ML20070D501
| ML20070D501 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 12/08/1982 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NCR-1350, NUDOCS 8212150079 | |
| Download: ML20070D501 (2) | |
Text
-
e J.
~*
8 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY pen
.m s
CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 374o1 400 Chestnut Street Tower II December 8,-1982 ' I3
~ i BLRD-50-438/81-15 BLRD-50 h39/81-15 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn:
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - PIPE HANGER DOCUMENTATION ERROR -
BLRD-50-438/81-15, BLRD-50-439/81 REVISED FINAL REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE Inspector R. W. Wright on January 28, 1981 in acccedance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 1350.. This was followed by our first interim report dated February 27, 1981 anc our final report dated August 11, 1981. TVA's response to violation 50-438, 50-439/82-23-04 committed TVA to provide additional information to clarify this report. Enclosed is our revised final report.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY D SL L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Licensing Enclosure cc:
Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 i?
c;#c3 O
/
<v B212150079 821208 y
PDR ADOCK 05000438 s
PDR An Equal Opportumty Employer s
(.
g ENCLOSURE BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 PIPE HANGER DOCUMENTATION ERROR NCR 1350 BLRD-50-438/81-15, BLRL-50-439/81-15 10 CFR 50.55(e)
REVISED FINAL REPORT Description of Condition Pipe hangero had been attached to electrical cable tray supports. The cable tray supports are qualified to Seismic Category I.
Because there is no allowance in the seismic analyses for the attachment of pipe hangers to these supports, the seismic analysis of the cable tray supports was suspect.
The cause of this nonconformance was the existence of an informal operating procedure allowing pipe runs to be installed upon receipt of an " interim" approval from an onsite representative of TVA's Division of Engineering Design (EN DES) project manager. This allowed the pipe hangers to be attached to electrical cable tray supports without " final" approval by EN DES. This informal procedure had the approval of both the EN DES and TVA's Division of Construction (CONST) project managers. A " final" approval by the EN DES project manager had not yet been received by CONST because the relevant drawings had yet to be reviewed.
Safety Implications The procedure of issuing " interim" and " final" approval could have increased the possibility that inadequate or interfering pipe hangers could have been installed. '
Had the defective pipe hangers been subjected to loading situations not evaluated by EN DES, it is possible that the hangers, cable tray supports, or the equipment they support could have been damaged during a seismic event. Had the equipment been safety related, the safety of operations of the plant may have been adversely affected.
Corrective Action The " interim" approved hangers on this NCR were reviewed by EN DES and approved or disapproved on a case-by-case basis. The EN DES project manager transmitted this information to CONST for implementation. To prevent recurrence, CONST was informed by a memorandum dated June 1,
- 1981, that " final" approval by the EN DES project manager had to be received before they could attach pipe hangers to other system supports. All l
supports will receive EN DES final approval before final inspection in order to maintain seismic qualification.