ML20065T367
| ML20065T367 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 10/05/1982 |
| From: | Conn W BURNS & ROE CO. |
| To: | Engelken R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| REF-PT21-82-727-000 82-06, 82-6, BRGO-RO-82-009, BRGO-RO-82-9, PT21, PT21-82-727, PT21-82-727-000, NUDOCS 8211020351 | |
| Download: ML20065T367 (2) | |
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Subject Work Order 3900-4000 Washington Public Power Supply System Main office Supply System Nuclear Project 2 550 Kinderkamack Road 10CFR21 Reportable Condition #82-06 oradell. New Jersey 07649 Remote Shutdown Panel (201)265-2000 Responds to: NA yo -M l October 5, 1902 BRGO-RO-82-009 Response Required: NA Mr. R. H. Engelken U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, California 94596
Dear Mr. Engelken:
This letter provides a revised report on the subject reportable condition. The only change from our previous report is the addition of reference to other facilities.
If you have any additional questions, please contact either A. T. Luksic (509) 943-8243 or G. W. Brastad (509) 943-8242.
Very truly yours, d
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flu W. G. Conn Licensing Group Supervisor WGC:ATL:jk Attachment cc:
B. A. Holmberg - SS R. T. Johnson - SS J. G. Tellefson - SS L. C. Floyd - SS L. LeBlanc - Bechtel B211020351 821005 l
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-\\,s REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL (82-06)
Description of Deficiency GE design criteria (22A3085, Sec. 4.1) states that "the remote shutdown system shall be designed to control the required shutdown systems from outside the control room irrespective of shorts, opens, or grounds in control circuits (in the control room)" which we have committed to in the FSAR (Sec. 7.4.1.4.b).
The remote shutdown panel controls loop B of the standby service water (SSW).
During a Human Factors Engineering Review, it was discovered that there did not exist any controls on the remote shutdown panel to operate valve SW-PCV-38B. During a subsequent review, it was further discovered that the Supervisory Control Panel CS-2, which controls valves SW-V-2B, SW-V-12B and SW-V-69B, received its power from the control room.
Both of these conditions made the system dependent on the control room which is a violation of the design criteria for the system.
Date and Method of Discovery The condition that the control for valve SW-PCV-38B was not on the remote shutdown panel was noted during a Human Factors Engineering Review and documented on July 21, 1982 on an internal memorandum (EMR-82-ll43).
It was determined to be reportable by Barns and Roe on August 19, 1982.
Analysis of Safety Implication If the control room is evacuated, and it becomes necessary to bring the reactor to cold shutdown, the spray ponds may not be available.
Reactor decay heat would be dumped to the suppression pool which ultimately lead to overoressurization of the crimary containment.
Corrective Action The design of the remote shutdown panel has been reviewed and no other deficiencies have been identified.
Control switches for SW-PCV-38B will be located on the remote shutdown panel and power to the supervisory panel will be supplied from outside the control room.
Other Facilities Affected None known.
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