ML20069C503

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BWR Scram Discharge Vol Long-Term Mods, Technical Evaluation Rept
ML20069C503
Person / Time
Site: Vermont Yankee File:NorthStar Vermont Yankee icon.png
Issue date: 06/11/1982
From: Mucha E
Franklin Research Ctr, Franklin Institute
To: Eccleston K
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20069C510 List:
References
CON-NRC-03-81-130, CON-NRC-3-81-130, TAC 42229 TER-C5506-64, NUDOCS 8206160113
Download: ML20069C503 (49)
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{{#Wiki_filter:! l TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT. . BWR SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME i I LONG-TERM MODIFICATIONS A ! VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION { l VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION y 2 _. ... =

pj NRC DOCKET NO.

50-271 FRC PROJECT C5506 ce ; NRC *AC NO. 42229 FRC ASSIGNMENT 2 l NRC CONTR ACT NO. NRC-03-81-130 FRC TASK 6/ b Prepared by Author: E. Mucha [ Franklin Research Center '20th and Race Street Philadelphia, PA 19103 FRC Group Leader: E. Mucha jd 4 .d: Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer: K. Eccleston f:! tq J .'e June 11, 1982 h?) $] This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor ,9@q any agency thereof, or any of their employees, makes any warranty, ex-pressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability'or resconsibility for any [N third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, apparatus. product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by },p such third party would not infringe privately owned rights. W@b O((3 Y cp0 ([G j~1 Q n \\ N N Mj Franklin Research Center 3 M .j1 A Division of The Fran} din Institute n een,anwn FrankJ,n Parx.ay. Ph,ta Pa 19103 C :$)448.: COO ERE I I I ll 'IIIIII I I I II I Il l l

TECHNICAL EVALUATION REPORT BWR SCRAM DISCHARGE VOLUME LONG'-TERM MODIFICATIONS VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION NRC DOCKET NO. 50-271 FRC PROJECT C5506 NRC TAC NO-42229 FRC ASSIGNMENT 2 NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC-03-81-130 FRC TASK 64 s. PreparedDy Author: E. Mucha Franklin Research Center 20th and Race Street FRC Group Leader: E. Mucha Philadelphia, PA 19103 Prepared for Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Lead NRC Engineer: K. Eccleston June 11, 1982 This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor any agency thereof, Or any of their employees, makes any warranty, ex- ] pressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for any third party's use, or the results of such use, of any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed in this report, or represents that its use by such third party would not infringe privately owned rights. ^AF ranklin Research Center A Division of The Franklin Institute The Benjamin Franklin Parkway, Phila. Pa. 19103 (215)448 1000 - ~.. - -

TER-C5506-64 CONTENTS Section Title Page

SUMMARY

1 1 INTRODUCTION 3 1.1 Purpose of the Technical Evaluation 3 1.2 Generic Issue Background 3 1.3 Plant-Specific Background. 5 l 2 REVIEW CRITERIA. 6 2.1 Surveillance Requirements for SDV Drain and Vent Valves 6 2.2 LCO/ Surveillance Requirements for Reactor Protection System SDV Limit Switches' 7 2.3 LCO/ Surveillance Requirements for Control Rod Withdrawal Block SDV Limit Switchec; 9 3 METHOD OF EVALUATION 12 4 TECHNICAL EVALUATION 13 4.1 Surveillance Requirements for SDV Drain I and Vent Valves 13 4.2 LCO/ Surveillance Requirements for Reactor Protection System SDV Limit Switches 14 4.3 LCO/ Surveillance Requirements for Control Rod Withdrawal Block SDV Limit Switches 18 5 CONCLUSIONS. 22 6 PEFERENCES. 26 APPENDIX A - NRC STAFF'S MODEL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS APPENDIX B - VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION LETTER OF OC'ICBER 14, 1980 AND SUBMITTAL WITH PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGES FOR VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR STATION ranklin Res.,m,e_ arch Center .~. -~i.,i..,...,

N ~ TER-C5506-64

SUMMARY

This technical evaluation report reviews and evaluates the Vermont Yankee ' submittal concerning prcposed Phase 1 changes in the vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Technical Specifications for scram discharge volume (SDV) long-term modificationa regarding surveillance requirements for SDV vent and drain valves and the limiting condition for operation (LCO)/ surveillance requirements for reactor protection system and control rod withdrawal block SDV lLait switches. Conclusions were based on the degree of compliance of the Licensee's submittal with criteria from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staf f's Model Technical Specifications. ) The Licensee's submittal dated October 14, 1980 was not responsive to the NRC's July 7, 1980 request [2] for proposed Technical Specifications changes. The NRC sent an additional letter dated March 6,1981 to the Licensee request-ing a commitment to propose revised Technical Specifications at least 3 months in advance of long-term modification completion dates. Since no answer was received from the Licensee, this TER is based on the first, nonresponsive submittal of October 14, 1980, and subsequent information obtained from the Lead NRC Engineer. The agreed-upon revision of the Vermont Tankee Technical Specifications to require verifying that each SDV drain and vent valve is open at least once per 31 days and cycling eacn valve quarterly in accordance with the Vermont Yankee Insorvice Inspection Program meets the NRC staff 's Model Technical Specification requirements of paragraphs 4.1.1.1.la and 4.1.3.1.lb, respectively. Page 22, Table 4.1.1 of the Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications does not meet the surveillance requirements for reactor protection system SDV limit switches of the NRC staf f's Model Technical Specifications, paragraph 4.3.1.1 and Table 4.3.1.1-1, which require Channel Functional Test for SDV water ~ level-high not every 3 months, as specified at Vermont Yankee, but monthly. However, the Licensee is installing a second instrument volume containing four additional limit switches, for a total of eight limit switches for the reactor _ bhranklin Research Center A DMacn of The Franen innsnee

TER-C5506-64 protection system. This increases'significantly the reliability of'the system - and provides techn'ical bases : for acceptance of the Channel Functional Test ' every 3 months as required in the present Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications. I There is -a.' discrepancy between the Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications requirements,:page 47, Table _3.2.5, and the actual SDV system in regard to control rod withdrawal block. Instrumentation. The specifications call for two trip systems; the actual Vermont' Yankee SDV system has only one trip' system. with one instrument channel containing one limit switch for control rod with- -drawal block.- To eliminate the above discrepancy and make the existing system acceptable, the Licensee agreed to incorporate the following note or its equivalent concerning page 47, Table 3.2.5, for~ Function, Scram Discharge Volume Water Level-High: " Note (1) is not appplicable to this function. There shall be'one operable or operating trip system for this function." The remaining surveillance requirenents are met by page 47 (Table 3.2.5), to be revised as indicated above, and pages 19 (Table 3.1.1), 25 (Table 4.1.2), 59 (Table 4.2.5), and 72 without any revision. Table 5-1 on pages 24 and 25 of this report summarizes'the evaluation cesults. 4 bd Franklin Research Center A Dwama d The Franhan insutwo

TER-C5506-64

1. INTRODUCTION 1.1 PURPOSE OF THE TECHNICAL EVALUATION The purpose of this technical evaluation report (TER) is to review and evaluate the Vermont Yankee submittal concerning the proposed changes in the Technical Specifications of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station boiling water reactor (BWR) in regard to "BWR Scram Discharge Volume Long Term Modifi-cation," specifically:

o surveillance requirements for scram discharge volume (SDV) vent and drain valves o limiting condition for operation (LCO)/ surveillance requirements for the reactor protection system limit switches o LCO/su;veillance requirements for the control rod withdrawal block SDV 1'.mit switches. The evaluation used criteria proposed by the NRC staff in Model Technical Specifications (see Appendix A of this report). This effort is directed toward the NBC objective of increasing the reliability of installed BWR scram dis-charge volume systems, the need for which was made apparent by events described below. 1.2 GENERIC ISSUE BACKGROUND On June 13, 1979, while the reactor at Hatch Unit 1 was in the refuel mode, two SDV high level switches had been modified, tested, and found inoper-able. The remaining switches were operable. Inspection of each inoperable level swit.ch revealed a bent float rod binding against the side of the float chamber. _/ On October 19, 1979, Brunswick Unit i reported that water hammer due to slow closure of the SDV drain valve during a reactor scram damaged several pipe supports on the SDV drain line. Drain valve closure time was approximately 5 minutes because of a faulty solenoid controlling'the air supply to the valve. Af ter repair, to avoid probable damage from a scram, the unit was started with the SDV vent and drain valves closed except for periodic draining. During A u00Eranklin Research center A Dene on of The Frannan Insende

r TER-C5506-64 this mode of operation, the reactor scrammed due to a high water level in the SDV system without prior actuation of either the high level alarm or rod block switch. Inspection revealed that the float ball on the rod block switch was bent, making the switches inoperable. The water hammer was reported to be the cause of these level switch failures. As a result of these events involving common-cause failures of SDV limit switches and SDV drain valve operability, the NRC issued IE Bulletin 80-14, " Degradation of BWR Scram Discharge volume Capability," on June 12, 1980 [1]. In addition, to strengthen the provisions of this bulletin and to ensure that the scram system would continue to work' during reactor operation, the NRC sent a letter dated July 7, 1980 (2) to all operating BWR licensees requesting that they propose Technical Specifications changes to provide surveillance require-ments for reactor protection system and control rod block SDV limit switches. The letter also contained the NRC staff's Model Technical Specifications to be used as a guide by licensees in preparing their submittals. Meanwhile, during a routine shutdown of the Browns Ferry Unit 3 reactor on June 28,1980, 76 of 185 control rods failed to insert fully. Full inser-tion required two additional manual scrams and an automatic scram for a total elapsed time of approximately 15 minutes between the first scram initiation and the complete insertion of all the rods. On July 3, 1980, in response to both this event and the previous events at Hatch Unit 1 and Brunswick Unit 1, the NRC issued (in addition to the earlier IE Bulletin 80-14) IE Bulletin 80-17 followed by five supplements. These initiated short-term and long-term programa described in " Generic Saf ety Evaluatton Report BWR Scram Discharge System," NEC Staff, December 1, 1980 [9] and " Staff Report and Evaluation of Supplement 4 to IE Bulletin 80-17 (Continuous Monitoring Systems)" (10]. Analysis and evaluation of the Browns Ferry Unit 3 and other SDV si: tem events convinced the NRC staff that SDV systems in all BWRs should be modified to assure long-term SUV reliability. Improvements were needed in three major areas: SDV-IV hydraulic coupling, level instrumentation, and system isolation. To achieve these objectives, an Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (URR) task force and a subgroup of the BWR Owners Group developed Revised Scram Discharge As b ranklin Resear a o-- a n. r..ch Ce.nter ~ _______.___________.___._.__._.__..m.._.

d' s TER-C5506-44 System Design and Safety Criteria for use in establishing acceptable SDV systems modifications [9]. Also, an NRC letter dated October 1, 1980 requested all operating BWR licensees to reevaluate installed SDV systems and modify them as necessary to comply with the revised criteria. In Reference 9, the SDV-IV hydraulic coupling at the Big Rock Point, Brunswick 1 & 2, Duane Arnold, and Hatch 1 & 2 BWRs was judged acceptable. The remaining BWRs will require modification to meet the revised SDV-IV hydraulic coupling criteria, and all operating BWRs may require modification to meet the revised instrumentation and isolation criteria. The changes in Technical Specifications associated with this effort will be carried out in two phases: Phase 1 - Improvements in surveillance for vent and drain valves and instrument volume level switches. Phase 2 - Technical Specifications improvements required as a of long-term modifications made to comply with re u esign and performance criteria. r r> This TER is a review and evaluation of Technical Specifications changes proposed for phase I. 1.3 PLANT-SPECIFIC BACKGROUND The July 7,1980 NRC letter not only requested all BWR licensees to amend their facilities' Technical Specifications with respect to control rod drive SDV capability, but enclosed the NRC staff's proposed Model Technical Specifi-cations (see Appendix A of this TER). as a guide for the licensees in preparing the requested submittals and as a source of criteria for an FRC technical evaluation of the submittals. This TER reviews and evaluates the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Technical Specifications submitted on October 14, 1980 (see Appendix'B) by the Licensee, the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation (VYNP), in regard to "BWR Scram Discharge Volume (SDV) Long-Term Modifications" and, specifically, the surveillance requirements for SDV vent and drain valves and the LCO/ surveillance requirements for the reactor protection s'ystem and control rod withdrawal block SDV limit switches. The adequacy with which the VYNP information documented compliance with the NRC i staff's Model Technical Specifications has also been assessed. A Nbranklin Research Center ~ ~ ~ ~. _~~-.,+.,--.~c-~..

TER-C5506-64

2. REVIEW CRITERIA The criteria established by the NRC staff's Model Technical Specifications involving surveillance requirements of the main SDV components and instrumenta-

?. ion cover three areas of concerns o surveillance requirements for SUV vent and drain valves o LCO/ surveillance requirements for reactor' protection system SUV limit switches o LCO/ surveillance requirements for control rod block SDV limit switches. 2.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR SDV DRAIN AND VEhT VALVES The surveillance criteria of the NRC staff's Model Technical Specification for SUV drain valves are: "4.1.3.1.1 - The scram discharge volume drain and vent valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 31 days by: a. Verifying each valve to be open*, and b. Cycling each valve at least one complete cycle of full travel.

  • These valves may be closed intermittently for testing under administrative controls.'

The Model Technical Specifications require testing the drain and vent valves at least once every 31 days, checking that each valve is fully open during normal operation, and cycling each valve at least one complete cycle of full travel under adminstratite controls. Full opening of each valvo during normal operation indicates that there is no degradation in the control air system and its components that control the air pressure to the pneumatic actuators of the drain and vent valves. Cycling each valve checks whether the valve opens fully and whether its movement is smooth, jerky, or oscillatory, j During normal operation, the drain and vent valves stay in the open posi-l tion for very long periods. A silt of particulates such as metal, chips and l l nklin Research Center A DMme d De Franun knue t..

TER-C5506-64 flakes, various fibers, lint, sand, and weld slag from the water or air may accumulate at moving parts of the v'alves and temporarily '" freeze" them. A strong breakout force may be needed to overcome this temporary " freeze," pro-ducing a violent jerk which may induce a severe water hammer if it occurs during a scram or a scram resetting. Periodic cycling of the drain and vent valves is the best method to clear the effects of particulate silting, thus promoting smooth opening and closing and more reliable valve operation. Also, in case of improper valve operation, cycling can indicate whether excessive pressure transients may be generated during and after a reactor scram which might damage the SDV piping system and cause a loss of system integrity or function. 2.2 LCO/ SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR REAC'IOR PROTECTION SYSTEM SDV LIMIT SWITCHES The paragraphs of the NRC staff's Model Technical Specifications pertinent to LCO/ surveillance requirements for reactor protection system SDV limit switches are: "3.3.1 - As a minimum, tha reactor protection system instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE with the REAC'IOR PRCM'ECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME as shown in Table 3.3.1-2. Table 3.3.1-1. Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Applicable Minimum Operable Functional Operational Channels Per Trip Unit Conditions System (a) Action 8. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level-High 1,2,5 (h) 2 4 Table 3.3.1-2. Reactor Protection System Response Times Functional Response Time Unit (Seconds) 8. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level-High NA nklin Research Center A Dmeson ei The Frankan insonde

TER-C5506-64 "4.3.1.1 - Each reactor protection system ins?rumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance. of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUICTIONAL TEST, and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.1.1-1. Table 4.3.1.1~1. Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements Opera tional Conditions Channel in Which Functional Channel Functional Channel Surveillance Unit Check Test Calibration Recu ired 8. Scram Discharge Volume Water Level-High NA M R 1,2,5 Notation (a) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status up to 2 hours for required surveillance without placing the trip system in the tripped condition provided at least one OPERABLE ch:,el in the same trip system is monitoring that parametcr. (h) With any control rod withdrawn. Not applici le to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2 A$: tion 4: In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 or 2, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS

  • and fully insert all insertable control rods within one hour.
  • Except movement of IRM, SRM or special movable detectors, or replacement of LPRM strings provided SRM instrumentation is OPERABLE per Specification 3.9.2."

Paragraph 3.3.1 and Table 3.3.1-1 of the Model Technical Specifications require the functional unit of SDV water level-high to have at least 2 operable channels containing 2 limit switches per trip system, a total of 4 i operable chann71s containing 4 limit switches per 2 trip systems for the reactor protection system, which automatically init!.ates a scram. The technical objective of these requirements is to provide 1-out-of-2-taken-twice 4 UOUU Franklin Research Center A DMason of The Franen insature

TER-55506-64 logic for the reactor protection system. The response time of the reactor protection system for the functional unit of SW water level-high should be measured and kept available (it is not given in Table 3.3.1-2). Paragraph 4.3.1.1 and Table 4.3.1.1-1 give reactor protection system instrumentation surveillance requirements for the functional unit of SW water level-high. Each reactor protection system instrumentation channel containing a limit switch should be shown to be operable by the Channel Functional Test monthly and Channel Calibration at each refueling outage. 2.3 LCO/SURVEILIANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK SW VOLUME LIMIT SWITCHES The NBC staff's Model Technical Specifications specify the following LCO/ surveillance requirements for control rod withdrawal block SW limit switches: "3.3.6 The control rod withdrawal block instrumentation channel shown in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE with trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3.6-2. Table 3.3.6-1. Control Rod Withdrawal Block Instrumentation Minimum Operable Applicable Channels Per Trip Operational Trio Function Function Conditions Action 5. Scram Discharge Volume a. Mater level-high 2 1, 2, 5** 62 b. Scram trip bypassed 1 (1, 2, 5**) 62 ACTION 62: With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the minimum OPERABLE channels per Trip Function requirement, ~ place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition within one hour.

    • With more than one control rod withdrawn.

Not applicable to control rods removed per specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2. 4 0000 Franklin Research Center A Chemen of The Franun inseawee .- _ ~ _.... _

~ TER-C5506-64 Table ~ 3.3. 6-2 Control Rod Withdrawal Block Instrumentation-Setpoints' Trio Function'

  • Trip Setpoint Allowable Value 5.

Scram Discharge volume ~ a. Wster level-high. NA. NA b.: Scram trip bypassed NA NA 4.3.6.. Each.of the above control rod withdrawal block trip systems and instrumentation ch'annels shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL' CALIBRATION operations for the OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.6-1. / Table 4.3.6-1. Control Rod Withdrawal Block Instrumentation Surveillance Requirements-. Operational Conditions-Channel in Which Trip Channel Functional Channel Surveillance Function Check ~ Test Calibration - Required 5. Scram Discharge Volume a. Water Level-NA Q R 1, 2, 5** High b. Scram Trip NA M NA (1, 2, 5**) Bypassed

    • With more than one control rod withdrawn. Not applicable to control roda removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2."

j Paragraph 3.3.6 and Table 3.3.6-1 of the Model Technical Specifications require the control rod withdrawal bl'ock instrumentation to have at least 2 ) operable channels containing 2 limit switches for SDV water level-high and 1 I operable channel containing 1 limit switch foe SDV scram trip bypassed. The technical objective of these requirements is to have at least one channel containing one limit switch available to monitor the SDV water level when the other cnannel with a limit switch is being tested or undergoing maintenance. The trip setpoint for control rod withdrawal block instrumentation monitoring nklin Research Center A ca on a n. rr.nwm ww. L

o TER-C5506-64 SDV water level-high should be specified as indicated in Table 3.3.6-2. The trip functi6n prevents further withdrawal of any control ' rod when the control rod block SDV limit switches indicate water level-high. Paragraph 4.3.6 and Table 4.3.6-1 require that each control rod withdrawal block instrumentation channel containing a limit switch be shown to be operable by the Channel Functional Test once per 3 months for SDV water level-high, by { the Channel Functional Test once per month for SDV scram trip bypassed, and by Channel Calibration at each refueling outage for SDV water level-high. The Surveillance Criteria of the BWR Owners Subgroup given in Appendix A, "Long-Tera Evaluation of Scram Discharge System," of " Generic Safety Evaluation Report BWR Scram Discharge System," written by the NBC staff and issued on December 1, 1980, are: 1. Vent and drain valves shall be periodically tested. j i 2. Verifying and level detection instrumentation shall be periodically I tested in place. { 3. The operability of the entire system as an integrated whole shall be demonstrated periodically and during each operating cycle, by demon-strating scram instrument response and valve function at pressure and [ temperature at approximately 50% control rod density. l Analysis of the above criteria indicates that the NRC staf f's Model. Technical Specifications requirements the acceptance criteria for the present e TER, fully cover the BWR Owners Subgroup Surveillance Criteria 1 and 2 and partially cover Criterion 3. i t e l t l b e nklin Research Center A Dhquon of The Franhan insomme

TER-C5506-64 3. METHOD OF EVALUATION' The VYNP submittal for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station was evaluated-in two stages, initial and final.: 'During the initial evaluation, only the NRC staff's Model Technical . Specifications requirements were used to determine if: o 'the Licensee's submittal was responsive.to the. July 7,.1980 NRC request for proposed Technical Specifications changes' involving the surveillance requirements of ~ the SDV vent and drain. valves, LCO/ surveillance requirements for reactor protection systen SDV limit' switches, and LCO/ surveillance requirements for control rod block SDV limit' switches o the submitted information was sufficient.to permit a detailed technical evaluation. During the final evaluation, in addition to the NRC staff's Model Techni-cal Sp 2cifications requirements, background material in References 'l through 10, pertinent sections of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), and the Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications were studied to determine the technical bases for the design of SDV main components and' instrumentation. Subsequently, the Licensee's response was compared directly to the requirements of the NRC staff's Model Technical Specifications. The findings of the final evaluation are presented in Section 4 of this report. The initial evaluation concluded that the Licensee's first. submittal dated October 14, 1980 was not responsive to the NEC's July 7,-1980 request for pro-posed Technical Specifications changes. The NRC sent a letter dated March.6, 1981 to the Licensee requesting a commitment to propose revised Technical Specifications at least 3 months in advance of long-term modification comple-tion dates. Since no answer was received from the Licensee, this TER is based on the first, non-responsive' submittal of October 14, 1980, and subsequent information obtained from the Lead NRC Engineer. . 00h) Franklin Research Center A DMason cd The Frankhn insatute J,-

^ ..a 'o TER-C5506-64 \\ 4. TERNICAL EVALUATION 4.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR SUV DRAIN AND VENT VALVES NBC STAFF'S MODEL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Paragraph 4.1.3.1.1 requires. demonstrating that the SDV drain and vent valves are operable by: \\, a. verifying each valve to be open at least once per 31 days (valves may. be closed intermittently for testing under administrative controls) b. cycling each valve at least one complete cycle of full travel at least once per 92 days. LICENSEE RESPONSE The Licensee responded as follows: "Our positions on the NRC proposals are listed below. 1. Operability of SUV Vent and Drain Valves. Model STS - Would require the subject valves to be tested and timed: a) af ter every shutdown of greater than 120 days b) every 120 days during normal operation Model STS would also require that the SDV vent and drain valves be verified open ait least once per 31 days. Vermont Yankee The subject valves at Vermont Yankee are tested and timed Position - in accordance with the Vermont Yankee Inservice Inspection Program. The program requires that this tiesting be done quarterly and is therefofe more conservative than the change proposed by the NRC. Vermont Yankee agrees with the position that the vent and drain valves be verified open at least once per month. This requirement will be administrative 1y enforced until ~ l such time a's this minor change can be included in another proposed change submittal." l According to information received from the NBC on June 3, 1982, the Licensee agreed to -avise the Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications to 00 er.nuiin a e.,ch center A Dhauen of The Fransen insenste

TER-C 550 6-64 require verifying that each SDV drain and vent valve is open at least once per 31 days, and cycling each valve quarterly in accordance with the Vermont Yankee Inservice Inspection Program. EVALUATION The agreed-upon revision of the Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications to require verifying that each SUV drain and vent valve is open at least once per 31 days and cycling each valvo quarterly in accordance with the Vermont Yankee Inservice Inspection Progran meets the NBC staff's Model Technical Specifications requirements of paragraphs 4.1.3.1.la and 4.1.3.1.lb, respectively. 4.2 LCO/SUEVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR REAOTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM SDV LIMIT SWI"'CHES NRC STAFF'S MODEL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Paragraph 3.3.1 and Table 3.3.1-1 require the functional unit of SDV water level-high to have at least 2 operable channels containing 2 limit switches per trip system, a total of 4 operable channels containing 4 limit switches per 2 trip systems for the reactor protection systers which automatically initiates scram. Paragraph 3.3.1 and Table 3.3.1-2 concern the response time of the reactor protection system for the functional unit of SDV water level-high which should be specified for each BWR (it is not specified in the table). Paragraph 4.3.1.1 and Table 4.3.1.1-1 require that each ' reactor proaction system instru-mentation channel containing a limit switch be shown to be operable for the functional unit of SDV water level-high by the Channel Functional Test monthly and Channel Calibration at each refueling outage. The applicable operational conditions for these requirements are Startup, Run, and Refuel. LICENSEE RESPONSE The Vermont Yankee position is given below: "2. Surveillance Requirements for SDIV High Water Level Scram 4 bd Franklin Research Center A DMs.on of The Frar%n insuute n

TER-C5506-64 Model STS - Would requires a) channel functional test every 31. days b) channel calibration every 18 months Vermont Yankee Current Technical Specification requires Position - is) channel functional test every 3 months b) channel calibration every refueling (12 months) Vermont Yankee believes that the testing interval for this trip should not be reduced for the following reasons: 1) Calibre. tion is done concurrent with the functional test on a quarterly basis. Past functional testing of this trip has been highly successful with no instances of failed SDIV level switches due in any part to float arsembly misoperation. 2) Tripling the frequency of functional testing in this area would unnecessarily increase personnel exposure." The following corrections should be made in the Licensee's statements: "Model STS - Would require: a. channel functional test every 31 days" (it should be monthly); "b. channel calibration every 18 months" (it should be each refueling outage). Page 19 of the Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications contains Table 3.1.1, Reactor Protection System (Scram) Instrument Requirements, which pro-vides the following information for Trip Function, Scram Discharge Volume High Level: "1. Trip Settings: < 24 gallons 2. Modes in Which Functions Must be Oper,ating: Refuel (1), Startup, Run. 3. Minimum Number Operating Instrument Channels Per Trip System (2): 2 1 4. Required Conditions When Minimum Conditions For Operation Are Not Satisfied (3): A" Notes: "1. When the reactor is subcritical and the reactor water temperature is less than 212*F, only the following trip functions need to be operable , UUUU FrankJin Research Center A Om of TN Prerman Inseawee i n

TER-C5506-64 a. mode' switch in shutdown b. manual scram c. high flux IRM* or high flux SRM'in coincidence d. scram discharge volume high water level. 2. Whenever an instrument system is found to be inoperable, the instru-ment system output relay shall be tripped immediately. Except for MSIV & Turbine Stop Valve Position, this action shall result in tripping'the trip system." In addition, the Vermont Yankee FSAR provides this information on page 3.4-13: "At the third (highest) level, the four level switches (two for each reactor protection system trip system) initiate a scram to shut down the reactor while sufficient free volume is still present to receive the scram discharge." The above information is applicable to the NRC staff's Model Technical Specifications requirements.cf paragraph 3.3.1 and Table 3.3.1-1. The requirements of paragraph 3.3.1 and Table 3.3.1-2 are covered in the Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications in Section 3.3 (page 72) and in Section 4.3 (Control Rod System, paragraph C: Scram Insertion Times), which include the reactor protection system SDV water level-high response time frem scram time tests. The applicable information to cover the NRC staff's Model Technical Spec-ifications requirements of paragraph 4.3.1.1 and Table 4.3.1.1-1 is found on pages 22 and 25 of the Vermont Yankee Specifications. Page 22 contains Table 4.1.1 (Scram Instrumentation and Logic Systems, Functional Tests, Minimum Functional Test Frequencies for Safety Instrumentation, Logic Systems and Control Circuits), with the following information for Instrument Channel High Water Level in Scram Discharge Volume: "1. Group (3): A 2. Functional Test (7 ) : Trip Channel and Alarm 3. Minimum Frequency (4) : Every 3 months"

  • The Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications state IBM; it should be IRM.

TER-C5506-64 Notes: "3. A description of the three groups is included in the basis of this Specification." (See page 31 of the Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications.) "4. Functional tests are not required when the systems are not required to be operable or are tripped. If tests are missed, they shall be performed prior to returning the systems to an operable status. '. I 7. A functional test of the logic of each channel is performed as j indicated. This coupled with placing the mode switch in shutdown 1 each refueling outage constitutes a logic system functional test of the scram system." Table 4.1.2, Scram Instrument Calibration Minimum Calibration Frequencies for Reactor Protection Instrument Channels, on page 25 contains the following infoonation for Instrument Channel High Water Level in Scram Discharge Volumes -

  • 1.

Group (1): A 2. Calibration Standard (4): Water Level 3. Minimum Frequency (2): Refueling Outage" Notes: "1. A' description of the three groups is included in the bases of this specification." (See page 31 of the Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications.) "2. Calibration tests are not required when the systems are not required to be operable or are tripped. If tests are missed, they shall be performed prior to returning the systems to an operable status. 4. Response time is not part of the routine instrument check and ~ calibration, but will be checked every operating cycle." According to information received from the NRC on June 3,1982, the Licensee is installing a second instrument volume containing four additional limit switches, for a total of eight limit switches for the reactor protection system. EVALUATION Pago 19, Table 3.1.1 of the Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications com-plies with the NRC staff's Model Technical Specifications requirements of para-LOh ranklin Research Center A DMeson of The FranhSn insense

gg uW g. t TER-C5506-64 & r graph 3.3.1 and Table 3.3.1-1..The Vermont Yankee reactor protection: system SDV water. level-high instrumentation consists of 2 operabie channels. containing

  • 2 limit switches per trip system, for a total of 4 operable channels containing

'4 limit switches per 2 trip systems, making 1-out-of-2-taken-twice logic. Page 19, Table 3.1.1 also specifies < 24 gallons as a trip setting _for scram ini-tiation and applicable operating conditions of Refuel,-Startup, and Run, which j are acceptable. Although the Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications do not directly specify the reactor protection system SUV water level-high response time, as required in the NRC staff's Model Technical Specifications, paragraph 3.3.1 and Table 3.3.1-2, they have~ the requirements for scram time tests, which include the required response time (see Section 3.3C, page 72; and Section 4.3C, Scram Insertion Times). This approach is acceptable, since the reactor protection system SDV water level-hAgh response time can be deduced from the scram time tests. Page 22, Table 4.1.1 of the Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications does not comply with the NRC staff's Model Technical Specifications requirements of paragraph 4.3.1.1 and Table 4.3.1.1-1 that the reactor protection system SDV water level-high be tested monthly by the Channel Functional Test, and not every 3 months as specified in the Vermont, Yankee Technical Specifications. However, the Licensee is installing a second instrument volume containing four additional limit seitches, for a total of eight limit switches for the reactor 2 protection system. This increases significantly the reliability of the system and provides technical bases for acceptance of*the Channel Functional Test every 3 months as required ~ in the present Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications. l 4.3. LCO/ SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK SDV LIMIT SWITCHES NRC. STAFF'S MODEL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Paragraph 3.3.6 and Table 3.3.6-1 require the control rod withdrawal block instrumentation to have at least 2 operable channels containing 2 limit switches for SDV water level-high, and 1 operable channel containing 1 limit l NO Franklin Research Center t - A cm on er The nonen mm. a.

P TER-C5506-64 s switch for SUV trip bypassed. Paragraph 3.3.6 also requires specifying the trip setpoint for control rod withdrawal block instrument'ation monitoring SDV water level-high'as indicated in Table 3.3.6-2 Paragraph 4.3.6 rnd Table 4.3.6-1 require each control rod withdrawdl block instrumentation channel containing a limit switch to be shown to be oper-able by the Channel Functional Test once per 3 months for SDV watec level-high, once per month for SDV scram trip bypassed, and Channel Calibration at each refueling outage for SDV water level-high. LICENSEE RESPONSE In regard to LCO/ surveillance requirements for control rod withdrawal block SUV limit switches, the Licensee's response was as follows: "3. Technical Specification Requirement for Control Rod Block on SDIV High Water Level Scram Bypass Model STS - Contains requirement for this rod block function to be operable when the mode switch is in Run, Startup/ Hot Standby, or Shutdown or Refuel. Associated testing and calibration requirements are also provided. Vermont Yankee Vermont Yankee does not feel that this requirement is Position - justified for the following reasons: 1) Plant design at Vermont Yankee does not allow the SDIV high water level scram to be bypassed unless the mode switch is in the shutdown or refuel position. In these modes, a low power rod block is conccyrently provided by the IRM system as well as by the high level scram bypass switch. 2) At Vermont Yankee the SDIV rod block can only be ~ reset by draining the SDIV to a point below the 12 gallon control rod block setpoint. This assures that ~ during the period of time that the SDIV high water level trip is bypassed to allow draining of the SDIV a rod block is present until the water level drops t below the rod block setpoint." Page 47, Table 3.2.5 ' Control Rod Block Instrumentation) of the Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications provides the following information for Trip Function, Scram Discharga Volume: U Franklin Research Center A Dhemen of The Frenhan wenuie

~ TER-C5506-64 "1. Minimum Number of Operable Instrument Channels per Trip System (Note 1): 1-2. Modes in Which Function Must be Operable Refuel, Startup, Run 3. Trip Setting: < 12 gailons" Note la "There shall be two operable or tripped trip systems for each function in the required operating mode. If the minimum number of operable instru-ments are not available for one of the two trip systems, this condition may exist for up to seven days provided that during the time the operable g system is functionally tested immediately and daily thereafter; if the J condition lasts longer than seven days, the system shall be tripped. If the minimum number of instrument channels are not available for both trip systems, the systems shall be tripped." The information provided on page 59, Table 4.2.5 (Minimum Test and Calibration Frequencies, Control Rod Block Instrumentation) is as follows regarding Trip Function, High Water Level in Scram Discharge Volume "1. Functional Test: every 3 months

2. Calibration:

Refueling Outage." The Licensee agreed to incorporate the following note or its equivalent concerning page 47, Table 3.2.5, for Function, Scram Discharge Volume Water Level-High: " NOTE (1) is not applicable to this function. There shall be one operable or operating trip system for this function." EVALUATION The existing Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications, page 47, Table 3.2.5 (Control Rod Block Instrumentation) require "two operable or tripped trip systems for each function," and one trip system should have at least one oper-able instrunent channel, making a total of two operable instrument channels per two trip systems. Page 3.4-13 of the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station FSAR indicates that the present control rod withdrawal block ins * 'ntation has only one trip system with one instrument channel containing one limit switch. 4% U000 Franklin Research Center A o m an a n. rr. nun m.a,

4 TER-C5506-64 - Thus, the actual Vermont Yankee SUV system in regard to control rod withdrawal block instrumentation does not comply with the existing Vermont Yankee Techni-cal Specifications requirements of Table 3.2.5, page 47. Bowever, there are technical bases which make the Licensee's existing system acceptable as long ~ as the existing Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications are corrected. In addition to the control rod withdrawal block channel containing one limit switch with a 12-gallon trip setpoint for water level-high, 'Jetacat Yankee has another SDV level switch set at a lower point which initaates an alarm for operator action (see Vermont Yankee FSAR, page 3.4-13). Reference 9, page 50, states Design Criterion 9, " Instrumentation shall be provided to aid the operator in-the detection of water accumulation in the instrumented volume (s) prior to scram initiation," gives the Technical Basis for "Long-Tern Evaluation of Scram Discharge System," and defines Acceptable Compliance, "The present alarm and rod block instrumentation meets the criterion given adequate hydraulic coupling with the SDV headers." Thus, if the Vermont Yankee scram discharge system is modified (long term) so that the hydraulic. coupling between scram discharge header and instrumented volume is adequate and acceptable, then the present alarm and rod block instrumentation meets NRC requirements, since the Licensee agreed to incorporate the following note or its equivalent concerning page 47, Table 3.2.5, for Function, Scram Discharge Volume Water Level-High " Note (1) is not applicable to this function. There shall be one operable or operating trip system for this function." The specified trip setting for control rod withdrawal block SDV water l level-high of < 12 gallons meets the NRC staff's Model Technical Specifica-tions requirements of paragraph 3.3.6 and Table 3.3.6-2 and is acceptable. Page 59, Table 4.2.5 of the Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications com-plies with the NRC staff's Model Technical Specifications requirements of para-graph 3.3.6 and Table 3.3.6-2; it requires the Channel Functional Test once per 3 months for the control rod withdrawal block instrumentation channel contain-ing a limit switch and Channel Calibration each refueling outage for SDV water level-high. I g i UUUU Franklin Research C.en.ter sm==nwn.n==mm m l l t .m-m m.

O g, TER-C5506-64 5. CONCLUSIONS Table 5-1 cummari'zes the results of the final review and evaluation of the . Vermont Yankee submittal concerning Phase 1 proposed Technical Specifications changes for SDV long-term modification in regard.to surveillance requirements - for SDV vent and drain valves and LCO/ surveillance requirements for reactor. protection system and control rod block SDV' limit switches. The following conclusions were reached: o 13un Licensee did not propose any changes in the Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications. The Licensee's submittal was not responsive to the NRC's July 7,1980 request for proposed Technical Specifications changes. Since then, according to' information received from the NRC on June 3, 1982, the Licensee agreed to the required revision of the Vermont Yankee Specifications to meet the NRC staff's Model Technical Specifications requirements. o The Licensee agreed to revise the Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications to require verifying that each SDV drain and vent valve is open at least once per 31 days, and cycling each valve quarterly in accordance with the Vermont Yankee Inservice Inspection Program. This revision complies with the NRC staff's Model Technical Specifications requirements of paragraphs 4.1.3.1.la and 4.1.3.1.lb, respectively. o Page 22, Table 4.1.1 of the Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications does not meet the surveillance requirements for reactor protection system SDV limit switches of the NRC staff's Model Technical Specifications, paragraph 4.3.1.1 and Table 4.3.1.1-1, which require ' the Channel Functional Test monthly for SDV water level-high, not every 3 months'. However, the Licensee is installing a second instrument volume containing four additional limit switches, for a. total of eight limit switches for the reactor protection system. This increases significantly the reliability of the system and provides techincal bases for acceptance of the Channel Functional Test every 3 months as required in the present Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications. o There is a discrepancy between the Vermont Yankee Technical Specifications requirements (page 47, Table 3.2.5) and the actual . Vermont Yankee SDV system in regard to control rod withdrawal block instrumentation. The specifications call for two trip systems; the actual Vermont Yankee SDV system has only one trip system with one inctrument channel containing one limit switch for control rod A branklin Research Center ^ % w m rmne. wwu. ~-

e TER-C5506-64 -withdrawal block. To eliminate the above discrepancy, the Licensee agreed to incorporate the following note or its equivalent concerning page 47, Table 3.2.5, for Function, Scram Discharge Volume Water Level-Bigh: " Note (1) is not applicable to this function. There shall be one l = operable or operating trip system for this function." i l o The remaining surveillance requirements are met by pages 19 (Table 3.1.1), 25 (Table 4.1.2), 59 (Table 4.2.5), and 72 without any revision and page 47 (Table 3.2.5) with revision as indicated above. e e e O e e e. e 4 O A 000hranklin Research Center A Ohemen of The FrenMn inethsee

Table 5-1 Evaluation of Phase 1 Proposed Technical Specifications Changes for Scram Discharge Volume Long-Term Hodifications Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station .g

e. 3 N%

Technical Specifications $y NRC Staff Model Proposed by fn Surveillance Requirements (Paragraph) Licensee Evaluation k 14 SDV DRAIN AND VENT VALVES Verity each valve open Once per 31 days Once per month Acceptable (4.1. 3.1. la) (See page 14 of this TER) Cycle each valve one Once per 31 days Quarterly Acceptable ,y complete cycle (4.1. 3.1. lb) (See page 14 of I this TER) REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM SDV LIMIT SWITCHES i Minimum operable channels 2 2 Acceptable per trip system (3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1) (p.19, Table 3.1.1) SDV water level-high NA NA -Acceptable response time (3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-2). (p. 72, Scram Insertion Times) SDV water level-high e Channel functional test Monthly Every 3 months Acceptable. (3,1,1, Table 4.3.1.1-1 (p. 22, Table 4.1.1 o and page 18 of this TER) -and page 18 of this TER) m. Channel calibration Each refueling Each refueling Acceptable 1 (4.3.1.1, Table 4.3.1.1-1) (p. 25,_ Table 4.1.2) 9

Table 5-1 (Cont.) m Eis "g l a Technical Specifications gh NRC Staff Model Proposed by ym surveillance Requirements (Paragraph) Licensee Evaluation 'k CONTROL ROD BIDCK SDV LIMIT SWI'ECHES h Minimum operable channels per trip function SDV water. level-high 2 1 per 1 trip system Acceptable *. (3.3.6, Table 3.3.6-1) (p. 47, Table 3.2.5 with revision, see p. 20) l SDV scram trip bypassed 1 NA h (3.3.6, Table 3.3.6-1) (p. 47, Table 3.2.5) SDV water level-high Trip setpoint NA' .112 gallons Acceptable (3.3.6, Table 3.3.6-2) (p. 47, Table 3.2.5) Channel functional test Quarterly Every 3 months Acceptable (4.3.6, Table 4.3.6-1) (p. 59, Table 4.2.5) Channel calibration Each refueling Each refueling Acceptable (4.3.6, Table 4.3.6-1) (p. 59, Table 4.2.5) SDV scram trip bype.ased Channel functional test Monthly MA Acceptable * (4.3.6, Table 4.3.6-1) E R 1

  • See Reference 9, p. 50, and pp. 20 and 21 of this TER.

8 O 4 g

n i TER-C5506-64' 6. REFERENCES 1. " Degradation' of BWR Scram Discharge Volume Capability" NRC, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, June 12, 1980 IE Bulletin 80-14 2. D. G. Eisenhut (NRR) Letter "To All Operating Boiling Water. Reactors (BWRs)" with enclosure, "Model Technical Specifications" July 7, 1980 3. " Failure of 76 of 185 Control Rods to Fully Insert During a Scram at a.BWR" NRC, Office of Inepection and Enforcement, July 3, 1980 IE Bulletin 80-17 4. Supplement 1, " Failure of 76 of 185 Control Rods to Fully Insert During a Scram at a BWR" NRC, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, July 18, 1980 IE Bulletin 80-17 5. Supplement 2, " Failures Revealed by Testing Subsequent to Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR" NRC, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, July 22, 1980 IE Bulletin 80-17 6. Supplement 3, " Failure of Control Rocs to Insert During a Scram at a BWR" NRC, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, August 22, 1980 IE Bulletin 80-17 7. Supplement 4, " Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR" NRC, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, December 18, 1980 IE Bulletin 80-17 8. Supplement 5, " Failure of Control Rods to Insert During a Scram at a BWR" NRC, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, February 13, 1981 IE Bulletin 80-17 9. P. S. Check ('NRR) Memorandum with enclosure, " Generic Safety Evaluation Report BWR Scram Discharge System" December 1, 1980 10. P. S. Check (NRR) Memorandum with enclosure, "Staf f Report and Evaluation of -Supplement 4 to IE Bulletin 80-17" June 10, 1981 -2p ObFranklin Research Center A % et n rr. nun m.ou.

7 ~. .e. e TER-C5506-64 } APPENDIX A 1 NRC STAFF'S MODEL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

  • 4 f

Note: Applicable changes are marked by vertical lines in the margins. i ranklin Research Center A Ownen of The Fransen inenause

// \\ l* ~ 5 P-C5506-64 ' ~ f REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS I .s, e [f, LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (Continued) / i

l f

.r ACTION (Continued) c' 2. If the inoperable control rod (s) is inserted, within on[, hour j r disarm the associated directional control valves either: {,, 3) Electrically, or b) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves. 3. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours. With more than 8 control rods f r'topera11e, be in' at least H'OT SHUTDOWN /' c. within 12 hours. J SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS r ,e 4.1.3.1.1 The scram discharge volume drain and vent valves shall be sianonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 11 days by: J / f a. Verifying each valve to be open,* and / Cycling each valve through at least che compleke cycle of.,, full travel. b. ~ ^,/ 4.1.3.1.2 Vhen above the preset power livel of the RWM and RSCS, all withdrawn control rods not required to have their directional control valves disarmed electrically or hydraulically shall be demonstrated CPERABLE by moving each control rod at least one notch: p a. At least once per 7 days, and ['t b. At least once per 24 hours when any control rod is immovible as a resultofexcessivefrictionormechanicalinterference.} ,( 4.1.3.1.3 All control rods shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by eer'omance of / Surveillance Requirements 4.1. 3. 2, 4.1. 3. 4. 4.1:3. 5, 4.1. 3. 6 and 4. } p.7. .i "These valves may be closed intermitter,tly for' testing under administrative controls. ~ I ' r t <- ~ o / s. GE-STS 3/41-4

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a ^\\ a e i., = j't _ w 'I / 3 ') s f TER-C5506-64 i, ; REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS ~ [ I J J f CONTROL EOD M*.XIMUM SC UM INSED. TION TIMES s w< LIMITING 00NDIT10N FOR CPERATION 2.1. 3. 2 The stximum scrm insertion time of each centrol rod from the fully withdrawn position to r.otch position (5), based on de energization of the ., scru pilot valve solencids as tice :ero, shall not exceed (7.0) see:nds. 3 APPLICASILIH: CPEFATIONAL'CNDITICHS 1 and 2. ACT'Tt"!: Mth the maximum sc e:s insertion time cf.one or care control rods excaeding (7.,0) seconds: Declare the. c:ntrol red (s) with the slew insertion time incperable, a. 'y and b. Perform the Surveillance Requirements of Specificatter. 4.1.3.2.c at least on'ce per 50 days when :peration.is c!.ntinued with three or more c:nt.ol reds with maximum scram insertien ti=es in excess of (7.0) sec:nds, er s _, c. Se in at least HOT SHUT 00VN within 12 hours. CURVEILLANCE REOUIREv.ENTS ') / / t 1. 3.2 The maximum scram insertien time of the c=ntrol rods shall be dec:n-strataC thr:ugn =easure:ent with reacter cc:lant pressure greater than or equal rf, c53 psig and, curing single c:ntr:1 r:d scram ti=e tests, t*e centrol red (,ive pumps. isolated fr:c the ac:umulat:rs: N a. For all centrol r:ds prior t'o THE?."AL POWER exceeding aC% of RATED THE??AL POWER following CORE ALTE?ATIONS or after a reacter shutd:vn that is greatar than 120 days, 7 h. For specifically affected individual c:ntrol reds fo11cwing caintenance on or codificatien to the cent c1 red er c:ntrol r:d drive system / ~ Maich could affect the scram insertion time of those specific c:ntre) -{~ rods, and Fer 1C% of the control reds, en a rotating basis, at least once per c. / 120 days of operation. e j' v ~ GE-STS 3/4 1-5 ' A A-2 Ubbhrank!!n Research Center '/ A Dmse of The Fra.Wm bauute ~ i 1 ( ~

e. l TER-C5506-64 3/4.3 INS 7.LHENTATION 3/1.3.1 REAC OR PROTECTION SYSTE* INSTRUMENTATION Lt.wi Il[3 CONDITION FOR 0?! RATION

3. 3.1 As a minicu=, the react:r protection system instru entation channels sh:<n in Tcle 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERASLE with the REACTOR PROTECTION SYST~cd P.E3?CNSE TIME as shown in Table 3.3.1-2.

APPLICABILITY: As shown in Tabl4 3.3.1-1. /-C ICN: a. Vith the nu=be'r of CPERAELE channels less than required by the Minimum CPE?JBLE Channels per Trip System requirament for one trip system, place at least ene inoperable channel in the tripped c:ndition within one hour. -l c. Vith the nu=ber of OPERA 3LE channels less than required by the Minimum CPERAELE Channels per Trip System requirement fo'r both. trip systems, place at least ene inoperable channel in at least ene trio system" in the tri;;ed c:ndition within one hour and take the ACTICH required by Tele 3.3.1-1. c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable in OPERATICNAL CONDITION 5. T.'7VEILLANCE REOUIREuENTS 4.3.1.1 Each react:r pr:tection system instrumentation channel shall be dL :..strated CPERABLE by the perfemance of the CF.ANNEL C4ECX, CHANNEL T1.DtCTICNAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIERATION :perations for the OPE *.ATICNAL CCNOITIONS and at tae frequencies shown in Tele 4.3.1.1-1. 4.3.1.2 LOGIC SYSTEM FUNCTIONAL TESTS and si=ulated aut==atic operation of a.11 channels shall be perfomed at least once per 18 months. 4.3.1.3 The REACTOR PROTECTICN SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each react:r trip function sh wn in Ta.ble 3.3.1-2 shall be ds=onstrated te be within its limit at least enca per 13 mnths. Each test shall include at least ene logic train such that both logic trains are tested at least :nce per 35 =enth.: and one channel per function such that all channels are tas ad at least once every N ti=es 13 e.:nths where N is the t:tal nu=ber of redundant channels in a,. speetiic react:r trip functicn. of :: n enanne)s are inoperable in one trip rystas, select at least one ^ in:terable enannel in that trip system to place in the tripped c:ndition, t:ce;t >< hen this w:uld cause the Trip Functica : eccur. i. 3E-573 3/4 3-1 000 Franklin Research Center A Cheeson of The Fm insoeute

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TER-C5506-64 TtSLE 3.?.1-1 (Continued) ?.Es. 0 FROTECTION SYSTEM INSTRUFENTATICM ACTION 1.CTI:H 1 In 07ERATICSAL CONDITION 2, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours. . In OPERATICNAL CCHDITION 5, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTE?.ATIONS* and fully insert all insertable control rods within ore hour. ACTION 2 Lock the reec.or mode switch in the Shutdown position within one tour. ACUCN 3 Be 1: at laas STARTUP within 2 hours. ACTION 4 In 0: ERA IGNE CONDITION 1 or 2, be in at least HDT SHUTDOWN I within 6 heun. In 0? ERA"'ICMAL CONDITION 5, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTE4TI NS* and fully insert all insertable control rods within ore hear. 1:~ ION 5 Se 1: at least HOT SHUTDOWN within 6 hours. A: TION 6 Se h STMTU? vith the caia staan ifne isolation valves closed within 2 hours or in at least HOT SHUTDOVN within S hours. kCU:N7 Initiate a re uction in THEK"AL POWER within 15 minutas and reda:e ::t.ine first stage pressure to < (250) psig, equivalent to THE*NL PC4*ER Tess than (30)% of EATED THERMAL POWER, within 2 he:rs.. AOTION S In 0?EFFIOSA*.' CONDITION 1 or 2, he in at least l'DT SHUTD0'N within 6 hcurs. In 0?E EIGNAL CONDITION 3 or 4, verify all insertabie c:ntrol rods to te fully inserted wit (in one hour. In 0?E2.A ICHAL CCHDITION 5, suspend all cperations involving CORE ALTIRATIONS* and fully insert all insertable control rcds within ore hoar. A~TICH 9 In OPERATIONR CCHDITION 1 or 2, he in at least NOT SHUT 00nw within 5 hours. In 0?ERATIGNE CONDITION 3 or 4, loch, the reactor mode switch in the Stut.de.n position within one hour. In 0?E:.ATIONAL COXDITION 5, suspend all cperations involving CORE ALTERTIONS* and fully insert til insertable control rods within e e h::r.

  • i.x:a:t covement of 1 f., S??. or special covable detectors, or replacement of LF ?.d strings provided !??. i:strtmentation is 0?!?.A3LE per Specificatica 3.9.2.

IE-E5 3/43-4 A-5 000 er.nwiin Research center A DMoon of The Frenten Insttute

TER-CS506-64 TABLE 3.3.1-1 (Continued) F.EACTOR-PF.0TECTION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TABLE NOTATIONS (a) A channel may be placed in an inoperable status for up to 2 hours for requi.ed surveillan:e without placing:the trip system in the tripped condition ~ provide-d at least one OPERABLE chanc.et in the same trip system is monitoring that pa'rameter. b) The " shorting links' shall be removed from the RPS circuitry prior to and during the tice any control red is withdrawn" and shutdown =argin demonstrations performed per Specification 3.10.3. (c) An APFJi channel is ineparable if there are less than 2 LPhi inputs per level or less than (11) LPRM inputs to an APPdi channel. (d) These fEr.ctions are not required to be OPERA 3LE whe.n the reactor pressure vessel head is urbeited or removed per Specification 3.10.1. e (e) This fur.ction shall be autematically by;assed when the reactor meda. switch-is not in the Run p:sition. (f) This function is not required to be OPERA 3Li when PRIMARY CONTAINME!ff INTEGRITY is not required. (g) Also actuates the stancy gas treatment systa=. (h) Vith any centrol red withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods remcved per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2. (i) These fur.cticas are aute:atically bypassed when tu-5ine first stage pressure is < (250) psis, equivalent to THE??.AL PCWER less than (30)% of RATED THEPy.AL FCT.'ER. (j) Also actuates the ' EOC-RPT system. "Not requitec f or cc..t-o1 rods recoved per Specificati n 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2. a GE-STS. 3/4 3-5 000 Franklin Research Center A Dhesion of The Frenidn insatute

TER=C5506-64 4 9 -= oC. . C c3 b 4 f== 342 g eu-4 -n EE. r. =, w nn nnn n n mO em eme e .3 e

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    • 4== E

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  • me b

C a.4=X4 en in J =J ed 4 & a a f. W W Gd C tr8 te OC4 O O. b 3 O C3 b in a C4O "3 4 =d WOh ed U U== I= Of 30 & C E SO W =d O O l= U &.b 3. x 0 E"u c. E O >= 4 b & d en O C

  • > * > P. 4 U en 4 (J ** = U

== == 8 1 o M ad 0 - =8 = 8. O b b =d.c = '330 3 C J h L 0 '3 > 4 :t h O O to a b' Q U 3 & G = 0 0==== CA C = & O== '3 0-= E ::". - C Z W W e= d J s 4 ed =d 4 E e= = - =d 4 Cb 3 "3 C4&QUU U CC 4.O 4 >6 U = 4== - 9. b - s = es C O ed ea C L. b U .G# e 4

0 '". b in E=== 3 .o C O O "3 4 I= u 3 -44 <mmuaa E E = m u m i-- - ce = =d E- = P= 3 O. O ad 4 U c b >= c c 0

%,w=

= .o -~ 4 . = m a n 4-m o r-e c - id.. u II.75 3/4 3-6 b Franklin Research Center A Dhteson of The Fransen m

Es. E= ' '2 ~ a gh TABLE 4.3.1.1-1(Continued) N SI 'J. REACTOR PROTECTI0ll SYSTEll Ill5TRUMENTAT10ll SURVEILLAllCE REQUlilEHElifS

ig -

CilAHilEL

OPERAT10NAL Io CilAllllEL fullCTioilAL CllAllNEL COHOITIolls IN 1011C11.

Eh TUllCTI0llAL UillT CllECK TEST CAllHI:ATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED-1 8. Scrara Discharga Volume ifater . 3 ~ Level - liigli 11 4 il R-1, 2, 5 9. Turbine Stop Valvo - Closure llA H H I

10. Turbine Control Valve fast Closure Trip 011 Pressure - tow HA H

4 1 ]

11. Reactor flode Switch in y

Shutdown Position llA R llA 1,2,3,4,5 ao

12. llanual Scram IIA H

liA '1,2,3,4,-5 i (a) lieutron detectors may*be excluded-from CllAHilEL CAL 10 RAT 10N. (b) 1(Ithin 24 hours prior to startui, if not performed within the previous 7 days. f, (c) The IRH and SRil channels shall e deteralnnd to overlap for at least ( ) decades during each startup and the 11111 and APR:t channels shall be determined to overlap for at Icast'( ) decades 3 during each controlleil shutdown, if not performed within the previous 7 days. (d).This calibration shall consist of the adjustment of the april channel to conform to the power values j. calculated by a heat balance during OPERATI0ilAL CONDITION 1 when TilERHAL POWER > 25% of RATED lilElulAL POWER, Adjust the APHil channel if the absolute difference greater than~2%. Any APRM channel gain adjustment.made in compliance with Specification 3.2.2 shall not be included in determining the absolute difference. (e) 1hh callbration shall consist of the adjustment of the APRH rendout to conform to a calibrated finw signal. (f) The LPluis shall be calibrated at Icast once per 1000 effective full power hours (EfPil) using the TIP system, 13 Y Pn iy )

  • e, l

I e

TER-C5506-64

  • W37RUw:NTATION J 'a. 3. 6 C0h* TROL RCD WITriDRAVAL ELOCK INSTRLHE5"TATION L*w TING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
3. 3. 5.

The control rod withdrawal block instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.5e1 shall be OPERAELE wi.h their trip setpoints set consistent with .r.e values sh:wn in the Trip setpoint column of Table 3.3.6-2. A:?LICARILITY: As shewn in Table 3.3.-6-1. A TION: With a control rod withdrawal block instrumentation channel trip a. satpoint less conservative than the value shown in the A11cwable Values chlumn of Table 3.3.6-2, declare the channel inoperable until the channel is restored to CPERABLE status with its trip setpoint adjusted c:nsistent with the Trip Setpoint value. b. With the number of OPERAELE channel,s Jess than required by the Mtnit:u: OPERABLE Channels per Trip Function, requirement, take the ACTIO:i r Kuired by Table 3.3.6-b The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are n:t applicalila in CPERA-c, TICHAL CONDITION 5. I'.:.VEILLtNCE REOUIREMENTS

4. 3. 5 Each of the above required control rod withdrawal block trip systems ar.d instrumentation chahnels shall be demonstrated CPERA3LE by the perfctmance
f :ne CHANNEL CHECX, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL. CALIERATION cpera-

-f =ns fer the OPERATIONAL CONDITICNS.and at the frequencies shown in Ta:1e 4.3.5-1. l- ~ t 31-ITS 3/4 3-30 m l nkHn Research Center A chesson of The Frennen besitute

o..

1Anl.E 3.3.6-1 m E CollT110L 1100 til11till!MlAL ULOCK lil5TRIAlfilTATI0li i. Q Hillifill!l APPLICADLE gg OPERADI.E CilAlulELS Ol'IRATI0llAl. s 5-TillP filllCil0li P[I! 1111P fullCTI0li Coll 0lTIolls ACTI0li 1. It00 Otoci; 110!!!T0!! ") I 0lE a. Upscale 2 la 60 li. Inoperative 2 la 60 c. Downscale 2 la 60 pp

  • k 2.

IPRI: a. finw litased $1mulated llicroal Power - lipscale ,4 1 . fil li. Inoperative 4 1, 2, 5 61 c. Ocunscale 4 1 61 d. licutron flux - Upscale, Startup - 4 2, 5 61 3. SullRCE IIAllGE 1101111 0:15 Y t' a. Dctcctor not full in(b) 3 2 61 5 2 5 61 3 2 61 L. Upscale (c) 2 5 Gi Inuperative(C} I c. sl. Downscale'O 2 4. tilI[It!!f 0! ATE ilAllGE 110!!!IORS e a.' llctector not full in (c) 6 2, 5 61 la. tipscale 6 2, 5 61 '"operall 6 5 2, 5 61 Downscale{g) c. 6 2, 5 61 d. 5. SCllAll 015CllAflGE V0tUIiE a. 11ater f.evel-lil0h 2 1, 2, 58* 62 Is. Scram Trip flypasseil 1 1, 2, 5** 62 @[ 6. IIEAC10ft C001 AllI SYSlll! HECIRCUt ATlall fl0W ~ a. Lipscalo 2 1 62 62 R h. Inoperative 2 1 i. c. (Coinparator) (Downscale) 2 1 62

n.,....,. 2 ,..z..... g-4 - 4. TER-C5506-64 TABLE 3.3.5-1 (Continued) CONTROL ROD VITHOP.AVAL BLOCX INSTEU".ENTATION ACTION ~ A;T*ON 50 Take the ACTION required by Specificatica 3.1.4.3. A~T 3N 61 With the nu=ger of OPERA 3LE Channels: a. One less than required by the Mini =u:: OPEF.ABLE Channels per Trip function requitecent, restore the inoperable channel to CPERABLE status within 7 days er place the inoperable channel in the tripped c:ndition within the next. hour.

b. " Two.or more less than required by the Mini =us CPERASLE Channels per Trip Function recuirement, place at least one inoperable channel in the tripped c:ndition within one hour.

~ Vith the number of CPERAELE channels "less than required by the A*E 'H 52 Minicus OPERAELE Channels fer Trip Function requirement, place the inoperable channel in the tripped c:ncition within ene hour. NOTES ~ ~ Wita THETd'AL PCVER ?, (20)% of RATED THEPJ'AL PCVER. With :: ore than ene centrol red withdrawn. Not applicable to control rods ree:ved per Specification 3.9.10.1 cr 3.9.10.2. The REM shall b'e att matica11y bypassed when a ;eripheral c:ntrol red is a. selected. 5. This ft. een shall be aut matica11y bydessed if detect:r count rata is 100 c.ss or the ITdi channels are on range (2) or higher. 5 c. This function shall be automatically bypassed wnen the associated IFJi cnar.nels are on range 8 or higher. d. This function shall be eutematically bypassed when the 17d4 channals are en range 3 or higher. This function shall be aute=atically bypassed when the IPJi channels ire e.

n range 1.

31-i 3 3/a 3-52 A-11 000 erenwiin aesearch cente, A cm n w n. rr an man. // M

o TER-C5506-64 a 6 .M -E W. w' g . M.g - g' W A ' *= m 'J' I - =J W e-et 92 O e e. &q g E u." u C cr. e. 4 E w u - e O 8 N. w w = .m -m =

>

4 W e >= .?

  • =

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  • dr.

A A O da% O 3s + 4 .h O .O e N ^ 4 b 1 6"b m y h.= s m ' W h L. J 3 0 3 O c= 4 h*l CB ..== U >= = M W N N N M UU Z 43 M U Me A X O ^ G CL N" O t

s. we 3:
c..

c. A ^ es* ^ E Q r*) r*3 US N r"t m [ o w o w w w w w w w w h _. t a v4 i vLi vi Evd E v& 4i v4 v& vi vs c3 C ~ .o. = &v

== uc >= M C,is .C .= = m = m m = 2' 23:l 3 o o o .C eu c. c. u .,cs W, J d 93 0 U M ng .N u - u e a 3 m E M W 4 we Q = M W u .O "3.s= g W W = we - c= .J -..y M. = = P= e es Le ret - 3d P= W >== 2 m 3'

c..==

== u M M Q h c= h 3 O ^ O ^ C:3 W we 3 e e W

== C w N W >==- 4 h h vn h "= ma w cl3 ee g= >= au-asl u o C o cm r.: w ec w ac tr. o . 3 .e,- C J ~ cr. cr. A ^ e-A o. c ey >= aC C + 9-4- &#3 6'1 e-og lR c. h h O O W N ^ W h

== <C >= 3 o 3 o CL u's et ag a w M u N N M U.ll1 H g m to

  • A us M ^

se c3 m .ir A e Q ^ N d'"* O N CO Q .C =d c. O h"3 N c - m w't ,O % we w o w w w

== w w we w w w 3 2 = s < e-vlz Al v t:il". Al vl ~ vl3 Al C vf3 Al vi< xa a O' v!n vi u C C O C C m s-- o a 4 .2 E aC =a J 6 ac u o G 3 0 = c:: U ^ 8= 3 >= M G h Z W W

  • ==

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=== C. m w c m wt >= t.M D= cl2 VI s=== O ". h >= C =t = x

== .a c a c c. C c ""l* lll3 0 3 = 0 C = 3 U m gi 6 er -- p-= rJ C aC C t.M S & >=* a a - e u. e.- Q >0 CC d.B -a vi o = -o e >- m 2 es - r3

  • J -

3. L .J - 6 .J - 2 CJ L aC a r3 Lo g GJ #3 #6

== b #3 C C =d IM Q C #3 6 8.iJ Q C #3 f5 $ JW -d C f3 6 Q W - :. u Cosuou e a - i-u >- a - i. u C - s. c 2 + ~ r3 y e 3 c .9 6 f3 U CD o .atll* u "J c we C.J LE C 4 cJ C. r = 2 o c. =, =4 2 e u =. = C w u c. 3 u u c. = m o r= u u =. a E u we o oC o 3 3 VI C".

  • e nO 3 C

d nO 3=

=d 6 we oo E. O o C. C O C O U CJ 2CO LJ U C. ; O C u CC C. C U U =.*

=

d 3== C 6 8-* C 3 W C O ** C C Q O "-* C 3'; m C 3== w C t c u c= >= r: c U ... = "'. 2 C w aC U

t. 3 4

i = C cr. 3 >= E

  • E*le.

C >= LJ I .= c C = .... u w = ,s.2 u .c e .o u 3 vi c.= u a m.= u c w c.m = .= u <C C. UA i .=,2, t = .N n =- n w [ j GE=STS 3/4 3=55 I A-12 b Franklin Research Center [ ^ cm an et m r,.,un in.ona.

puil I. 4. 4. to-i ,,l CHillNGL INNI WililllNAWAhl0CX lH5lN14llillAllDji SullVI til AllCE kl40lllllitill5 l fS CllAllfirl DPERAilDilAL gh CilAllll[L [UllCllilllAL CllAllllEL C01101110815 lit lAllCll g) p:a 1Hir fl#tCilull Clit CK 1[51 CAllililAIloll SURVEILLAllCE il[ QUIRED l. lifMI DIDCK linill10R i ~ II 5/U 'I,H Q la a. Upscs.3 11 4 h. Inoperativo ilA 5/U .It ilA 1* g c. Downscale 114 5/U di Q l' 2. Al'Ril a. Flow Diaseel Simulated Tinraal 5/U,).H Q 1 gi Power - Upscale NA I h. Inoperative 114 5/U 11 NA 1, 2, 5 c. Downscale llA 5/U H N e d. ficutron Flux - Upscale, Startup isA 5/U(h)'M q 2, 5 f [,', 3. '00RCE IIAllGE 1101111 0115 5/ujj, {*c} HA 2, 5 ?- a. petector not tull in llA h. Descale IIA 5/u,). (c) Q 2, 5 gi c. Inoperative ilA 5/U ilA 2, 5 5/u,), (c) 4 2, 5 gg d. Downscale 11 4 1. lillEHilfillAlE RAllGE HDillTORS i

a.. lietector not full in llA
  • 5/U HA 2, S' i

h. Upscain MA 5/U Q 2, 5 ,. 5/U(gg,)', (c) h c, Inoperative llA II4 2, 5 d. Downscale 11 4 1~S/U ) gg) q 2, 5 5. SCRAll DISCllARGE VOLi#tE a. Water Level-lllDh. HA Q R - 1, 2, 54* ~ h. Scram Trip nypassed 11 4 11 N4 1, 2, 5** N 6. It[AC10ll C00l Alif SYST[H RECIRClllATinil FIDW ~ Y 5/uy'j,H .. upscale HA Q i 0 l h. Innparative llA 5/U ' 11 4 1 i c. (Comparator)(Downscale) 11 4 5/Ugg),H ,H q 1 t .m" 1 g

= . TER-C5506-64 E'.E 4.3. 5-1 (Continued) CONTROL RCD s.'ITH3RAVAL ELOCK INSTRUMEhTATICH SURVEILU.NCE REOUIREMEhT5 . NOTES: a. Neutron detect:rs esy be e.xcluded ft:m CHANNEL CALIERATION. b. Within 24 hours prior to startup, if not performed within the' previous 7 days. c. Vhen making an enscheduled change fr:m CPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 to CPERATIONAL CCNDITION 2, perfor= the required surveillance within 12 hours e.fter entering CPERATIONAL CONDITION 2. Wit $ THERMAL POWER > (20)% of RATED THERMAL PCWER. With any centrol rod withdrawn. Not t;plicable to c:ntrol reds removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.S.10.2. e b 05-573 3/A 2-55 00b Franklin Research Center A DMseon of The Fe insatute =

f-w l, TER-C5506-64 APPENDIX B VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER CORPORATION LETTER OF OCTOBER 14, 1980 AND SUBMITTAL WITH PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGES FOR VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION e b 4 ~ ~. - -

TER-C5506-64 REGULATORY INFOR5ATIdN DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS) I ACCESSION NSR 6010,210336 00C.DATE: 80/10/14 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET s I .FACIL:50-271 vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Vermont.Yancee 050002T1 AUTM.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION

  • SMITH,R.L.

Vermont Yantee Nuclear, Power Co.rs. RECIP.NAME

  • RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Ofrec' tor

SUBJECT:

Resoonds to NRC 600707 lte requesting scram disenarge vol Tech Saec cnanges.Util agrees tnat vent & crain valves ce verified open sin of once per month. Requirement for control cod clock on nign water level scram eysass not Justified. DISTRIduTION CODE: A0015 COPIES HECEIVED:LTR

l. ENCL _k SIZE: d TITLE: General Distrioution for after Issuance of Goerating License NOTES:

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE /NAAE LTTR ENCL ID CODE /NAME LTTR ENCL ACTION: IPPOLITO,T. O t* 13 til IN Tear. AL: 0/01R,9UM FAC08 1 I&E 06 2 E NRC PO4 02 L OELD 11 1 0 GR ASSESS dR 10 1 REG FILE 01 1 1 EXTERf,AL: ACRS 01 lb (" LPOR 03 L 14 ~ NSIC 05 L M s O TOTA. NuM6ER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 38 ENCL [ B-1 00 Franklin Research Center A DMemn of The FrerMn trename

TER-C5506-64 VER>lONT YAN REE NUCLE tR POWER CORPORATION SEVENTY SEVEN GROVC STRECT 3,3,2,1 RuTt.Aso, VERMONT 05701-WY 80-146 maphy Ton ENGINEERING CFFICE TURNPiKC RO AD wEsTsoRo. u AssAcNusETTs o s s a: TELEPeto pe t487 348-9419 October 14, 1980 United States Nuclear Regulatory Cecmission Washington, DC 20555 Attention: Office of Nuclear Reacter Regulatica

References:

(a) License No. DPR-28 (Docket No. 50-271) (b) Letter D. G. Eisenhut to All Operating Boiling Water Reacters, dated.bly 7,1980 Subjecti Response to ! RC Request for Scram Discharge Volume Technical Specification Changes s

Dear Sir:

~ ~ Reference (b) requested that Vermont Yankee amend. the statier: Technical Specifications with respect to control rod drive scram discharge volume (SDV) capability. Guidance was given in the form of model standardized technical specifications (STS) which provided increased surveillance requirements for SDV vent and drain valves and LCO/ surveillance requirements for RFS and Control Rod Block SDIV limit switches. Verment Yankee has reviewed the proposed amendment with respect to our facility and our current technical specifications. Cur positions on the NRC proposals are listed below. 1) Operability of SDV Vent and Drain Valves Model STS . Would require the subject valves to be tested and timed: a) after every shutdown of greater than 120 days b) 'every 120 days ducihg normal operation Model STS would also require that the SDV vent and drain valves be verified open at least once per 31 days. Vermont Yankee The subject valves at Vermont Yankee are tested and timed Position in accordance with the Vermont Yankee Inservice Inspection Program. The program requires that this testing be done quarterly and is therefore more conservative than the change proposed by the NRC. ( Ver=ont Yankee agrees with the position that the vent and. drain valves be verified open at least once per month. This requirement will be administratively \\ enforced until such time as this minor change can be included in another proposed change submittal. 801021o 3 3 6 g A B-2 00bhranklin Research ( 'nter A Dewson of The Franklin inst wie I

v TER-C5506-64 ,U.{., Nuclear Regulatory Commission October 14, 1980 Atta. Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Page 2' 2) Surveillance Requirements for SDIV High' Water Level Scram Model STS Would require: a) channel functional tes : every 31 days b) channel calibration av try 18 months Vermont Yankee Current Technical Specification requires a) channel hnetional test every 3 months Position b) ohannel calibration every refueling (12 months) Vermont Yankee believes that the testing interval for this trip should not be reduced for the following - reasons:

1) Calibration is done concurrent with the functional test on a quarterly basis. Past functional testing of this trip has been highly successful with no instances of failed SDIV level switches due in any part to float assembly misoperation.
2) Tripling the frequency of functional testing in this area would unnecessarily increase personnel exposure.

3) Technical Specification Requirement for Control Rod Block on SDIY Eigh Water Level Scram Bypass Model.STS Contains requirement for this red block function to be operable when the mode switch is in Run, Startup/ Hot Standby, or Shutdown or Refuel. Associated testing and calibration requirements are also provided. Vermont Yankee Vermont Yankee does not feel that this requirement is Position justified for the following reasons:

1) Plant design at Vermont Yankee coes not allow the SDIV high water level scram to be bypassed unless the mode switch is in the shutdown or refuel position.

In these modes, a low power rod block is concurrently provided by the IRM system as well as by the high, level scram bypass switch.

2) At Vermont Yankee the,,SDIV rod block can only be reset by draining *the SDIV to a point below the 12 gallon control red block setpoint. This assures that during the period of time that the SDIV high water

~ level trip is bypassed to allow draining of the SDIV a rod block is present until the water level drops below the rod block setpoint. We trust the information presented above is satisfactory; however, should

  • you have any questions, please feel free to contact us.

a Very tnaly yours, VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR PCWER CORPORATION /** R. L. Smit Licensing Engineer A Dhtman of The Franhan inausute i .m - ..}}

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