ML20065J126
| ML20065J126 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 09/30/1982 |
| From: | Silberg J CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING CO., SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8210050374 | |
| Download: ML20065J126 (20) | |
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DOCKETED USNRC September 30, 1 2
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, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ] -
-- NUCLEAR
- REGULATORY. COMMISSION .
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Before the Atoitiic Safet'y and Licensing $3oard-Insthe Matter of )
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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ET AL. ) 50-441
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(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )
Units 1 and 2) )
APPLICANTS' ANSWER TO SUNFLOWER . -
ALLIANCE, INC. MOTION TO COMPEL APPLICANTS TO ANSWER SECd D SET OF" INTERROGATORIES .
.By motion o.f September 10, 1982, Sunflower Alliance, Inc.
et al. (" Sunflower") asks the Licensing Board to compel . .
Applicants to answer certain interrogatories of Sunflower's Second Set of Interrogatories to Applicants, dated April 30, 1982. All the interrogatories in question are directed at Issue #1 -- the workability of the off-site emergency evac-uation plan. On September 2, 1982, Applicants' counsel and Mr.
Daniel D. Wilt, counsel for Sunflower, conducued a telephone conference with regard to Applicants' objections'to Sunflower's Second Set of Interrogatories. In light of the relevancy rulings made by the Licensing Bosrd in its Order of August 18, q 1982 (Concerning a Motion to Compel), Applicants agreed to 8210050374 820930 PDR ADOCM 05000440 kSDB
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answer certain interrogatories to which they originally had objected, and to reconsider their objections as to other inte,rrogatories. As to those interrogatories Applicants hereby agreetoa$swer,,Applicantswillfiletheirresponsesshortly.
The Legal Standards
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Applicants already have discussed the relevant legal s
standards, see " Applicants' Substantive Answer to Sunflower Alliance, Inc. et al. Motion to Applicant to Compel Discovery"
(" Applicants' Substantive Response"), filed July 23, 1982, and will not burden the Licensing Board with yet another discussion of these relatively straight forward legal pr'nciples. i It m.ay l
bear repetition, however,that the" relevant standard is set .
forth unequivocally in the Commission's Rules of Practice. 10 C.F.R. 5 2.740(b')(1) clearly requires that discovery "shall relate only to those matters in controversy." The fact of the matter is that many of Sunflower's interrogatories do not relate to Issues admitted by the Licensing Board to this ,
proceeding. However broad Sunflower believes discovery ought
.to be, Sunflower simply is not entitled to discovery once it reaches beyond the subject matter of the Issues in controversy.
It also may bear repetition that Sunflower again mischaracter-
. izes the basis of Applicants' objections. Applicants have never objected to any interrogatory on the ground that Sunflower is seeking information inadmissible at the hearing.
See " Motion to Strike Sunflower Reply Brief in Support of l
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Motion to Compel Discovery," filed August _, 1982. Sunflower's arguments on that poin*, attack a straw man no one is attempting to defend.
Applicants' Objectione Applicants
refer t'Ee"Licending Board to Apkl'icants'
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previous discussion of the scope of Issue.#1. contained in s
Applicants' Substantive Response, at pages 5-7. As in that Response, Applicants will examine each of Sunflower's argu-ments, using the numbered paragraphs in Sunflower's brief.
Paragraphs 7 - 10: ,
Sunflower asks the L,1 censing Board to direct Applicants' to .
answer Interrogatories #44, #45, #46 and #47, but only with '.
regard to Applicants' Emergency Operations Facility (" EOF").
As to Interrogatory #44, Sunflower limits the Interrogatory to .
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of NUREG-0814.1/ As to Interrogatory #47, Sunflower has clarified its concern as directed at whether visitors will be allowed in the EOF during normsl operating conditions. With these limitations, Applicants will answer the Interrogatories. The responses will be filed shortly.
1/ Sunflower identifies only Sections 5.1 and 5.2 as being relevant to Issue #1. Thus, Sunflower only has attempted to meet its burden of persuasion as to those two sections. See Applicants' Substantive Response, at 4-5 (burden of persuasion l lies with party s.eeking discovery).
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Paragraphs 11 - 13:
Sunflower asks the Licensing Board to direct Applicants to answer to Interrogatory #56.
The $terro,gatorydealswithApplicants' engineered safeguards to prevent or* reduce radioactive releases during an
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accident. Ther. oInterrog'atory thu's goes far beyond the scope of
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the contention admitted by the Licensing Board. As best Applicants can determine, Sunflower's argument is that the l
plant's engineered safeguards are relevant to Issue #1 since their failure might cause more eerious radioactive releases, l making it imperative that there be a workable emergency i .
l evacuation plan. Sunflower also appears to argue that it needs discovery on the engineer 6d safeguh'rds in order to determine ,
L whether the appropriate Emergency Action Level ("EAL") is used as to any accident. By those lines of logic, every safety feature in the plant comes within the scope of Issue #1.
Indeed, there would be no need for any other safety contentions since, under Sunflower's logic, every safety consideration .
would impact the need for a workable off-site emergency
. evacuation plan.
These arguments already have been rejected by the Licensing Board in the context of plant instrumentation.
. During the August 13, 1982, Prehearing Telephone Conference, intervenors argued that they wanted discovery on plant instru-mentation since such instrumentation would inform the operators that an accident was taking place, which, in turn, would be the
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. basis for the appropriate emergency response. Applicants noted that such reasoning, if taken to its logical conclusion, would mean,that every safety related feature in the plant was subsumedwIthin,thescopeofIssue#1. Applicants observed that a line must be drawn somewhere,.and that the Issue should not be read so broadly 'a~s~to make-its scope virtually.
boundless. .
. s The Licensing Board agreed that Issue #1 could not be j l
given the breadth intervenors are seeking. As to the plant l instrumentation interrogatories, the Licensing Board held that intervenors could not use Issue #1 to obtain discovery on whether the plant instrumentation would function as it is ,
designed to function. Rsther, intErvenors would have to assume i / .
"that the instrumentation in the plant is sufficient to inform the people within the plant of the condition of the plant."
Tr. at 708. There is no principled distinction between the arguments made by intervenors with regard to plant instru-mentation and by Sunflower with regard to the plant's engi- .
! neered safeguards. If anything, the engineered safeguards are removed even a step further from the workability of the off-site emergency evacuation plan. For the same reasons that intervenors are not permitted to use Issue #1 to obtain discovery on all plant instrumentation, they should not be allowed to use the Issue to obtain discovery on the plant's engineered safeguards.
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An additional answer to Sunflower's argument is that the need for an off-site emergency evacuation plan is not at issue here Commiscion regulations require that Applicants demon-strateawErkabl,eplan, and Applicants will not receive a full l power operating license until the Commission has concluded that such a plan exi,sts. ,,
Wh'elher the'.need for a workable plan is more crucir'. or less crucial depending on.the consequences of anyl,one particular accident is irrelevant to the fact that Applicants must have a wor'.able plan. Thus, Applicants' obligation to demonstrate such a workable plan is completely unaffected by the reliability of the plant's engineered safeguards. -
.. r Paragraphs 14 - 15: .
Sunflower asks the Licensing Board to direct Applicants to answer Interrogatories #59 and #60. Sunflower argues that the .
interrogatories are relevant, and, therefore, should be answered. .
Applicants already have answered the Interrogatories to the best of their ability. Applicants have not objected to the Interrogatories on the basis of relevancy or for any other reason.
As clearly stated by Applicants in response to the Interrogatories, and as restated during the telephone confer-ence of September 2, 1982, neither Interrogatory can be answered further. There simply is no way Applicants can
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determine the consequences associated with a particular evacuation time estimate without knowing the type of accident, the , time of day, the meteorological conditions, and a host of otherfact$rsnecessarytodeterminetheconsequencesofany l
accident. Similarly, Applicants are- unable to state an
" acceptable" range of eltimates 'without knowing Mtat type of accident and associated conditions Applicants are dealing with, s
Par 1 graph 16:
Sunflower asks the Licensing Board to direct Applicants to ,
ancwer Interrogatories #61 and #62.
The Interrogatories are irrelevant. Isspe #1 is concerned with the workability of the off-site emergency evacuation plan.
The Issue is not concerned with the radiological consequences .
of particular accidents. Sunflower argues that it must have ,
this information to determine whether the off-site emergency .
evacuation plan is workable as to every-type of accident. [
Sunflower's argument, however, is predicated on a misapprecia-tion of the purpose of evacuation planning.
Applicants do not contend, nor are they required to show, that evacuation will be used for every type of accident and as !
r to all weather conditions. To the contrary, it is well ,
established that in certain situations, the desirable protec-t tive action would not be evacuation, but sheltering. What Applicants are required to show is that there is a workable i off-site emergency evacuation plan -- that is, a plan that will
t safely evacuate the residents within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, or a selected portion thereof. The evacuation time estipate study is developed not to show that the evacuation will "outrdn" al,1 accidents under all conditions, but, rather, as a planning tool to enable the respons!'le officials in time of an emergenc{,to dete' rhine whe'ther an evacuation should be ordered or some other protective measure taken. As recently s
stated by the licensing board in Diablo Canyon, '[t]he purposes for evacuation time estimates are to identify transportation routes for which traffic control planning is needed and to provide time estimates which enable decision makers to choose between sheltering and evacuation as protective actions." .
Pacific Gas & Electric C6'. (Diablo" Canyon Nuclear Power Plant,.
Units 1 and'2), Initial Decision, slip op. at 173 ( August 31, 1982).2/ If the consequences of a particular accident are so serious that evacuation is not feasible, the off-site emergency evacuation plan does_not thereby become unworkable. It simply means that evacuation is not the desirable protective measure. .
. 2;/ See also Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-81-59, 14 N.R.C. 1211, 1574-75 (1981) (licensee's plan correctly considers sheltering as alternative to evacuation if " evacuation could not be well under way prior to expected plume arrival due to short warning time, high wind speeds and/or foul weather"), 1578-79 (" primary purpose of [ evacuation] time estimates is to provide a basis on which to determine whether evacuation is a viable protective action option in a particular situation"); see generally NUREG-0654, at 8-9 (discussing protective actions that may be taken within plume exposure pathway EPZ); NUREG-0396, at 13 (same).
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Thus, the radiological consequences of particular accidents are not relevant to the workabi;ity of the off-site emergency evac,uation plan, and, therefore, not within the scope of Issue
- 1.
Paragraphs 17 - 18: ,,
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Sunflower'-1sks the Licensing Board to direct Applicants to answer Interrogatories #63 and #64.
Applicants objected to Interrogatory #64 and part of Interrogatory #63 on the ground that Insue #1 is concerned only 1
with off-site emergency evacuation planning within the plume exposure pathway EPZ. Commission regulations,do not require l emergency evacuation planning beyond the plume exposure pathkay EPZ, and inquiries directed at areas outside of that EPZ thus .
I are beyond the scope of the admitted Issue. (And, for that f
l matter, beyond the scope of any issue that could be admitted .
under applicable Commission regulationes)
Sunflower advances two arguments for why Applicants should be ordered to answer the Interrogatories. First, Sunflower argues that the ingestion pathway EPZ is relevant to the Issue, and that areas within the ingestion pathway EPZ thus may be the subject of discovery. Second, Sunflower cites a pending petition for rulemaking which seeks to have the plume exposure pathway extended from ten to twenty miles.
Sunflower's first argument -- that the ingestion pathway EPZ is relevant to Issue #1 -- was dispositively rejected by
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the Licensing Board in its Order of August 18, 1982 (Concerning a Motion to Compel), at page 2. Sunflower implies that 10 C.F.,R. $ 50.47(a)(10)3/ and NUREG-0654 require emergency evacuation *plann,ing for the entire ingestion pathway EPZ.
Sunflower, however, cites no specific passages for.this extraordinary. assertion'.~~Quite'tt the contrary,although ce tain protective actions are required for the ingestion pathway EPZ, evacuation has never been one of those actions, l and no regulation, NUREG, or licensing or appeal board decision i has even suggested that evacuation may be required for that EPZ. See Applicants' Substantive Response, at 6-9.
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Sunflower's second argument -- that ther'e is a pending .
rulemaking petition to extend the plume exposure pathway EPZ .-
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provides no support for Sunflower's position. If anything, the rulemaking petition implicitly recognizes that evacuation planning is not required outside the plume exposure pathway EPZ, and that the appropriate challenge to the prevailing standard should be in the form of a request to the Commission .
for reconsideration through a generic rulemaking proceeding.
.En2s, neither of the reasons advanced by Sunflower on behalf of its interrogatories can be the basis of an order compelling Applicants to answer.
3/ Presumably Sunflower is citing to S 50.47(b)(10). There is no 5 50.47(a)(10).
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During the Telephone Prehearing Conference of August 13, 1982, the Licensing Board raised the possibility that some form of emergency evacuation planning may be necessary outside of the plume exposure pathway EPZ. The Licensing Board cited a sentence on page 11 of NUREG-0654 which reads: "On the other hand, for the worst pos's'ble i acdidents, protective actions
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would need to be taken outside the planning zones." The Licensing Board wondered whether this might require some form of emergency planning outside of the plume exposure pathway EPZ.
Neither Commission regulations nor NUREG-0654 recommend evacuation planning beyond the plume exposure' pathway EPZ. .
Both the regulations and'NUREG-0654 expressly state that the ,
I plume exposure pathway EPZ should b'e approximately ten miles in radius. 10 C.F.'R. 5 50.47(c)(2); NUREG-0654 at 11-12.4/
NUREG-0654 acknowledges that it is unlikely that any protec-tive actions for the plume exposure pathway would be required beyond the plume exposure pathway EPZ." Td. at 12. This .
statement in NUREG-0654 is consistent with the statements in NUREG-03965/ that doses of radiation requiring evacuation "are, 4/ The Commission cites NUREG-0654 as guidance on imple-menting its emergency planning regulations. See 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, 5 I n.1 and 5 IV n.4; Notice of Final Rulemaking, 45 Fed. Reg. 55402, 55403 (August 19, 1980).
5/ NUREG-0396, " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light-Water Nuclear Power Plants" (December, 1978),
introduced the co.ncept of emergency planning zones. The NUREG has been endorsed for use as guidance, see Commissi.n Policy (Continued Next Page) l 1
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for all practical purposes, confined to areas within 10 miles of the reactor," NUREG-0396 at I-50, and that the approximately ten , mile limit is designed to account for "a full spectrum of accidents $nd co,rresponding consequences," NUREG-0396 at 15.
NUREG-0654 also indicates that in.the extremely unlikely event of a severe core-Melt acci' dent requiring evacuation beyond the plu'me exposure pathway EPZ, the " detailed planning within the 10 miles would provide a substantial base for expansion of response efforts." NUREG-0654 at 12. Similarly, NUREG-0396 states that " actions [outside the plume exposure pathway EPZ) could be taken on an ad hoc basis using the same considerations that went into the initial act' ion determina .
tions," NUREG-0396 at 16.** C As stated in NUREG-0396, the ten mile limit for the plume exposure pathway EPZ " sets bounds on the planning problem."
NUREG-0396 at 14. In this regard, it must be emphasized that
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the Commission intentionally was very conservative in where it drew the line on evacuation planning. As the Commission has .
noted, the regulatory basis for the EPZ concept is a " decision
.to have a conservative emergency planning policy in addition to the conservatism inherent in the defense-in-depth philosophy."
(Continued)
Statement, 44 Fed. Reg. 61123 (October 23, 1979); 10 C.F.R. 5 50.54 n.1, Part 50, Appendix E n.2, and its conclusions and basic rationale concerning EPZs are restated in NUREG-0654.
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Statement of Considerations to Final Rule, 45 Fed. Reg. 55402, 155405 (August 19, 1980).6/ The highly conservative nature of the , ten mile limit has been recognized in a number of decisions refusingt$considerevacuationbeyondtheplumeexposure pathway EPZ. See Metropolitan Edison Company (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station," Unit 1)/.LBP-81-59, 14
'.R.C. 1211, 15 3-1559 (19'81) (refusing to rule on or review the adequacy of twenty mile emergency response plans); Southern California Edison Company (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1),
DD-81-19, 14 N.R.C. 1041, 1047-49 (1981) (uncategorically refusing to consider evacuation planning outside the plume exposure pathway EPZ); Southern California Ed'ison Company (S.an Onofre Nuclear Generatio6' Station," Unit 1), DD-81-20, 14 N.R.'C.
1052, 1059-53 (1981) (same).7/
6/ Essentially, the ten mile delimitation was the result of a careful balancing by the Commission. On the one hand, the Commission sought to provide maximum protection to the public.
On the other hand, it was recognized that at some point the benefits of evacuation are greatly outweighed by its costs. .
The Commission deliberately struck a highly conservative result-by requiring evacuation up to ten miles from the plant -- this despite overwhelming evidence that evacuation to that distance would almost never be necessary. The ten mile limit was chosen in large part because the Commisson's supporting documents showed that the immediate benefits from evacuation were almost nonexistent beyond that point. See NUREG-0396, at I I-52.
Sunflower, by citing sources that claim that evacuation is necessary beyond ten miles, is requesting that the Licensing Board litigate the factual findings and the balancing of inter-ests at the core of the Commission's emergency planning regula-tions.
7/ See also Carolina Power & Light Company (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), " Memorandum and Order (Reflecting Decisions Made Following Prehearing Conference),"
dated September 22, 1982. In Shearon Harris, an intervenor (Continued Next Page)
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- Many of the Commission's regulations clearly indicate that evacuation should be limited to the plume exposure pathway.
For , instance, 10 C.F.R. $ 50.47sb)(5) requires "early notifica-tionandc$earinstructiontothepopulace" for protective actions "within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone" ( emphasis added) ."' 10 C. F.'R. Part 50, Appendix E, 6 IV
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requires "an analysis of the time required to evacuate and for taking protective actions for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations" (emphasis added). The regulations also call for " yearly dissemination to the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ of basic emergency plann'ing information,"
and for " initial notifich~ tion of the public within the plume .
exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes" of a radiological (Continued) submitted a proposed contention to expand the plume exposure pathway EPZ to twenty miles. The intervenor argued that evac-uation might be necessary outside of the ten mile plume expo- .
sure pathway EPZ for worst case accidents. The Shearon Harris licensing board rejected the proposed contention as a " direct attack on 10 C.F.R. 50.47(c)(2) and 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix
.E, which require a plume exposure pathway EPZ of ' about 10 miles' in radius." Id., slip op. at 26.
The recent Diablo Canyon Initial Decision, supra, also is of particular relevance. There, the State of California had certain emergency evacuation planning requirements going beyond
, the ten mile plume exposure pathway EPZ. The licensing board held that while the State had the right to promulgate and enforce such requirements, the licensing board had no authority to enforce evacuation requirements going beyond the federally established ten mile plume exposure pathway EPZ. See id., slip op. at 12-13, 97.
t I emergency. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.D.2 and 3 (emphasis added). Similarly, Appendix E requires the issuance of a,n operating license before a full-scale exercise to test emergency [lanni,ng"whichwillenableeachStateandlocal )
government within the plume exposure. pathway EPZ . . . to l participate."; ,10 .. .
C.F.R'.~ Part 50, A. ppendix E, S.'iV.F.1.b (e phasis add'ed). Perhaps most significant is the Commission's statement that "[t]he plans for the ingestion pathway EPZ shall focus on such~ actions as are appropriate to protect the food ingestion pathway." 10 C.F.R. SS 50.47(c)(2), 50.54(s)(1)
(emphasis added).g/ It simply is not possible to reconcile the body of Commission regulations dealing with emergency evac .
uation solely in the cont 6xt of th'e' plume exposure pathway EPE with the argument that Applicants must plan for evacuation outside the plume exposure pathway EPZ.
For these reasons, Sunflower's request that Applicants be compelled to answer Interrogatories #63 and #64 should be denied. .
g/ .By requesting that evacuation planning be required beyond the plume exposure pathway EPZ, Sunflower effectively attempts to negate the Commission's mandatory language that planning beyond the plume exposure pathway EPZ and within the ingestion pathway EPZ focus.only on protecting the food ingestion pathway.
t Paragraph 19:
Sunflower asks the Licensing Board to direct Applicants to answer Interrogatory #69.
For h$e sam,e reasons discussed with regard to Interrog-atories #61 and #62 (Paragraph 16),. Interrogatory #69 is
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irrelevant. in. . that r, o
- it s'e' ks infdrmation on radiological co sequences of nuclear accidents rather than information on thel, workability of the off-site emergency evacuation plan.
Moreover, Applicants' opinion of what an " acceptable level of risk to the public" would be, has no relation whatsoever to the workability of off-site emergency evacuation plans. In
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this regard, Applicants note that they do not""have an assump-tion of what is acceptabls in term's'of human life loss and ,
injury as a cost of doing business."
Paragraph 20: .
Applicants will file their response to Interrogatory #75 shortly. .
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Paragraph 21:
Sunflower asks the Licensing Board to direct Applicants to answer Interrogatory #80.
As stated by Applicants' counsel to Mr. Wilt, Applicants
, are at a complete loss on how Interrogatory #80 is at all related to the off-site emergency evacuation plan. The explanation offered by Sunflower in its Motion to Compel --
that " Applicant [s,'] answer doesn't cite anything which would
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.show that the emergency plan has taken into account the consideration of liquid pathway [ sic]" -- does no more than rest, ate the Interrogatory without providing any explanation for itsreleva$cy. , Sunflower thus has not carried its burden of persuasion on the Motion: See Applicants' Substantive Response, at 4-5-(party" ' ' '
seeking.Niscovery must do'more than i -
make general assertion of relevancy). .
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- Applicants only can reassert that they do not understand how the liquid pathway has any relationship to the workability of the off-site emergency evacuation plan. Sunflower has offered no explanation for what appears to be a totally irrelevant Interrogatory. The Licensing Board should deny .
Sunflower's request that' Applicants be compelled to answer ths Interrogatory.
Paragraph 22: .
Applicants will file their response to Interrogatory #85 shortly. However, as stated to Mr. Wilt, Applicants will not answer any portion of the Interrogatory directed at Applicants' security plans. Nor has Sunflower moved to compel Applicants to answer the Interrogatory with regard to Applicants' security plans.
Paragraph 23:
-Despite Sunflower's implication to the contrary, Inter-rogatory #86 does not ask Applicants to provide a bibliography of protective action studies. Mr. Wilt, however, asked e
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Applicants' counsel to provide such a bibliography voluntarily, and Applicants will supply such a bibliography shortly.
Paragraph.24: '
Appricants will file a response to Interrogatory #88 shortly that will respond to those portions of the Interroga-tory relevant.hnd'r e the Licensing Board's Order of August 18, 1982 (Concerning a Motion to Compel).
Conclusion For the stated reasons, Sunflower's Motion to Compel -
responses to its Second Set of Interrogatories should be denied in its entirety. -
.* g-Respectfully submitted, .
SHAW, PITTMAN, POTTS & TROWBRIDGE By: - / r _
Jay E. Silberg, P.C.
Robert L. Willmore Counsel for Applicants 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 822-1000 Dated: September 30, 1982 e
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before'the Atomi[: Safety and' Licensing Board
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In the Matter of )
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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ) Docket Nos. 50-440 ILLUMINATING COMPANY, ET AL. ) 50-441
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(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, )
Units 1 and 2) )
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE e . 9-This is to certify that copies of the foregoing " Applicants' Answer to Sunflower Alliance, Inc. Motion to Compel Applicants to ,
Answer Second Set of Interrogatories," were. served by deposit in the U.S. Mail, First Class, postage prepaid, this 30th day of September,1982, to all those on the attached Service List.
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i Robert L. Willmore l Dated: September 30, 1982 e
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l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Mattero'f : *
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THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC. ) .Do'cket Nos. 50-440 ,
50-441
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ILLUMINATING COMPANY . )
, ) ,
(Perry Nuclear Power Plant, ) ,,
Units 1 and 2) . )
s SERVICE LIST Peter B. Bloch. Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Appeal Board Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Jerry R. Kline Docketing' and Service Section Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of th'e Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission " U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CQmmission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 .
Mr. Frederick J. Shan James M. CutchAa, IV, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Executive U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Legal Director .
Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Christine N. Kohl, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Ms. Sue Hiatt Appeal Board OCRE Interim Rcpresentative-U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8275 Munson Avenue Washington, D.C. 20555 Mentor, Ohio 44060 Dr.' John H. Buck Daniel D. Wilt, Esquire Atomic Safety and Licensing Post Office Box 08159 Appeal Board Cleveland, Ohio 44108 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Donald T. Ezzone, Esquire Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
' Gary J. Edles, Esquire Lake County Administration Center Atomic Safety and Licensing 105 Center Street Appeal Board Painesville, Ohio 44077 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 John G. Cardinal, Esquire Prosecuting Attorney Atomic Safety and Lic'ensing Ashtabula County Courthouse Board Panel , Jefferson, Ohio 44047 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Terry Lodge, Esquire 915 Spitzer Building Toledo, Ohio 43604
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