ML20066B399
| ML20066B399 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Arkansas Nuclear  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1990 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20066B375 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9101070114 | |
| Download: ML20066B399 (3) | |
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE Of NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED T0,, AMENDMENT NO.112 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-6 ENTERGY OPERATIONS. INC_._,
-ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE, UNIT NO. 2 DOCKET NO. 50-368 INTRODUCTION Dy letter cated October 9, 1990, Entergy Operations, Inc. (the licensee) requested an emendosent to the Technical Specificaticos (TSs) appendeo to facility Operating Licensn No. NPF-6 for Arkansas huclear One, Unit No. 2 (ANO-2). The proposed arendment woulo revise ANO-2 TS Table 3.6-1 to delete the exclusion of containment isolation check valves from Type C leakege tests, inspection Report 50-313/88-47, 50-368/88-47, and a clarification of notice of violation 313/8847-05, which the NRC staff provided in a letter dated June 22, 1990, identified inside containment isolation check valves that had not-been Type C (local leak rate) tested, whereas Appenoix J to 10 CFR Part 50 requires such testing. The propc ed amendment to TS Table 3.6-1 deletes the # sign from the check valves listed in the table. This f cign annotates the valves as
- not subject to Type C leakage tests.*
EVALUATION Section 11.H. of Appendix 0 states, in part, that CIVs in the following category shall be Type C tested:
"2.
Are required to close automatically upon receipt of a containment isolation signal in response to controls intended to effect containment isolation;"
The staff's position is that the check valves listed in Table 3.6-1 of the TSs o
l fall into this category. This is supported by the following two points.
First, check valves that are CIVs are considered to be automatic CIVs. CDCs 55 and 56 state that a containment penetration riormally must have two CIVs, l-one insice and one outsice containment, and each must be either a locked closed
-or an automatic isolation valve.
It is further stated that, "A simple check valve may not be used as the autoraatic isolation valve outside containment."
l This implies that a check valve irside containment is an-automatic isolation valve. This is stated explicitly ~ in Regulatory Guide 1.141, " Containment I
Isc16 tion Provisions for Fluid Systems," April 1978, which endorses the following definition in ANSI N271-1976/ANS-56.2, ' Containment Isolation Previsiuns for fluid Systems":
9101070114 901201 PDR ADOCK 05000360 P
2 automatic is016 tion valve. A valve whute closurt: is initiated Fy7teratic means~ Nut any action t,y a plant operator upon rcceipt of an iscistion signhi f rcn. e protection system; ~or a siriple or posi_t_1u _ ec tino check ve h e.
(er.phesis added)
Second, the chtcl vehed listed in Table 3.6-1 ere the equivalent of vtives
" required to close autcmetically upon receipt of a contoirrent itolation signol in response to controls inter.deo to effect containment isolation * (to quote Appendiy J). The definition f rom AliS1 Id71 atove implies this equivalence.
3 Also, the Appendix J ostinition quoted stee is, in essence, the definition of m
an autom6 tic containment isoletion valve, which cifferentiates it from other types of iseltticn valves or selves which isolete on some other signal.
For example, although a Pain Steem is016 tion Volve (MSIV) in e pWR is a CIV which receives several automatic closun signals (such as sittu line pressbre-negative rate-high), the signols are not necesserily containroent isolation signals, eno the h51Vs are considered to be remote-nianuti CIVs in accordance with GDC $7. The in+ortent tector to consider is the function of the vbive, if the veht:5 were a diff erent Lind of automatic isolation valve, other than check v61ves, they would cleerly require Type C testing. 1he there fact that a check valve was used insteac 01, soy on air-operated gate valve should not alter the testing nquirement, in general, it ont; CIV in a penetration n.ust bi. Type C tested, the logico11y the other CIV should b. Type C tested. They ere reouncont t'errier; to leeLage through a single potential containn.ent otmosphere le6L path.
Casec on the above, the steff's positiori is that check volu s ere not excluded f roni Type C testing merely t+cause they cannot receive a contairnent isolation signol.
The design function of the check vehe should be considered to deter-ruine whether the chtck valve is cavivalent to 6 velve described in ll.H.? cf Appendix J.
It shoulo further be noted, however, th61 the ANO Unit 2 Technical Specifica-tions currently state that certain check vehes listed in TS Table 3.0-1 are not requind to be Type C testtd. This is apparently consistent with the review done for Unit ? ct the tine et issuance of the origine.1 operating license.
Nevertheless, the staf f finds that the proposed amendnient to delete the exception to Type C testing for containnient isolation check valves correctly reflects Appendix J requirernents.
Therefore, the staff finds this chargt to T! Table 3.0-1 to be acceptable.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION The amendment inschts a change in a recuirement with respect to the instella-tior or use of a f acility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR part 20 and cheroes in surveillance requirements.
The staff has determined thut the amendment involves no siprificant increase in the en.ounts, and no sigr.ificant change in the types, of any cf fluents that may be nieosec cffsite, and thot there is no significant increase in incivioual or
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cuncletive occupational radiatica exposures.
The Connission has previously issued 6 proposed finding that the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding.
Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forthin10CFRSection51.22(c)(9).
Pursuantto10CFR51.22(b),noenvironmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuonce of the amendment.
CONCLUSION The staff has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurante that the health and safety of the will not be endangered by operation in the proposed marner, and (2) public such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the conmon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated: December 31, 1990 Principal Contributors:
J. Pulsipher S. Peterson
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