ML20064D493
| ML20064D493 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 12/27/1982 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NCR-2082, NUDOCS 8301040668 | |
| Download: ML20064D493 (2) | |
Text
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TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CH ATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 400 Chestnut Street Tower II Decembe r 27, 1982 BLRD-50-438/82-79 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Attn:
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100 Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DISRUPTION AND COLLAPSE OF SODlUM HYDROXIDE STORAGE TANK - BLRD-50-438/82 FIRST INTERIM REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-OIE Inspector a
R. V. Crlenjak on November 24, 1982 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR 2082. Enclosed is our first interim report. We expect to submit odr next report on or about June 20, 1983 If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
22 Very truly yours, ca Cr TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
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L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Licensing Enclosure ec:
Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
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ENCLOSURE BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 DISRUPTION AND COLLAPSE OF SODIUM HYDROXIDE STORAGE TANK 10 CFR 50.55(e)
BLRD-50-438 /82-79 NCR 2082 FIRST INTERIM REf0RT Description of Deficiency During a filling operation of the sodium hydroxide storage tank, TVA site personnel discovered the following damage:
1.
The base plate for the supports was lifted from the foundation.
2.
The concrete foundation was broken.
3 The sway struts at three locations around the tank were sheared in half.
At the time of these discoveries the tank was full of water and overflowing, resulting in the filling of the adjacent expansion loop with wa te r.
The tank was drained and additional investigation revealed the tank had collapsed on three sides and the associated piping was sprung.
Interim Progress A site investigation team was organized to determine the events leading to the collapse, the possible causes of the failure, and the appropriate corrective action.
The investigation is complete and the site team has prepared a report which is in the review and approval cycle. Pertinent information from the investigation report will be included in the next re po rt.
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