ML20069K482
| ML20069K482 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 04/08/1983 |
| From: | Nix H GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 50-321-1983-003, 50-321-1983-3, GM-83-314, NUDOCS 8304260365 | |
| Download: ML20069K482 (6) | |
Text
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- Georgia Pbwer Edwin 1. Italch Nuclear Plant j]
{l A@, l J April 8, 1983 GM-83-314 PLANT E.
I. HATCH Special Report Docket No. 50-321 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II, Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Attention:
Mr. James P. O'Reilly Pursuant to Section 3.13.1, ACTION 2 of Hatch Unit One Technical Specifications section 3.3.6.8, ACTION b of Hatch Unit Two Technical Specifications, please find attached special Report No. 50-321/1983-003, Rev. 1.
A <<-c+1 General Manag/
H. C. Nix er HCN/SBT/abb xc:
R. J. Kelly G. F. Head J.T. Beckham, Jr.
i P. D. Rice K.
M. Gillespie S.
B. Tipps R. D. Baker Control Room Document Control OFFICIATEopc
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SPECIAL-REPORT 50-321/1983-003, Rev.~1 LICENSEE
- -Georgia Power Company FACILITY NAME : Edwin I.
Hatch
- DOCKET-NUMBER : 50-321 Tech. Specs. section(s) which requires report:
-Unit 1 Tech. Specs. section 3.13.1, ACTION 2 and Unit 2 Tech. Specs.
section 3.3.6.8, ACTION b.,.
. required _ this report due to inoperable e fire 1 de tection instrument's not being restored _ to operable status within 14. days.
Plant conditions at the time of the event:
Unit 1 was in ' cold shutdown, and Unit 2 was in steady state power operation at 1700 MWt (approximately 70 percent power) on February 10, 1983.
Detailed description of the events:
During performance of ^ " FIRE DETECTOR SURVEILLANCE' - SAFETY RELATED
. AREAS" procedure -(HNP-1-3360 and HNP-2-3360), plant' personnel could not complete the' surveillance such-that the minimum number of fire detection instruments (detectors) for the following fire detection areas could be considered operable:
1.
CABLE SPREADING ROOM AREA (Control Building 147 ft. EL.:
Unit 1 Tech. Specs. Table 3.13-1,
' item A.3.3) 2.
. UNIT 1 REACTOR BUILDING AREA 130 ft. EL.
(Unit.1 Tech. Specs.-Table 3.13-1, items D.1.1 and D.1.2) 3.
CONTROL BUILDING AREA 164 ft. EL.
(Control Room:
-Unit 1 Tech. Specs. Table 3.13-1, items A.4.1,2, and 3) 4.
RPS VERTICAL CABLEWAY AREA (Control Building 130 ft. EL.:
Unit 1 Tech. Specs. Table 3.13-1, item A.2.3,_and Unit 2 Tech. Specs. Table 3.3.6.8-1) 5.
UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING 130 Ft. EL. AREA (Unit 2 Tech. Specs. Table 3.3.6.8-1).
6.
UNIT 2 SWITCHGEAR ROOMS 2C and 2D AREA (Control Building 130 ft. EL.: Unit 2 Tech. Specs. Table 3.3.6.8-1) 7.
UNIT 2 CORRIDOR AND WORK AREA (Control Building 112 ft. EL.: Unit 2 Tech. Specs. Table 3.3.6.8-1) 8.
BATTERY ROOM 2C AREA (Diesel Generator Building in Switchgear Room 2G Area:
Unit 2 Tech. Specs. Table 3.3.6.8-1) 9.
UNIT 2 CORRIDOR (Control Building 130 ft. EL.: Unit 2 Tech. Specs. Table 3.3.6.8-1)
,Q Following is the sequence of. events:
-1.
February 2, 1983:
Personnel-performing HNP-1-3360 complained aboutisafety hazards in performing HNP-1-3360 on fire detectors all over plant.
-Plant personnel performed a
safety review and
' determined that fire detectors that could not be. reached by either a ladder or -scaffolding (for.HNP-1-3360 or HNP-2-3360 to be performed) were not safely accessible.
Personnel-were then told to perform HNP-1-3360 and HNP-2-3360 l
on all fire detectors that were safely accessible.
2.
February 10, 1983:
a.
Personnel reported (upon completion of HNP-1-3360) that the minimum number - of-fire detectors as required per Tech. Specs. to-make
" CABLE SPREADING - ROOM:
CONTROL BLDG. 147 ft.
EL.,
and Unit 1 REACTOR BUILDING 130 Ft.
EL."
l operable could not be-performed due to fire detectors not being safely accessible, b.
An LCO (1-83-020) went into effect for sequence of' events 2.a.
Also, personnel noted that the reason HNP-1-3360 could not be performed on " CONTROL BUILDING 164 ft.
E L.' "
.was LCO 1-82-279 had this fire detection ~ area out of service for modifications' as reported by Special Report 50-321/1982-002.
3.
February 24, 1983:
Personnel reported (before completion of HNP-2-3360) that the minimum number-of detectors as required-per Tech. Specs. to make
" Unit 2
REACTOR BUILDING 130 ft.
EL.
and SWITCHGEAR ROOMS (2C and 2D):
CONTROL BLDG.
130 ft.
EL."
operable could not be performed due to fire detectors not being safely accessible.
LCO's 2-83-35, 2-83-36, and 2-83-37 went into effect for the above sequence of-events.
4.
March 15, 1983:
Personnel reviewing HNP-1-3360 completed data package (dated 2/10/83) and comparing this data to Tech. Specs. Table 3.13-1 found that "RPS VERTICAL CABLEWAY AREA:
CONTROL BLDG.
130 ft.
EL." did ~ 'not have the minimum number of' fire detectors as required per Tech. Specs.
to be operable due to the detectors not being safely accessible.
On March 15,
- 1983, LCO 1-83-055 (Unit 1 Tech. Specs. section 3.13.1, ACTION 2) and LCO 2-83-053 (Unit 2
Tech.
Specs. section 3.3.6.8, ACTION b) were written on "RPS VERTICAL CABLEWAY AREA: CONTROL BLDG.
130 ft.
EL."
using an event date of February 10, 1983.
I- -
E 5.
March 20, 1983:
a.
Personnel reported (upon completion of HNP-2-3360) that the minimum number of fire detectors as required per Tech. Specs. to make
" BATTERY ROOM 2C (Diesel Generator Building -
Switchgear Room 2G area)" operable, could not be performed due to fire detectors not being safely accessible.
LCO 2-83-59 went into effect for " BATTERY ROOM 2C (Diesel General Building Switchgear Room 2G area),
SWITCHGEAR ROOMS 2C and 2D (already covered by LCO 2-83-37),
and Unit 2 CORRIDOR AND WORK AREA (Control Building 112 ft. EL.)
b.
As recorded in comment section of data package for HNP-2-3360, dated 3-20-83, the fire protection detectors for
" CORRIDOR AND WORK
- AREA, Control Bldg.
112 ft.
EL.
(Zone 2Z43-NO33A)"
could not be tested due to 2Z43-P001 being in alarm condition.
The 2Z43-P001 was silenced due to welding setting off fire detectors alarms on LCO 1-83-46 on March 5,
1983.
The welding in area affecting fire detection was completed on March 24,
- 1983, and 2Z43-P001 was returned to full service with no alarm conditions present.
c.
Along with LCO 1-83-46 going into effect, LCO 1-83-41 on February 28, 1983, went into effect on modifications to fire detection panels in
" CONTROL ROOM, Control Bldg. 164 ft.
EL.
and Fire Detection Cable Termination Box, Control Bldg. 147 ft. EL.
This modification made fire detection systems inoperable for
" INTAKE STRUCTURE, CABLE SPREADING ROOM, Control Bldg.
147 ft.
EL.,
and CONTROL BUILDING 130 ft.
EL.":
also, this modification made " SPRINKLER SYSTEM CABLE SPREADING ROOM, Control Building 147 ft.
EL," inoperable.
d.
On March 20,
- 1983, LCO 2-83-59 Went into effect covering the fire detector areas already covered by LCO 2-83-37 and LCO 1-83-46: and including " BATTERY ROOM 2C AREA, Diesel Generator Building located in Switchgear Room 2G.
6.
March 25, 1983 LCO's 1-83-65 (Unit 1) and 2-83-63 (Unit 2) went into effect consolidating all outstanding fire protection LCO's for each unit respectively.
LCO's referenced in special reports that were consolidated are:
a.
Unit 1
LCO's:
1-82-279, 1-82-301, 1-83-20.
1-83-54, and 1-83-55.
b.
UNIT 2
LCO's:
2-83-14, 2-83-35, 2-83-36,
j ' -
'C'onsequences of these~ events:
~
Within: '1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> _ of ~ each of the events' (fire zones) discovery dates, fire watches or fire watch patrols were assigned to appropriate areas--
of the plant to inspect'the inoperable zone at'least once per hour as required per : Tech. Specs.
.The fire watches - and fire watch patrols
.wi.ll remain in effect until-'affected _ inoperable zones are returned to
~
an operabia - status.
The health' and safety of the public were not
.affected by this_non-repetitive event.
Cause(s) of'the event:
1.
Fire - detectors ' not being safely accessible for Cable Spreading' Room area, RPS Vertical Cablewayf130-ft.
EL.' area, Unit 1 Reactor Building 130 - f t. EL. area, Unit 2 Reactor Building 130 ft.
EL.
. a r e a,- Unit 2 Switchgear Rooms 2C and 2D area, Battery Room 2C area, and Unit 2 Corridor. in Control Building 130 ft. EL. area, was attributed as the first-cause of this event.
2.
Control Building Area fire detectors were not accessible for
! performance of ~ HNP-1-3360 due to modifications being made to the Control- - Building Area as.previously reported on Special Report 50-321/1982-002.
3.
The reporting of RPS. Vertical Cableway 130 ft. EL. inoperable after event occurred was attributed to procedural. error.
i
.4.
Corridor and Work area (Control Bldg.
112 ft.
EL.) were not L
accessible for performance of HNP-2-3360 due to 2Z43-POO1 panel being in alarm condition.
2Z43-POO1 panel was in alarm condition due to welding being performed in fire detection areas as listed on LCO 1-83-46.
5.
The ' Sprinkler System for Cable Spreading Room along with fire
' detection systems for Intake Structure, Cable Spreading Room,.and l
Control-Building 130 ft.
EL'.
were out of service due to modifications to fire detection panels in control Room, Control Bldg.
164 ft.
EL.,
and Fire Detection Cable Termination Box (Computer Room), Control Bldg. 147.ft. EL.
e i
Plans for restoring the instruments to operable status:
i The. Following actions-are being taken to make inoperable fire detection instruments operable:
1.
Engineering and Maintenance personnel are walking down fire
-detectors presently termed not. safely accessible to determine if a i
safe method of reaching the detectors can be found (expected to be completed by end of April 1983).
2.
For remaining detectors not safely accessible, maintenance and engineering personnel will determine which detectors can be reached on a "one-time" basis to be replaced with heat type detectors or move detectors to a safely accessible location in their respective fire zones.
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3.
_As methods are found.to safely -perform. HNP-1-3360, the inoperable
~
fire' detection' system will be made operable.
4.
HNF-1 -3 360 will - be performed on fire ~ detection areas-out of service for modifications'when.they~become accessible.
Engineering is continuing to-study other alternatives - to our.present fire. detection system to: find a-lower maintenance, safely accessible, reliable, and cost effective fire detection system that will minimize our plant's problems.
Other action for cause(s) of this event:
i 1.
- Control Room Area modification completion is now expected to be the end of May-1983.
2.
HNP-1-3360, Table 2 -is being revised to include the Tech. Specs.
- requirement for RPS Vertical Cableway 130 ft. EL.
3.
On March 24, 1983:
a.
2Z43-POO1 panel was returned to service on completion of welding in fire detection areas covered by this panel, b.
The fire detections systems taken out of service per LCO 1-83-46 were returned -to service due to completion of modifications to control room panels and, fire detection cable termination box in computer room 147 ft. EL.
Fire Detection Instruments now restored to operable status:
1.
Unit 1 REACTOR BUILDING AREA 130 ft. EL.
2.
Unit 2 SWITCHGEAR ROOMS 2C and 2D AREA (Control Building 130 ft. EL.)
s 3.
BATTERY ROOM 2C AREA (Diesel Generator Building in Switchgear Room 2G) l 4.
Ur.it 2 CORRIDOR AND WORK AREA i
(Control Building 112 ft. EL.)
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