ML20065Q600

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Notifies That Potential for Criminality Found Re Region 4 Investigation Resulting from W Ward 801202 Memo Conerning Facility
ML20065Q600
Person / Time
Site: 05000000, Brunswick
Issue date: 12/03/1980
From: Fortuna R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR (OIA)
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR (OIA)
Shared Package
ML20064E577 List:
References
FOIA-82-389 NUDOCS 8210280047
Download: ML20065Q600 (1)
v • d • e


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:' ( December 3, 1980 MEMORANDUM FOR: File FROM: Roger A. Fortuna', A/D for Investigations Office of Inspector and Auditor

SUBJECT:

I spoke with Robert Marsh, Investigator, Region IV, on November 28, 1980. Marsh gave me a brief overview of the Brunswick matter discussed in William Ward's December 2,1980 memorandum. In short, there now appears to be a potential for criminality. In view of IE's limited effort to date and their continuing interest in the matter from a public health and safety perspective, it is appropriate for the Region to continue pursuing the matter and when the issues and facts are more clearly developed (i.e., in writing) that the matter be submitted to 0IA for our review and possible referral to Justice. Of course, I advised Marsh that if there were any significant developments pointing more clearly to criminality, that OIA be immediately advised. I B210280047 820917 PDR FOIA MCINNIS82-389 PDR

m%g s fg UNITED STATES b D NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION - l, ig' ;j n WASHINGTc N, D. C. 20555 yO1 s s%... < *;d Cf q ~ C ~ e-FEB 121981 eW6 Docket No. 50-261 De MEMORANDUM FOR: E. L. Jordan, Deputy Director Division of Resident and Regional Reactor Inspection, IE THRU: W. R. Mills, Acting Section Chief, Events Evaluation Section, Reactor Engineering Branch, DRRRI, IE FROM: H. W. Woods, Reactor Systems Specialist, Events Evaluation Section, Reactor Engineering Branch, DRRRI, IE

SUBJECT:

H. B. ROBINSON EVENT ON JANUARY 29, 1981 1. _ Description of Event Early on January 29, 1981, the plant was having problems with the hydraulic pumps on the turbine Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) system. One pump had significant vibrations when in service, and the other had a significant oil leak through the shaf t seal. The operators were shifting back and forth between use of these two pumps while decreasing plant power as rapidly as possible so that the plant could be taken off-line and the EHC pumps fixed. At 0624 with turbine load at about 6%, the operators were shifting the EHC between those pumps when the second (last) generator output br'eaker was opened to separate the plant from the grid. This combination of transients produced a very quick oscillation of the governor valves which admitted a quick pulse of steam into the steamline, producing two momentary high steam flow signals. Since the primary system had already been cooled below the " low T average" setpoint, this produced a Safety Injection (SI) on coincidence of two out of three high steam flow - low T average signals: The plant tripped on "P7," i.e., first D stage pressure instantaneously indicated power greater than 10%, which will trip the plant unless the output breakers are closed. The SI signal existed long enough to pick up "B" train SI relays but not the corresponding "A" train relays. Observing the "B" pumps running but not "A" pumps, the operators manually initiated the "A" train SI. (NOTE: no actual injection occurred at this time since reactor pressure was around 2200 psig and shutoff head for the SI pumps at H. B. Robinson is about 1500 psig). grjg 21 @ At 0628, noting that pressuriz evel was at % and increasing and primary system pressure was at 2200 psig and steady, the operators reset [3 reactor-coolant pum s'were tripped. the SI. 6 '> /, o M () ~ Alz-

E. L. Jordan 2 FEB 121981 Continuing to recover from the plant trip and SI, at 0637 the plant operators ~ restored letdown (which is isolated on an SI) and stopped one charging pump. It is noted here that apparently no written procedure exists for recovery from an inadvertent SI; lacking such a procedure, the operator tried to restore letdown without resetting the air system that operates the let down isolation valves. Noting that letdown had not been restored, the operators realized the problem, went to a dif.ferent panel and reset the air system, and then restored letdown. Following restoration of letdown, the pressurizer level continued to increase but primary system pressure was decreasing, containment dewpoint increased from 85*F to 90*F, count rate in the containment went from 300 to 400 cpm, containment pressure increased from 0.12 psig to a maximum of 0.25 psig, and Heating-Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC) condensate alarms were received (all indicitive of a primary system leak into containment)., At 0645, the operators re-isolated letdown but primary system pressure continued to decrease, reaching 1715 psig at 0701 at which time a low pressure, automatic SI was initiated (but no water was injected since SI pump shutoff head is 1500 psig). At 0715, unsure what was causing the continued depres-surization with the letdown isolated (where the leak was suspected as all parameters except pressurizer pressure indicated the leak had been isolated) the operators isolated the charging line, stopped the "B" and "C" RCPs, and turned on the pressurizer backup heaters (previously only 900 PS of heaters had been on). These actions arrested the pressure decrease, and the reactor was restored in an orderly manner to normal hot shutdown pressure and temperature. Minimum subcooling during the event was 60 to 70*F, and minimum pressure was 1620 psig, above the SI pump shutoff head. No flow was ever indicated from the SI. At 0730, the 12" water level alarm in the keyway sump was received, indicating about 3000 gallons of water in containment. Sometime before 1400 the same day, the 15" alarm (s 6000 gallons) was received. These estimates of the water amounts are extremely rough because the curve showing water volume vs. level in the keyway ("incore" area) covers Ng'o and these measurements therefore are assuming less tha{n Irerror in the00,00,0) Curve. Later investigation revealed that there were several contributors to the above sequence of events. (1) Leakage from the primary system into containment was from a header j in the letdown system just downstream of the regenerative heat k'EQr i exchanger and the letdown orifices. This header had two leakage paths to the containment atmosphere. First, the 600-psig-setpoint relief valve on that header (which discharges to the pressurizer relief tank) had a failed bellows such that leakage past the stem went directly into containment. This was a minor leak compared to

E. L. Jordan 3 FEB iY 198J the second leak, which was from a 3/4" drain-line from the header with a manual valve (#204-C, normally closed) leading to a capped h7 pipe nipple. The valve was found to have a very loose packing so that it could easily be turned. and it was open "four or five turns." The cap was missing, there was a " dimple" in the concrete floor beneath the drain, and the last turn of threads on the drain nipple was stripped. The possibility of a pressure pulse or water hammer causing these failures was investigated, but no evidence (strip chart data, failed pipe hangers, abnormal valve line up due to lack of' a SI reset pro-cedure, etc.) has been found. The most likely explanation is that ~ vibrations from the positive displacement charging pump worked the #204-C valve open and the cap loose, and the transient of isolating and r'e-initiating letdown finally caused the cap to come off. The cause of the relief-valve bellows failure (a much smaller leak) is still being investigated by the licensee. The relief valve bellows has been replaced, the !204-C valve packing has been tightened, the valve closed and locked, other similar valves in the vicinity have been verified closed and their packings have been tightened, and the valve handwheels locked. The cap down-stream of the #204-C valve has been replaced and properly tightened. (2) Water collected in the keyway reached the 12" alarm level (s 3000 gal) f at Q715 January 29, 1981, and the 15" (4 6000 gal) alarm level sometime I O before 1400. Flow calculations for the open 3/4" drain line predicted 100 to 120 gpm under pressure conditions present in the letdown system. Since the letdown system was only un-isolated from 0637 to 0645, this would account for only around 960 gallons of the initial 3000. However, sump level at the start of the leak is not known, it is not known how much leakage came from the failed beilows (rate and time period both are unknown), the "3000" gallons associated with the 6" alarm is not an exact number, and in addition between 0645 (when letdown was isolated) and 0715 (when the 6" alarm was received) there was leakage past the air operated letdown isolation valve in the letdown system and out the drain, and there was an unknown amount of drainage from other parts of the letdown system. In summary, it cannot be concluded with certainty how much water leaked into the containment. It can be concluded that all sources of leakage into the containment have been found based on RCS leakage determination and visual inspections in containment. (The additional s 3000 gallons collected

  • between 0715 and s 1400 are attributed to leakage past the isolation valve).
  • The 6000 gallons (total) were not pumped out during this time period because post-TMI requirements required containment isolation, including sump flow,

~ upon receipt of an SI signal, so the pumps were not operating during the time the s 6000 gallons were accumulating.

E. L. Jordan 4 FEB 121SGI Before the licensee resumed power operation but after he had put the systems into their normal status, he was required to enter containment to verify the lack of other leakage sources (there were none). He also repaired the letdown isolation valve and verified its integrity, and pumped out the keyway. (3) Reactor depressurization duri.ng the event was caused by a stuck-open pressurizer spray valve, as determined by subsequent testing following the event ("B" valve stuck during such testing). The valve has been repaired and verified operable. (4) The EHC pumps and EHC system have been repaired and tested satis-factorily. The system will be carefully observed to further verify its proper operation upon restart. ( 5) After this event, for three to six hours there was indication that "B" Steam Generator had a 0.3 gpm primary to secondary leak (based on seconoary side radioactivity of 10-4u Ci/cc). The indication then went away. Either there was a small leak which subsequently closed, or the transisnt" stirred " crud" in the secondary system which caused the indication. Upon restart, the plant will monitor carefully for SG leaks (none have been detected following plant startup). (6) A 35 level increase in the reactor drain tank occurred early in this event. This is believed to be due to lifting of the letdown / the leakage of the letdown system isolation valve previously m system relief valve while the letdown system was isolated, due to II. Cause of Event There appear to have been multiple contributors to this event, as described in Section I. III. Corrective Action (a) Short Term Detailed in Section I. (b) long Term The possibility of a pressure pulse in the letdown system will be further investigated by the licensee, for example, be examination of the failed bellows for failure mode, further pipe hanger examinations, etc. The bellows failure is being investigated as a generic item by W with Crosby Valve Co., the valve vendor. The need for an SI recovery procedure will be evaluated. The licensee has evaluated this need, and is actively preparing such a procedure.

a

s E. L. Jordan 5

~ ' 12 lb~ re- - IV. Evaluation Based on the corrective actions detailed in Section I, we concluded that continued operation was acceptable. 1 h,-. L/A<- vN- ~ Hugh W. Woods, Reactor Systems Specialist Events Evaluation Section Reactor Engineering Branch, DRRRI, IE cc: J. H. Sniezek, IE N. C. Moseley, IE S. E. Bryan, IE RONS Branch Chiefs W. R. Mills, IE C. J. DeBevec, IE G. A. Schwenk, IE T. Novak, URR R. Tedesco, NRR G. Lainas, NRR R. Vollmer, NRR C. Berlinger, NRR S. Varga, NRR D. Neighbors, NRR C. iiichelson, AE0D

c O - t g - 3331 ) i' N 3

st:. a :

.,,r 1. ;.-r := :m March 10, 1981 FILE: NG-3514(R) SERIAL NO.: NO-81-444 A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation \\ ATTENTION: Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chiel Operating Reactors Branch No. 1 d[ United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission . A f3b /( 'l ,g Washington, D.C. 20555 gpg l f tg8 H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO.C4 M g g gn DOCKET NO. 50-261 ,s jj LICENSE NO. DPR-23 ,, f.j IN-SERVICE INSPECTION AND TEST PROGRAM

Dear Mr. Varga:

Carolina Power & Light Company (CP&L) is herewith transmitting to NRC three (3) copies of the revised In-Service inspection and Test Program (ISI Program) for the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2 (HBR-2). This submittal is made in compliance with 10CFR50.55a(g). The program is being updated to ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, 1977 Edition with addenda through the summer, 1978, addenda. The updated ISI Program will be applicable for the second 120-month interval beginning March 7,1981. CP&L intends to implement the new program effective April 1, 1981 which is the beginning of the second quarter of 1981. Requirements for the second quarter will be met by July 1, 1981. Plant technical specification requirements which are more conservative than the ISI Program will be followed in lieu of the ISI Program requirements. The requirements of the component inspection portion of the ISI Program for the first interval will be completed at the next refueling outage currently scheduled for the fall of 1981. The component inspection program to be conducted during the second interval will be developed and submitted prior to January 1, 1982. fool Yours very truly, ,5 6 b',5 h E. E. Utley y S E% b2Aw.~f ro. Executive Vice President Power Supply and p {N s Engineering & Construction TERA (;tel ac< l. We3 SDF/dk (N#41) nNet (lmlad ~ 81 OYru u Sk ' M kfb

e.

  • a',

1 CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPAW H. B. ROBINSON STCAN ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 2 IN-SERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAN INTERVAL 2 MARCH 7, 1981 TO MARCH 7, 1991 e h e10s1105R p

TABLE OF CONTENTS TITLE PAGE Abstract ii l List of Drawings iii Attachment A - Component Inspection Program A-1 Attachment B - Pump and Valve Test Program B-1 Table 1 - Codes and Symbols 1 of 1. Table 2 - Pump Test Program 1 of 2 Table 2 - Specific Requests for Relief I of 3 Table 3 - Valve Test Program ISI-200-5373-353 p. 1 of 2 thru ISI-SK-1

p. I of 1 Table 3 - Specific Requests for Relief I of 2 l

i

4 ABSTRACT H. B. ROBINSON. STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 2 IN-SERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM INTERVAL 2 - MARCH 7, 1981 TO MARCH 7, 1991 In accordance with 10CFR 50.55a(g)(4)(ii) the H. B. Robinson Unit 2 ISI Program is being updated to ASME Section XI, 1977 Edition with addenda through the summer, 1978, addenda. Steam generator inspections will continue to be inspected under Plant Technical Specifications. Specific reliefs are requested in accordance with 10CFR 50.55a(g)(5)(iii). The interval for which this program is applicable will commence on March 7, 1981, and end on March 7, 1991. Class 1, 2, and 3 inspections required to be completed during the first interval will be completed at the next refueling outage currently scheduled for the fall of 1981. The ISI Program was developed employing the classification guidelines contained in 10CFR 50.2(v) for Quality Group A. Regulatory Guide 1.26, Revision 2 was used for classification of items in Quality Groups B and C, along with ANSI N18.2, 1973 and ANSI N18.2a, 1975. Quality Groups A, B, and C are the same as ASME classes 1, 2 and 3 respectively. The List of Drawings identifies the drawings used in developing the program. Attachment A describes the Class 1, 2, and 3 compenent inspection program developed in accordance with Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD of ASME Section XI. Attachment B describes the Class 1, 2, and 3 pump and valve inspection program developed in accordance with Subsections IWP and IWV of ASME Section XI. ii

H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 2 IN-SERVICE INSPECTION PROGRAM LIST OF DRAWINGS Drawing # Sheets Title ISI-5379-353 Sampling System ISI-5379-376 1 of 3 Component Cooling System 2 of 3 3 of 3 ISI-5379-684 Chemical and Volume Control System ISI-5379-685 1 of 3 Chemical and Volume Control System 2 of 3 3 of 3 ISI-5379-686 1 of 2 Chemical and Volume Control System 2 of 2 ISI-5379-920 1 of 4 (Liquid) Waste Disposal System ISI-5379-921 1 of 2 (Gaseous) Waste Disposal System 2 of 2 ISI-5379-1082 1 of 2 Safety Injection System 2 of 2 ISI-5379-1484 Residual Heat Removal System ISI-5379-1485 Spend Fuel Pit Coolant System ISI-5379-1971 1 of 2 Reactor Coolant System 2 of 2 ISI-G-190196 1 of 3 Main, Extraction and Aux. Steam Sys. ISI-G-190197 2 of 3 Feedwater, Condensate and Air Evacuation Sys. ISI-G-190199 1 of 7 Service & Cooling Water System 2 of 7 3 of 7 ISI-G-190234 1 of 2 Steam Generator Blow-Down System ISI-G-190261 3 of 8 Penetration Pressurization System 7 of 8 8 of 8 ISI-G-190262 Isolation Valve Seal Water ISI-G-190304 1 of 2 HVAC - Turb, Fuel, Aux, and Reactor Buildings ISI-HBR2-6490 Post Accident Sampling System ISI-HER2-6933 Post Accident Containment Venting System ISI-HBR2-7063 Flow Diagram Legend ISI-SK-1 Fire Protection System ISI-SK-2 Fuel Transfer Tube iii

6 Attachment A ASME SECTION XI COMPONENT INSPECTION PROGRAN H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 The component inspection program to be conducted in accordance with Subsections IWB, IWC, and IWD of ASME Section XI will be developed and submitted prior to January 1,1982. l A-1

Attachment B ASME SECTION XI PUMP & VALVE TEST PROGRAM H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NO. 2 The pump and valve testing program shall be conducted in accordance with Subsections IWP and IWV of Section XI of the 1977 Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code through the Summer,1978 Addenda, except for specific relief requested in accordance with 10CFR50.55a(g) (5)(iii), which is identified in Tables 2 and 3 for pumps and valves respectively. The interval for which this pump and valve testing program is applicable commences on March 7, 1981, and expires on March 7, 1991. The pump and valve testing program was developed employing the classification guidelines contained in 10CFR50.2(v) for Quality Group A and Regulatory Guide 1.26, Revision 2 for Quality Groups B and C along with ANSI N18.2,1973, and N18.2a,1975. Quality Groups A, B, and C are the same as ASME Class 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The List of Drawings identifies the drawings used to develop the pump and valve testing program. Table 1 lists the codes and symbols used throughout the program. Table 2 lists all safety related Class 1, 2, and 3 pumps included in the testing program. The test parameters measured and the testing frequency are also listed. Table 3 lists all safety related Class 1, 2, and 3 valves included in the program. Specifically excluded per IWV-1200 are valves used for operating convenience only, such as manual vent, drain, instrument, test maintenance, pressure regulating, thermal relief, and system control valves. Test methods and frequencies are also listed. Valve maximum stroke times are listed. Valves which cannot be tested during normal operation have the next acceptable frequency listed as allowed by IWV-3412(a), IWV-3415 and IWV-3416. Cold shutdown testing, when required, will commence 48 hours after initiation of cold shutdown conditions as defined in Technical Specifications, except for refueling outages. Testing will continue until completed or until the plant is ready to return to operation. Completion of all testing will not be a prerequisite to returning to operation. Testing not completed at one shutdown will be continued during subsequent shutdowns within the required frequencies. B-1

l e TABLE 1 H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 CODES AND SYMBOLS Valve Types Actuator Types BF......... Butterfly A0..... ... Air CK......... Check M ... Manual DA......... Diaphragm MO..... ... Motor GA......... Gate SA. ... Self Actuate GL......... Globe SO.... ... Solenoid ND... . Needle Valve Position REG........ Regulator CL..... . Closed RV......... Relief / Safety 0 . Open 3W........ 3-Way LC.. ... Locked Closed VB......... Vacuum Breaker LO..... ... Locked Open Valve Test Methods F . Observe Failure Mode FF.......... Normally closed check valves are given a forward flow test to verify that disc opens. J Category A containment isolation valve tested in accordance with 10CFR50 App. J. LT. . Leak Test RF.......... Normally open check valves are given a reverse flow test to show that disc seats. RV..... . Relief Valve (Test per IWV-3510) S ..... Full Stroke T ... Measure Time VI.......... Verify-Remote Indication Test Intervals Misc. Symbols M.. . Monthly NA.. . Not Applicable Q......... Quarterly NR......... Not Required C.. . Cold Shutdown R... . Refueling A.. ... Annual X... ... Frequency Determined from Table IWV-3510-1 J......... Frequency Determined by 10CFR50 App. J. Page 1 of 1

TABLE 2

11. B. ROBINSON STEAH ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 PUMP TEST PROGRAM r

Page _]_ of _2 Pump Name Test Parameter Measured Pump Relief Drawing No. Speed Inlet Differential Flow Vibration Lubricant Bearing Request Number n Pressure Pressure Rate Amplitude Level or Temperature P, AP Q V Pressure Tb Auxiliary AFW-A* NR Q Q NR Q Q NR 1,2,4 Facdwater AFW-B* NR Q Q NR Q Q NR 1,2,4 C-190197 AFW-SD Q Q Q NR Q Q NR 1,2,4 Safety SI-A* NR Q Q NR Q Q NR 1,2,4 Injection SI-B* NR Q Q NR Q Q NR 1,2,4 5379-1082 SI-C* NR Q Q NR Q Q NR 1,2,4 Residual RilR-A* NR Q Q NR Q Q NR 1,2,4 Ileat Removal RilR-B* NR Q Q NR Q Q NR 1,2,4 5379-1484 Containment CS-A* NR Q Q NR Q Q NR 1,2,4 Spray CS-B* NR Q Q NR Q Q NR 1,2,4 5379-1082 Service SW-A* NR Q R NR Q Q NR 1,2,3 Water SW-B* NR Q R NR Q Q NR 1,2,3 G-190199 Sh. 1 SW-C* NR Q R NR Q Q NR 1,2,3 SW-D* NR Q R NR Q Q NR 1,2,3 Component CCW-B* NR Q Q NR Q Q NR 1,2,4 Cooling CCW-C* NR Q Q NR Q Q NR 1,2,4 5379-376 Sh. 1 Service Water SWBP-A* NR Q Q Q Q Q NR 1,2 Booster SWBP-B* NR Q Q Q Q Q NR 1,2 G-190199 Sh. 2

  • Synchronous or induction motors do not require speed check (IWP-4400).

TABLE 2

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 PUMP TEST PROGRAM Page _2_ of 2 Pump Name Test Parameter Heasured Pump Relief j

Drawing No. Speed Inlet Differential Flow Vibration Lubricant Bearing Request Number n Pressure Pressure Rate Amplitude Level or Temperature P, AP Q y Pressure Tb Charging CVC-B Q Q Q Q Q Q NR 1,2 5379-685 Sh. 2 CVC-C Q Q Q Q Q Q NR 1,2 Boric Acid A* NR Q Q NR Q Q NR 1,2,4 Transfer B* NR Q Q NR Q Q NR 1,2,4 5379-685 Sh. 3 i 1 } jj e s a Y V / e >( s (, l

  • Synchronous or induction motors do not require speed check (IWP-4400).

TABLE'2 H. B. ROBINSON UNIT 2 SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR RELIEF' This section provides justification for the specific relief requested from Code test requirements as provided for in 10CFR50.55a(g)(5)(iii). Each request is identified by a unique number and identifies the pump (s) f.or which the request is being made. The specific Code test requirement found to be impractical is defined and the basis for exclusion from Code requirements is presented. Any testing performed in lieu of Code requirements is specified. 1. Specific Relief Request-: ll Monthly In service-Test Applicable To: All pumps ~ Basis for Relief Request: . ~, Monthly Section XI operability testing has been a plant requirement for most of these pumps since operation began. An analysis of'the results of these tests and comparable data from other operating} plants has shown no significant changes in performance. Based on this analysis, the continuation of Section XI monthly testing would not significantly increase plant safety. !~ Monthly pump testing requires a total of at least 250 hours per year of pump operation, at least 575 man-hours per year, for data acquisition, and at least 50 man-hours per year for data reduction, analysis, and record keeping. This amounts.to a total of 525 man-hours per year. At a conservative total cost of $20 per man-hour, this amounts ~ to $12,500 per year. Based upon the average exposure ~ rates in the pump access areas, the total man-res exposure I per-year for pump testing is~approximately 1.0 man-rem. At' the present conservatively estimated cost of $10,000 per man-rem to plant personnel, this exposure costs an additional $10,000 per year. Total cost to our customers ,is approximately $25,200 per year, for no significant ' increase in safety. Alternate Testing: ~w, Pumps will-be tested in compliance with ASME Section XI and this program once per quarter. This is in agreement with changes that were implemented in Subsection IWP of '7' the Code in the Winter, 1979, addenda. s Page 1 of 3 m ~, _m. -,-,_..y ,_m

TABLE 2 H. B. ROBINSON UNIT 2 SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR RELIEF 2. Specific Relief Request: Measuring pump bearing temperature annually. Applicable to: 4 All pumps. Basis for Relief Request: The referenced Edition of the Code requires bearing tempera-ture to be recorded annually. It has been demonstrated by experience that bearing temperature rise occurs only minutes prior to bearing failure. Therefore, the detection of possible bearing failure by a yearly temperature measure-ment is extremely unlikely. It requires at least an hour of pump operation to achieve stable bearing temperatures. The small probability of detection of bearing failure by temperature measurement does not justify the additional pump operating time required to obtain the measurements. Alternate Testing: NONE. This is in agreement with present changes that are being implemented in Subsection IWP of the Code to delete yearly bearing temperature measurement. Deletion of bearing temperature has been approved and will be included in future Addenda. See minutes of the November 28, 1979, meeting of the Operating and Maintenance Working Group - Testing of Pumps and Valves in San Jose, California, dated January 9, 1980. 3. Specific Relief Request: A. Flow rate measurements as required by IWP-3000. B. Differential pressure measurements as required by IWP-3000. Applicable To: Service Water Pumps Basis for Relief Request: The service water pumps are used for remov'ing heat from certain secondary system components during normal operation. Since heat load varies and inlet temperatures vary, automatic temperature control valves will vary the flow rates through Page 2 of 3

y e ,uw e- < s e i TABLE 2 i 1 H. B. ROBINSON UNIT 2-SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR RELIEF the individual components, thus varying pump resistance. ~ The system has no installed flow measuring devices capable of measuring flow from the pumps. The piping is concrete lined which prohibits the use of ultrasonic flow measuring techniques. There is insufficient room on the outlet piping of each individual pump to allow installation of any accurate flow devices. H. B. Robinson currently verifies service water system operation during refueling by conducting a " dead head" (zero flow) test on each pump. This test provides a point for comparison to determine the condition of the pumps since the previous tests. These tests will be used as an alternative to the monthly Section XI test. If a pump is i declared inoperable and maintenance is required on that pump, the pump will be tested in the manner in which the refueling tests are performed. Vibration and normal pump parameters will be checked on a quarterly basis as per the ISI Program requirements. Alternate Testing: s Verification of system operation during refueling by conducting " dead head" (zero flow) test on each pump. s 4. Specific Relief Request: 1 Measure Flow Rate. Applicable To: P Auxiliary Feedwater A, B, and SD, Safety Injection A, B, and C, Residual Heat Removal A and B, Containment Spray A and B, Component Cooling A and B, and Boric Acid Transfer A and B. Basis for Relief Request: i Instrumentation is not installed to measure flow rate for testing. For the first ISI interval, these pumps (except Boric Acid Transfer A and B) were tested in a fixed resistance configu-ration so that any change in performance would be indicated by a change in differential pressure. This method of testing has proven satisfactory and will be continued. l l Alternate Testing: i NONE. i Page 3 of 3 L

1 Q TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT No. 2 System Name Sampling System P&ID No.

ISI-200-5379-353 Page 1 of 2 ^ m W u Valve Valve h Il E 3 E .0 ^ e $j Category 5 S e Y 5 E-8E Remarks Number m E $m 0 S ES N "O u d EE 3 et e u u 8 n 1 8 l 4 a

  • 4 u

$s u u m s g g g A B C D 956A 2 B-5 X 3/8 GL A0 CL Y S Q t F Q T Q 60 VI Q J J 1 956B 2 B-6 X 3/8 GL A0 CL Y S Q F Q j T Q 60 VI Q J J 1 956C 2 C-5 X 3/8 GL A0 CL Y S Q F Q T Q 60 VI Q \\ J J 1 l l 956D 2 C-6 X 3/8 GL A0 CL Y S Q l F Q T Q 60 v1 Q J J 1 956E 2 E-5 X 3/8 GL A0 CL Y S Q i i F Q i T Q 60 i VI Q j J J 1

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 System Name Sampling System P&lD No.

ISI-200-5379-353 2 2 page of S n n s u Velve E Valve E U j 3 E E $^ e g Category R H t S E. 88 Remarks Vj Number m a t 4 a %8 e ? e "a u 0 0% 8 3 et a u u 8 n 1 8 1 4 0 a

  • 4 L

u de u m e m 4 e a o e A B C D 956F 2 E-6 X 3/8 GL A0 CL Y S Q F Q T Q 60 VI Q J J 1 956G 2 G-5 X 3/8 GL A0 CL Y S Q F Q T Q 60 VI Q J J 1 95611 2 G-6 X 3/8 GL A0 CL Y S Q F Q T Q 60 VI Q J J 1 959 2 J-4 X 3/8 GL A0 CL N S Q l F Q T Q 60 VI Q I

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM !!. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 System Name anv4142,.u enn12nt.q u e. rneponent P&ID No. ISI-200-5379-376. Sh. I of 3 Page 1 or 1 Cee1 ia: l E ^ e x u Valve E Valve E 11 g y j^ 5 e 0 Category N Y f ff P, g Remarks $ ^h Number = N 0 k E %,4 r4E ? 5 E* H 4 *U M v e O y O e yl q 0 0 3 Y d MN m y o e o y A B C D H d 702A 3 11 - 5 X 16 CK SA O/C N FF Q RF Q 702B 3 K-5 X 16 CK SA O/C N FF Q RF Q 702C 3 H-5 X 16 CK SA O/C N FF Q RF Q 707 3 B-4 X 3x4 RV SA CL N RV X l 1 e h 4 4

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROCRAM

11. B. RO'31NSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 System Name Auxiliary Coolant Sys. Component P&ID No.

ISI-200-5379-376, Sh. 2 of 3 1 2 Looking p a ^ e x u ifnive E Valve E E. t g y ,$ ^ o Category S' N Y f E. OO Remarks $ +{ Number m E 5 0 E %E ? 5 "O u O ? 8 Mt e

  • f K

1 8 h u u a E "R a EH y 5 H g g g A B C D H FCV-626 2 K-14 X 3 GA N0 0 Y S C T C 60 Cycling valve during normal VI C operations would interrupt CCW J J l flow to the Reactor Coolant Pump 715 2 N-12 X 3x4 RV SA CL ,Y RV X 716A 3 J-3 X 6 GA N0 0 Y S C Cycling valve during normal T C 60 operation would interrupt CCW VI C flow to RCP's 716B 2 J-3 X 6 GA N0 0 Y S C Cycling valve during normal T C 60 operation would interrupt CCW J J l flow to RCP's VI C 722A 3 H-8 X 3/4xl RV SA CL Y RV X 722B 3 1-8 X 3/4xl RV SA CL Y RV X 722C 3 K-8 X 3/4xI RV SA CL Y RV X 729 2 11 - 1 3 X 3x4 RV SA CL Y RV X 730 2 I-14 X 6 GA H0 0 Y S C Cycling valve during normal T C 60 operation would interrupt CCW J J l flow to RCP's VI C

TABLE 3 VAI.VE TEST PROGilAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM El.ECTRIC l'LANT llNIT NO. 2 System Name Auxiliary Coolant Sys. Component ISI-200-5379-376, Sh. 2 of 3 2

2 P&ID No. t.ooitng 5 n n x u Valve E Valve E E. U ] 8 E j^ e Category Y B8 Hemarks $ +{ Number m N 0 E %E ? N "O u U 0E E 0 EU a u u .e O N f O E

  • d o

u u $9 m 9 H A B C D 735 3 J-16 X 3 GL N0 0 Y S C T C 120 Cycling valve during VI C normal operations would J J l interrupt CCW flow to Reactor Coolant Pumps 737A 2 N-3 X 3 GA M 0 Y S Q 739 2 H-14 X 3 GL A0 CL Y S Q F Q T Q 60 VI Q 749A 3 D-3 X 16 GA H0 CL Y S Q T Q VI R 749B 3 D-6 X 16 GA M0 CL Y S Q T Q VI R 79]A 3 B-15 X 3/4x) RV SA CL Y R X 791B 3 11 - 1 5 X 3/4xl RV SA CL Y R X 1 J

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT No. 2 System Name Auxiliary Coolant Sys. Component P&ID No.

ISI-200-5379-376, Sh. 3 of 3 1 1 Looling p,, 7 "~~ 5 n m x u valve E Valve E { U j i E .0 ^ o Category 6 S H Y $ +} Number m d 5-00 Remarks N 5 0 %E A ? E "O u G OT 8 Mt e ~ u m .o 8 n 1 3 0 a

  • 4 o

o EH g o e g g A B C D 791D 3 L-10 X 3/4xl RV SA CL Y RV X 791E 3 I-10 X 3/4xl RV SA CL Y RV X 791J 3 C-4 X 3/4xl RV SA CL Y RV X 791K 3 E-5 X 3/4xl RV SA CL Y RV X O

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGR/Ji

11. B. R0hINSON STEAM ELECTRIC Pl. ANT UNIT NO. 2 System Name CVCS P&ID No.

ISI-200-5379-685, Sh. I of 3 I 3

pog, or m

e s u Valve E Valve E E. t j^ e $ m{ Category 5 N Y Number m f 88 Remarks E 0 S ? N $3 u U 02 E 8 EU M s u 8 n 1 8 2 a a a

  • 4 8

u. 49 u u u m s ~ A B C D 200A 2 B-9 X 2 GL A0 C Y S Q F Q T Q 10 VI R 2008 2 B-ll X 2 GL A0 C Y S Q F Q T Q 10 VI R 200C 2 B-10 X 2 GL A0 0 Y S Q F Q T Q 10 VI R c 202A 2 C-15 X 3 GA H 0 N S C Cycling valve during normal J J operation would interrupt charging flow 203 2 A-9 X 2x3 RV SA CL Y RV X

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM II. B. ROBINSON STEAH ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 System Name CVCS P61D No. ISI-200-5379-685, Sh. 1 of 3 2 3

pag, og E

^ o x u Valve E Valve E 11 '8 y ,$ ^ o Category ~S h 7 S Sg Remarks 5 +h Number m N 0 u ? S$ ? 5 U OE E 0 $U a u .e E N Y E l 0 0 p" g u u u y g A B C D H 204A 2 A-13 X 2 GL A0 0 Y S C Cycling valve during normal F C operation would interrupt letdown T C 10 flow to CVCS. VI C J J 1 204B 2 A-13 X 2 GL A0 0 Y S C Cycling valve during normal F C operation would interrupt letdown T C 60 flow to CVCS. VI C J J 1 282 2 D-14 X 2 GL O Y S C Cycling valve during normal J J l operation would interrupt charging flow. 292A 2 N-14 X 3/4 GL M 0 N S C ] 3 J 1 f 293A 2 M-14 X 2 GL M o/c N S C 3 J 1 293C 2 L-14 X 2 GL M o/c N S C J J 1 Cycling valves during normal 295 2 N-15 X 3 GL M C N S C operations would interrupt : J J l seal water flow to Reactor' Coolant Pumps. 297A 2 H-1 X 2 ND H 0 N S C J J 1 297B 2 A-19 X 2 ND H 0 N S C J J 1 )

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PHOCRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 System Name CVCS P6ID No.

ISI-200-5379-685, Sh. 1 of 3 3 3 p,g, og I ^ m x u Velve E Valve E U 3 ,$ ^ o Category Y s u{ Number n f 8e Remarks Y d e %e M ? a u O UE a 8 et e m u 8 1 3 a 4 e 4 y" e 4 u m u U m o m a u A B C D 297C 2 H-10 X 2 ND H 0 N S C Cycling valve during normal J J l operation would interrupt seal water flow to the Reactor Coolant Pumps. 309A 2 D-15 X X 2 GL M CL N J J 1 313 1 E-2 X 2 CK SA C Y FF C Cycling valve requires opening valve CVC-311 which could cause l reactor trip on low pressurizer pressure upon failure of CVC-311 in non-conservative position. 381 2 G-14 X 3 GA H0 0 N S C 60 Cycling valve during normal T C operation would interrupt VI C seal water flow to RCP's J J 1 382 2 F-13 X 3 RV SA CL Y RV X t 4

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC Pl. ANT UNIT NO. 2 System Name CVCS P&ID No.

ISI-200-5379-685, Sh. 2 of 3 Page 1 of 2 E m e x u Valve E Valve E E. U j E E .0 ^ E% Category 5 5 S* N Y d E E-88 Remarks Number m E $5 0 E E N "O u O ? a 8 et e u "8 n 1 8 l 4 a

  • 4 o

MH o g g g u e a A B C D l i FCV-113A 3 J-13 X 1 GL A0 C Y S C Cycling valve during normal F C l operation would cause injection T C 300 of highly borated water into VI C Reactor Coolant loop. LCV-IISB 2 K-9 X 4 BF A0 CL N S C Cycling valve during normal F C operation could result in over-T C 300 boration of the primary system i VI C i LCV-IISC 2 11 - 7 X 4 GA HO O Y S C Cycling valve during normal ~ j T C 300 operation would interrupt flow VI C from Volume Control Tank to charging pumps. 209 2 B-7 X 2x3 RV SA CL Y RV X 257 2 C-8 X 2x3 RV SA CL Y RV K 266 2 I-7 X 4 CK SA 0 Y RF C Back flow testing during normal operation would interrupt flow from VCT to charging pumps. 283A 2 J-3 X 3/4x2 RV SA CL Y RV X 283B 2 K-3 X 3/4x2 RV SA CL Y RV X .l 283C 2 M-3 X 3/4x2 RV SA CL Y RV X

i TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM l

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 CVCS System Name P&ID No.

ISI-200-5379-685, Sh. 2 of 3 2 2 p m n Valve U Valve U 3. s u ,$ ^ e Category [ Y f ff 80 Remarks $ +{ Nunher n E 0 S %E "O u u 22 n i 8 un n ~ e u ~ 8 n 1 E N 4 3 a

  • 8 u

u w u U e e m g Ms A B C D 350 2 L-13 X 2 GA HO CL Y S C Cycling valve during normal T C 60 operation would result in VI C injection of highly borated water into Reactor Coolant loop. 351 2 L-13 X 2 CK SA CL Y FF C Cycling valve requires opening CVC-350 (see above). 355 3 J-13 X 1 CK SA CL Y FF C Cycling valve requires opening CVC-FCV-ll3A. 357 2 K-10 X 4 CK SA CL Y FF C Hust be tested with LCV-115B t o G S e

TABLE 3 VAI.VE TEST PROCRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT No. 2 CVCS System Name P61D No.

ISI-200-5379-685, Sh. 3 of 3 1 97.1__. p 8 n n m u Valva E Valve E { t ] E E j^ e Category H Y s E E. P, S Remarks T -{ Nun ber n: t a a %g e i a "a u 0 22 a 3 Et e u ~ C3 0 p. e H n g a g gg H H t H H A B C D 397A 3 L-7 X 2 CK SA CL N FF Q 397B 3 L-8 X 2 CK SA CL N FF Q 4 i i'

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAH ELECTRIC PLANT IJNIT NO. 2 System Name Waste Disposal

~ P&ID No. ~ page of E n a x o Valva E Valve E U 1 8 0 j^ e Category 5 i R Y O E. 8e Remarks 5 +j Number n E 5 0 E %E ? E u O 22 3 Et s u 8 n 1 l 4 xs u u MN g u m e A B C D H 1721 2 J-10 X 3 DA A0 0 Y S Q F Q T Q 60 VI Q J J 1 1722 2 J-9 X 3 DA A0 0 Y S Q F Q T 'Q 60 VI q J J l 1723 2 L-9 X 2 DA A0 0 Y S Q F Q T Q 60 v1 Q J J 1 1728 2 L-10 X 2 DA A0 0 Y S Q F Q T Q 60 VI Q J J l 1786 2 F-ll X 1 DA A0 0 Y S Q F Q T Q 60 v1 Q J J 1 e

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAH ELECTRIC PLANT llNIT NO. 2 System Name Waste Disposal P&ID No.

ISI-406-5379-920, Sh. 1 of 4 2 2 P e g E ^ o s u Valve E Valve E { ij ] g g j^ o Category R e 7 5 3 SS Remarks 5 +{ Number m 0 0 S %E ? N "O u Y OE E E O ~ a u m .e 0 0 Y. h 3 0 p" M u u m g g A B C D H 1787 2 E-11 X 1 DA A0 0 Y S Q F Q T Q 60 VI Q 3 J 1 1789 2 F-10 X 3/4 DA A0 0 Y S Q F Q T Q 60 VI Q J J l 1793 2 E-11 X 1 DA M Y S Q NA 1794 2 G-ll X 3/4 DA A0 0 Y S Q F Q T Q 60 VI Q J J 1 t

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT No. 2 System Name Safety Injection P&ID No.

ISI-200-5379-1082, Sh. I 1 4 p,, g E a x u Valve E Valve E Il ] M ,$ ^ ${ Category h Y f M 8 S8 Remarka Number n E $M 0 E %E ? 5 "3 u U OE E 0 EU s u [ N Y f d E O "d u $H y m H n g y A B C D H RV-842 2 11 - 1 X 1 RV SA CL N RV X 841A 2 D-9 X 1 GL A0 0 N S Q F Q T Q 30 VI Q 841B 2 D-9 X 1 GL A0 0 N S Q F Q T Q 30 VI q 845A 3 J-7 X 2 GL M0 C N S C T C 60 Cycling these valves during VI C normal operation would require closing valve 845C. Closing 845B 3 J-7 X 2 GL NO C N S C { 845C would negate the contain-i T C 60 ment spray system's sodium l VI C hydroxide injection function., j 857A 2 D-1 X 1/4xl RV SA CL Y RV X { 864A 2 D-16 X 16 GA MO O N S C i T C Failures of valves in VI C closed position would j result in loss of SI, RiiR 864B 2 D-16 X 16 GA H0 0 N S C and C.S, Systems T C VI C ) f - t h o

. ~ - TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRMI )

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT No. 2 System Name Safety Injection psID No.

ISI-200-5379-1082, Sh. 1 Page 2 of 4 E m n m u Valve E Valve E E. U 3 E E ,E 7 e Category 5 M 5 E-00 Remarks $ ~h Humber a E ? u E $8 5 5 NO d CE 3 et A: u ~ 8 1 8 l 4 e a

  • 4 u

'E .i u o i A B C D 867A 2 F-7 X 4 GA M0 CL Y S Q i T Q 10 4 VI R 867B 2 F-7 X 4 GA M0 CL Y S Q T Q 10 VI R 869 2 B-1 X 3 GA M0 O N S C Failure in closed position T C 60 would result'in loss offlow path VI C to hot legs. j J J l i j 870A 2 G-1 X 3 GA H0 CL N S Q T Q 10 1 VI Q J J l 870B 2 G-1 X 3 GA NO CL N S Q T Q 10 VI Q i J J 1 ,r 870C 3 H-5 X 3/4 VB SA CL N S Q 870D 3 H-5 X 3/4 VB SA CL N S Q 872 3 H-6 X 3/4x1 RV SA CL N RV X i 878A 3 F-10 X 4 GA H0 O N S C T C 120 VI C

] TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM H.B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 System Name Safety Injection P&lD No. ISI-200-5379-1082, Sh. 1 Page 3 or 4 5 n n s a Valve E Valve E E. U 3 E E d^ e Category 'O S N Y d E-88 Remarks Number m i E 5d Y d S ES E d $O w G 0? 3 Mt s: u ~ n 1 3 l d a a

  • d O

u kH y y m H g g A B C D j 878B 3 D-10 X 4 GA M0 O N S C T C 120 VI C 879A 3 H-11 X 3 CK SA CL N FF Q 8798 2 E-11 X 3 CK SA CL N FF Q 879C 2 C-11 X 3 CK SA CL N FF Q 880A 2 H-9 X 6 GA Ho CL N S Q T Q 60 l VI Q l 880B 2 N-9 X 6 GA Ho CL N S Q { T Q 60 j VI Q 880C 2 K-9 X 6 GA H0 CL N S Q T Q 60 VI Q 880D 2 K-9 X 6 GA H0 CL N S Q T Q 60 VI Q 4 883L 2 11 - 2 X X 1 GL M LC N J J 1 ~ 883W 2 G-3 X X 1 GL M LC N J J 1 J

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROCHAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 System Name Safety Injection P&lD No.

ISI-200-5379-1082, Sh. 1 4 4 i; E ^ m x u Vnive E Valve E E. D 3 8 j^ e Category S' N Y f E. Bg Remarks Tj Numlier m 3 a t 4 a %8 e i A "3 u O d2 3 et e u ~ C3 0 n. e H q g g m g g gg 0 0 0 0 C n 50 A B C D 889A 2 L-13 X 2 CK SA CL N FF Q 889B 2 L-13 X 2 CK SA CL N FF Q .h 890A 2 H-8 X 6 CK SA CL N FF C Testing valves during normal operation would require injecti y-j 890B 2 K-8 X 6 CK SA CL N FF C borated water and sodium hydroxide into the containment. 891A 2 N-5 X 6 GA H 0 N S C The safety positions of these J J 1 valves are open which is their normal position. The only reas n .i 891B 2 K-5 X 6 GA H 0 N S C they would be closed is to perf n. j J J 1 the IST, therefore compromising the integrity of the system don not appear to be justified in testing the valves quarterly 894 3 F-5 X 1 CK SA CL Y FF Q jj. I' f 1, 895V 2 A-2 X X 3/4 GL M LC N J J l 898F 2 A-2 X X 3/4 GL M LC N J J l j ( I h 4

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM II. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT No. 2 Systen Name Safety Injection P&ID No. ISI-200-5379-1082, Sh. 2 1 3 p ^ n x u Valve U Valve E { Ij y g g j^ e Category fs e $g Remarks $ ~{4 Number a i5 0 ,1,$ ? E fo n u H MM to V e O 4 y $o 5 3 y mg g g ge a m e o u a B 0 t g n 90 A B C D N E 849 2 C-2 X 3/4 CK SA CL Y FF C Cycling during normal operation would require opening valve 895V and 898L which are required by Tech. Spec. to be closed. 858A 2 B-11 X 2x3 RV SA CL Y RV X 858B 2 E-11 X 2x3 RV SA CL Y RV X 858C 2 H-11 X 2x3 RV SA CL Y RV X 859 2 C-1 X 3/4 RV SA CL N RV X 860A 2 N-8 X 14 GA M0 CL Y S Q T Q 120 VI Q 860B 2 N-8 X 14 GA M0 CL Y S Q T Q 120 VI Q 861A 2 N-9 X 14 GA MO CL Y S Q T Q 120 VI Q 861B 2 N-9 X 14 GA MO CL Y S Q T Q 120 VI Q

1 TABLE 3 VALVE TCST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM EI.ECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 s

System Name Safety Injection PAID No. ISI-200-5379-1082, Sh. 2 Page 2 of 3 i c a a u ^ e .m Valve Valve ,e y g g j g g g. Number g ag Category 3 g g g g g g 3e Remarks a %e 8

  1. a 88 e

R M A8 ~ e o n a B 0 4 e n Mn a a a e a A B C D 865A 2 D-9 X 10 GA MO O Y S 'C T C 120 Valves are for accumulator VI C discharge isolation. Tech. i Spec. requires valves to 865B 2 G-9 X 10 GA H0 0 Y S C be open with electrical T C 120 breakers pulled when reactor VI C pressure is above 1000 psig. 865C 2 J-9 X 10 GA H0 0 Y S C T C 120 ] VI C J 866A 1 G-1 X 2 GA H0 CL Y S C Valves are for high-head i T C 60 safety injection to hot leg l VI C isolation. Valves are e i required by Tech. Spec. to 866B 1 G-2 X 2 GA Ho CL Y S C be closed with electrical T C 60 breakers pulled when reactor 4 VI C is above 1000 psig. h These valves are in safety 873A 2 11 - 2 X 2 CK SA CL Y FF R ) injection high-head flow path 873B 2 G-2 X 2 CK SA CL Y FF R to RCS cold leg. Valves are kept closed during normal 873C 2 G-3 X 2 CK SA CL Y FF R operation by Reactor Coolant pressure. Verifying opening 873D 2 L-2 X 2 CK SA CL Y FF R of these valves would require injection of highly concentra ec (Cont'd on page 3 of 3)

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM El.ECTRIC PIANT UNIT NO. 2 System Name Safety Injection P6ID No.

ISI-200-5379-1082. Sh. 2 Page 3 of 3 E a s u n Valve E Valve E t 0 i E E .0 ^ e $j Category N Y f fr 88 Remarks Number m E $m 0 O 5 E N NO u d DE 3 et e u ~ 8 n 1 3 d a a

  • 0 u

Ma u g u v e g g A B C D (Cont'd from pare 2 of 3) 1 boric acid into the RCS. 873E 2 K-3 X 2 CK SA CL Y FF R Tesi i during cold shutdown is also n ot 873F 2 I-4 X 2 CK SA CL Y FF R )t practical for the same reason and because the RCS must be 874A 1 11 - 1 X 2 CK SA CL Y FF C vented in order,to perform the test. j Valves are in series with 874B 1 11 - 2 X 2 CK SA CL Y FF C 866A & B. 875A 1 J-3 X 10 CK SA CL Y FF C Valves are in Safety Injectior cold leg flow path. Valves 875B 1 K-3 X 10 CK SA CL Y FF C are kept closed during normal operation by Reactor Coolant 875C 1 H-2 X 10 CK SA CL Y FF C pressure. 875D 1 D-7 X 10 CK SA CL Y FF C 875E 1 G-7 X 10 CK SA CL Y FF C 1 875F 1 J-7 X 10 CK SA CL Y FF C 876A 1 D-6 X 8 CK SA CL Y FF C 876B 1 G-6 X 8 CK SA CL Y FF C 876C 1 J-6 X 8 CK SA CL Y FF C J

4 TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2

~ System Name Residual lleat Removal P&ID No. ISI-200-5379-1484 Page 1 of I E n a s u Valve E Valve E h U "E N E .0 ^ e $j Category e Y d E-00 Remarks Number n $w Y d S ES E MO u G BE a 3 et A: ~ u ~ i 8 n 1 8 l 4 E a

  • d u

N l E Y o* A 3 C D 1 706 2 L-1 X 2x3 RV SA CL Y RV X l 744A 2 H-1 X 10 GA H0 CL Y S Q T Q 15 VI Q I 744B 2 H-3 X 10 GA Ho CL Y S Q T Q 15 VI Q 750 1 N-16 X 14 GA H0 CL Y S C Valves interlocked with SI-86; A T C 300 & B such that they cannot be i VI C opened unless the SI valves are closed. 862A & B must bg 751 1 H-16 K 14 GA N0 CL Y S C open during normal operation, T C 300 or RHR suction is lost. VI C ) 753A 2 G-10 X 10 CK SA CL Y FF-Q i 753B 2 G-10 X 10 CK SA CL Y FF Q 759A 2 G-5 X 10 GA H0 0 Y S Q T Q 120 VI R 759B 2 D-5 X 10 GA H0 Y S Q T Q 120 VI R

l ] TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT llNIT NO. 2 System Name Reactor Coolant P&ID No.

ISI-100-5?~e9-1971. Sh. 2 Page 1 of 2 I C 3 E G N ^ m v m en Valve o. Valve ,3 y g N g j g g. e g Category 3 g g g 4 g ye Remarks Number a C m M SY U NO 0 e o ~ eo e 4 M t 4i e i o d 3 0 e a d 2d t .a a e a i A B C D OWC-1 2 F-18 X X GA H CL Y LT R i DWC-2 2 F-19 X X GA H CL Y LT R ', PCV-455C 1 E-17 X 3 GL A0 CL Y S Q ) F Q j T Q .j VI R i l PCV-456 1 D-17 X 3 GL A0 CL Y S Q F Q T Q l VI R PCV-473 2 E-1 X 3/4 GL A0 0 Y S C Failure in open position could F C result in overpressurization of ' T C 120 relief tank. Test at cold shutdown with tank vented. 516 2 0-1 X 3/8 GL A0 CL Y S Q F Q T Q 60 j VI Q J J 1 519A 2 F-1 X 3 DA A0 CL Y S Q F Q T Q 60 VI Q t J J l 1

l TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM II. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 ea tor Coolant System Name P5ID No. ISI-100-5379-1971, Sh. 2 Page 2 of 2 E valve E E. U E

  • E E

E $^ m x u m Valve e Category 5 R 7 5 5 OO Remarks i Number m I E $5 5 0 ? %E 5 E N $O u G ct 8 et e u u 8 n 1 9 l 4 4 ja u u g g e H H g o A B C D 519B 2 F-2 X 3 DA A0 CL Y S Q F Q T Q 60 VI Q J J l 535 1 D-17 X 3 GA H0 0 Y S Q T Q VI R 536 1 E-17 X 3 GA H0 0 Y S Q T Q VI R 550 2 E-2 X 3/4 DA A0 0 Y S C F C T C i 551A 1 B-ll X 4x6 RV SA CL Y RV X l 551B 1 B-13 X 4x6 RV SA CL Y RV X t 551C 1 B-15 X 4x6 RV SA CL Y RV X 553 2 C-2 X 3/8 GL A0 C Y S Q F Q T Q 60 VI Q J J 1

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 System Name Main Extraction & Auxiliary Steam P&ID No.

ISI-G-190196, Sh. 1 1 3 p E m q u Valve E valve E 11 1 g g e 8^ Category R h Y g. Oe Remarks 2 5 *l Number a Y d S 6E E SO a u O 22 E 3 Mt e u ~ .e Q O glL. e H q q m g gg O O E Y S M MN m J o y e e A B C D H 1S-VI-3A 2 J-16 X 26 CK SA 0 N 2 1S-VI-3B 2 E-16 X 26 CK SA 0 N 2 1S-VI-3C 2 A-16 X 26 CK SA 0 N 2 1S-Vl-3A 2 J-15 X 26 GA A0 0 N S C leol. F C T C 5 VI C 1S-VI-3B 2 E-15 X 26 GA A0 0 N S C isol. F C .T C 5 l VI C 4 iS-VI-3C 2 A-15 X 26 GA A0 0 N S C Isol. ! F C T C 5 VI C 1S-VI-8A 2 K-15 X 2 GL. M0 C N S Q t T Q 120 i< VI Q 1S-VI-8B 2 G-15 X 2 GL HO C N S Q T Q 120 VI Q i i I 1 / ) ] ) / +

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 System Name Main Extraction & Auxiliary Steam P&ID No.

ISI-G-190196, Sli. I 2 3 p E ^ m x u Valve E Valve E Tj j y y

  • 7 e

[h Category ~8 N Y 5 g S Sg Remarks g Number n ^ a H o xc e e e am A y$ E 6 U m $3 M M m" \\ e EE 2 R

  • y y

y Ag ~ e a 4 s 3 E e a as A B C D MS-VI-8C 2 C-15 X 2 GL M0 C N S Q T Q 120 VI Q i MS-VI-9A 3 K-15 X 2 CK SA CL N FF Q / MS-V1-98 3 G-16 X 2 CK SA CL 'N FF Q MS-Vl-9C 3 C-16 X 2 .CK SA CL N FF Q SVl-1A 2 J-10 X 6 RV SA C .N RV X SVl-2A 2 J-il X 6 RV SA C N RV X SVI-3A 2 J-12 X 6 RV SA C N RV X SVI-4A 2 J-13 X 6 RV SA C N RV X SVl-1B 2 F-10 X 6 RV SA C N RV X SVl-2B 2 F-ll X 6 RV SA C N RV X SVl-3B 2 F-12 X 6 RV SA C N RV X SVI-4B 2 F-13 X 6 RV SA C N RV X SVI-lC 2 B-10 X 6 RV SA C N RV X SVI-2C 2 B-11 X 6 RV SA C N RV X

l l 1l-1 liil li l 4 l l\\' Hg e" w >e<M Q,ms '5"5 a ,om Zg= msg = mFMQw~o 2h4 @ H 2o, M c' mtwo5a =05* E = m? k $ " >cE..,} erauB ~m '?5o m. W . g mge = - 2xC

m t

n ) o a y t s s e i e d c s e) <a $ e g8 e e p t r o n e k. gt e h p y i A h e u oc Esc $ s na p;3x v c y T s t u q re =73 i s in i n T o h n e q e t s a wi s i r P 3o M e R S( l ad s ( e o ii r C rr a v t l Ht t F f .e D o P e l a a a s e xm o z a u n i e t i ai C i V t r: d T s l MT S c o a e e A N R T R a n m$eu N ?O E n z x< X m$i

  • N
  • C E

n z x< M f l lI l1 l

TABLE 3 VAI.VE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC Pl. ANT UNIT NO. 2 System Name Feedwater Condensate & Air Evacuation P6ID No.

ISI-C-190197, Sh. 2 1 3 p E ^ e u Valve 0 Valve E E. t ] y y ,g ^ Category N Y f, y g. 8g Remarks 5 +j Number g, 2 A a %E e ? a ". 3 e u G n? n ? 8 un e 8 n B f u m a a

  • 4 u

pg u j u y g 9 g H d A B C D AFW-2 3 I-17 X 6 CK SA CL N FF Q Verified open during testing l } of Motor driven aux. feed pump. AFW-19 3 11-11 X 6 CK SA CL N FF Q AFW-20A 3 L-8 X 4 GA M0 O N S Q T Q 60 VI Q AFW-20B 3 H-8 X 4 GA H0 O N S Q T Q 60 VI Q AFW-24 3 L-14 X 6 GA H LC N S Q NA AFW-40 3 L-10 X 4 CK SA CL N FF Q AFW-41 3 N-10 X 4 CK SA CL N FF Q h Normal feedwater pressure on ' AFW-68 2 H-5 X 4 CK SA CL Y FF C back side of valves prevents AFW-69 2 L-5 X 4 CK SA CL Y FF C cycling during normal operatici AFW-70 2 N-5 X 4 CK SA CL Y FF C J AFW-V2-1'4A 2 C-10 X 4 GA H0 CL Y S Q T Q 60 VI Q AFW-V2-1'.B 2 E-lfi X 4 CA H0 CL Y S Q T Q 60 VI Q E

l i TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM j

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC Pl. ANT UNIT No. 2 I

i System NameFeedwater Condensate & Air Evacuation P&ID No. ISI-G-190197, Sh. 2 Page 2 of 3 l E l n x u n h E I E E .0 ^ l Valve E Valve E e u 5-8E Remarks l If Category H Y Tu} Number m U d E 9 S ES E E $O U OE N 0 ~ m u m .o 8 n 1 a l 4 e a

  • 4 u

M "y 3 E Y o* A B C D AW-V2-14 22 G-10 X 4 GA H0 CL Y S Q T Q 60 VI Q AFW-V2-16 \\2 H-7 X 4 GA 11 0 CL N S Q T Q 60 VI Q AFW-V2-16B2 L-7 X 4 GA H0 CL N S Q T Q 60 VI Q AFW-V2-16 22 N-7 X 4 GA HO CL N S Q T Q 60 VI Q r DW-19 3 K-17 X 6 GA H LC N S Q NA i DW-21 3 K-16 X 6 GA N LC N S Q NA FCV-479 2 B-ll X 4 GL A0 CL Y S C F C T C 60 VI C FCV-489 2 D-Il X 4 GA A0 CL Y S C Cycling during normal F C operations could result T C 60 in steam flow / feed flow VI C mismatch and plant trip. h

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 System Namgeedwater Condensate & Air Evacuation P&ID No.

ISI-G-190197, Sh. 2 Page 3 of 3 5 n n s u Valve E Valve E E. O E E E .E ^ e Category 5 N Y 6 E S-80 Remarks i Number m E 50 0 E %E 5 E E u u 2? 8 3 Et s u .o 8 n 1 3 a 4 a

  • 4 o

$H u m u C m H m a e. a a a A B C D FCV-499 2 F-ll X 4 GL A0 CL Y S C Cycling during normal operation F C could result in steam flow / T C 60 feed flow mismatch and plant VI C trip FW-V2-6A 2 B-12 X 16 GA H0 O N S C T C 120 VI C Cycling during normal operations FW-V2-6B 2 D-12 X 16 GA H0 0 N S C could result in steam flow / T C 120 feed flow mismatch and plant VI C trip. FW-V2-6C 2 F-12 X 16 GA NO O N S C T C 120 VI C J i f

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 System Name Service and Cooling Water P61D No.

ISI-G-190199, Sh. 1 Page 1 of 1 E = u Valve E Valve E E. t ? I E E $^ Category 5 R t 5 E. 88 Remarks Number m E TM Y d S 65 E 5 MO u G ? E 3 Et e u u 8 1 B l ,1 E a

  • 4 u

M U j E Y o A B C D 374 3 K-2 X 18 CK SA O/C N FF Q Rr 9 375 3 K-5 X 18 CK SA O/C N FF Q RF Q 376 3 K-3 X 18 CK SA 0/C N FF Q RF Q 377 3 K-6 X 18 CK SA 0/C N FF Q RF Q 9 9 G I

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC Pl. ANT UNIT NO. 2 System Name Service and Cooling Water P61D No.

ISI-G-190199, Sh. 2 1 3 E e x u Valva U Valve U E. t 8 y j^ e $h Category f, S N Y 5 E. P. e Remarks Number a a sw 4 e as A l e "a u 0 UT 8 Et e u ~ 8 n 1 3 E ,0 a

  • 4 u

o u Me s A B C D V6-33A 2 11 - 8 X 6 BF MO O N S Q T Q 300 VI Q V6-33B 2 11 - 7 X 6 BF N0 0 N S Q T Q 300 VI Q V6-33C 2 Il-7 X 6 BF M0 O N S Q T Q 300 VI Q V6-33D 2 11 - 6 X 6 BF M0 O N S Q T Q 300 VI Q V6-33E 2 11 - 8 X 6 BF M0 O N S Q T Q 300 VI Q V6-33F 2 J-7 X 6 BF M0 O N S Q T Q 300 VI Q V6-34A 2 D-16 X 6 BF M0 O N S Q T Q 300 vt Q

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAH ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 System Name Service and Cooling Water ISI-G-190199, Sh. 2 2

3 P&lD No. p E ^ e x u Valve E Valve E t j g g j^ e $h Category fs R Y f; j g. f, y Remarks Number E $w Y d u S fe E E "O O NE E 0 ED U a u s. .e [ 0 h d E d

  • d u

MH y 5 H g g g A B C D H d V6-34B 2 C-16 X 6 BF H0 O N S Q T Q 300 VI Q V6-34C 2 C-16 X 6 BF H0 0 N S Q T Q 300 VI Q V6-34D 2 B-16 X 6 BF H0 O N S Q T Q 300 VI Q V6-35A 2 B-12 X 1 GL H0 O N S Q T Q 300 VI Q V6-35B 2 B-ll X 1 GL H0 0 N S Q T Q 300 VI Q V6-35C 2 B-11 X 1 GL H0 O N S Q T Q 300 VI Q V6-35D 2 B-10 X 1 GL N0 0 N S Q T Q 300 VI Q 9

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM !!. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 System Name Service and Cooling Water P8ID No. ISI-G-190199. Sh. 2 Page 3 of 3 5 n e s u Valve Valve E U { 3 N .0 ^ g o $h Category fs S H 6 E S-P. O Remarks Nunher m $w M M S E NO u U 02 0 $U s u u .o 8 n 1 2 [ 3 a

  • 4 u

MH o g g m a g g A B C D 560 3 J-7 X 12 CK SA 0/C N FF Q 561 3 J-8 X 12 CK SA O/C N FF Q 580 3 H-12 X 1 GT SO O N S Q i 581 3 I-12 X 1 GT SO O N S Q l 9 I e 6 i

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT No. 2 System Name Service anci Cooling Water ISI-G-190199, Sh. 3 1

1 P&ID No. p m n s u Valve U Valve U t ] y y j^ $h Category S' N Y d j g. Sg Remarks Number m n t a a %8 A r a "a u d DT a 3 at e ~ u ~ 8 n 1 8 0 a a

  • a u.

P. s u u m e ~ A B C D E V6-16A 3 N-20 X 16 GA H0 0 N S Q T Q 300 v6-168 3 H-20 x 16 GA H0 0 N S Q T Q 300 118 3 H-20 x 6 GA H LC N S Q NA 530 3 L-25 X 1 CK SA CL N FF Q 541 3 I-19 X 30 CK SA 0/C N FF Q 542 3 H-19 X 1 CK SA CL N FF Q 543 3 ti-19 X 1 CK SA CL N FF Q 544 3 H-20 X 6 CK SA CL N FF Q 545 3 H-20 X 30 CK SA 0/C N FF Q

TABl.E 3 VALVE TCST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM EI.ECTRIC Pl. ANT UNIT NO. 2 System Name Steam Generator Blowdown ISI-G-190234 1

2 P61D No. p E ^ e x u Valve E Valve E t 3 E E j^ e Category 5 [ Y E

f. 8 Itema rks

$ ^{ Number m E 0 i ? ES E E "O d ? 8 at A: u m j n 1 a d E a

  • 4 u

M E Y u o A B C D FCV-1930/ 2 B-5 X 3/4 CA A0 0 N S Q F Q T Q 10 VI Q FCV-19301 2 B-5 X 3/4 GA A0 0 N S Q F Q T Q 10 V1 Q FCV-1931/. 2 F-5 X 3/4 GA A0 0 N S Q F Q T Q 10 VI Q FCV-19311, 2 F-5 X 3/4 GA A0 0 N S Q F Q T Q 10 VI Q FCV-1932a 2 K-5 X 3/4 GA A0 0 N S Q F Q T Q 10 VI Q FCV-1932 1 2 K-5 X 3/4 GA A0 0 N S Q F Q T Q 10 VI Q

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT llNIT No. 2

~ System Name Steam Generator Blowdown P&ID No. ISI-G-190234 2 2 p, 97 E ^ e x u Valva E Valve E U 3 8 0 j7 e Yj Category ~E R Y f E. 8g Remarks Number a E $M 0 u ? ? 5 $O 0 22 a 3 et e ~ u 8 1 a d E a

  • a o

u u jg 5 g A B C D H FCV-1933/ 2 C-4 X 3/4 GA A0 0 N S Q F Q T Q 10 VI Q FCV-1933) 2 D-4 X 3/4 GA A0 0 N S Q F Q T Q 10 VI Q FCV-1934/ 2 G-4 X 3/4 GA A0 0 N S Q F Q T Q 10 VI Q FCV-19341 - 2 II-4 X 3/4 GA A0 0 N S Q F Q T Q 10 VI Q IFCV-1935n 2 K-4 X 3/4 GA A0 0 N S Q F Q T Q 10 VI Q FCV-1935 l 2 L-4 X 3/4 GA A0 0 N S Q F Q T Q 10 VI Q

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBit4 SON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UtilT 110 2

= System Name Penetration Pressurization (PPS) P&ID No. ISI-G-190261, Sh. 7 of 8 1 2 p, 97 8 ^ m u Valve U Valve U 8. U ~8 E y j^ $h Category 8 f, R 1 5 8 8 B8 Remarks Number a E Vm 0 4 e 48 A l 4 u u n2 8 un e a u ~ 8 n 1 8 0 a

  • 4 u

u o 28 m u ~ N E A H A A u c o EV-Il2A 2 E-2 X 1 3W SO N S Q F Q VI Q J J l EV-II2B 2 E-5 X 3/8 3W SO N S Q F Q VI Q J J l EV-1722 2 E-9 X 1 3W SO N S Q F Q VI Q J J l EV-1727 2 D-5 X 3/8 3W SO N S Q F Q VI Q J J 1 EV-1728 2 A-5 X 3/8 3W SO N S Q F Q VI Q J J l 225C 2 A-5 X 3/8 GA M CL N J J l 226C 2 C-5 X X 3/8 GA M CL N J J l I

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC Pl. ANT UNIT NO. 2 System Name PPS P6ID No.

ISI-G-190261, Sh. 7 of 8 2 2 p,g, of I 8 m a Valve Valve h d 3 E E j^ e Category 5 S e Y 5 S. 80 Remarks T -{ Number n a t 4 a %8 A l a ". *. u O ST a 3 at u ~ 6 n 1 3 E 4 g" 4 o u e w e b A B C D H 235C 2 E-5 X X 3/8 GA h CL N J J l 245A 2 E-9 X X 3/8 GA H CL N J J 1 251C 2 E-2 K X 3/8 GA H CL N J J l O e A

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC Pl. ANT tJNIT NO. 2 System Name Penetration Pressurization (PPS)

P&lD No. ISI-G-190261, Sh. 8 of 8 1 1 E ^ e x u Valve E Valve U 8, U '8 g E j^ Category i i R M Y f g ff Sg itema rks 5 +j Number n N 2 A e se A ? e "3 u 0 3R i 8 un e ~ a 8 n 1 8 b a a a da o As m u m o m ~ i N e A 0 0 A B c o EV-1723 2 A-12 X 1 3W SO N S Q l F Q VI Q J J l EV-1724 2 A-16 X 1 3W SO N S Q F Q VI Q J J 1 241C 2 A-16 X X 3/8 GA H CL M J J 1 248A 2 A-12 X X 3/8 GA H CL N J J 1 274C 2 G-12 X X 3/8 CK SA N J J l t P-i

o 1 $ _O fe =m-m = m < n ~ u a C= " mF C"

  • c<

0. " a m 1 o e n Class 2 2 Drawing C Coordinates -m X n o u mI 5 ~- oo e o ,o < n a o C W Passive a m m* I Size (inches) c l w w l e Q Valve Type a i O= i zs Actuator Type gg z e-* m o -s w R Normal Position o-m S 2$ C z m< High .o ym Radiation Area Qy

= m

-g m n o Test Method E p8 i EO -4 h O ~ r Test Frequency N -i z Relief Request o Max. Stroke Time (sec.) O D 'JU 00 m m ED M W W om se l i e p I g 9

TA11LE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM El.ECTRIC PLANT UNIT No. 2 System Name llVAC P&ID No. _ ISI-G-190304. Sh. I of 2 Page 1 of 3 5

n n s u Valve E Valve E U { l $^ Category 6 N Y f E fr 8E Remarks $ +j t flumber m i E 5 0 u S N NO G 0? E 3 Et s u n B l 4 a O u $H w u m H g g A B C D l RMS-1 2 1-19 X 1 GA A0 0 N S Q F Q T Q 60 VI Q J J 1 RMS-2 2 I-19 X 1 GA A0 0 N S Q F Q T Q 60 VI Q J J 1 RMS-3 2 I-19 X 1 GA A0 0 N S Q F Q T Q 60 VI Q J J 1 RMS-4 2 I-19 X 1 GA A0 0 N S Q F Q j T Q 60 VI Q J J 1 V12-6 2 F-10 X 42 BF A0 0 N S Q F Q T Q 60 VI Q J J 1

l TABLE 3 VAIME TEST I'ROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM El.ECTRIC PIANT UNIT NO. 2 Systern Name ilVAC P61D No.

ISI-G-190304, Sh. 1 of 2 2 3 l a 2 0 0 U U m e ' Valve ,e Valve m e n. y g g j g g u 3g Category 3 g g y g g ye Reisa rks Hund>e r m a O SY E

  1. S e

o so a j t g3 ~ 1 e 0 b A A U n EA 0 0 O A B C D V12-7 2 F-il X 42 BF A0 0 N S Q t F Q T Q 60 VI Q J J l V12-8 2 G-18 X 42 BF A0 0 N S Q 1 F Q j T Q 60 VI Q J J 1 V12-9 2 G-17 X 42 BF A0 0 N S Q F Q T Q 60 VI Q J J 1 V12-10 2 11-18 X 6 BF A0 C Y S Q F Q T Q 60 VI Q J J l V12-Il 2 11 - 1 7 X 6 BF A0 C Y S Q F Q T Q 60 VI Q J J l 1

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC Pl. ANT tlNIT No. 2 System Name llVAC P&ID No.

ISI-G-190304, Sh. I of 2 3 3 7 E n n s a valva E Valve E s{ t 3 E U j7 e $j Category '6 R Number m Y f, E fr 80 Hemarks a su t 4 a 68 A T A "a u u UT a 8 Et 4: ~ u ~ C3 O A4 e e-4 tg o 4 s 3 0 a E AM g m e gg A B C D V12-12 2 G-10 X 6 BF A0 0 N S Q F Q T Q 60 VI Q J J 1 V12-13 2 G-11 X 6 BF A0 0 N S Q F Q T Q 60 VI Q J J 1 i l

TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRMI II. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 ~ System Name Post Accident Sampling ISI-ilBR2-6490 1 1 P&ID No. p ^ e x u Valve U Valve E D j 3 E E .3 ^ e [{ Category is [ N Y f, E. 8E Remarks Number n a t a u e e i E da 0 02 3 Mt e u ~ 6 n 1 3 0 4 a

  • 4 u

As u m e m S E A B C D PAS-1 2 C-5 X X GL M CL N LT R PAS-2 2 D-5 X X GL M CL N LT R PAS-3 2 C-5 X X GL M CL N LT R PAS-4 2 D-5 X X GL M CL N LT R PAS-5 2 D-5 X X GL M CL N LT R PAS-6 2 D-5 X X GL M CL N LT R G e 9 W 9 \\

\\ v i TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM II. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT No. 2 System Name Post Accident Cont. Vent & Ins. Gas P&ID No. ISI-IIBR2-6933 Page 1 of 2 5 n n s u Valve Valve E U j 'E E E $^ o Category f; N Y "3 OE Remarks Numbe r m E YM Y d S ES E E MO u G CE 8 Mt a ~ u ~ 8 n Y a g 4 E 4 E. d u u u e e g H g g A B C D l PCV-1716 2 G-4 X 2 GA A0 0 N F C Cycling would result in loss of VI C instrument air. Valve can only' be tested by failing air supply. Operability is further verified during SI Tests during refuelf:23l-outages. SA-43 2 G-4 X X 2 DA H LC N J J l SA-44 2 G-3 X X 2 DA H LC N J J 1 V8-5 2 G-3 X 2 CK SA 0/C N RF Q V12-14 2 B-1 X 3 DA A0 C N S C No testing during normal F C operations due to potential T C 60 violation of containment VI C integrity. J J l V12-15 2 B-3 X 3 DA A0 C N S C F C T C 60 VI C 3 J .1 )

8 TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT NO. 2 System NamePost Accident Cont. Vent & Ins. Gas P61D No.

ISI-ilBR2-6933 Page 2 of 2 E = x u Valve E Valve E E. II E 3 E E .E ^ e Category f; N Y 5 S-OE Remarks 5+{ Nunbe r n E 0 E 5 E E "O u d 2? 3 Et e u ~ .e 8 n 1 8 2 4 E a u $s u u u C v e m A B C D L2-18 2 D-2 X 3 DA A0 C Y S C F C No testing during normal T C 60 operation due to potential VI C violation of containment J J 1 integrity. l2-19 2 D-4 X 3 DA A0 C N S C F C T C 60 VI C J J l j D

i i l TABLE 3 VALVE TEST PROGRAM

11. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT IINIT NO. 2 System Name Fire Protection P&ID No, ISI-SK-1 Page 1 of 1 5

n a u a Valve U Valve E E. U y 3 E E .E ^ e Category f S' N Y f E E-P. E Remarks 5 +j Nunhe r m E 0 E foe 5 E E NO u G BT a 3 et e u u 8 n 1 9 l 3 a

  • 4 u

MH o m s y g g g A B C D FP-248 2 X 4 GA H0 O Y S Q ] T Q 60 VI Q LT R { FP-249 2 X 4 GA H0 O Y S Q T Q 60 i VI Q LT R Valves installed by Plant FP-256 2 X 4 CA M0 O Y S Q Modification 445 0. T Q 60 VI Q LT R FP-258 2 X 4 GA HO O Y S Q T Q 60 VI Q LT R J

ne 252 o> c-(D < nm Cn M ,m, a Class a z D E Drawing Coordinates E x c i 22 e = ao - n C < W G nm = x a c2 m M Passive d ~~ m Size (inches) .~ ce p Valve Type o .cm ezs 2 Actuator Type to g; z e-en " e su [! Normal Position g g4 cs xp z m< High ? M m Radiation Area Q$ x en M = m.g 5 o_ Test Method 5 ~3 d-W 5e a M$ ~ c., Test Frequency ~ -i z Relief Request ,o P Max. Stroke Time (sec.) D m 9 w Q 5 .. e 'D

4 e TABLE 3 - VALVE TEST PROGRAM H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 2 SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR RELIEF This section provides justification for specific requests for relief from code requirements as provided for in 10CFR50.55a(g)(5)(iii). Each relief requested is identified by a unique number and identifies the valve (s) for which the relief request is being made. The code test requirement found to be impractical is defined and the basis for exclusion from code requirements is presented. Any alternate testing is specified. 1. Specific Relief Request: Seat leak testing and Category A valves as required by IWV-3420. Applicable to: All Category A valves for which test method is designated as J. Basis for Relief Request: 10CFR50 Appendix J requires periodic leak testing of Containment Isolation Valves. All Section XI Category A valves for this plant are containment isolation valves and require Section XI leak testing. In order to preclude redundant test requirements on these valves, the Appendix J requirements will be met in lieu of the Section XI requirements. The H. B. Robinson containment has two features in its design that assure adequate integrity during and following a loss of Coolant Accident. These are the Isolation Valve Seal Water System and the Penetration Pressurization System. These two systems are conservatively designed, seismically qualified, and required to be operable by the Unit Technical Specifications. Additionally, they satisfy the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix J for seal systems that can be used in lieu of local Type C valve testing. Alternate Testing: The PPS and IVSW systems will be tested as required by 10CFR50 Appendix J. 2. Specific Relief Request: Exercising of valves as required by IWV-3520. I Page 1 of 2

c-Q.}. .3 TABLE 3 - VALVE TEST PROGRAM H. B. ROBINSON STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT UNIT 2 SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR RELIEF Applicable to: MS-Vl-3A-C Basis for Relief Request: These valves are the Main Steam check valves downstream of the MSIV's. Normal steam flow verifies the proper opening of the valves. Section XI requires reverse flow seating of the valves. Due to the design of the system, no meaningful test can be performed to prove this seating at any operating condition. Alternate test: NONE Page 2 of 2

8 a ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF THE H. B. ROBINSON REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAK ON JANUARY 29, 1981 by the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data March 23,1981 Prepared by: Wayne D. Lanning Lead Reactor Systems Engineer NOTE: This report documents results of studies completed to date by the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data with regard to a particular operating event. The findings and recommendations contained in this report are provided in support of other ongoing NRC activities concerning this event. Since the studies are ongoing, the report is not necessarily final, and the findings and recommendations do not represent the position or requirements of the responsible program office of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ()te:I 'g()(!-- pl) A

o s TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 9 1. EVENT DESCRIPTION...................... 1 2. EVALUATION OF THE EVENT................... 3 2.1 Ope ra to r Ac t i o ns.................... 3 2.2 Charging Fl ow Termination................ 4 2.3 Safety Injection Actuation.............. 5 2.4 P res suri zer Spray.................... 7 2.5 Relief Valve Bellow Failure............... 7 2.6 Letdown Isolation Valves................ 8 2.7 Leakage Inside Containment............... 10 2.8 Drain Valve and Pipe Cap................ 10 2.9 Failure of Fire Protection Isolation Valve....... 11

3. CONCLUSIONS.........................

11

4. REFERENCES..........................

13 Table Number 1 Sequence of Events.................... 14 APPENDIX A - Information Provided by Licensee at Meeting on February 20, 1981 1. Draft Plant Operating Experience Report 2. Operator's Log 3. Shift Foreman Log 4. Strip Charts 5. Figure 1 - CVCS Diagram (excerpt) 6. Figure 2 - Containment Sump Volume

5 1. EVENT DESCRIPTION ~ A sequence of events is contained in Table 1. Problems with both oil pumps in the turbine electro-hydraulic (E-H) system forced the plant to initiate a plant shutdown. During the process a safety injection signal was generated by a high steam flow coincident with low RCS average temperature. The high steam flow signal was generated by the governor valves spiking open, believed to be caused by the erratic operation of the turbine E-H system. The low average temperature was the result of overcooling the RCS by excessive injection of boric acid solution. The safety injection (SI) signal tripped the reactor. The reactor power had been reduced from 100% to approximately 6% at the time of trip. The duration of the high steam flow / low average temperature signal was apparently not of sufficient duration to latch the "A" train nor close the main steam line isolation valves. Both were manually actuated. A containment fire alarm was received shortly after the SI. After having determined that a spurious SI had occurred, the operators initiated actions (e.g., reset SI, feedwater isolation, restore letdown) to continue to hot standby condition. During the automatic isolation of the CVCS letdown line due to the spurious SI, it is believed that the outermost isolation valves (see Figure 1, valves 204A&B) closed faster than the two open orifice isolation valves (CVC-2008 and C), or that leakage past the orifice isolation l valves resulted in the opening of the relief valve and the rupturing of the bellows on the relief valve (CVC-RV-203). In addition, a pressure surge due to the isolation valves closing caused a drain cap to be blown off. Unaware of these two failures, letdown flow was reestablished. Subsequently, l containment pressure and dew point increased. The containment pressure and humidity increases attached additional significance to the already decreasing l l l

  • ~

D RCS pressure. Letdown was secured (valves closed and sequence unknown) about 15 minutes after letdown was reestablished. A containment entry was made. A leak was identified in the letdown system area but no fire existed. The heat sensitive fire alarm detected the steam from the leak in the letdown system, which implies that this leak occurred in the CYCS during the first SI. Approximately 3,000 gallons was estimated to be in the containment sump based on level indication in the control room. After the letdown was thought to be isolated, the pressurizer pressure continued to decrease and the level to increase. A second safety injection occurred on low pressurizer pressure. Both trains of safeguards equipment actuated. The level increase was the result of continued charging flow and heatup of the primary system (the MSIVs had been closed to recover average temperature earlier). The cause for the depressurization could not be identified positively. Four hours after the first entry, a second containment entry was made and the leak was identified to be from a drain line which was still leaking. The drain line is located upstream of the orifice isolation valves (see Figure 1). The cap on the drain pipe was missing and valve (CVC-200E) was manually closed. Water in the containment sump had now increased to approximately 4,500-6,000 gallons. Evidently, the two level control valves (CVC-LCV-460AAB) were leaking at five to seven gallons per minute between 0650 and 1120. After the drain 1 o was closed during the second containment entry, the RCS pressure co" t> w ed

  • decrease.

Many steps were taken to determine the cause of the decreasing RCS pressure after letdown had been isolated; e.g., isolating charging line auxiliary spray, checking pressurizer relief and safety valve leakage, and increasing pressurizer heater output. The cause was identified when the operators I

i a stopped two of the three reactor coolant pumps in the loops with the pressurizer spray scoops and the pressure began to increase. One of the two pressurizer spray valves was not fully closed. Positive identification of spray valve RC-455B as the leaking valve was made later. The spray valve position is indicated by demand, not stem position, which delayed identification of the cause for depressurization. During this event, steam generator samples indicated a primary-to-secondary leak of approximately 0.5 gpm based on activity of 10-*pC/ml. Steam generator "B" was isolated on the secondary side. Subsequent samples indicated decreasing activity and no leak. The licensee has concluded that the increased activity was the result of " crud" being agitated during isolation of the steam generators during the event. Repairs were made to the spray valve and the relief valve bellows. The cap was replaced on the drain line and all drain valves were verified closed. The unit was back online on February 1,,1981. 2. EVALUATION OF THE EVENT s 2.1 Operator Actions Operators responded to the events in a systematic and timely fashion. Data 1 entered into the logs were detailed and accurate. After the plant was stabilized, the license contacted Westinghouse to ensure that their diagnoses were correct and no other unforeseen problems existed. One shortcoming identified was the lack of a procedure for recovery from a spurious safety injection actuation. Guidelines should be available to the operators to differentiate between a real and spurious SI actuation. The licensee indicated that a procedure will be written for recovery from a spurious SI (identification criteria not included). For this event, resetting the SI

~~ -4_ g had no consequences. However, pressurizer pressure, level and average temperature had all been decreasing prior to the SI and had "stablized" for only about two minutes before resetting SI. In retrospect, there was still a small reactor coolant leak and the spray valve was open. However, SI had been initiated on signals indicative of a steam line break and since secondary system conditions were stable and the governor valve position recorder indicated spurious valve opening, the operators correctly diagnosed the SI' signal as spurious for this event. An area of improvement would have been to test the safety injection actuation ahd main streamline isolation signals since one train of SI failed to latch and the MSIVs failed to close. Both were manually actuated. Although both SI trains actuated on the second safety injection signal, this was not adequate verification of operability on high steam flow / low average temperature actuation before returning to power. These tests could have helped substantiate that the signal was not of sufficient duration to latch the SI relay and close the MSIVs. 2.2 Charging Flow Termination Although SI actuation occurred twice, no boric acid was injected into the RCS based on samples of the boric acid injection tank. This was because the RCS system pressure exceeded the shutoff head (1,500 psig) of the SI pumps at the times of actuation. Hence, the charging pumps were making up lost RCS inventory during the event. During the attempts to identify the cause for the depressurization and recognizing that pressurizer spray could cause the depressurization, the charging flow was isolated (closed valve CVC-HCV-121) to terminate a possible leak from the auxiliary spray valve (Figure 1). This operator action did not terminate

  • ~

all makeup flow to tt.: RCS. The flow path was maintained to the RCP seals which would provide makeup flow (approximately 60 gpm). RCS conditions (approximately) at this time were: Pressure = 1,600 psig; Tavg =. 548'F; pressurizer level = 56% and increasing; nomal steam generator level for the condition; and margin to saturation was approximately 50-55'F. The charging line was isolated from 0726 to sometime after 1932 (shift foreman's log). No consequences resulted from isolating the normal charging flow for this event although SI flow was not available due to the pump head limits. However, it is suggested that NRR determine whether isolating the charging flow is advisable for small loss-of-coolant accidents or when the system pressure is above the shutoff head of the SI pumps. Westinghouse has indicated that no credit was taken for charging flow for the ECCS analyses. The emergency procedure for depressurization (EI-1) does not include criteria for terminating charging flow. The charging pumps are a part of the CVCS and not considered a part of the safety injection system at Robinson. However, the charging pumps provide high pressure makeup flow when the RCS pressure exceeds the shutoff head of the SI pumps. Ensuring that charging flow is not interrupted for the systems employing low / medium heat SI pumps may be desirable to enhance safety. 2.3 Safety Injection Actuation The first safety injection actuation occurred on a "high steam line flow / low l Tavg" signal. The licensee's review of the event indicated that the momentary spike-opening of the turbine governor valves caused the steam flow, in at least two steam lines, to exceed the steam flow set point for a period of l about 25 msec. The combination of high steam flow in 2/3 steam lines and the existing low average temperature of the reactor coolant generated a main i steam isolation valve (MSIV) closure signal and a SI actuation signal.

  • However, only train B of safeguards equipment responded - the other train of safeguards equipment and all the MSIVs did not actuate. Licensee's observations are that the MSIVs require a signal duration of one second to close and tha't the SI actuation relays, including SI logic train latching relay, require a signal duration greater than 25 msec to actuate. Since the SI signal was of less than 25 msec duration, only the train B latching relay actuated. Reactor trip, emergency diesel start, feedwater isolation and other safeguards equipment actuations for train B occurred as a consequence of SI train B actuation.

Reviewing the logic diagram of Robinson's Safeguard Actuation Signals (Dwg CP 300-5379-2759 sh 8, rev 6) it is seen that the reactor trip signal is initiated on SI actuation along with emergency diesel start, feedwater isolation and safeguards sequence actuation. A review of a later Westinghouse logic diagram (typical) shows that the reactor trip signal is derived separately from the SI actuation signal; i.e., the reactor trip signal is taken off " upstream" of the SI actuation signal, similar to the MSIV closure signal on Robinson. This could mean that on certain spurious SI actuation events of short signal duration, SI, feedwater isolation and auxiliary feedwater system actuations may occur with no simultaneous reactor trip occurring. The comparison of logic diagrams also shows that the P-4 interlock (reactor trip breaker position) in the the Reset / Block feature of SI logic of later Westinghouse units is not provided in the Robinson design. Additional analyses would be needed to ascertain the significance of different reactor trip logics for Westinghouse plants. The need to provide a direct reactor trip on spurious safety injection actuation is referred to NRR for review.

s ,7, 2.4 Pressurizer Spray i The open spray valve could not be identified due to lack of spray flow indication or actual spray valve position. The failure of the valve to close evidently did not affect the capability of the valve to open as evidenced by subsequent testing. The Licensee is evaluating the possibility of relocating and replacing the spray valves during the next refueling outage. Previous problems have been experienced with the spray valves and their location in containment reduces their accessibility for maintenance. 2.5 Relief Valve Bellows Failure The licensee has experienced previous failures of this Crosby relief valve (number JB-36, Type B, shop drawing number H51380). Basic information about the valve and the discharge piping configuration were obtained from CP&L and Crosby Valve Company and are as follows: Relief Valve 2" diameter inlet, 3" diameter outlet Set pressure, 600 psig - System pressure, 300 psig (approximate) Dynamic backpressure, 25 psig (specified) - Bellows tested to 150 psig Piping A horizontal run exits from the relief valve before turning vertically up for at least 12 feet to the pressurizer relief tank.

CP&L indicated that the bellows fails every time the relief valve lifts. .Since the bellows has been tested to 150 psig, it would appear that the system is operating quite differently from the anticipated mode. The dynamic backpressure probably exceeds 150 psig (six times the specified 25 psig). A mechanism that could cause the high pressure might be stagnate water from either steam condensation or valve leakage in the line from the relief valve to the pressurizer relief tank. Boric acid crystal fonnations may also be a possibility. When the valve opens, water or other debris in this line could restrict steam flow and cause a high dynamic backpressure until the line is cleared. Also, if the line is filled with stagnate borated water, the bellows may be susceptible to corrosion attack, but corrosion has not been identified from previous failures and replacements. From an operational viewpoint, the failure mode for the bellows should be identified and changes necessary to prevent additional failures should be implemented. The operation of the CVCS isolation valves may be a major contributor to the bellows failures and is discussed in Section 2.6. 2.6 Letdown Isolation Valves The isolation valves played a dominant role in the sequence of events at Robinson. The failure of the bellows on the relief valve was attributed to the closing of the out board valves (CVC-204AaB) before the closing of the orifice isolation valves (CVC 200BAC) upstream of the relief valve. Consequently, the set point (600 psig) of the relief valve was reached since this part of the CVCS was pressurized by the reactor coolant system which was at approximately 1,800 psi. The design pressure downstream of the valves (CVC-200 series) is 600 psig. The sequential operation of the isolation valves is evidently causing this part of the CVCS to be pressurized to at least the setpoint of the relief valve, as evidenced by the opening of the relief valve whenever the CVCS is isolated.

s _9-In addition to the isolation valves, valves LCV-460 A and B (Figure 1) were closed in an attempt to isolate the leaking drain valve / pipe. Both of these valves leaked which permitted an additional 3,000 gallons (approximately) to leak into the containment after the letdown system was thought to be isolated. The licensee did not perform any maintenance on these valves to ensure their operation before returning to power since these are not containment isolation valves. These valves are part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and are designed to close on low pressurizer level to conserve RCS inventory. The design and operation of this part of the CVCS raises two concerns: first, the potential for overpressurizing the system to 2,200 psig assuming the downstream isolation valves (CVC-204A&R) are closed; and secondly, the capability to isolate a potential break downstream of valves LCV-460AaB. The licensee has indicated that the relief valve is designed to prevent overpressurization of the CVCS. The failure of the bellows does not appear to affect the pressure relieving function of the relief valve. In addition, the flow control valves (CVC-LCV-460A&B) have been designed to isolate a break downstream of these valves for the maximum size break and RCS conditions. The functional and testing requirements for the flow control valves are not clear. These valves should be ASME Class 1 since there are no valves upstream and the valves downstream are classified as ASME Class 2.

However, these flow control valves are not identified in the Robinson Inservice Inspection and Testing Program (Reference 4).

Since these valves are on the RCS pressure boundary and are designed to isolate the RCS on low pressurizer level, it is not clear why maintenance on the valves was not required after they were known to leak and before returning to power.

10 - Both of these concerns could lead to a small loss-of-coolant event inside containment. This postulated event is within the scope of an analyzed small break loss-of-coolant accident and not a new safety concern. However, from an operational consideration, overpressurizing the CVCS could be prevented, provided the orifice isolation valves were closed before the outboard isolation valves. Correcting the valve closing sequence for isolation would also reduce ~ the challenge to the relief valve. 2.7 Leakage Inside Containment The licensee has acknowledged that the quantity of water that leaked into containment can only he approximated. The estimated 6,000 gallons (corresponding to approximately 15" in the sump) is a small fraction of the range of indication in a 65,000-gallon capacity sump (See Figure 2). A mass balance was not possible since neither charging flow nor volume control tank level are recorded. The major leak was after letdown flow had been reestablished between 0635 and 0650. This could account for approximately one half of the 3,000 gallons indicated at 0650. The drain valve could have also been leaking at an unknown reduced rate from the initial SI until letdown was restored (approximately ten minutes). The ruptured bellows on the relief valve also contributed some amount to the inventory in the sump. These sources in combination with the inaccuracy of the sump measurements can lead to the conclusion that all the leak sources had been identified. 2.8 Drain Valve and Pipe Cap The leakinq valve was CVC-200E (see Fiqure 1) not CVC-204C as reported by IE (Reference 1). This helps to understand the leak rates and quantity of water reported in the LER (Reference 2) and the IE evaluation. The licensee's explanation for the missing cap on the pipe was that when

the orifice isolation valves closed, a pressure pulse was applied to the valve and cap. Since the valve was partially open and the cap not tightly secured, the cap was blown off. The licensee believed that vibration in the CVCS (induced by the charging pumps) caused movement of the valve and cap. The valve position was last verified on October 11, 1980 during a refueling outage. Since the drain pipe is located close to the pressure reducing orifices, the flow instabilities at these orifices could also induce vibration in the CVCS. All drain pipes with valves have been verified closed. Most valves have been chained and locked. 2.9 Failure of Fire Protection Isolation Valve When a Phase A isolation signal was generated by the safety injection actuation, one (FP-248) of the four containment isolation valves failed to close due to a tripped breaker. Since the other isolation valve in the line closed, containment isolation was achieved. This failure had no bearing on the leak and was a separate reportable event. 3. CONCLUSIONS The event at H. B. Robinson involved four separate, somewhat unrelated failures: (1) pump failures in the turbine EHC system; (2) two separate leaks in the CVCS (related failures); (3) an undetected open pressurizer spray valve; and (4) leaking valves in the CVCS. The event did not appear to include any safety concerns. The following areas of review concering this event are eferred to NRR for consideration:

j 1 Whether a requirement should be placed upon operating plants to establish a. a procedure for identification and recovery from a spurious safety injection actuation (if such a procedure is not already in place). b. Whether criteria for tenninating SI should include provisions for isolating charging since charging flow could be considered high pressure safety injection for very small breaks. c. Whether there is a need for a direct reactor trip on a spurious safety injection actuation at other Westinghouse plants which do not have a direct trip. d. Whether operation of the isolation valves in the CVCS at Robinson is causing the system to be operated in a manner which is contrary to its design bases. The closing sequence for the isolation valves appears to cause part of the CVCS to be pressurized to the setpoint of the relief valve and may be contributing to the failure of the relief valve bellows whenever the system is isolated. AE0D did not find any basis for a need to study this event further. A formal response from NRR is not requested. This event and the operator's response provide a good example of an operating experience which should be disseminated to other licensees for infonnation and training purposes.

13 - 4. REFERENCES d (1) Memorandum, H. Woods to E. Jordan,

Subject:

H.B. Robinson Event on January 29, 1981, dated February 12, 1981. (2) Licensee Event Report 81-005, H.B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2, Docket 50-261, dated February 12, 1981. (3) Meeting with Carolina Power and Light Company in Bethesda on February 20, 1981. ~ (4) Letter, E. E. Utley, CP&L to S. Varga,

Subject:

H. B. Rohinson Steam Electric Plant Unit No. 2, Inservice Inspection and Testing Program, dated March 10,1981. I i i r c_,

Table 1 SE0llENCE OF EVENTS January 24, 1981 Plant at 100% Primary to secondary leak of approximately 0.3 gpm. 0500 "A" EHC oil pump seal leak, "B" EHC pump already out of service due to vibration. 0541 Started load reduction. 0542 Added boric acid to RCS. 0543 Started "C" charging pump, "B" charoing pump running, "A" charging pump inoperable. Opened CVC-2008 orifice isolation valve, CVC-200C already open. 0549-0609 Continued to add boric acid. 0613 Stopped "IF feedwater pump and condensate pump due to erratic FWP hehavior. 0620 Tavq reached low Tavq setpoint (543*F) alarm. 0623 Generator output breaker opened. Turbine governor valves spike open. SI signal and MSIV closure signal on high steam flow / low Tavg. SI train "B" automatically started. Phase A isolation; safeguard B emergency equipment started. Reactor trip on SI signal. Tavg = 532"F. Pzr pressure = 2210 psig. Pzr level = 13%. 0625 Fire alarm in containment. Pressurizer relief tank level alarm due to opening of CVC-RV-203 relief valve. Bellows probably ruptured and drain cap was blown off. MSIVs closed manually. SI train "A" started manually. Started "A" DG, AFWP, RHR, manually. Letdown valves CCV-460A&B manually closed (should have automatically closed on PZR level of 13%). 0627 Reset SI and feedwater isolation. 0634 Attempted to restore letdown flow but CVC-200A would not open (instrument air system isolated on Phase A isolation). Restored letdown flow af ter resetting isolation signals. Pressurizer pressure started decreasing sharply (-2000 psig). Containment dew point and pressure started increasing. 0637 Received condensate collection alarm from the coolers. Diesel generators A and B stopped manually.

_. 0645 Isolated letdown flow. (Isolation valves closed from control room.) Containment dew point and pressure decreased. Pressurizer. pressure still decreasing ( 1840 psig). Tavg increasing. Pressurizer pressure increasing. Notified NRC by ENS. 0650 Containment sump level indicated approximately 3000 gallons. 0700 First containment entry to check for leak and fire. 0705 Second SI actuation on low pressurizer pressure. Both trains and all equipment started. Pressurizer pressure = 1715 psig. Pressurizer level = 50%. 0705-0727 Operators attempting to determine cause of depressurization. 0722 Steam dumps opened manually to control pressurizer level. 0727 Reactor coolant pumps B and C stopped and charging line isolated to eliminate possibility of leaking auxiliary spray valves. Increased pressurizer heater output to maximum. Pressurizer pressure started increasing. 0729 Continued cooldown using steam dumps. 0735 Pressurizer pressure increasing (= 1720). Tavg constant = 540. Pressurizer level = 50%. 0738 Stopped diesel generators A&B. 0741 Stopped "B" RHR pump. i 0745 Opened breakers on containment sump pumps. 0825 Secured SI pumns. 1000 Continued plant cooldown. Sample on "B" steam generator indicated 0.5 gpm primary to secondary leak. Isolated "B" steam generator. Second sample showed decreased leakage (0.25 gpm). 1120 Second containment entry. Found CVC-200E open and cap missing. 1 Found bellows on relief valve CVC-203 ruptured. Contacted Westinghouse. J

- I f, - 1218 Blocked low pressure SI. 1230 Closed CVC-200E. 4 Isolated letdown by closing CVC-309D. Containment sump level was 4,500-6,000 gallons. j d 1445 "B" charging pump out of service due to leaking relief valve 1830 Aligned "A" charging pump for operation after completing surveillance tests. (late entry) Tested pressurizer spray valves. 1913 Started "B" RCP. 1932 Started "C" RCP. (Later) Placed charging line and CVCS letdown in service. Removed excess letdown line from service. 2315 Spray valve RCS-455B identified as leaking spray valve No additional primary to secondary leak identified. January 30,1981 at 1700 plant on-line i

l j APPENDIX A INFORMATION PROVIDED BY LICENSEE AT HEETING ON FEBRUARY 20, 1981 Contents: 1. Draft Plant Operating Experience Report 4 2. Operators Log 3. Shift Foreman tog 4. Strip Charts 5. Figure 1 - CVCS Diagram (excerpt) 6. Figure 2 - Containment Sump Volume 4 s I l l l

-DRAFT-I ?* PLANT Ol'r.RATillo EXPERIF.NCf, REPORT 1. Event Date_ January 29, 1981 2. Identification of Occurrence A spurious safety injection signal initiated by a "High Steam Line A) Flow / Low T,yg" signal. Reactor Coolant System icak through letdown line drain valve CVC-2002. ,l B) t Primary plant depressurization leading to a second safety injection C) r signal initiated by a " Low Pressurizer Pressure" signal. 4 3. Conditions Prior to Occurrence A plant shutdown to hot standby was in progress to repair a secondary The unit had been operating at 100% reactor power (725 MWe) plant problem. with normal Reactor Coolant System pressure and temperature. Description of Occurrence (All Times Are Approximate) 4. ~A) At 0624 hours on January 29, 1981, a safety injection signal initiated "A" train equipment was manually started at "B" train of safeguards. 1 0625 hours. B) At 0635 hours on January 29, 1981, the chemical and volume control letdown system was restored and system pressure began decreasing with Letdown was secured an increasing containment pressure end dew point. at 065C, hours. C) At 0705 hours on January 29, 1981, a safety inj ection signal initiated both trains of safeguards. -DRAFT-1 to

-~~ ^ -DRAFT-i 5. Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence At approximately 0400 hours, "A" turbine electro hydraulic (E-H) oil pump developed a seal leak. "B" E-H oil pump had been taken out of service earlier due to high vibrations. At 0541 hours, the decision was made to shut down to hot standby before receiving a trip signal due to the loss of E-H oil. Attachment No. 1 contains additional information on the failure of the E-H Oil System. At 0624 hours, immediately following opening the generator output breakers, the reactor tripped and a safety injection was initiated by a "High Steam Line Flow / Low T,y " signal. Only "B" train of the safeguards was activated. "A" train equipment was manually started at 0625 hours. It was determined that the erratic operation of the E-H Oil System and the fact that the operators were switching from "A" E-H oil pump to "B" E-H oil pump caused the governor valves to spike open. The resultant steam flow spike was high enough to cause a "High Steam Line Flow / Low T,y " signal but it was of insuf ficient duration to fully latch the "A" safeguards train seal-in relay. The seal-in relays in the safeguard trains are latching relays that require a finite period of time in the energized mode to ec:hanically latch them into the closed position. Attachment No. 2 contains additional information on the partial safety injection. The steam line isolation signal that was generated from the "High Steam Line Flow / Low T signal was of insufficient duration to allow the main steam isolation valves to go shut. The open signal was reinstated so quickly -DRAFT-tm 2

-DR. AFT-5. Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence (Continued) af ter the isolation signal that the valves were unable to travel far enough to isolate the steam flow. The main steam isoir. tion valves were manually shut to reduce the secondary steam demand following the reactor trip, thereby promoting the return of T,yg to the no load setpoint. At 0627 hours it was determined that safety injection conditions did not exist and that the initiation was spurious. The safety injection and feedwater isolation signals were reset. The chemical and volume control letdown system was restored at 0635 hours. The Reactor Coolant System pressure had been slowly decreasing, but when letdown was returned to service, the containment pressure and dew point began increasing. Another indication of abnormal containment conditions was a fire alarm from the area of the containment operating deck which was received at approximar.ely 0624. Letdown was secured at 0650 hours with Reactor Coolant System pressure at 1850 psig. The initial containment entry made at 0700 hours to investigate the abnormal conditions confirmed that the RCS leakage was from the letdown line and that no fire existed. A subsequent containment entry at 1120 hours further identified the source of the leak as valve CVC-200E, a drain valve on the letdown line, which was found open and the pipe cap missing. The leak that resulted from the open drain valve was approximately 5 to 7 gpm with the letdown air operated valves closed and approximately 100 gpm with letdown flow established. The leak was com-pletely stopped by shutting valve CVC-200E. The letdown flow was not restored until after the condition was found and repaired. Additional information regarding the RCS leak and containment fire alarm can be found in Attachment No. 3. \\ 3 tm nn a rr

-DRAFT- -~ 5. Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence (Continued) However, even with the letdown control valves closed, the pressurizer pressure continued to decrease, leading to the second safety injection initiation at 0705 hours from a " Low Pressurizer Pressure". Both trains of the safeguards equipment functioned as designed. At 0727 hours, charging was isolated (except reactor coolant pump seal injection) to eliminate auxiliary spray and "B" and "C" reactor coolant pumps were securod to prevent the pressurizer spray valves from circulating cooler water from the Reactor Coolant System into the pressurizer through the spray valves, decreasing the pressure. It was subsequently discovered that the pressurizer spray valve from "C" reactor coolant loop had prob-ably opened and not fully reseated. The pressurizer pressure immediately started to increase. The reactor coolant system was stabilized at approximately 2050 psig and 535 F with pressure controlled by the pres-surizer heaters and temperature controlled by the secondary steam dump. Attachment No. 4 ccntains additional information on the reactor coolant system pressure transient caused by the spray valve malfunction. Coincidental with the decreasing pressurizer pressure, pressurizer level was increasing. This was caused by two factors.

1) The charging flow from two charging pumps was maintaining or increasing the system volume, including the system losses through C7C-200E. The slightly open pressurizer spray valve was causing the pressure to decrease.
2) The density changes in the reactor coolant due to the slowly increasing RCS temperatures and the heat up of the relatively cold water added by the charging system caused the system to expand. These factors combined to cause an increasing pressurizer level. The margin to subcooling remained tm 4

-RRAFF-

= ~~ 5. Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence. (Continued) greater than 55 F throughout the entire transient. The minimum subcooling t margin occurred at 0720 hours, with reactor coolant system pressure at 1620 psig and temperature at 551 F. The relief valve on the letdown line, CVC-RV-203, lif ted following the first saf ety injection initiation. This was apparently due to the isola-tion valves, CVC-204A and CVC-204B, closing slightly faster than the orifice isolations, CVC-200A, CVC-200B and CVC-200C, or leakage past one or more of the orifice isolation valves. This caused the pressure between the valves to increase above the set pressure for CVC-RV-203 (600 psig). The valve reset af ter the letdown isolations closed, but the bellows had ruptured. Attachment No. 3 also contains additional information regarding valve CVC-RV-203. a 6. Analycis of Occurrence Several problems with the turbine E-H Oil System had occurred within approxi-mately one week preceeding the reactor trip and safety injection on January 29, 1981 which could have contributed to the initiation of the event. These problems are sunnarized as follows: e 1) The E-H oil had become contaminated with water due to a ruptured E-H oil cooler approximately one week prior to this event. However, the E-H oil had been purified (replaced) and restored to specificaticn f prior to this event. It is not felt that this contributed to the following problems. l 2) On January 28, 1981 "B" E-H pump unloader developed a fatigue crack I in its discharge nipple. While replacing this nipple, air was introduced into the "B" E-H oil pump portion of the systen. When ( -DRAFT-tm 5

-DRAFT-e g 't.

    • 6.

Analysis of Qecurrence (Continued) "B" E-H oil pump was restarted, it caused excessive vibrations throughout the E-H Oil System. "A" E-H oil pump was restarted and "B" E-H oil pump was secured after a brief period of operation. 3). The' seal leak which developed on "A" E-H oil pump on January 29, 1981 which necessitated the turbine shutdown is felt to have been caused by either age or the excessive system vibration. 4) As the seal leak on "A" E-H oil pump became larger during the re-maining moments of the turbine shutdown, the operators decided to run "B" E-H oil pump despite the vibration problem in order to allow the leak to be isolated so a normal turbine shutdown could be completed. Coincidentally, "B" E-H oil pump was started as the generator output breakers were opened. When the generator output breakers are opened the turbine switches from load control to speed control. One, or some combination, of the above probably caused the turbine governor valves to spike open. The exact cause cannot be determined. This caused the first safety injection initiated on a low reactor coolant syhtem average temperature coincident with high steam line flow. The high steam flow was of a very short duration, thus only "B" safeguards train was activated and the main steam isolation valves remained open. Letdown line drain valve CVC-200E had vibrated open since it had last been verified shut on October 11, 1980. It is postulated that the pressure transient caused by the letdown line isolation caused the pipe cap to blow off. Thus, a Reactor Coolant System leak existed. -DRAFT-tm 6 e

,-DRAFT-o =_ 6. Analysis of Occurrence (Continued) ~ " ' The continued decrease in pressurizer pressure was caused by the failure t of the pressurizer spray valve from "C" reactor coolant system loop (RCS-455B) to fully shut af ter opening during the transient. The event ~ identification was complicated by the letdown relief line lifting to the j pressurizer relief tank which indicated that, there were two separate leaks. The Reactor Coolant System pressure decrease was stopped when "B" and "C" reactor coolant pumps were secured and the charging line was isolated to eliminate auxiliary spray. With the pressure decrease stopped, operator control of the Reactor Coolant System was re-established and normal hot shutdown conditions were established. Following the first saf ety injection at 0624 hours, the fire protection containment isolation valve FP-248 did not shut automatically and had to be manually closed. Attachment No. 5 contains additional information on the performance of the fire protection containment isolation valve. A summary of the P250 computer output for this event is provided as Attachment No. 6. . r 7. Corrective Action A) The E-H oil was completely replaced with new oil. B) "A" E-H oil pump and unloader were replaced. C) The unloader and discharge nipple on "B" E-H oil pump were replaced. D) The valve stem on RCS-455B was lubricated, stroked and valve posi-tioner was adjusted to ensure the valve will fully close. RCS-455A was also checked for proper operation. -DRAFT-tm 7 r

'~ j -~ -DRAFT-1 7. Corrective Action (Continued) E) CVC-200E was locked closed and the pipe cap was replaced. Similar valves in~ the letdown and charging lines were also Ipcked closed or otherwise verified to be secured. 7) The breaker over current trip setpoints on the four Fire Protection System containment isolation valves have been adjusted and checked a to insure proper valve performance. G) The event was fully analyzed by the plant staff and Westinghouse, 9 and the results discussed with the NRC, Region II, to ensure that all safety concerna were identified and resolved prior to returning, the unit to operation. M 3 MH Unit 2 Operating S pisor U*Y Manager - peratibus-end Maintenance _ r' J ill General. snager -DRAFT-8 tn

r-s. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS 0541 Unit shutdown was initiated due to E-H System trouble. 0620 . Tavg reached the low Tavg setpoint (5430F) during plant shutdown. 0624 Generator output breaker is opened removing unit from system. Load on unit is %6%. Turbine governor valve (s) spike open (see Attachment No. 1). High Steam Flow / Low Tavg signal generated. MSIV's closure signal (see Attachment No. 2). SI signal, train "B" actuates (see Attachment No. 2). CV isolation valve FP-248 fails to close (see Attachment No. 5). Minimum Tavg = 5320F (based on incore thermocouple). PZR preneurc = 2100 pnig. PZR level = 13%. 0625 Fire alarm at CV operating deck (see Attachment No. 3). Pressurizer relief tank Icvel alarms from CVC-203 discharge (see Attachment No. 3). -DRATT-

0625 (Contd.) Primary pressure begins to dccrease (see Attachment No. 4). MSIVs manually closed. SI train "A" equipment manually started. Letdown valves 460A & B manually shut. 0627 Manually reset SI. 0635 Restored letdown. Containment dew point and pressure begin to increase. 0650 Isolated f.etdown (suspected leak in letdown system). 0656 Tavg reaches maximum value of 552 F and holds steady. PZR pressure = 1750 psig. PZR level = 50%. 0700 Containment entry to check for leak and fire (see Attachment No. 3). 0705 Second SI signal due to low PZR pressure, 1715 psig. Both "A" and "B" trains activated. i 0705-0727 Operators attempt to determine cause of depressurization. The following equipment was checked: -DRAFT-

~ - ~. . -DRAFT-e, i 0705-0727 a) PZR safety valves flow indicators. (Con td. ) b) PZR PORV discharge line temperature. c) PZR block valve position. d) PZR relief tank level. e) PZR relief tank pressure. f) PZR spray valve position (the valves in'dicated closed but since this indication is demand indication the valve controllers were-again manually closed). s 0722 The RCS temperature was lowered slightly using the secondary steam dumps to help control the increasing pressurizer level. Tavg = 549 F.' PZR pressure = 1620 psig. PZR level = 62%. 0727 The charging line was isolated to eliminate the possibility of auxiliary spray causing the depressurization. RCP "B" and "C" were stopped to eliminate the possibility of main spray flow causing the depressurization. Pres,surizer pressure begins to rise. 0735 Tavs = 5430F. t PZR pressure = 1715 psig. PZl: level * $0%. -DRAFT-

0820 PZR pressure stabilized. Tavs = $350F. f PZR pressure = 2050 psig. ~ PZR level = 45%. + 1120 Made second containment entry and isolated CVC-200E at 1230 hours. L 1120 (1-29-81) to 1700 (2-1-81) Review and analysis of transient with Westinghouse. Dincussions of trannient with NRC Region II. i' 2315 (1-29-81) RCS-455B positively identified as leaking spray valve. i 1700 (2-1-81) Plant on-line. f I e e -DRAFT- _~ _

-DRAFT-ATIACHMENT NO. 1 E-H SYSTDi FAILURE The E-H System had experienced several problems prior to the transient on 1-29-81. During the previous week the E-H fluid had become contaminated with ( ';. water. (This contamination was restored to within specification.) On Wednes-o day morning,1-28-81, a stainless steel nipple on the E-H System unl,ader on "B" pump cracked. This caused a loss of approximately 30 gallons of E-H fluid. The fluid and nipple were replaced and "B" pump restarted. However, the pump was immediately stopped due to noise and vibration. Several attempts were made to troubleshoot the problem but no definite cause was found. The system was left operating satisfactorily with one pump in service. At 0500 on 1-29-81 the second E-H pump, "A", developed a seal leak which caused E-H fluid to leak out of the system. At 0541 the operators began to take the unit off line to repair the E-H Sys.em. At 0624 while the unit was being separated from the system, the E-H System generated 'a pressure surge to the governor valves wh'ich resulted in the valves momentarily opening. Three factors could have contributed to the pressure surge. The turbine control was switching to speed control. The opera tors were trying to start "B" E-H oil pump to supply E-H oil during the final moments of the turbine shutdown. The E-H System had been contaminated by water during the previous week. This caused a momentary high steam ' flow to be sensed on at least 2 steam lines. The spike shows up on all three steam flow charts. The effect of this flow spike is described in Attachment No. 2. The f ailure of "A" pump seal on the E-H System was due to age and transf erred vibration from "B" pump. Subsequent to these pump failures, the unloader of pump "B" has been replaced and pump "A" was replaced in its entirety. The complete system was restored to service and is operating satisfactorily. -DRAFT-tm 1 __r

-DRAFT- ~ ~ ~ ATIACHMENT NO. 2 PART1AL SI AT 0624 HOURS On January 29, 1981 at 0541 a unit shutdown was commenced to do repair work on the turbine E-H System. At approximately 0620 hours Tavg dropped below the low Tavg setpoint of 543 F due to an inadvertent overshoot during plant shutdown. At 0624 with the unit atru6% power the generator output breakers were opened disconnecting the unit from the system. At this time the turbine E-H control system switched to speed control and due to pressure instabilities in the E-H control system the turbine governor valves spiked open. A review of the event indicates that the spike caused an indicated steam flow in at least two steam lines to exceed the steam flow setpoint for a time period less than 25 msec. This indicated high steam flow in 2/3 steam lines combined with the low Tavg mentioned earlier generated a main steam isolatio'n valve closure signal and a SI signal. The duration of this signal would be the same as the steam flow spike. It has been observed during periodic tests that the MSIVs require a signal duration o~f approximately 1 sec. to close and so none of the NSIVs ~ closed on the momentary high flow / low Tavg signal. (The MSIVs were manually closed immediately by the operators in order to stabilize RCS temperature.) The SI signal is divided into 2 trains "A" and "B". Each of these trains cc.n-tains several relays including a mechanical latching relay (Westinghouse Type MG6) which is used to luck in the SI train until manually reset. A signal duration greater than 25 msec. is required to insure that all relays close and the latching relays lock in. Since the SI signal was less than 25 msec. only the latching relay for train "B" fully engaged. The operators immediately noticed that train "A" had not engaged and so they manually started the train "A" equipment. Containment isolation Phase A was initiated by train "B". No S1 water was injected into the system since RCS pressure vas ev2100 psig and the -DRAFT-to, _ _ 8

1 -DRAFT-ATTACHMENT NO. 2 (Continued) shut off head of the SI pumps is 1500 psig. SI was manually reset at 0627 since the SI initiation was identified as spurious. Once train "A" was manually initiated the SI System performed as expected, with the exception of CV isolation valve FP-248 (see Attachment No. 5). The actua-tion of the SI System did not effect the physical course of eventa during the transient, however it did obscure the cause of the RCS depressurization (stuck pressurizer spray valve). No repairs to the SI logic or components are ~ considered necessary. l i -DRAFT-tm 2

ATTACHMENT N00 3 (Continued) Ill \\ l, at 0624 it apparently caused a heat sensitive fire detector to go off in containment. The detector was located above the drain valve on the operating r i deck. Since the operators had ihdication of RCS leakage and a fire in the i t. containment, an individual using respiratory protection wss sent into the containment to investigate. This individual confirmed.the leakage and identified the source as the letdown line but was unable to identify the exact l 1eak poin: because his air supp1p was low. During the inspection no evidence of fire was found. r To prevent future occurrences the CVC-200E pipe threads were dressed and a new end cap installed. CVC-200E and several other valve / pipe cap arrangements which could be exposed to the same condition were inspected and physically locked or verified secured in the closed position. t i O I e l l l l l t t -DRAFT-tm 2

ATTACllMEhT NO. 4 FRIMARY SYSTDi DEPRESSURIZATION I The main concern during the transient of 1-29-81 was an unexplained decrease f in RCS pressure..The pressure dropped from 2200 pois to 1620 pois in approxi-l mately one hour. Many steps were taken during the first hour of the transient j to determine what'was causing the depressurization. The presiturizer (Pzr) I safety valves were checked'by looking at the accoustic flow indicators down-stream of the valves. No flow was indicated. The Pzr PORVs were checked by l looking at the pipe temperature downstream of the valves. Again, no flow was I indicated. The P:r block valves were checked to verify that they were shut. 1 The Pzr relief tank level and pressure were also checked to verify that they were not increasing. The main Pzr spray valves were then switched to manual control and closed by the operator. The indication on the RICB showed the valve to be closed, however, since this indication is only of demand position, the operator tried to insure that the valves had closed by manually closing them. The charging line was then isolated to'see if the auxiliary spray valve. CVC-311, was leaking. Additionally, P.CP "B" and "C" were stopped so'that flow through the main spray valves 455A & B was not possible. Pzr pressure began increasing. Later that night (2315 hours) spray valve 455B was positively i t identified as the leaking valve. An inspection of.the valve showed that the stem was binding on the valve pack-ing. One reason the binding problem was not identified earlier is that tho spray valves do not move much during power operation. RCS pressure control is accomplished by varying the Pzr heaters with the spray valve partially opened. The valve was repaired by lubricating the stem. The valve was then tested four times to insure proper operation. In addition, the electro-mechanical i I positioner zero setpoint was discovered to be slightly off and therefore was t f reset. -DRAFT-1 tm

~ ATTACHMENT NO. 5 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE FAILURE (FP-248) I At 0624 on 1-29-81 a SI' signal generated a Phase A contIinment isolation. As part of this isolation the newly installed fire protection containment isolation ~ valves FP-248, FP-249, FP-256, FP-258 were signaled to shut. FP-248 did not shut. The valve was then manually shut. The cause of failure was a tripped breaker which would not allow power to the motor operator. Subsequent review indicated that the trip point on the magnetic overload breaker was not set high enough to insure proper operation. The breakers had been tested successfully upon installation, however, the current demand of the valve motors can change with time and so if the trip point is not set with enough margin the breaker can pass a test and yet fail at a later time. The setpoints on all four valves have been readjusted to compensate for the above problem and tested. This should correct any future problems w'ith these valves. e 4 0 e -DRAFT-tm 1

.ATTACHMElfr NO. 6

SUMMARY

OF P250 COMPLTTER OUTPUT 7' Time Event 0620 Alarm - Low Tavg Permissive Set 0620 Alarm - Low Tavg 541.2 (setpoint is 543.0) 0623 ORR - Control Rod Bank C Inserted (reactor trip) 0624 Alarm - RHR Pump "B" BKR Closed (SI signal) 0624 Alarm - Low Tavg 532.7 (minimum Tavg) 0625 INCR - Hi PZR Relief Tank 75.2% (Valve CVC-203 lif ts) 0627 RETRN - RHR Pump "B" BKR Open (SI reset) 0705 Alarm - PZR Low P & L SI (Second SI signal) 0705 Alarm - RHR Pump "B" BKR Closed 0705 Alarm - RER Pump "A" BKR Closed 0726 Alarm - RCLB Im Flow (RCP "B" stopped) 0727 Alarm - RCLC Lo Flow (RCP "C" stopped) l e e -DRAFT- -, _Gm __ _ ___ _

.~ p, ^CQefa ders (-. o y

  • j. : :

s i 2d-Q.V' .... '- Wis ). N'9# _ ks. tic. 2aL.,2<1--/ u.s. s4 E. Lo;<s.;/- Ju. lipA/s e t x1J;c.A G/Z_ w/..,4 unL.s- 'ss--propc.,203.J. n 4. -.. _.....,)Ic. n h C enJ.:4 '.<.-, dC.-J.i'sA S~.7c. ca a <. s4.ef j.)u.a...Aa_ i. - /oev:.s /c J rye,..L's A 4 -//..c>n - 72 ep. y ow e -r --a uf,a,4 [ ,2ce- /n..a.s as A os>, e_.2. sz n~ co, 6/-.e><jm y. { f;en A<c.Le.- 72. fr 6m-C4fxA T l h,..yi, dIA. 1%.jn_pm c x, o c.sp s-c ac -j,.lym,,..A. <1.H 9u Ye ~' .2 r c -e , % e f; & g .. S c'c. /e a /* A /c '<t f r e.7 n u,. 3 lA'-..Os w..G<ft &, %.,0 l -C c.t.%,. C v. r'A' '2"/ /1-.'<t -t> rut r. 'Y5b' i E W Qtty Ce.epfe_fa j___ff i).I O l'IS dc'il is.- J.etss n l 1% < le> A J.s b,3 i.t,af._fas-.A - A ve~ I i O/ft C ce_-p_/ ea_- / 7' E40 31 7i C_ M o d O LL 1' 'Tbyl11_.f+ s LJ_f a.,a.so 0 Y1

  • A Mi i..

3.0 Ca, -Aaa lea. < 02N f~12+/l /cJ.--. cue / 5 Y{:.f S*. I '2' g As eAArV. fr>~- /.:.f/ /a. _L7. SX ~' '~ 6.LW -. 3 b-h! -J /caaf Deevaa --. D.s. -..fo _ E:/L_o a'L4,._.,, o s c]/cm l O ID - 4Das c- /o-. G./s 2,/ l-_:te. C.. /s..h> -Q A's3.- _ S) ~-leL._'l.."- CAl1 . a -,i f,,p. a., J,1_oo s_ or, f, _ - 8 " s**f ? A o<.o-2o G-h. B.s. /u.p.cJ '.Y. l D 5 tr 12.s*/ /* l gis6 't 't \\ 06d1 tc { _ _2/ 0 </ s< 't it_. te i, si C&Ck 0 " _).-I'f~cJ.s i.!.jJe 4se,. pg,;. c'#'r g ( e _ g S*b'_* % l./.._k *.: _. j.?c.$,_'h % } c D t o "! .ADDcD 2 0 Gd1. jR,' 's.f Ce b $ W.. -.-.. ---...-. - J'f--. 51 ppe.d. YI L f~Itid ..hsJ W.cc.a.],2e. ssp. ( A. 0/6.--. A DO as. /o G. /s /J J,' r C /.r. f r> J G & ? '(. .. o w /'.<rf/ cm J. s av}/ cc6s 2 I e o & 2n_ c. J -.S T.-. rt.-~.j; sia. ihd s 5^re,y /0_w r2__ k, nu x - 4.. ~ m n -(s = %. & L W D h, & p...a c i x..b \\ A.

  • a S C p.Y M.

/ wi.. ' l. w.c w.~a. + e ,,, c v. i s s,c- ~>

o-t 235 i I L _ < N.- # . 4,mky ~ __.. 3AN !L9 JS1. .._d.62 7._./c.s, /..._S..T... w &n, / _ __- - _Ola V. _.S (.?r.1 A. b ". g 7G.. punf>. _. ___ _. _.. 1~ Q U- }..- ~~Z ~ ~~biliiiL~C6ii!fgiditi6n1~_T Z 1 i -Date ^' ?^YL--Time ALML Oper.. d'* Bonk_ Position.(Steps). W A n 1.f.... B. _ _ *3 'W C' > m ' D. #' ?' "t i Tave.- f 7f,.*F-. Pressure. '2. 2.b' PSIG i ~ - -- ; Baron Concentration ------- /#5'.-- -PPM j ~ Reo'etor Power Level 38' =. Amps :..us --fo f . _ O__. 3I,*p'ed b(f._Y AVc )n_}l/.pil>*.! lA' ~ 2 ** A \\^Jll ^ *h o f e. m O Dla3 ? CJ.%) CC$e.a./un- ~ )/A.,Sizt/tr Ar G__JM-Y, i.... o M O.-._ S J ~ h.' 4 c.;, _. s___, a _ q u~ p_ j. x soj_ _A / p H m _p,.g. y a,_ ._4 " r.er cL70s , _, _g r _, ymoa__,,w_,,,,,,,,.,,g gja,_, .,0h&.. 4 a.ny 4,. cu...(b A A c. 3 -- f 0 N -- b fod-Y " Y l f C*f* tai. a.nw _sc.s...p~. _.si~.La._,o c ~.,i.,,._ ow t c A 7 2 L _ 3 4,y, t. g f. c fcfu ,,a_j,,e. py,._ t gg,,, g,,,,,_,,,y --- 3.W._. 9ja e m.dow~ -_.. ow O.I. 'I

  • $ b' y cd }h [ lll$._..

f .'$5).MW _$it//.ct._.f taL%.A_%D &f.o.J.'A.id $c.'< U l'g AhX__cz.~ _Sk f:h, m _ Tw X,, e GrseX S/L)j J G 2. Oc>o.c /S,,, Coo,( bo p wy &._ Ay __.z 2 a 4r w s. . 0 C tt 3r. c. . C. for.L. FXc c o/. f.2ff * [2/F_.. r ~ -.is."' g / c..teL'<_ c c# 4 g i 5. ....J l 5

m U JD p i - CD* ~~l /[fAll7// .... _. _ _ _..__ _ _ / "_'.Y'h . ~. - - _. ,,Q . -.....h*e icW<m..@.itu1..SWir-7's_y6s ; s;r,4;7<.s. 3se'!f75.ige 3 l,' _c' 7.s c.. aQL s'ss. tiv dife-x./n,fie,y.,9A lc',9,vj_' es,on, paw.r.c~re yat - N.--..... Tresc~.xu% ia ry. toss. sam.' zud. raut..s-k.c,,<t s yS-/s >c m

<s T t.:<= A:d.c anne.1c.cr.. AD. c n. _<,e; 7:-,vg.A,,,x panc fy*,;y ea s
1.,'....

.... tad.S A + %. nwire k. Ay/,1ss+27.Q. a ', "_5.p g ;.,: ,5 3 c_ g .-....&..u: iWi. a,.. ca.>P 's. _et.c...-l.., u c 3.r_..a.ee,n. meg,_.,uc.,,y, x -- Sw)mrut. A,n/ ccc.,. yv. r_ce.A,ne__ sZ c,ct fausus h : j

y-.-.

,\\ 4:.fisM fvM.ncy c;,._.s.r.nA s. ).r-2,.; ot _ n Q. ._de sc:7 1qwc. e,,,ysy_.ge g5;g, _ - -.....At

  • tI linc)./N;Tcr-Tee s. /m' r'L. fA tot
  • h'TDr&.. 4't MTMss.L. 3MQ

!tLCU a. 'Es//n' A..>A_fas4.,4 '/de/Jwwc ~ d M H n.t-L.' /</[_, (d. ,.---- CL3 c-in//en. _.xc.. <-rW/c s&f ap3o L<'.4 ? %. w : n1E.._(!to.o4_6le o22 //-,.9

  • OE-S'*I~'cT MB

)'c-M s.- OMI- .k?th'*-Q."E" At/tC_A< m/ n ?.d*_ A x ca r- %.C e,,v c: U.... u e l '_ 0 <.r g s-07'tC .nct < w .. 3 Kc/'...Sp vsft2 7c..e tc>t,c t'<./<tx'sy. ..-.o W9... Ere& e v.._B..,ced.. snnu //c: / - CD h - 1D!.&CW /. //. y.Z c.L L &.'s_ c. Aun./2_ ___ _ MLS 5ri.d..e.~r A - cr / m/'.r I 0F3D.--. Achw& Y2O..ffc s c.cm... 7/co.. DD.9..__.sm Ge;0.. t/t/s.</ ic./1/J)eA<.es.p /ef,&nev,g D5'/6. .%'.i'?c~ v_ AG &> w// < c* ] 0 l'l 7.. Ac& _.s// B/.wh.eid iso e,ste v _ J jc.q. ...Mi L _.. 2lc>%27. A/vW-y. Y tr'c/ Y-/. O / EWCC . AS dei.m . /6' 2 6.,/,*/* x?. C91c> Wii,:hz' / o,s' "~'. c. ~~ " ? N j~ / -._ ~ 09/& -. fT~ 7. 3 1'. 2c. f.. tEW/t'e7e z.i_ 0 ?/ V.. . E'*4*'Ar'_ lWJ.9)c fc'3 /13 L ncea-o ^B A'cs' m.,e..;,4,. '- df33 Sti' h0/ 75t.,/if t ( s e irc. ils n <t y,i 7-l. 0Y5? ,$- }}/ jyx 'g / fcf ch. '.fq. ,t c3e r I U '!- ") ),'lG T S'u'N 5Ud / ^ I l i. u'fl s"W (~, A-M \\' S u'l ~ "J ..yb jl,ong' u,a m-c.rai~ -fC3.. Nic-Cd'Gt' Je> ' p'c ff / /012 STAATeo AG WD (f, S70

  • f,... r )

} n t [ d 'a tf ' .i. .. ]s6t < s 4 1 .,.. r7 CS1'ft'.. wva t Aw-..../D. 22- % '" 7.. E ..... _....- /.21.* 2/'_ -. y h 3.pM-W - d'J.f.-. fr-j._... &. W....-. f *' W e W.. W/C...cNt) Wb 'Fb?'t_.T. )Tiif. Nidc..>d 6 W.. f64_ ..]D,30..... N S $.'A'ow $ *6 f /C ~1.'s ffisy t . t0 W -..JNtWA>f, Nd?E~A'. 5- '}S?.. h_ _ l. 2.'.Y.,rPt 5

. Wok..

(019.. 6'6cd...SX^We c'. <//.w')..c.v.) '.'B ~ 9'c* u.n.

    • 5 M _- 2/r1/d.L c oEoQ-_nAllk' s/4_

8c w 2 pwi. jo!//.- ._ - itA//7~.-. 0/.S W AL cTJ--. 0l^l N_? - % C ../(.92 ---. Zaad BiaJ.cr. ?g. _6.O42_ +Q. _llY! K o S.c a e-. S '< ' 3 co.9 D '_.Wh'2W T ' N /* G9A M A A ='-' M > f h &J. M U'/.? sie u c' ..-..Ic/W.ie- /cse.. E&is. - a0 _&seliL1-ca > hwa. 7s7 E y.. L.EE-4 a2_tMAc4 AAzM 7t> 7f ALsr 1YK. B_Olus2.-.Aist. eL.ALles peif cm.-2-kn 7-7,20 ~ o

.J'dE-h A'*iA..AlS..T@ /- G $ 0'f.lML..b'G:dC

\\ i ..Q/ ~ K. ........ $M[--%' maw.4.,. $X!J. AO. AT44 *' 2XANMigti--))tt _. IN M#s..AAE...Kk'McA-EK4eJE.EM.. C h e s'WP-, ~ _ AC..Jd8.k.:f.- 8s@- l%8 AStk,..'7tAArc?- Q 3 C >?Eid6 _....eu

  1. 3r G_O.. r> ch.7 -._s_u'h- @ 3 w d_s,

- - -( f) Cl16 t't0 . 'h K Tc ~ Es. 1~/lC h'9l 't' Y-- --- l ?. 6:~ $ / L E l ... $h/W _.. lkt 2(C o. -ictis t:Y km/ / ~ / :"i:o.cc $ S/ if7.5. s <* C. S.. :Cr/srt, ti sr 7 t,. a Ir> s.'My ):sc r/L t- -. Ytitst. f/1)s (n. syt.'6. ;p..s'dIr.' tit _ j.y $ tr.1cis as.: s se 7. wd s'#Dt* > I 1 - _.--....._ PL C l? ! 'Ti t s'. . s~ o174' r . C '* 7FC SG. t/W '3 4 h '. _ _. -.. 3.. )!c~yn~ g c 3 s WITA' f ' ' '.A ;.f. 't 6 ! '. //* * *. o # 7n'.. //' *C - $so. i os , ; 6 AM t 4 ns. .w a G '~n.,&/ /.* Antis s de o c', ?:s* * !! o . r.. : v s

  • 1 : <'; m:M ': sN. * ~*

,e s

  • ? *: r";/, **~/F,

/t et * :. c et. rt.:, t s'Y J A V 7a,,,

- _b v 1) <-s <* 2, e.'.* * -

J' Y5 'Y /*P t' ten r *! '.

a. a.o.:.

..,. :.: s). ./:..... .r;.n., < ta n:tsa ie. c'ec:, s *es.o* s *iri/ s epier.jgs a yt '. . e <rt:c t. ias. s c r A'ss<v en, s ss~ <M.; s J !Nf'. ~ V.:. 9 -e ' ~l 9.r.n 2.r rr'wov' _ s.1tW, . _.fi!!11.*-I; ..!.' A !! Cf. r's.'<l. <*r r i s *.i:,..n,.c .tr.ne:ik I,. Gt.'. s' is. > >. . -... -.... AM ' ~tiist/ ' s 's 'rc 1. tM.... ife/s.'</u.. i h e 5.s sas. - .f,....- -

,o E E IE11 M ElW I IEEN H. B. ROBINSON /Uso ~>fs e C)._l0 '7'_b_ h_; _ // Y/ e ^ - -? ? ld*D W A n 8 mm sud ~$A 0-d,[ A /L, he_= & T.r? & / 0 A ^ \\ / c y 90-ofso 7L A s t/19/t/ d Md $~%_- 2 L$ 'JPA N alxE.',Q: xl-n/fru aM / s.t <-r )W- ~ ln s b ' - 4, A1 - O h_ ~"D NVJ If/Jl'1 Y s < rL W / d'i L u d w N ) /'rAA" Af 'M i o r r/ 1 s f 7 e /4 E m ~Z'-- m k it/.m +n nue nm nL n _=Mr N% N fa,u~ _ =$, '~ ' A./ s% lw u Jwh N t PS n B f e.<L 4 a mn, / 7 $_A .nds -- u

3 2_ w p

$ GM cis/L N/-/.f~ ~ l Mz E-14,eLar27.n =-a-JE add -- \\ k,_ d/7r:)-L L, =:1/w L e s ' ~ ' ' ' i a. ff" /j, { r 'e l, '?W esh Y 1 h /' m od J' J s 4 / e_-- A - d 4. l 7)90fy/f_g/AZ W,,4 V E /. f A ?__ h y W ' 5 $9 o 4 2. i d 8 b !. iL #A L A m 1: Lb s= - n= b $/AJ \\ ~ OW"ma \\ \\ '%n nr 1i L cA.s L~s~r eLZ u mm.- an is - A-2. I id 00/Fr'5LZ'ul1222'w Ma-sn &c= D2G^CAdei. ~ A.s, e ~.2 ' nJ f e vL XZX h A, ' ' iS $dssiADL, #6MMBAdu'm.- : .a A x L' - A - ~ n b 2' W d n. = is9sysrsLa:% JsiU w n ,s&' ,&L,k'427'.,% Srsn fA',d.' xn +_% n) 4 % 7 m A's N' k w, M >= ~ A',X2 ' wL ~E. ] sai _A~. r / / S.1 :7 U K :L ,. x..1z z, ~, ~. = x-l s M w 1/fI-/ettoC/c /J L= 20#e* e Ps 8 $ 3 /+ D/Y5'bos/'/D2~ >b~ / d). IP e 't

g

'b** -3

    • /,.g g.- g y *

$ ; ' r.r.h . w., J.,*'.. F s. N' * ' r * ~ r

~ ~.. .2 H. B. ROBINSON UNIT N? 7632-I p ir 3 us %::c- [ o % -16 iGsdu % n int, d kAunasel fruira, - S k. fly N s t D.D e .L Ls tn w (ese 'o fw a 00[ae.Mi$r-Lal f $ 0t[ 4 s m

c. t.

~ i 34M I iq tue tus af [ o~ A rak cDL t n e. Cec k ( A r ra ~ res k 1 s t i ~ G n..bs k clee m.sr so f J m c6 LAL 4r j.$ s-i w 3 /... /. f-j + A g 1 /oc>o h s = 6 .So K.s

s t *w ut;

= __stcro.r nC e s u li, k . Tse(A l 6 %. '-hC Ait Ll %sSA h/L../ Y h whis cw S.e J .e l [%q Q[-- 1 =f <d sutti. /N ev'776 >L 1Al.< n a Ata ' d,n si i j ~ 'lld 51 aEt!.L -==. m hy FM S,J .s%4 ./ 4 4 sb o,Ar,, /bM n a-s 4 ' 'n H n -sn (w6,J.'&dM 1. h % 'M ^4de cd Av% e Hzo L, al' Rn~ J m W Oe.-awa /)& Os la w ~ L & pr..o n k ~s,lN% W'h /s>li/J/ h/1% m 34 cr/c-Jo w w d' c/o s< l co<- 2 e,s f Onw data e_ u zsa L,.s kn

  • T/

'Z /% fruel wk EsaM /n.ro L, was l FT W /: o y xmhL ~ &~ ' EPk.fecu. Fa L ~ -t %fJ /sn. bs N*!4 95 dm:- lL.o /&d 4 's 9yCL, & W1 ' 3' O,X,J RA r oc.L lik I L f ~ "._ DY %b b. LSc*W, e R Ak kk eT.- .g \\y w t h I.T Es uitz c U~L% s fic's a 1 9'7 9 ' f nl /sco n: roriL k OAL Cc A Cf'duch (Oct.b w A M hl ~ {~.. %A .. 'L r. ' ?. - A.31 e .gs cs3 s43 t e m us ~ L-O fu l 'ly Z {ee./ M M x F - r-

t i i ~ H. B. ROBINSON N? 7633 >' UNITL M L,jl _ "7kg. '"';)A.:... 9 _. "'" %w.WT /4se - Srad ME - - K i t //s.f/r,/ l , gi .. m ' Am <ca/ d\\ Q c 3WL 'n JJ ' 'nu ' h < r s-a u Me D' 6 Ed L -/t,. sa &.fi) A + 0 'c 3, g, y F .<~' ~ 51 Q*Azb aa

  • k ' a1Ad.,'A. ' :. i y

-/ - w as ut ur on k' H v <~ L hx. 7 c-i ts.s 'a t-c nC # C Q. '* ' pj e ,r / _/ s tt.- L f-ee. 2 i s =_t AswaaL i W OA. W h i s u,4 (t=p-s yn. f i b ec. 1:n r,uko r>r- %, a les M=L 1-i. % c I' 3 g g< [ i,. u r-r., _w,,x n wa 1 u b. %esFw - -- w e O. o, - 2 y,,f, h _t*' W /s. -r e 3 /'s rz K a W 'e ' MP ~ n_ -.J f s '. M_ . x.m$w /A eP 39B-d ? MN* * *% a A,o s As A ~'f b

  1. M%

DN"%A.23 ~ }&6 428.J l w L' W5k*d i Zw U

s. ad J M ~'Di

-1 n 2,A A, zkk. ~1s

  • mr > mu=.

L. 2%W&A U c. L _, AkL' ~ 9 1 1 a i ).' : as.

s. s un L,

__] -AdOw i ~u i.-eg y - ~ a 3~ m~, a .w p_ n H AG A f.D w r v Tc ~ 'n' ~ ~ ' A L. W J, )\\ W dn Sa 1.h A *- - X w -= J -; L N;?, su cJ5e1 J dJ ktw 's,.-,"'1z A-: f d ~#A~. <3 E/ 7' A < f-d ' y -l; Am - e, n s} 1 L.~- l _ jL. x Ja /1 g. a:f-s_ e, o, ,c, te es,. c. 1

+

s'**Ansaa n > i. 1 ~. i L 'LG 'OL e:a: J A.,.

  • -n - __.

c ~v \\ M'. / 'KY 9 & na, ' ' ut u er a ~& n n so - ~ A % 2./ '...~. _ %. / L. A 2 L ' n s r ./W ai'

I l di'QM 49 7F06C 7000 0 y-

p. q n oRI. 4aI' Ng
  • ,p I ng! o o pp u n ow. I o~g n g...

_.i. .,yd. ,e 7 !![ 2;i.j g-2 .i .i. ", d"M. ,g d. .I ,,I i tip I k.y h'i gm . e r. - tj;;y,- - - - j- ~ n . t- , p, p fj; i Ws.mM e .e f;j

/

.j b .,TW n T ftNh h h 'h! O "h h rA h h th S' },"

mu t

1 'sp d mi mimoir a nn r m w'

  • ni ii[ k !!

g [][: ltiniti1lt iii mii ti!! immi ir P F iiii iih s, a.. -l ,a irt.it 4 Co,

o*x uo*. m**

o* an' . o - a ,aer un i on i nach - a.: :au we i97 ' l]I iIiii'" % TV IIii li ! 01 m jlg di

  • i i du ;!it

~ lIll 1l lii' @

  • iim F"T il i.o n

fi so 41: ii ilh j gn ih131: nb nii l! [E m Q@NIIII M:,. !!i hi, 's IIii Ill IIII' h nii hi nI np Hli 1 nh ill 11!; IIII:, ..i". i ni-Q yi: o !n! M 1 ' 4I m' !ilM I; nN nu IHI ii nh i i' ':. ou ni, g;. ic 3H n 9r ii iF nii 9n :h' Vi ik: 9 00 ::n 96 Ho ( H ll ll 6 - ll d3 IH l !! dli nh I'll I Ilil 6 i

  • d IJ

~a f8%.s, o e y nnum o @ n uiru m.c a ninrum,. mn ( a un ( lii IIh it t

h:

un ui ini un i.4 4il sin ih: ". 1 nMh: u

z m a m

s

  • y y $3

.- c.o=3 oz.

,o=. 99 <<=i non un ca,9 gen.asn hay ao.

l' hl ' M lif !jP.j.i k .J N "'( UO dl f 1l - !F '. ll h il llil hll !di @ M d@! $l Q !@ p i l' 1 11ill Il :lh % nuinail h !! iih ihHi 4 - O H- ",f .d i u!n m c un nr on am uiou m in un mo. n un-1 .mnm, [ 13h j ji llr do.! T q) m.,a M l ' il yo ll!l f th! 'hi ih'IIH nn ha !y lU lit q: , e o m nn amnu," mn no .n 1.% m m' g l : 11H i ! ! nil f I E,d h (' .:P :.b 4 I CI' 'I.:.[hi lii; un i i: ir +. Winiit < c all ini ui. nna!iliiUe !in i h iis i Il i 14 Idi !!V i i HP I + i~i ny p h e i

  • *4,on n =no...oi ou
gox,

.. o < m p.;, os ;, non nac::.acn nos: ,;oi [ hh5 I nl llll N l n I ll nll nl HN Ilti "? IN 1Hl !'i! 5I Ini !Ei

  • 7 Tiitit7i e #Q ns hF cii iii.

'il iin u n i i ini li ng nr .a i n '. al,o n.:

n
.ign t'tirInmM 1 miiir im tii-I<

ch dn d ii i titi un! a w iiiriff im Ti til iiii 1 I' {Mwi l IL EuOK t!t LNFS UU i*Ut!dR!!iih U" d' !ill 'h 5 ib HH !H Hl! ? i;18!! d i $ "ji! :3

o. na nn y am un

+. m a~inlir lini P 'm tiii ii id igilift nn I g!$ ig nn i w w i

m..<m

. ] 13 ii i! il y jiii PRii i ( q INm ii'i ih mi 0 hh lin PiiE Ti ini mi7i' un nn .m i liliiTuihililii! nn H mi i ilh nF i ot. ., coc d ! ',84:; H;.0 ( w noe ian 'at!! rasp. asp n- ,'oi "Ch Ho*J @ Puo*J o [ hi !!b ip! U jd d!i di' 10 Hi! :hl i;4 lhi ph ( IiEIiiiii 1I i N4 WI @ li' mi i h9 an 'l m u un yio! musn nu na e non !ms' nue nn ni ! W on a + u n o l l Ilh lli t lhi ph 1 IP id ini di! do IIIiiii' ( !"' dil Oil inl 131 ily ini 7 : !i 'nt Ip nP .h q m n!m% ]3.i quoumom t on nn on on w wn annon m A 10 @ nn ! 3ngu y w up lip llii Hp r

in np gg nig glj pjy y n i H gj n j.

ll l h

in

ldi no m.. in lpi ni: Hn !!c t !!U du :hi Op 4 VM H Hl; Y n. li l Il ! lid - U;EIiiiii hui l Il IU.iii ni! un d!! t .HI liF nn illi 'IIN .ti! lib W !O Hn i @-[Ag [*ii~iiif n0 o~ Wi kn Un oji ;Ui il lii'l'i"Tii an 'i un di ai ik: Mil & di # .i :ni i li ni in ",f h !,P*.- h88,. 8

  • ! Iho"y i

h 4 '84 iii" i ts hoWa naH,.a% nac; :ac: :at. n! iiii mi < n.n 9 :it hn un im 1 4n e i I @ m na m! m: m ao I H e + 2 iluup i m 2

. s e

i m Ip! un N nli 4d i I! n & gli y< # !!il s ch Up ah a mi i n no in '; l 11 0 1* Ti"~iiiiiiiii n I L b UU !! L j! dlU!ii1 !$ !!i E!! n!! 31101 L !!!! UI HU q13! El!!! n !!2 Pt i J L! l!!104k & !! !!R !"l!! ! !!! !!!! 0IE UUJJ !E !!ai. "ijh !i ll! f!! L I m{j g4$m7m i, *-t b di M$$HM dMMN MMP W !!R! 4 o m.. l..m..ow. l.,. i ~. __ ,.,.i,. o.-.. .4 ....,as. ,. 0 p e i n pu +. .4 ,a. q g iliI i i I iii L - ig IIII ey a; Iiisinumm'u mmn a m[ t un. um !M 1!H luil i 1 % !yl Wi 9 Oi!! oh 9 quill!

!.l!! M 70 m a un v
n un 91 4

i i [ + hn 1:! dQy Dijul n'! I dl iEi$[jjN tf '"! @ l15 I" TJ $1 in' 1h h,li! I lin d,~

  • . I.Ilis thi hu 'Hi 3

! H M 1!! !!D i-do ml 44 dil 2 16a" i ! "H i" li $u11 1 r ni uh w a ni<n.m ein su un cn un no uii i on ch 'm W :.nd w nn * + M mi i+.m i L g g4 ,'es !**n em9?*:p=- p Om m goos 4*! ha- .ac ! Un! do gg[yg Z m n

mi.!n r A m! gnaiuj i i

ml Up tm un o E im n 'n ci, un lip @.W iA z [q n&. d TlP iD lh IW H" NI HD U ID H! HH M # dH $ UU HI El!'!h ik.!!! W dS iF d' (r, y. 'ngm iin :nl ( ,ln Un ni nu il pm d uin ! O inl yn in ipt Ut n..,g. - o i ns an un N'7 W ' u il. L 3 Q g ],' enny- !", 'lh t 49 nh H llp I! lul II'Ih jl ip !i!! I i! 'IU V 'Tii nn a in n gg t ii ni n slu a tn i

g. 3 s

a i :n w p: s, gn R as m; 'ni I W W M $jO @ M M @ ' N M $ N ! NO I 'd lil[ :lh !d!d!!. h! MI E b ~. XI +e .npuh 1,. T (" @ @ In N 4; 1% . WI.n1MI d:tu t p" ,, 's. ,m :n in,tnp.nj no im IH! ' ' '% in' t n""'o b5jp",jhiWgg..1

  • 0.8PiM n i &:JhCi N5li F un po e

i ~ I i i t k-408 s avW J ee? ? e i s, o-L e t .P e e f i e I bF I E .1 .n ,. p t, _ _ _ ___._ no a. to g ___ _- E --._[ . o.._ .._0 . 3 1,:.._-. __ _. 1 = e,. s v. _4 J ._ o ..O .4 J_ . LJ .__.t .m %J _.c ~_ ..oo _... _o. .w. _ _. _. _ _.-._._...s .= . __..- _._. _. _ __._ __._ _ _..no_ _. _ _ _. _ _ _. _... _. o. .._.mm. p >mm _ +.. n {_..__ v... . g.._.... t .M .4 ____m .___._,.4_ . m. m 4 e w .. _.a m .+ (. t...... .......m.. _.,...n ..m.a.. -=Ju .._2 s. ... C .. t _..... A. _.... n.. ....3C..-... . c... X, 1 k ..e,.J ,g , _..._.._6 ....) ..3 ..m... -.o . O. w_. O .... O ~.... ~~ ~. ~. _ - ' o,... m 5 5 .j ~.... ' ' '... _ ~._ ' _ . ' - _.-. " ' ~ ,",J . u_ ~ _-_ g .d w .{. .0.4.. ,,._f. Ip . _ _._,. _ _..2 4._%.c -M* f.e _m_ .J p E - i' ._E .6 ._4 8 -y, I _. -._..g_ -.4 _3ad 3 r-i _'s g, p - -,4, T __.. p._._ __ -._m ..~* y . m'. . _..._W' '. - 4_, .mm mm + i e._. ...e e -. x 3.%, r"'. _A, W. p ..W_ p- .1 _..8".._2._- _.g ~-.._ e-N. _e ee d w_ 1 .i,p. mi ~ _ l m M

  • h j

t g.,.- O -- _.Q .m_,-._.....9_ _ r. .r 4 -_ _ _ -44 T{$ M $ 4 l . E g $. 8 % '8 e 80 y 9 i 0 O e t i s

0 NR W L i~ && s.. ..._.,\\ M]E 3 ~ i 1 7 i l ' v n n a u m u w a; o e m! nwn a l 2, 1_J. 1.I_1. ,1 ' N I dlit r# 7 I I W l l ,i l l t lu ,u n 1,H. m l i h ] d]I LL11 LE I I l li .h T i i i i ji II!! lil l t l Ill lll -l l l !1 l lli Ji! bl. l, ill l!ll lli lii TIII i ill I !!! ! -Ill T I I; lli ll ll-ll ~ !L 2IllEliL i% ill! I lII' llil i 1 lil l I I Ti I! I 111]. ill! I i, I . i In i I + iii , o' i l Idill . l ol a !al l l o W fol al a a w i .I l 1 _l l il I j i i c c,s l I l %,u.Stf I 1 r ^' L l l l i i I i .l I i 'l il 1 s b a -1 i hi U i l E i' i X i. i li k#bf'- j 4 l i;l H l lj9i ( i a a n b n a o o n g .q, .y p y w g q i T l I lil 1 q q, 'T i n. I Hil Li I hh ilk Illi l o il F l lj i l l i ll i 1 ni ini o lil!.! ll l l R'. ' :.L _i li; I ! ljl !il I i l

i. !i ni ' t.s ihl i j i l ll!lll' ilITt4ML.L l
l lI lI!i j 'l l\\

j - l. -lj.g g 1j pn j ni %e m 6 i iin - l-i l p, m Iu i l l { l i li ll q ye Ij i l p N y% a ,l gp w o o n e -I hl_ l! l II i i A I! !N _.. 1 ti l L.ill ! I if " i ^ l,n e + t, t mI l l: Il jld !L ! '1 _ l l! i -i 'I-l il l lll! ll I!!i l '. i L J L !!j R._ ly. p .l I p 1 g g. 4 l l' l l l-I l l ! g 3 l-I l 'l I 'l _[li..- I i l [ q g i i !! U l. Il ilil px lis I l ?l H I ll k. 1 !P; "I I n!u a n e n c 4, m IN Hu ll i lll !!i I lill l! I !l 'l l I i l ill l lll ilj !!il l li !li h i :i! H nq g !!h Jl 1, Lh :hi 1!!' 1 ! i!ll li ,l l.1 l! i iil ;I!' ll' ii' : 'ti iill l, i E i:!! '!! I!n t lE ! li !nj ! * 'n;- h !! Nll pg H!j itu I n! ni!, ll i !! N! i lu ! !~ u .'.jliin i: !n f! Un.!n Uli iinIp! ll1 lH! Un' H! N111!1 on L. :i up pu nu i lli F ';

a .,4...s v,... m p. O s. '------f-..."'Y,~f- -.c_.,_ ...,..y . O .. _- I .. _. ? ,e.__ ..".....t.'_

4--

EO ,.4.. + o %,...c -a--

  • f" 4...._

4.. ......4._.. 1-.'.

  • jF

.9....__. ..t---- .o 2 _._p._._ v _.-..A... ___.e... 6 s.L c .o _,._._t%' . _ _ ~., .g... .y. _.9 p..... . ~ _. ._2_.~ __4. _.__ - ~ <. ~.. -. ...._.g .o O.. _. .,....f.... ...... ~ _.. ..._..p____ i - - - j . g ...j.. T 4__._ }. .l- ..._p_.. ___t__.___ f. a... .4 ..,... _.. _. +... - 4_ . ~. _..,. ~ _ __t ,_. O .w...f... ..._ _ e _. r, ...g._. .. ~... - -. , _ t. .... _..:........ g. _c f. _ ~. _.. .,i. _ -..., -..., * - .O - =- .O ..._e_. .. _. 1 .r w _.g..._. I ( 3 3.- __= 9 O... - - .T-... i 4_ -n M. 7 _..2._, 4-p__.___ _... ;-. ....__4_.. 4... .._q..._._ -_L.. g _

g..

~ o f 2_... . _._.____ I ---..p..... o p__ _ ..._ g 3._._. I = 1 4..._ ___.a..__. .._ a ____ _ y __._.p._. f. ..e p ___._w.,. j .-...v. .q....._..._ ...... : _.. -_._r.__. 4 - ._..,O_ 41_ p....._-.. ....__.i r 1 m...... t yp ; . y _ __ p t.._.. ..f 2

t. g

,y g...._ . _ _ _ _ _.. _ _ _ ~

g..

a .. b.. v. _ _ g +

b..

C.. ._ _ f o_. cp ~. . g _... _..._4._. .__.w ___.. t -. ~._.___ w. .___a _._. p.... _.. _.... +. _. e - ..._... +. H _:E._ __- -.-._..f... ---_4 2- ..O. .. _ -. _... c..... _ _. f .... +. ..__.,. g. ..-_4._.... _4_.... . _ _.g . g .._p.....

4..

-..L 'M _.p ,f..... -. _ _ _._. ___.__L m. _...f _2...._ i__.. c_ .......o_._......._..,._._v. g.._ ....t__._ ....4 3- - .t -. p..... . --. ;.. f.._.. .. _ +.. -. _. i _...g... _ _... _ O ..f..... ...4 e _ - _ - _.._. g . _.....-...._ _. -. w..... l 5 __.._g.._ _ _.. _ - _.. _ ~ 7_._.. . _........_..j;._.. -.._..,..__.... _.... C. _ _ _. _ +. _ _... C .,i

g.. _...... _

____4._.. m..-.. _,s__.. .-...s f. e..... ... l t __.}._... _..._ _ f.... ~ .g i -_.._.4 . ~. -._ 6 -4 v .. f..._. --.6. ,D. _. j. + .. + _ d ]- j _. -. + _ _. _. ..j. .._...s_ .s 4 .--._.4 .. j.. J. -a -_-...L ... ;_. O. p ___ _-... _ ... _. _ -... _. _ _ + _ _. C . g;.. _y... +

g. __

.e.... j _-. ...a.... 4_... . - - - - - - -.. q _.q. 3 .g._. .a..._ + . --.r ... <_..o y_-. ..._s -a- = 9- ._..n f. .7.. . g ..j.. ,~ ._.a.... ,,,r ... _ i 6._ 40 -- 4.- ~ 6 ._ _. _.s _.90 s. .s e.. evemoeio.: mouac, >aun LumEpMcW23d w oa e co e u n . L _ L. ). ) i e e i s ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) I f k.i

v i e t Le.vte.t. ~ Fu.d Stun t smm Gasawe A La\\ l Novme %/w%w-i i t > o o e e e verrrs e o e e o e o e e e o e e e e e o e e en M>M i f b O = G T_

"i "t."..

- -'~ ' [ '~ ~~' 2 l 2 _"L 2 1 =; e ..m ,"_bm', L e' m;'- -~~J -'.'",;"~ 'L l 1 '= 7 e 1 'L _. a f --1. l h ,. = ( + ? r = : '"T". ".. ^. e ASM W1Vedfl0 'NO$1TWOdWO'3 810tt1NO3 OlHofwo 3 - ' *. _ _2.'** ,4 1883t88-90sp t se r 1 l e 9 8 I 4 9 e a, J h ? 4i e 0 I t

pn uudy Pres = ve e YNR s WR) m . - ~ i 'hUhjjjj]'I'ln. samnsg$ ' k lq fu 2,

w.,

rw QW . h.. [ [ i n u g. m uon. l l{J I 3 h l 3 g tw I i i I A A- _, 4' d L.iM =$ ! I N=k a a =I in A u.nsm iI s u i ' o X .I i l i. .of .i , i. n .d/Ji_llH:p t 2,1jff ll ll; ** m igx o bbbOlkdb. '3sn $,uwNf!jjd d d I I ' l ra nun [num ,w g g I j gm ux. 1 gi i a. g m$i dIb$ [ d N 'hau-h 8 @nhl l! lk ll: 0 Mhli l li ' lhidil ' l Ph 0

  • a on umoo.

1 m g sw n 'swo 1 .m m hill 31 ! "Mdh !h ill,j)%[81 Etiim i l i 1 41 0 WIL Lillil a l i 'y* !li_ ! !g A n u I iu c ii x, 2 muus aun,inutimu ni e n

  • ww ll-(11l

[l [M %g tk.=a d l! I l l i ' i e i NI ljhF i h{munm'sm,unm uu dj Yh t ) R l h o m 3 IL lli M !u l t 'M i Wi i e el 9 low y hoA E' t a an g i ra n ~ is Inani.i jjy23 uan' ,Ihlf.9 ,18 {l[ j!hj

  • j g rirueca l l w

r a m v } 4 m col0l f.E $[ n uunnLm %h{, , yll$1!)q }gg j,y ljj jplhp'l :[l{ 10j@ fl l .J yl xuno.. W ,w e a m U2roon ut n* Minne ~ '{ ,!M! II!iHl!!1111 LiEIbn mi f :ufve2m'r .1 3111 ' n i 0 ! m i19 !wWu H 0 l y i i t umu 11 u nmun#% o +==* L i l I v i d i T1UJ2 ', i ri i i i t l i a w a im4F. 9W 1 x ui un n mpnoM n * + q a , a w w p' s munlunmut.mmloim!nsw ncusnII i unt

  • a o

y "So M :om' i@;11Q2@ pil l l In*M! i! 25=

  • lA t u m m i

4 I t $$- 11 mi W S* J j WlIlm li.i 'it im ok innd: h4 motn nW uNW

  • mi l!

Im hh IH m! m' ' Hli I I! Im @!b! dii WI d ll]HW Hj Uf T [ ddiiFJ lHI W rj 1 dH * .t i l $ d f ' iwi w 1 sins uns LE!@Q*i t'/ M I W lhi!bhb II!t>!. ig11!IHI ll!h.

  • I i l i

n@o nu m e nn MS 9 m pip ril tviiii$fi wl i hau h, N Ii ie* g a v ,g,, g. g omimunnn ulnil * . :J.jggv., $y i I ik i i MTil Li 1 Li i 1

  • p hH a j 4

isos a i ..nhl;M E. t h *,, .j d p. I t I i ii; i' UpJ aYli i y:o J o fo'w. p iy@Huin si:In mHnHmsn: 1 hwoop 34;.2,ca{. W,i!L 12 io@lD i1Ig

  • 1 m

t

4 uco'hi jW byooi
;h Vij.2 iso) 44 ij 3 250e
  • i y

{ Mi,i t n . J- {. o .:! #0 !!d 2 !N @ EII{if 4 W gulgiilil tillu@m+u! u I!! Iff *, H Wp ig hghn l l In1EgW . ;p HiHill u l gj. -. d(,q%

, y,.y.

3 m nunun u unun nun o m a g; oup.nl tim #j,pNi..! an a u mu .no t e t .li r i m.- a m wn n u.c

w.,

..w, y i ni!! g t e n i i m n n u n m c m W W I i i l i n iwoi i l : I w c: i !us : m i

x=
  • y n u n o

.o iu mn yE o w n m-%m.w u up*j i >nm E ann 4 qsos 4 o ni w m a u 1 w. WO!iHHli W@m Mi!$ :11tm llu 'illi !m' 11 0 ga@s,c,n*[ WI i j j y dein NF :soi Hij j jW y3s!g did{ '2icoi i j g j, v i y Wh Illi W Illl @ !!M i U M lki ; d'jjj!nslm; o, I s o

  • 5 ggj j p lll l

gijh { l [ 'lU g$@ lq fl @ p' t ,lsnununun.mu%r noi

  • L,qlpglj x

an 9 u o. r2*m m usnuon. !Ii1,Ii1gic!IIiulik il. Li i I d m .y m um i o a n u mnnnpui ne nVi e' y o: i i i l l icooi i 8 ! Li l Iny, U I !sen* i ju gj m j; L jq uy , jm muy mn 1 m! *e S I ! I ! [ i i._.Jl ! Ik IL* $ c i u m i T.i ! . iwg i it c.!?J.., t / - }W

i i

1Hlll I - Idi

  • li 10 l

yo tgoo i gw - ser e o E %@ UI !! noo in n h a$$!.11 !I!;!!dhl[p$!ilM.! 001$M i i w p i.- i i t I 1 wl q mn2wo f go,iggnw* g i m Ni 01lW 9!jh c; mi muniA. @yd ild 0 1pt!lli y !!!m!3 gap I pg@m s!14 p ll l LOMs' j '4 W$F41@* M JU Tpu o w s um

  • lili"Il'lihall!'k'*.

wos a a gr 1 t n noe m 'uw

  • i W

l! l' U 'l I l y! [!Ihl!. i lhi 10' jhi h ! lE dW I. HIH 1 0 lii Ifi . i.1 4 icoo: i i

i

' um i u ml 'a. i .. u p a h.i 1 4 3o x

  • j

'q [; g l{glW q g ! 'g H I, gu 0 [ l i ;ho il Q 1 l.il]M* l l / y i e' 4 .c une, thi t hhhul 4 pig jh t h; 4 1 we H m m o u e ci m y d ji ; p.i p m m g ;

  • m Mhi I

y n y wl n } tan - veo. umo,A :.oa4.ncf. 1i o g t iIii n 1iWii M I I d' 3 ' 'l Il Ni c { ,g nqs.9+.. 2 wu9 m"'"E ~ yllHildtynHV4tl l *i!!b ,@@HlnlWI$ * ,o, e m,< wHe i

7-I 4 f$ ZOAl?tA (AtM ORE f i f ( ( } ( t t ( ( ( ( r i i e. a i i e ~ .f** r*.. i i i i t t t t t

  • i s

.{.. - ~. g 4 .:. ;t

, _... 4n..

'T ..,,3 _ 4 ,..,...I, 7 t .,,,.. m 4,..;. g,. ;. ,f g -., e m.. w., ....-. e4..., ; .........,1,,.,. .f n.f., ..,.~.. g3 H. ~7.-..2 .g .~..a -~- + - - - -.. - < .g..__,,f f . <. _.. n. y,._..t ............. _.. -...7 ..y ., _..... M J a. -5 -[ .1 _l - -. - ~ _. - ,.._n._,.._..Y. ~. ,g-.;. 6 _..._...._..7.-.;, .. - ~. ~. ...~I. ~ -~. - -..

4..=_.j., -......

4.. 7---.-, g - ~.--, ~..J _-- L ; ' ~." ..",.' - : y-.- - - ~. - .,i. T.

f.. ~. ~.. A _; ::~~..

..,.._._....y._... -\\....._..._..._,_. .~.*L*M.---'-.-. --.. n. -- - ; L, r._ .:.,:71........ ~ ~~, ' ~... _ _. _ -_ y

__,.. o -

~~- O.+y. ; :.-.: r - .. ' : 5 :.;.;- :-: - -.

  • _- o.- -

e. 4 .~.~.~r.*~,,,'~-~.-

_ _ :: c..- ::.- d,- - -.=

--4. ...~*.s ..--?".~._~.-- b _- ~ O.i.,.;;... ~j.,._..- -..... < - -+ C"3 -O ^ t N _, ;.,;;_;f.. 7... ~. ; _ ;. 's. ;_.;_ ; ..; M.- -.. _.. '.. ~. ' ' ',. ' -. ~ .9 gg. ,3.:: _ _. .-..".'2._..._._. -. .? ..,. _p'___..g .. _N_ s, .g ,____..,_..u..s.-*:.;--.. ....- N. 3 n d - = _ _, ._y_ +- -..) .-s ....-.. #_..-,..) __J..... f..... a,.-. ..t. s.. ..g - -. .....-.'T. u-.. . ~. - -...... W t _._ w y.... -...,. - -. 4 _3, 2 T. 1.. . CN -- - l.*.~ '.' i., -t. - -l. ..,. 4 . 7..-~.- ;--I, _.e.-,... e .Q y ,.....+ ---....... :! -_ 3 _,,,,,,__..,_."......,;;1".--* A.m _ __ _- --.._, .. 1 ....,;*... _. _ ~,.

1. p' L. O *C.._.s.:'..~,I

.._e..... _ A. O+ ..1-~-....- ..c,,.'._.-'.~m_. ~r-'" ...).. -~~ ~ ' : q.... .T F -.-l 5 f. l1. $L....A.s..C_~.*~. - A W T.Q,~~.-..-..--.'*."_6 - s g - ~.--.. ~...Q -._. O., :"'.~._'i.~ ~ ~ --' --*6"-- .... ~ .s .3 j l.*

.- ~_ ".

.. 4 W__,_O.;;l_. ; G.

_
Q **$*5 } ~._ i.._7_..,:~ S$..*. W L

. q. _.--. y ..;. q -g._-.____ .._L .b 4 f... ..1...~~... 7. ..g ,..p. . -.1. _;.;.. : _.;.-. a-..jz... + =. ._,-.L._.....__.) .......).g.._.._ 4... ,...... _.. _._,...J...,.. . ~ - -. - a... . -. p.6 ,,,,,..--p .L. ._.-\\. {.._.... s... _..........+,. 5 . =.. ....a.... .g..-. . y. ... _.. u.4 ~ o_...._._... 4 . ~...... 3,. ._._.,.L_. =.. _-.,._ t- ., ~.......--,.. .4 ......... s..J _.:,.._...........n 4 -..;_, _ 4.. , O. .s ... ; (. -,_; t_._,,,,.,...y..__,....... .os -..... 1g;.,._ r. 'I. _4

4. O....

.-_l r..,;_ e...-, ...}_r ._,. 7- : __o..- .I__._._.. .7.,.;.;.._. _._....,-._.=_.3...---I'~..~.......;,...v..__,..._ ,, ;;.g... 2 I,..a.y _... F.* s,- --r.: ; - t-L.. .<f.'...._, .r._..._. ..i.... .---t-r -r ~-- ~ p ...a._. j - -T... -- p-t._.. el - -- - - I.-- i --1.---- .-_.-_q _t.. _4.._ i 4 --.4-,_- _ _ _ -..._ j _.a._ __.-%__2..__---_. /,. t y_ - + _ =_. __ y. .;_-----4-.--+__ / r. 7.- o_.- .__ x,_ _.__- - _ _ _ _.4 t-o - o-_ 3._ j ._.l u I i - -, 1 r:::.o i 1 w g N ,.. - _ -. w _.,_ N : _c; p__} --+ Nog _o- .,.__f_n o g. j 3 s 1 1 -C- _.r p-.-t N ; - r- - -o-o; woa nwotum.s y e.ouvuoduos s) o meno a .. r. g /Dt. MS (, I. P70 L E VE t. I ( ( ( ( t ( ( ( ( ( g ( ( l l g @ l. - i --+-- ____ w_ _+ __,W H . _._q:_ _: tF m. E __._ :=:=1 = _ =.2 _ HEE.g O m -- t - r--- ; . o_ =- 4___% .h_-._.- .___ --.._ _M_:___--4.0, O rr.

== t c _=__1 - T -. = ,,c -, 6 =- t _:. _._ l__ _1__-. _ m__==_.,;.__.----. w___ --. m ___..-.,..4__ - "' =j_ -- +

_ -} =.

.. - = _:: t= _ - ]-_.. s. t-. '-_- - ' =_,. --1 = t = ' = -. -. -.. y -._..t_a.- _u-- .-_%._-.__ }_ '. _ f- _T - .g- =-

- ;-- q
y

- [ = = _-.s___2..__. - [ _ ~f

..- -.... _-- --..-...j----. :. 1 - : L u_ "

.t . --+, - -.' __.l .,4_ .;- :n ~_,;t . T_- _Q 3'-- 7 -. 5.:- = ---{.:;, t. .;_ 7:: q- - Q- -8.- - =-. g _.. r, =3y- _ a q g :-~=.._-Gj --. - -..T:-.::- - ,4_ r.3.__:r t - - i .r~:

c_-- :: O : =. -

L... --* CQ -O =.L-. 50- _-.... -..=. - - 2 : ~

.--y=-

G.q :=:-Q -&"f.f R ca _ __ ) =:

- :. - -- _.;z.

~~. ^ * = - -,.:... =. 1. 1 ;f 3 . ? _~ _:-5 -- 10 E_ d'3:- I. .._L.t_.m = _I .sl - #l, l...- 7 ..p. % .e i. ,Q IW{.-Fdh r p. .. L... - *P C#"l i _L.a;-j. ._4j- . T T~.; '. Icia ..q _.y~ i fr-f-j2 -l l 1 . _e..........- i = t _..3... p__ 4._.;.g,-._=.2 a_., . l A.AE * '.'--'

  • [.

k e - - p --. ..1...'.,..; -.. y.- .g.. ^-* _ 1 _. __m -_.s.

  • . ". ~...,

I l }, -~ = r. @.:. #1.M W=Q- . Q...}-..-}- __- _. _; g ~.~_.::'.=.:-.. y , p_ M. , i 1- .1-ME p..a l 3 t 4 1 .. - _1._ _. _ L_ _ - -_ w, ~ .= .-4.., x% pr: r, - _-..y=_.i q. yz._na= e;

- i i

. e'. m . 13' l g ~ ~ .O -4 _..O.. 1 __ ; _7 -. _ -g _g_- 3v .a . _ ! ^. - -- l -- r -- ! - - - -* 22' y ,, _.T f s._ _;. [_ - ; p- ~.. - J g_,,j 2.g --.- .{. '.,_.,. g

e i

a.,;_ ""i.7 _y j' p _. { .2. [-

U 2 f i-

.,3 --q_ ..;.] _g,I-n 4 t t ,,a. =j _ -- - ; --i-- j_' _.; _.. Le._ - k. + _. --..a -; = -- .,._-.._.s.a,u..__._.; 7-O.. ----.-'-r - $i,_.- 3-. - -O E_.. - -, _ - = O

.*_'A.nE i__

... C1 1-a .n c1 t j ...~.} ' - - * - - * - * * ~ ~_.i. _- =_ : r.----- .i_ {. r r i i . _ _. _.._ _.. _.._... _..._ L. .-. a - :--- - - --- f, L "----.W-p, p'. c. l -..{ ~. g- .. I 2. I-- -.i J F. -JM Zf - t i 3- .L...... g i g, 3, y.- --r?

1.. _ _

i 0..-'.i--..--- - - - - O - --- -~~ ' ' 9 1 .c. IOOOtOO-00GWLB U4 t

d ,j e l 8-g e emJ i 8 e f b e I k' %gg bTG.AM f G. =a ~.. -, . ao,o...........r.....t%........,, ~ e ; -- i - -t ---s j [ i ]__'. ~~~ -H _4 i ] i [ i i y 9 l } gy--- --g-1 __,---.__p ~ --4." f' t--- . - - - + ~~[ .t, _,_.._~_E'" - * - - - ----+- .g - I;

  • 1 27_.- $ _
,4:%<;. -

".i.. ,w

.- 2
; L e - -r

~- 44-- ~ C 7 4:. J ' "w puun j Q E.---_w-_- %-6 mm u = - 'a .= f_ ~~ ~ Q -Q ~)\\_ w____=_

~~'

~~ - _3__ ____4: e m_ 9 -_-__---_____________ ^ -i _N_ nan AN 1 ,=_ e .1: = _=-=-_ 5__5

== m3 ^&

===, a=' r _ Q *N '* a.. 18069 69.-jl9918..e.g m g a i t 4 a f 9 e e o 1 a.

T S 9 ,I 9_ l %ss EMM i h Gamwe C Lem. ooT eoeeoeeeeoeoeoee-e-Fee-eoeoeoee~* R _.p R I - - - =a ~ 1.1- ~i~~B g g_3__3 ,e 3, ~'- = _ _ -.~ _."_. ~ C' " - ~^ h ,q w __ _,_ - C8f ~-1 ---f =2p m ^ _ g m__ -9. 7- . = f e_ _ w-- --' H-]-k/ Fi.t. ,E ~ ~- d yL.7 q.m ~ -1 f M3' _.._m y _._ f - .;; __ a = = - - j.__. r

t l,2, -.- -f-M 2

C ,, 2C r52 . :_s L r

,-qM3 Dy'

- f.

  1. s [

m ___s -r 2 n_ = -e w__ i -_f, _,=- & ~ x e _.a =. _ + _ _.._-- _ ar

y
=

;r -g l.__. f ~/ ,I f-y it __ ! y,

=- y

._=q ,=- jj _w_a S __ h i B-R - E- - __ g gu"~ _._g- ,j.- 1. = 7._ . _ u,r r,, _,,,,,,, _,,_,.-E b-_' *n 2-- r m. l han um 8- 'I - g ,J e+ ,.v

W"

+. vest se enmuend ygy gg! I l l I I i I r I l

4 4 Tu c b b. <. 66Jecn o,. tMve.. La;on i n:

w cy,. tn!

11 tp'[j; $.. ~ r.rQ \\ le 19 $fdIh ., m:',97 % ps =m e.c w w <r{ 0 %.$h . a$ u;

/ jj i
,$ - )

i , '.:il: 1, ' ' ' e e. j M' n I h h1N MM 7- 'y.' $1 9.~.... I,l wwa,n .n- ${NI. "M '~ 4,$!;l[ ~' 4 o 1 o s r h 1

j.,

i...T SH21-> !.i i, :l I i

l' i

' '., _.. 5i ' ', ~ - ~' d7"i .)

2"*T !

ir i., l c s .. Y "1. l,i I'T'.7fd..]:l I i % Vf L 3pck g ~ ---- c ,1 yy. > i

..l. e,' ' :.
a

.y l, _ s s; a mM .i 'a 8 4' a A i ry <, 1 l / v-)L % 'pp I c g 1 r i t ~~i j~~ i; I l / Q ~ 3 i w3 +, i i .i _... !. _,...! ' 1

)i I

l.a. -y l r, j i i i e, f. 3 3 ( b' V(livt j.? / . 1_, _!. 4 4 nt.. , 4e e c ! -I i 8' i . L-l. '?S.' SAM.f.kl* l I ). l j 9 3 N i l s

  • -g.

I g e } l Ri .3-f Yls(*1 ' i t .x - l l i,. . ;.f i. l l t g h ( ,,.gf;p 5 or 'y 4AM ^* l p T

  1. p%

e*< g u a .s E g 3 8 ..,~ p,.. w u o u g . Y., t j Q ;,,._1. .r-

-[hk 3 St' h [ h-ll l.(( llflf[ il[ 0ll k yll $i iMI,EU I {~,9

e. p.m.4.f 6 ' T 4< -

.1 7lly ll q H Q.j j gJ j. g ( m*. 3.: Jk p,,. i i ~ g. m.4,s 4 gl N no i g" M' jl

"i!

"i n "p !.l!.l" : il l

nt y' 'p

.jj _, I d 4b i,l, u,";l f.d oh t t i !) ;lhl6l l.i H liI i, ui n i s e ~f h l l dl l! ~ t i l ! Ii[ I ,f '.-y c m i.n -,,Y. $$} T... b, .,9li II l ! eyl ln . El .,J l 1., t i lit, un s !!ii.i :1 ol flll i'. ni i s s 0"ld1IU IOI O! !. b D W $. ~. h N [h.I.lI .I..l l} d,V ~. k d[ U i[idlI I f.Y ./ l li dil. !El l . pi ! i l'U d iu p!, .I.N.. i i.l.II I ,J ! t'l!.I.I l l lJ'i.i a_! H..!!i.i l. i. ,,.i. 1 1 l i 1 t 3 _ N:dl nI fl0 EII !UI l i;h d!l 10! iH: :i ! 'ni hH i 13 ]I k[ h[ f I' . O. O I,p! 3 } I' I f i u y u- ! L u gu,u_ !b p . p i 1 u un.p: !umiJ y II1 lll' sH h.i j *ill di IFL (I ll l 9r d.! l "n 1p k. .J 6 3 4( .c .., g' .H!l iQ: d@g4.i @e, Uil., i m n 1 H l "U U l l iih ( J ! [E lI !! l !l l.l i lp II L

l "h!ji~ f j!!! h yb[:i h lJ qll a

( l l l D. ' l !1 l ( .cI i L h, il p : i i .g. p .d . [, h j r ni y i in .I J' 'l U j l $h( ,I li

l q,

"'l ;U Lj 2 3 u}',,d.! E;. h ,1 iU M, h E .., eD... .. '2.1 b h ' y j, i !MW L.. H.!.&_hi s 1 h n

  1. ll ll!! :'N HEM, iT d.ll l.i!

I Oh E d lf lOj 12 !l 1 D! !@I% !!!! !U1h!dO! : 4$ 30 it U! 41!jy::II'$ "U2 i 2 ' Llj i!p W dL p!h!$ t! .i .p;dI "U U f'l 1! !p. !.b'l. ' Aih !Ih hl i]i l i 4H "liprn! ll} i gi d.:iiK~ i,? O,T llt I t i 3 s n i [ 'I l] c!j p; Li; 'l j 'Ip jj ip lll't l' ( i "I U+ P. ilI ;;; :':. ~ t t q'! ! '"j }] Ib h dt! h- '? h th :';! hk'l.. l p i li O U.' A 1 '. ' dt I rr ,i { i .i ..t 1 f(

w di q ip..p.i a

i.. i IN r ll l !fi llll lIl ! I Illi llj' 1 'l Il 4} P..'!,.D [nt:. S ' 2 j, (l[i..[ lj ul CH 4 4i' j s y o .i..as i. i n.. I 'j!l ll' '.i Ib . / jpl

i pi I

h N i U 1i I' bl I O I b,}bbt $ li!'2. I N j h.S 1 t q .i. op h...i !j! ; ;.

i; li!!.'i I!I. l.d! ;!4 1, I i

..o 'f !Il 'lil ilH o .[ @l "!i '., T. ['! I pn.. 1 .h i i Ml E~M d'd:. l $! $. j/ 'J . ( [b t ( ~, j I /. 4. ,j I, ::I YM: "h ( o.- .....p , :.i.'j... N l . L. ; . 1.1.0. l '.,lh o. j'~ - 9i

)>

'e s _ t n L .l. . Ji. p; p 4 t ni a., i ..y l 0 ,' l.'.l.. 1;;l d i '.O,!i '..' ll...!!;n. .ll I h,. ..l . i . f, l i ] ., C..;l 'I

i,il',.. '.jij

. 'i n...'..

'l

.'i: l l, , i,.p L i l]i.ip.'s h'..D ill, :,..'...l.l l l, t t.6 it .N l l 4 f p i p (a i! 4 i

h.. k,

...i y

9

,p f at .d .i i i

1...n... '

y 3...'..,. l 1,. .g j.,. i. m o i j p.. 'I'..j ' y

j

',; t, a *. 4 t, U 'N

i rn

'i i+ ,U i

y 4- ~ l .se 3,.

  • ej

,. Q. L ,.Ys g g p g.,.s I

o., q q

3 'r oi .i ,;;.}.

p w

j '. .Q _'c ' = ? Q: l'j..'ll ~ ~ ' ;[ T h-4; 4_l_,c[ . w \\ T ~-.,. .i,jll u, l f ll h ,il i j . I ill1j! Ll -l ll y,I ; i. i E ' W i i i . w n.,o, t voo4. ( 'a p. i l,i i.. c o ih l t M' l l, 1 11 1 l ylji c gr L-i t l -s ..w' w w ~ l l l '( ij I Q,.u P, r w n ~ M l.i l -,,s ,?N,,..):~ ~ g% ,l l e i . h i Wl \\, l l I: ( ( 3 l l ( lyn ni l ( {c.,'! 'l, I i I I ) ( wii,i pl l l - ( i 'j! M5 .i T i/ 'l!! ll! l l 3,,,- (

1 i

ii i I + 1 l 3 l N l; ll

i

,1

3. "'
l

( i'I. d F* ll

n

~% ll l la,i !'l it i'I j' t.. hk l.L. -l-[1 e i _l ai. ( ~ i. ' g n;!l0 j l (]' l i I l 1 0 4llhlm! O 1-}9 i l ( 1-7 l t a u-wln. -.- m..n. l u n. l i c 1 y! i .i >. ng d.,. ;i!. '!l . _17 j x l g i ji 'l i ,ll i!li l 4,,.i ltlI ll i u!I l' l ti; x .. i.' : i i .j ':!. ij N;> -p- ( i MC,i. L_b-t i li 6 : ( I ' 4 i ' L t t . xJ... I Ml ! !! 8ii-si

r. 'i; e,I i:!

.:ii e..l..! l f [ i N 1 ( m .,i .i:, l 8 h].

7p' '

Q;*; ,i ll p i ?! l

*lJj

~ s E - % l E11Ji ~ f

,; ji j

U .g. ;q i -, i1 ! '.,:m o ~ nn 2., t 1

g gce bea[,., G4...,.,,. (AD.. - -.- a.=* - - ~ * - ~ ~ ~ ~ * ' * ~ ' " ^ .,..g %p:uipim @T]; C 414 'y_ ~ Tsggd J Wi .in utt c I }1 _.Tygy [gu Q %'. g.qug;y c.a 9 m '.i " w~y+[ji ~i "..T"j@ j]: ~

11,!

. ':~ ) v. c. u. a p:.. .[--l ! !,, 'q % % $. m, i . l [.[ w. 3 -.f ..{ 1I i- >7 ',,.,7,. ! j i i ' I F#{u#*

8 7 h.-. 7,i : a:

git 3 i nt 7, g% .n..s 3 1 . ilo U4 d.t d.' $h.,,..n- [ in ) o os ru un r! ri I D l.;l ill ( [ TD Ag 9 I "I JE : !i, .i. ITg"N iiii'ifil TLi I j jyhMf,% ITi I" iE :- re ui ; o e io,..: on D 'I;i? pli Jji71111 f!!id,e ri!1 h.u"' "Wgy Q [Ill h'. l ' '.',! n l,l_ITIb - ~l i_t :.

4..a,

. > i j._ .p s p ..g.M. ,o i. .o n i.., - um 3. ia. Up H" n

n o un i

o.! We [l}I 2[ [l I [ f 3 O ~ ) 4 . r.. .. y ls.,.n..i m!h ,I g "j i ji lI~< c.,- l, l 3.:, i. i 'IliiIII G.: i;!'I"lIIIll ili. I~ hI w* *cg l m -.1 5h h .._I. I qgguyg ylg ), 1*h m p qqn.. crrr iiy 7,iij u, n,,.. if m " T-%_ _g u '!; _njoi unU%i l p n'n &P t I "' a n g-i.a$n n i u u..n' % ~ B g'i_n.. + 3, _l! H '91 q!_~ h.. I,i gm d I !! g!!' 3 y n-l 'll I /!! li m n,g, s 'I l3 %b~ 4 ciu').@DM, h-Duaum rg ) . -,k 1.- i T ria u i o n d u on i. a. + {nu'J Eff wm a ,,li !u.x in liTJiriTEliiTTiTW iT i.' pp- ~~ ?g un q : q-un ui: un un n i ii l < e%)m'yp*/ s. s t T1 ? i m T: ]m [- l..t., 3 't l g j, g]ku J 'l m y'a i'4...T t TT - s 6 j ? 1.L '.a gyg* hkbT k i ( f u nn un n : nn +m' pir j [g...a;:.. u._..g2, t &ng "' un u y a it n: qu ni U go. iMWM II, w'!i M i el'l [!Q 'i:: ill! w ,3

  1. yd b:g'.c7.

l ! i,i M i. t 7, y. 3-o f f L l'l,f bl If k ff. A . Wff ilD c ~illiIbh th: $n i h nl'i i: g in'"- W..n 5 @Q T 9 eq ~I

1. E UnWi f tp! S j h.. o.T

, : u Tilt.I W > 'n -T llj. i h..: itT .., ~ m , e,.. pli' i .%g,m.-*s*q.ff' p~ n v 1 i h W.M.h TiiW %. 2 RMQ c' 44 H.i..j.i"i if >. % $ M.,

  • MiU..!_t..,W.,jWii..:a 4:_i! Ni

@p!: n' ' , aL ...i . 4 . n '~ I u n h n "4 - . t: u i, t.: i,, :n: ^ '+$g@g)yp!Py [!! h...B n rifI.!' h N h i' !l'i. { 4 ' 4jugh 5 ,i. l I l' 'I l l l l!!! III g o i ai I.o l. 1 M i i u lI i:t; r

e ,,.g., / gm,.. y gln.-.. -. - - -. ~.. -... y, sj,.*.o*. t "'.h L,, _ g, gay v,' ~ ..-.3 ,.w ,3 }g-. t. . ~ ~..,,e = Y e g 3 *i i EM,i ijM; .y m" A^I<.-WSfr s I l l ' ';*W h ei M, l, pig //. ? l kD pe t,C yM 8 ] a .1 e I' i i .g

)

e l 4 ) 3. i -... M.s p u o s. i \\ e. - - l $_.. -3

  • *.a.

t-g '4

m. :.\\p*.x*

. d+. l g .b. +. . u. ; .s.

..ue.,.

e N - aQ.. ! .../;3-[+u..;.,7 ] [ ^ ~.it,.i> s' a, E t &,.. r 3 p-a .~ I. m ..v- ~ '.is

l

/ A

]l r

i.r-h ...Mr5'6:. up* I' .A:. 3-,,----- r a.a i p. . a,$ m.. s P :s h, 1-6

m. a rt 6}%

p:r ~j . ;.e. o 3 Is..;rh. -,.iy. + E,, !I (B de. l . 3; Q.A r= -s.> - % _. n , am,m p. o m J.d.h. E. M:;. !. H)

i. ___. - I,

-. - ~.. vg.!h, M 45

p- _ _

H.

h, f f y,t p

q g. ...,,,.4,, V-~0 b.b. c

  • i.. ~*

v.]. y . ' v; .a. T 6

  • s, a u.

(.: ..t - O Wi!.- .,;a ti.itq V n g 9 -o-o o ' '. ;% kA 2 '.th.a.@g - - [' 1;hh ~ LO ->4] % $6 O ]., !;, yd 9 :-

p i

4 4..sj j g.Tjg. ,P i-

s y;

4 > o"_. 4q' 6-vi p. l.- q..A),e -. G

1.

h., so 4 0') e r, e .lff.p* f. o .- ] N.' +k..i n,. M-p [ = R ( M t! o ~- c. tn iTW:.. t o ~1.> Q'tJ g, L' <n .: 3 ;;r,,.. ' - n

  • e.
.r n

a u { g

r r.

F 3 Y W va 7d, 4 4-i M..T.J: p>. i i q w..-.. >,1 g .g q ,O' M e l' ; *} ? ,a u \\ s .o p eor ~

i..!'A T r

Ihh) l ~ .q" l ( l .5 It ', w.,a ~. m...:r y?a. y >[-l[\\e. v u q. q. s.' -3 y l. Il;3u/ , t 4;/_ )

3-

}y1 k,5 -): i.?ppy1 y x.o, 3 uoco y ' 3 ap- . Odd 66 3 3 ( l ) '4 _ *5 8_****. {3 g s.n.. 'di

,y'@g?.

s e 1'.- = .A D : 4 2 ,e. i

/. *.

f.* y ;l-1.?$...f-vooi \\ .,l. a. g. 11 - r. v - .x A,,, 6,. 3g. 88 ,i. 9 ..T 8 {...g' 2.. J,;, y>j. , ~:: r; , '%j j

-l.j W..r.P;ip

.t y I,;'y ' i we %**e#- H -- -$43 8 / ~

  • f
m. EH-

\\ . ?.;i,692 3'

  • I "2,; l 3

O; }g - !tp ~ a a: I*' ~ ~' '.D .h!j 'O-L j Of,

  • 0-][i i

s 3 .. I }" CH-J ej ,, I -H3 ,4f - a l~. @ G $: 5 { g E64-

EM-i EM-

.c a

  • t

-H-3 'I' . i.. "W. t .. + s a.., l f43 I l-3

  • i\\.

a o f..:. ~ g J.'... Q..' g s .I.

  • gd.

t3 /3 ,. ;. M'. I I-l t. 3 t-o. 2 m i'.i 1 i. 1 l l %jy$

l.. & d, r<.

.. % ).w ^ f e h h h I u ~ i.? I 2 - i.'s.?'U)C;. a uoc .S \\g.7., 8 (E'., u', l'

  1. , D lF,:

', E ' d5 .P5.# C .at.t

a. u.,

o

  • : ~.q.. t:

jag ys /. 3

X.3

.i 8., J >. : f.-

o aj o

_. t ..a ...t: - '.Y) b ; 8 l l. I'.d M. '.M(- . T.W.. ..py;'- ?.V< t ~

1 l Ii\\

i{gII i!l{!i1
)

l\\ \\1!l.3hw P3._O 5ii ! gN/ l ! !i l t wf*- o OOB Y 7 3

9

? p 2 m 3 u S f 0 o 3 p ? M o T F T US 5 i T M 4 E 2 M lA 7_ I A'. 2 ir 0 O. >. 2 EM C U L O V >. F F / P O M U

i. m W

S T tb N EM T N T

i. f I

O A I T S N O C .. z =__ I 2 !s E 0 R U O

  • 0 G

I A I F y ..8 m rF ,. 6 ,. 4 .. 2 o O5 9 0 9 b5 W 0 0 0 0 D O N 5 5 4 3 0 0 C G 2 3 1 I .~ 0 o8 D '}}

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20065Q600&oldid=5507355"