ML20064E052
| ML20064E052 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | North Anna |
| Issue date: | 11/09/1978 |
| From: | Stallings C VIRGINIA POWER (VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.) |
| To: | Harold Denton, Parr O Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7811140101 | |
| Download: ML20064E052 (6) | |
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VamoxxxA Ex.ncruxc Ann Powna CoxPANY Rtcnnown.VtmoiwxA sassi NovemberE9,.1978 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director
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-Serial No. 619 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation LQA/RMN:esh Attn:
Mr. O. D. Parr, Chief Light Water Reactors Branch No. 3 Docket No. 50-338 Division of Project Management U. S. Nuclear Regu.latory Commission License No. NPF-4 Washington, DC 20555
Dear Mr. Denton:
AMENDMENT TO OPERATING LICENSE NORTH ANNA POWER STATION UNIT NO.1 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE NO. 16 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, the Virginia Electric and Power Company hereby requests an amendment, in the form of changes to the Technical Speci-fications, to Operating License No. NPF-4 for North Anna Power Station Unit 1.
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The proposed changes are enclosed and have been designated as Change No. I6, The proposed change would complete Technical Specifications 3'.7.1.6 and 4.7.1.6 by specifying cation conductivity limits and surveillance require-ments for the' secondary system. Contro11Ing the secondary water chemistry within the specified limits will control the potential accumulation of corro-sive impurities in the steam generator and minimize tube degradation during all conditions of operation.
The proposed changes have been determined to be a Class ill amendment.
The amendment involves a single issue but does not involve a significant hazards consideration. Accordingly, a check in the amount of $4,000.00 is attached in payment of the fee.
This proposed amendment has been reviewed and approved by the Station Nuclear Safety and Operating Committee and the System Nuclear Safety and Opera ~
i t i ng -Commi tt ee.
It has been determined that this request does not involve an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59 Very tr-
- yours,
}{d Wffh C. M. Stallings N
Vice President-Power Station and Production Operations At tachments:
1.
Proposed Technical Specification M/[/
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Voucher Check No. 38642, in the amount of $4,000.00 P) cc:
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region il i
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h COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA )
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- s. s.
CITY OF RICHMOND
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Before me, a Notary Public, in and for the City and Common-wealth aforesaid, today personally appeared W. L. Proffitt, who being r
duly sworn,' made oath and said (1) that he is Senior Vice President, of the Virginia Electric and Power Company, (2) that he is duly authorized to execute and file the foregoing Amendment in behalf of that Company, and (3) that the statements in the Amendment are true t
to the best of his knowledge and belief.
Given under my hand and notarial seal this 9/2 day of Neu mlw
,222d My Commission expires t)-,mw. v 2o >14/ '.
si }W YnY F
Notary Publ'ic (SEAL) l b
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PLANT SYSTEMS SECONDARY WATER CHEMISTRY LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.7.1.6 The secondary water chemistry shall be maintained within the limits of Table 3.7-3.
APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 ACTION:
a.
With the Cation Conductivity exceeding its Steady l
State Limit but within its Transient Limit, verify at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> that the Transient Limit is met. Restore the cation conductivity to within its 7
Steady State Limit within 14 days; or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
The requirements of T.S. 3.0.4, 4.0.4, and 6.9.1 are not applicable.
b.
With the Cation Conductivity exceeding its Transient Limit, restore the cation conductivity to within its t
Transient Limit within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT SHUTDOWN I
within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS
- 4. 7.1. 6 The secondary water chemistry shall be determined to be within
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the limits by analysis of those parameters at the frequencies b
specified in Table 4.7-2.
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TABLE 4.7-2 a
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SECONDARY WATER CllEMISTRY SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS E
Water Sample Parameters Frequency e
g Location Blowdown Cation Conductivity At least oncer per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />
-Main Feedwater Cation Conductivity At least oncer per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> YG J
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TABLE 3.7-3
'N SECONDARY WATER CHEMISTRY LIMITS 2,
E 2-Water Sample Parameters E
Location G
Cation Conduct"ivity pmhos/cm 9 25 C i
Blowdown Steady State. Limit:
1 2.0 Transient Limit:
1 7.0 R
b.
~y Main Feedwater Steady State Limit:
1 1.0 C
Transient Limit:
1 3.0 t
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PLANT SYSTEMS BASES i
available to remove decay heat and reduce the Reactor Coolant Svstem temperature to less than 350 F when the Residual Heat Removal System may be placed into operation.
3/4.7.1.3 EMERGENCY CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK The OPERABILITY of the emergency condensate storage tank with the minimum water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to maintain the RCS at HOT STANDBY conditions for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> with steam discharge to the atmosphere concurrent with total loss of off-site power. The L
contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usuable because of tank discharge line location or other physical characteristics.
3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY The limitations on secondary system specific activity ensure that i
the resultant off-site radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupture. This dose also includes the effects of a coincident 1.0 GPM primary to secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line. These values
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are consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.
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3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM TRIP VALVES The OPERABILITY of the main steam trip valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blowdown in the event of a steam line rupture. This restriction is required to 1) minimize the positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and 2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the I
event the steam line rupture occurs within containment. The OPERABILITY I
l of the main steam trip valves within the closure times of the l
surveillance requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the l
accident analyses.
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3/4.7.1.6 SECONDARY WATER CHEMISTRY Contaminatio'n of the steam generator secondary coolant can cause
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potential tube degradation and impair tube integrity. Generally, the l
most severe contamination results from condenser inleakage of caustic forming impurities that may accumulate on the secondary side of the i
steam generator or on the high heat flux surfaces of the steam genera-l l
NORTH ANNA - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-3
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PLANT SYSTEMS i
s BASES tor tubes can lead to the potential for intergranular stress corrosion I
I cracking.
i Controlling the secondary water chemistry within the specified l
limits will control the potential accumulation of corrosive impurities-in the steam generator and minimize tube degradation.
These limits-provide reasonable assurance that the conditions in the steam genera-tor will minimize the potential for tube degradation during all con-l ditions of operation and postulated accidents. These measures ensure
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the continued protection of the steam generator tubing which is an i
essential part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
l 3/4.1.7 and 3/4.7.1.8 STEAM TURBINE and OVERSPEED PROTECTION
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The turbine generator at the North Anna facility is arranged in
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a nonpeninsular orientation. Analysis has shown that this arrangement is such that if a turbine failure occurs as-a result of destructive "j
overspeed, potentially damaging missles could impact the auxiliary building, containment, control room and other structures housing safety related equipment. The requirements of these two specifications provide additional assurance that the facility will not be operated with degraded valve performance and/or flawed turbine material which are the major contributors to turbine failures.
3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures j
that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations t
of 70*F and 200 psig are based on average steam generator impact values at
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4 10*F and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.
3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SUBSYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the component cooling water system ensures that 4
1 sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety '
j related equipment during normal and accident conditions.
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3/4.7.4 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM i
The OPERABILITY of the service water system ensures that sufficient
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cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety related i
equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling i
capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is consistent with the-j assumptions used in the accident conditions within acceptable limits.
NORTH ANNA - UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-4
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