ML20070E143
| ML20070E143 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | LaSalle  |
| Issue date: | 12/09/1982 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20070E130 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8212170030 | |
| Download: ML20070E143 (13) | |
Text
a UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION AMEN 0 MENT NO. 10 TO LICENSE NPF-11 LA SALLE COUNTY STATION, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-372 Introduction By letters dated August 19, 1982 and October 22, 1982, Commonwealth Edison (licensee) proposed a" amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-11 for La Salle County Station, Unit No.1 to delete License Condition 2.C.(17) and to change the Technical Specifications as a result of hardware modifications to satisfy License Condition 2.C.(17).
Evaluation License Condition 2.C.(17) requires Commonwealth E'dison to implement isolation protection in conformance to the requiremerts of Section 6.3 of Gr. ^.tandard Review Plan against overpressurization of the low pressure emergency core cooling systems at the high and low $ressure interface containing a check valve and a closed motor-operated valve. The concern is to prevent the inadvertant overpressurization of the low pressure piping in the event of an initiation condition concurrent with the failure of an emergency core cooiing system injection line check valve. Commonwealth Edison is providing a high/
low pressure interlock design which does permit the opening of a low pressure emergency core cooling system injection valve on a corresponding initiation sional unless redundant reactor low pressure permissives are satisified.
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The revised high/ low pressure interlock design consists of eight newly added pressure switches (1821-N413 A, B, C, D, E, F, G, & H) used to provide the low reactor pressure permissives described above. This is the only function performed by these switches. Switches A and B are connected to reactor vessel instrument tap N14A. Low reactor pressure sensed by either or both of these switches in conjunction with low reactor pressure sensed between low pressure core spray and its downstream check valve F006/F041A (as sensed by switich C/D) will open the injection valve if a corresponding initiation signal is present.
Similarly, low reactor pressure sensed by either or both switches E and F (connected to vessel instrument tap N140) in conjunction with low reactor pressure sensed between residual heat removal systems B and C injection valve if a corresponding intiation signal is present.
Each pressure switch channel is powered from an emergency bus in the same division as its associated emergency core cooling system injection valve (s). The switches are Barton modei 288 A-s (static 0 ring type that close on loss of pressure), and the licensee has stated that these switches are part of their qualification program.
The licensee has also stated that the added pressure channels comply with the criteria of IEEE Standard 279-1971, including the physical separation between redundant divisions. The NRC staff notes that the circuitry used to implement the permissive logic for a given valve does not by itself meet the single failure criteria of IEEE Standard 279 with respect to the valve opening when not desired.
This is because the redundant reactor low initiation signals for a given valve are powered from the same electrical division. However, the combination of the permissive logic and valve located downstream of the injection valve (for each low pressure emergency core cooling system line) does satisfy the single failure criterion of'IEEE S,tandard 279. This permissive logic / check valve combination 8212170030 821207 DR ADOCK 0500037
I t coupleo with the associated surveillance requirements in the La Salle Unit 1 Technical Specifications provides sufficient protection to prevent over-pressurization of the low pressure emergency core cooling system piping, and is, therefore, acceptable.
Each low pressure emergency core cooling system injection valve has an associated annunciator point in the control room to alert the operator when the permissive logic required to open that valve is satisfied. There are no analog indicators associated with the new pressure channels. Each channel is tested monthly according to the La Salle Unit 1 Technical Specifications by valving its associated pressure switch out of service, applying a pressure to the switch, and then bleeding off this pressure until the permissive valve is recorded.
Each channel is calibrated during each refueling.
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Our review has identified no' single failure (including power 'supp1f, pre'ssure switch or instrument sensing line) which could defeat the high pressure / low pressure interlock function (permissive logic / check valve combinatfon) wiien the reactor is at a high pressure, or prevent sufficient injection valves from opening when required to accomplish the low pressure emergency core cooling system safety function.
The licensee also discussed the impact of the hardware changes on its loss-of-coolant accident analyses. The injection valve logic modification result in a delay (relative to the previous logic) in the valve opening which, in turn, results in a delay of 1.6 seconds in the calculated time for reflooding the core. For the new valve opening time of 20 seconds (folicwing power source anSability and receipt of the permissive signal), the peak cladding temperature is increased by 10
- Fahrenheit. Since the previously calculated peak cladding temperature was 2009'F, the 10 CFR 50.46 limit of 2200*F is not violated by this change.
We have reviewed the Technical Specifications associated with this design modification, including Table 3.3.3-1, " Emergency Core Cooling System Actuation
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Instrumer.tation", Table 3.3.3-2, " Emergency Core Cooling System Actuation Instrumentation Setpoints", Table 3.3.3-3, " Emergency Core Cooling System Response Times, and Table 4.3.3.1-1 " Emergency Core Cooling Actuation Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements"; and found them to be acceptable.
Based on our review of the licensee's high/ low pressure emergency core cooling system interlock desiga at la Salle, we conclude that this modification is acceptable and fulfills the requirements of Licen'se Condition 2.C.(17).
Environmental Consideration 4
We have determined that this amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types of total amount nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that this amendment involves action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact, and pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and envircnmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this statement.
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, Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that; (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered, does not create the possibility of an accident of a type different from any evaluated previously, and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety (2) there is reasonable margin, the Amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration; assurance that the health and safety of the by operation in the proposed manner; and (3)public will not be endangered such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulttions and the issuance of this Amendment will not be inimical to the common defence and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Date: December 9, 1982 Y
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ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 10 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-11 DOCKET NO. 50-373 Repla.e the following pages of the Appen, dix "A" Technical Speci. fica,tions,.
with the enclosed pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.
REMOVE INSERT 3/4 3-24 3/4 3-24 3/4 3-25 B 3/4 3-25 3/4 3-27(a) cx-3/4 3-28 3/4 3-28 3/4 3-29 3/4 L-29 3/4 3-31 3/4 3-31 3/4 3-32 3/4 3-32 3/4 3-33 3/4 3-33 3/4 4-8 I
3/4 4-8 O
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TABLE 3.3.3-1 EMERGENCYCORECOOLINGSYnEMACTUATIONINSTRUMENTATION m
l.
MINIMUM OPERA 8LE APPLICABLE 1
.g CHANNELS PER TRIP OPERATIONAL U
TRIP FUNCTION FUNCTION (a)
CONDITIONS ACTION A.
DIVISION I TRIP SYSTEM 1.
RHR-A (LPCI MODE) & LPCS SYSTEM a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 2(b) 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
30 b.
Drywell Pressure - High 2(b) 1, 2, 3 30 i
l c.
LPCS Pump Discharge Flow-Low (Bypass) 1 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
31 d.
LPCS and LPCI A Injection Valve Injection Line 1/ valve 1, 2, 3 32 Pressure-Low (Permissive) 4*, 5*
33 w
e.
LPCS and LPCI A Injection Valve Reactor Pressure-Low 2
(Permissive)
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2 1,2,3 38 4*, 5*
33
[
f.
LPCI Pump A Start Time Delay Relay 1
1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
32 3
l g.
LPCI Pump A Discharge Flow-Low (Bypass) 1 1,2,3,4*,5*
31 h.
Manual Initiation
]
1/ division 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
34 2.
AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM TRIP SYSTEM "A"#
a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 2(D) 1, 2, 3 30 coincident with b.
Drywell Pressure - High 2(b) 7, p, 3 30 F
n>
c.
ADS Timer 1
1,2,3 32 i
s
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d.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 (Permissive) 1 1,2,3 32 Ii 5
e.
LPCS Pump Discharge Pressure-High (Permissive) 2 1,2,3 32
)*
f.
LPCI Pump A Discharge Pressure-High (Permissive) 2 1,2,3 32 g.
Manual Initiation 1/ division 1, 2, 3 34 i.
L 4
i l
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TABLE 3.3.3-1 (Continued) vi
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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION 5
I i
MINIMUM OPERABLE APPLICABLE CHANNELS PER TRIP OPERATIONAL c-h TRIP FUNCTION FUNCTION (*)
CONDITIONS ACTION t
B.
DIVISION 2 TRIP SYSTEM 1.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Low Low, Level 1 2(b) 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
30 b.
Drywell Pressure - HEh 2(b) 1, 2, 3 30 c.
LPCI B and C Injection Valve Injection Line 1/ valve 1, 2, 3 32 Pressure-Low (Permissive) 4*, 5*
33 d.
LPCI Pump B Start Time Delay Relay 1
1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
32 e.
LPCI Pump Discharge Flow - Low (Bypass) 1/ pump 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
31
^
f.
Manual Initiation 1/ division 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
34 4
g.
LPCI B and C Valve Reactor Pressure-Low (Permissive) 2 1,2,3 38 4*, 5*
33 2.
AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM TRIP SYSTEM "B" a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 2(b) 1, 2, 3 30 coincident with b.
Drywell Pressure - High 2(b) 1, 2, 3 30 c.
ADS Timer 1
1,2,3 32 I
d.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low, Level 3 (Permissive) 1 1,2,3 32 h
LPCI Pump B and C Discharge Pressure - High e.
(Permissive) 2/ pump.
1,2,3 32 o
f.
Manual Initiation 1/ division 1, 2, 3 34
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a 4
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l TABLE 3.3.3-1 (Continued)
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION ACTION ACTION 38 With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum OPERABLE Channels per trip function requirements:
With one channel inoperable, remove the inoperable channel a.
within one hour; restore the inoperable channel to OPERASLE
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status within 7 days or declare the associated ECCS systems inoperable.
b.
With both channels inoperable, restore at least one channel to OPERABLE status within one hour or declare the associated ECCS systems inoperable.
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LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 3-27(a)
Amendment 10
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TABLE 3.3.3-2 s
F:
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM:'hCTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS N1
[
ALLOWABLE gi TRIP FUNCTION TRIP SETPOINT VALUE 1
A.
DIVISION 1 TRIP SYSTEM 1.
RHR-A (LPCI MODE) AND LPCS SYSTEM a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 1-129 inches
- 1-136 inches
- b.
Drywell Pressure - High
$ 1.69 psig i 1.89 psig c.
LPCS Pump Discharge Flow-Low 1 750 gpm 1 640 gpa d.
LPCS and LPCI A Injection Valve Injection 500 psig 500 1 20 psig Line-Low Pressure Interlock e.
LPCS and LPCI A Injection Valve Reactor 500 psig 500 1 20 psig Pressure-Low Pressure Interlock f.
LPCI Pump A Start Time Dalay Relay 1 5 seconds
< 6 seconds w
g.
LPCI Pump A Discharge flow-Low 1 1000 gpm 3 550 gpa
);
h.
Manual Initiation NA NA 2.
AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM TRIP SYSTEM "A" a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level.- Low Low Low, Level 1 1-129 inches
- 1-136 inches
- b.
Drywell Pressure - High 5 1.69 psig 5 1.89 psig c.
ADS Timer
< 105 seconds
< 117 seconds d.
Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 5 12.5 inches
- i 11 inches
- e.
LPCS Pump Discharge Pressure-High
[146psig, increasing
[136psig, increasing f.
LPCI Pump A Discharge Pressure-High 2 119 psig, increasing 2 106 psig, increasing g.
Manual Initiation NA NA a
g.
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TABLE 3.3.3-2 (Continued) 2-E EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMiACTUATION' INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS P1 ALLOWABLE Ei TRIP FUNCTION TRIP SETPOINT VALUE EN
- . 1 B.
DIVISION 2 TRIP SYSTEM l
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1 1-129 inches
- 1-136 inches
- b.
Drywell Pressure - High 1 1.69 psig i 1.89 psig c.
LPCI B and C Injection Valve Injection 500 psig 500 psig'120 psig I
Line-Low Pressure Interlock d.
LPCI Pump B Start Time Delay Relay 1 5 seconds 1 6 seconds e.
LPCI Pump Discharge Flow-Low 1 1000 gpm 1 550 gpm f.
Manual Initiation NA NA s
g.
LPCI B and C Injection Valve Reactor 500 psig 500 1 20 psig y
Pressure Low Pressure Interlock
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2.
AUTOMATIC D5 PRESSURIZATION SYSTEM TRIP SYSTEM "B" d>
a.
Reactor Vessel Water Level - Low Low Low, Level 1
>- 129 inches *
>- 136 inches
- b.
Drywell Pressure - High 31.69psig 31.89psig c.
ADS Timer
< 105 seconds
< 117 seconds d.
Reactor Vessel Water Level-Low, Level 3 5 12.5 inches
- I ll' inches
- i e.
LPCI Pump B and C Discharge Pressure-High
[119psig, increasing
[106psig, increasing I
f.
Manual Initiation NA NA i
13 8
Et 5
8n C
4
t TABLE 3.3.3-3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM RESPONSE TIMES ECCS RESPONSE TIME (Seconds) 1.
LOWPRESSURECOREJPRAYSYSTEM i 40*
2.
LOW PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTIGN MODE OF RHR SYSTEM (Pumps A, B, and C)
,$ 40*
3.
AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
.NA 4.
HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM 1 27 5.
LOSS OF POWER NA
- Injection valves shall be fully OPEN within 20 seconds after receipt of the reactor vessel pressure and ECCS Injection Line Pressure Interlock signal concurrently with power source availability and receipt of an accident initiation signal.
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1 LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 3-31 A.mendment 10
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TABLE 4.3.3.1-1 E!
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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS OPERATIONAL CHANNEL Ei CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH tj TRIP FUNCTION CHECK TEST CALIBRATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED A.
DIVISION I TRIP SYSTEM n
1.
RHR-A (LPCI MODE) AND LPCS SYSTEM a.
Low Low Low, Level 1 S
M R
1,2,3,4*,5*
b.
Drywell Pressure - High NA M
Q 1,2,3 c.
LPCS Pump Discharge Flow-Low NA M
Q 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
d.
LPCS and LPCI A Injection Valve Injection Line Pressure Low Interlock NA M
R 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
e.
LCPS and LPCI A Injection Valve Reactor Pressure Low Interlock NA M
R 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
u,
];
f.
LPCI Pump A Start Time Delay Relay NA M
Q 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
u, 23 g.
LPCI Pump A Flow-Low NA M
Q 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
^2 h.
Manual Initiation NA R
NA 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
2.
AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM TRIP SYSTEM "A"#
a.
Low Low Low, Level 1 S
M R
1,2,3 b.
Drywell Pressure-High NA M
Q 1,2,3 c.
ADS Timer NA M
Q 1,2,3 d.
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]F Low, Level 3 S
M R
1,2,3 e.
LPCS Pump Discharge it Pressure-High NA M
- Q' 1, 2, 3 f.
LPCI Pump A Discharge Pressure-High NA M
Q.
1,2,3 r0 g.
Manual Initiation NA R
NA 1,2,3 a
o s
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l TABLE 4.3.3.1-1 (Continued) 9 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 3
g CHANNEL OPERATIONAL CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL CHANNEL CONDITIONS FOR WHICH TRIP FUNCTION CHECK TEST CALIBRATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED c
z U
B.
DIVISION 2 TRIP SYSTEM e*
1.
Low Low Low, Level L..
S M
R
.1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
b.
Drywell Pressure - High NA M
Q 1,2,3 c.
LPCI B and C Injection Valve Injection Line Pressure Low Interlock NA M
R 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
d.
LPCI Pump B Start Time Delay
,g Relay NA M
Q 1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
e.
LPCI Pump Discharge Flow-Low NA M
Q.
1, 2, 3, 4*, 5*
j J,
f.
Manual Initiation NA R
NA 1,2,3,4*,5*
w g.
LPCI B and C Injection Valve Reactor Pressure Low Interlock NA M
R 1,2,3,4*,5*
2.
AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZ TION SYSTEM TRIP SYSTEM "B"#
a.
Low Low Low, Level 1 S
M R
1,2,3 b.
Drywell Pressure-High NA M
Q 1,2,3 g
c.
ADS Timer NA M
Q 1,2,3 a
d.
E Low, Level 3 S
M R
1,2,3 l
l e.
LPCI Pump B and C Discharge 3
Pressure-High NA M
Q 1,2,3 o
f.
Manual Initiation NA R
m NA.
1,2,3 o
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REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4 4.4.3.2.2 Each reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve specified in Table 3.4.3.2-1 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:
Pursuant to Specification 4.0.5, except that in lieu of any leakage a.
testing required by Specification 4.0.5, each valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying leakage to be within its limit:
1.
At least once per 18 months, and 2.
Prior to returning the valve to service following maintenance, repair or replacement work on the valve which could affect its leakage rate.
The provisions of Specification 4.0.4 are not applicable for entry into OPERATIONAL CONDITION 3.
b.
By demonstrating OPERABILITY of the high/ low pressure interface valve leakage pressure monitors by performance of a:
1.
CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and 2.
CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once per 18 months, With the alarm setpoint for the:
1.
HPCS system $ 100 psig.
2.
LPCS system 1 500 psig.
3.
LPCI/ shutdown cooling system $ 400 psig.
4.
RHR shutdown cooling $ 190 psig.
i 5.
RCIC $ 90 psig.
t LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 4-8 Anendnent 10 l
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