ML20065Q545
| ML20065Q545 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone, Brunswick, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 08/03/1978 |
| From: | Stello V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Muller D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20064E577 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-82-389 NUDOCS 8210280031 | |
| Download: ML20065Q545 (2) | |
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,[AUG 0 3 07a MEMORANDUM FOR:
D. Muller, Acting Director, Division of Site Safety and Environmental Analysis F RC.'h V. Stello, Jr., Director, Division of Operating Reactors
SUBJECT:
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REQUEST - REVIEW OF RECENT EVENTS AT MILLSTONE AND BRUNSWICK PLANT NAMES:
Millstone Unit 2 and Brunswick Unit 2 DOCKET NOS.:
50-336 and 50-325
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RESPONSIBLE BRANCHES:
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PROJECT. MANAGERS:
E. Conner and J. Hannon
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REQUESTED COMPLETION DATE:
October 2, 1978 TAC'NO.'; ACTIVITY CODE; NRR CONTROL NO.:
7761 and 7762; R36; 39 F
This is a request for technical assistance to review two recent events at Millstone 2 and Brunswick 2 to assess their safety and environmental sig-nificance.
The first event (Enclosure 1) was the catastrophic failure of a radwaste con-centrate tank at Millstone Unit 2.
This resulted from the overpressurization of the tank because a vent line was plugged with solidified concentrates.
T.here has also been a recurring problem with corrosion of this radwaste con-centrate tank which may have affected the structural integrity of the tank.
Three LERs and DOR, DSE and DSS memoranda (Enclosure 2), which discuss the corrosion problems associated with this tank, are enclosed.
The review of the first event should also consider this problem.
The second event (' Enclosure 3) was the contamination of the area around the Brunswick 2 Radwaste Building. This was caused by a steam release from the auxiliary steam system.
Radioactivity had been drawn back into a steam heat-ing supply line from the concentrated waste tank during cooling of the steam line.
This activity was released when the steam line was inadvertently pres-surized lifting a steam relief valve.
We request that DSE review the above events at Millstone 2 and Brunswick 2.
The evaluation should address the safety and environmental significance of the events, the generic implications, and recommendations to resolve any identified problems.
This should include estimates of the possible exposures to the public offsite from the two events.
Contact:
J. Donohew, EES/ DOR 28066 821C280031 820917 PDR FOIA MCINNIS82-389 PDR
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Tne review of corrective action for LERs is'an 01&E responsibility. Con-seguantly, OIt.E should be contacted to obtain further technical inforr.ation on the occurrences. Additional inforr.ation requests to the licensee (if any are needed) should be discussed with the D0R contact, J. Donohew. _
The revica should also address the applicabiliti"of this evaluation to the CP/0L licensing process.- Should the revicw lead to any changes in the li-ccasing positions, these ci.ances should be addressed in your response to ensuia ccasist nt technical p:siticas for both DSE and EEB.
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Tha DDR contact for this technical assistance request is Jack Donohew.
Victor Stello, Jr... Director.
Division of Operating Reactors
Enclosures:
As stated cc:
B. Grires D.'Eisenhut R. Vollr.er J. Collins T. Ippolito J. !!annon E. Adensam L. Barrett Section B/EEB DISTRIBUTION Central files EEB Rdg VStello JDonohew i
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w RECOG;EtJDAT10t:5 TO REDUCE PER50titJEL ERROR OFTEf1 LEADItJG TO UtJPLAtJ!JED RAD 10 ACTIVE' RELEASES AT LWRs
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1.
Avoid jerry-rig maintenance.. Prompt repairs and maintenance can normally be completed in a calendar quarter. Temporary repairs are often forgotten by the operating personnel.
2.
Do not introduce live steam or compressed gases into a radioactive liquid taok without adequate provisions for controlling the potential radioactive materials in gaseous releases.
3.
Do not connect contaminated systems to non-contaminated systems without adequate back flow control, such as a check valve or syphon break to assure that potentially radioactive materials are not inadvertently transferred into non-contaminated systems, i
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