ML20064K408
| ML20064K408 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 11/28/1980 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20064K410 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8012240145 | |
| Download: ML20064K408 (5) | |
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UNITED STATES
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j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTCR REGULAT!CN RELATED TO ArENDPENT NO. 36 TO FACILITY CPERATING LICENSE NO. OPR-66 DUGUESNE LIGHT COMPANY CHIO EDISCN COPPANY PENNSYLVANIA POWER CCMPANY BEAVER VALLEY POWER STAT!ON, UNIT NO.1
<t DOCKET NO. 50-334 Intieduction In a su5mittal of May 14, 1980 Duquesne Light Company (the licensee) proposed multiple changes to the Technical Saecifications in Accendix A of License No. DPR-66 Five of these requests have been sufficiently simple to review that we are incorporating them into a single amendment.
Our evaluations of these proposed changes are as folicws.
Installation of New Hydraulic Snubbers Technical Specification 3.7.3.12 lists all hydraulic enubbers that are required to be operable to ensure that the structural integrity of the J
reactor coolant system and all other safety related rystems is maintained
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p during and following a seismic or other event initiating dynamic loads.
The licensee has prooosed to install seven additional snubbers which will Se included in this list. These snu5bers are identified as follows:
(1 and 2} RC-MSS-130 and 131 installed on the Reactor Coolant Pump in an inaccesst51e, high radiation zone.
(31 SI-HSS-337 - installed on the Safety Injection System for the reactor in an accessible, non-high radiation zone.
(4, 5, 6, 7} SI-HSI-002, 3, 9 and 10 - installed on the Safety Injection System in an accessible, non-high radiation zo ne.
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- Snubber SI.HSS-337 was installed as the result of the seismic analysis made in resconse to the Commission's Show Cause Order and, subsecuently, IE 3ulletin 79-07 The other snubbers were installed during creviously reviewed activities that were performed under provisions of 10 CFR 50.59.
The inclusion of these snubbers in Table 3.7.4 of Accendix A of License CPR-66 (T.S. 3.7.3.12) will require that they be considered in the surveillance requirements. Consecuently, this action increases the level of plant safety and is acceptable.
i Revised Surveillance Recuirements for Auxiliary Feedwater System The surveillance requirements in Technical Specification 1.7.1.2(a) have been ceveloped to ensure that each auxiliary feedwater ( A?W) Ouma is operable and each valve in the auxiliary feedwater flow path. f s in its correct :osition. As the result of our review of lessons learned from the TMI-2 accid:nt, the staff determined that all licensees should con-firm flow path avc41 ability of an AFW system flow train that has been out o f service.
i In ful fillment of the staff's recommendation GS-6, the licensee has proposed four additional surveillance Technical Specifications for the AFW system:
(a)
Verification of status and position of each valve will be performed by a second and independent operator.
(b) Maintenance of constant communications with the control room while any discharge valve is closed during testing.
(c) Verification of operability of each River Water Auxiliary Supply Valve.
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(d) Verification of flow path from the Primary Plant Deminerali:er Water Starace Tank (WT-TX-10) to the Steam Generators.
I These actions satisfy the intent of the staff's recommendation and are I
3CCeotable.
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The licensee has assured the staff that the three River Water valves can be exercised, one at a time, without allowing river water to enter the I
suction lines of the AFW pumos.
Auxiliary Feedwater Rate Indication a f Remote Shutdown Panel operability of the flow indicators in the auxiliary feedwater ( AFW)g the The licensee has prooosed a change in the frequency of demonstratin flow train.
Feedwater from the AFW pumes is pumced to each steam. generator through normally open control valves when this emergency source o# water
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Flow is monitored in each line by flow indicators. The valves that control AW flow can be manually adjusted fmm both the control room and the shutdown control panel. Currently, the Technical Soecifica-tions for monitoring the AW train recuire demonstntion of the ' low indicators coerability on a monthly frequency. Such.a check is not meaningful unless the AW system is operating and feeding the steam ganerators.
The licensee proposes that the AW ' low rate be checked when the AW system is being used during plant startup. This schedule assures that the indicator will be checked at least once oer fuel cycle as well as after each l!cheduled or unscheduled shutdown' that result in an extended (
o uta ge.
Al though each AN pumo must be demonstrated to be operable once per 31
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days, such a check does not require actuation of flow to the steam generator since both motor and steam coersted pumps are equipped with recirculation paths upstream from the flow indicator.
We find the if censee's proposal to check the AW flow indicator after each extended outage to be acceptable because it is only when the plant has been in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) that the AW pumps are used.
Containment Liner Weld Channels and plugs Integrity The licensee has proposed two additional criteria to be met for assuring an acceptable structural integrity of the containment. In addition to visually inspecting and verifying that containment surfaces appear normal, a similar inspection of liner test channels and the dome area shall be made. These requirements expand the scope of " Type A Tests" as defined in Aopendix J to 10 CFR Part 50 and Technical Specification 4.6.1.2.
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The licensee's prooosal implies that an acceptable surveillance of containment test channels is equivalent to an acceptable visual insoection of the containment ' liner welds that are obscured by the test enannels.
Where these channels are found to have flaws that would impair the integrity af the containment, the channels are to be removed.
Similar reasoning underlies the inclusion of test channels in a visual inspection of the dome.
Inasmuch as visual inspection of the channels complements the use of the channels to verify the integrity of the liner joints, such a procedure is acceptable.
Redefining the Term "Ocemble*
In response to the Staff's request dated April 10, 1980, the licensee, by letter of May la,1980, prooosed changes to Apoendix A, Safety
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21'S:ecificatien 3/4'.0.
These enanses reflect the S:aff's T ecnni:
current cefinition of the term "::eracle" as it applies to :ne single failure cri:erien fer safety systens in oewe-reac crs.
The NRC's Standard Technical Scecificatiens (STS) were formulated to
- reserve the single failure criterien fer sys;ans tha; are relied upcn in :ne saf ety analysis report.
By and large, the single failure criterien is preserved by specifying Limi:ing Conditicas for Operaticn (LCOs) that require all redundant comocnents of safety related systens to be OPERAELE. When the requirec recundancy is not maintained, ecui ment f ailure of maintenance cutage, acticn is either cus ::
recuired, within a specified time, := change the coerating mcde of i
the plan: :: :iace f: in a safe conci icn.
The s:ecified time to take action, usually called the ecuipment cut-of-servi:e time, is a temporary relaxa:icn cf :he single failure criteri:n, which c:nsistent with overall f
system reif ability considera:icns, ;revides a iiantec time to fix equip-er otnerwise make it CPERABLE.
If equictent can be returned Oc men CPERABLE status within the specified time, plan: shu:dewn is not recuired.
LCOs are s ecified for each safety related system in the plant, and witn few exceptiens, the ACTION statements address singie cutages of c ccenerts, trains er subsystens.
For any particular system, One 8 C0 dces not adcress multiple cutages of redundan ccmcenents, ner adcress the effects Of cutages of any sup:cr: systens - such dces i:
as elec;ri:ai pcwer er cccling water,- that are relied u:cn Oc maintain
-he OPERASILITY of the particular sys;em. This is because of the large l
number of c:mbinations of these types of cutages that are pcssible.
Instead, the STS emcicy general scecifica:icns anc an ex licit definiticn Of :ne term GPERASLE :o encompass all such cases. These provisions have been fer:ula ed :: assure that ne set of e:ui: ment cutages wcuid
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be allowed to cersist tha wcule resul; in the facility being in an I
uncrotected c ndi icn.
t Tc achieve the necessary clarifica:f on, the 5:aff pr vi:ed the licensee I
with mecel Tecnnical Scecifica:icns :na: have :een ac:ected and re-sucmi::ed wi:heu: change. We, :nerefore, find these changes Oc be ac:ectacle. The licensee sha!! i= clement accr::riate pr:cedures :c the necessary rec:rds, sucn as plant icgs er similar assure Ona:
documents, are reviewed Oc ce: ermine ::ccliance with :nese s:eciff-l ca:icns.
l Environmental Ccnsideration We have deternined that the amendment dces not authori:e a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in cower level and will not resul t in any 'significant envircruental imoact. Having made this deternination, we have fur *ner cercluded tha: the amencment l
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..,volves an action wnich is insignificant fran :ne stard:oint of environmental incact and, ;. :2ent to 10 CFR 551.5( ) ?), that an environmental imcact statement or negative declaration and enviren-mental impact apcraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amencment.
Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed accve, that:
(1) because the amendment dces not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and dces not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, tne amendment does not involee a significant hazards consideration, (2) f-there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the puolic q
will not be endangered by operation in the precosed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and tne issuance of this amendment will not ce inimical to the commen defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Date: ticvenbcr 23, 1 230
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