendment requer,t submitted on May 25, 1989, as supplemented January 25, 1991, to be ar.ceptable.
3.0 UATE CONSt,".TATION in accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Illinois State official was notified of the proposed issuance of this amendment. The
$iate official had no coments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
This amendment changes a reouirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in l
10 CFR part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the : mounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that :aay be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation expo dre.
The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment-involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public i
comment on such finding. Accordingly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categ Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b)orical exclusion et forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
no environmental impact statement nor environmental assess-ment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this m endment.
4
5.0 CONCLUSION
J The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:-
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and sefet of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner,y(2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security nor to the hsalth and safety of the public.
1 Principal Contributor:
L. 01shan Date:
March 8, 1991
-i l
l 1
4 2
M-r
'A