ML20063B783
| ML20063B783 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinch River |
| Issue date: | 04/07/1982 |
| From: | Houston R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Check P Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20062N348 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-82-344 NUDOCS 8204290408 | |
| Download: ML20063B783 (2) | |
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v DISTRIBUTI0ti DOCKET FILES AEB R/F Plant File MThadani AD/RP RF JMitchell Docket No. 50-537 11En0RANDUf1 FOR: Paul S. Check, Progran Director Clinch River Creeder Reactor,Prograu FR0!1:
R.1-fayne !!ouston, Assistant Director for Radiation Protection. DSI StlBJECT:
UPDATED CRitRP FIllAL Ef!VIR0tii1FitTAL STATEPEtiT: Sut".;'ARY OF RADIOLOGICAL C0tlSE0tlEr!CES OF POSTULATED ACCIDEr1TS Encl.osed is a narked copy of Table 7.2 of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant Final Environnental Statenent. The table has been revised to reflect the differences in the current site atnospheric dispersion values from the regulatory guide values used for original FES calculations.
This input was prepared by tiohan Thadani (X28941), of the Accident Evalua-tion Hranch.
Oricins] 91. rad by R. Ku.7ce?!or.cten R. Ilayne Houston, Assistant Director for Radiation Protection Division of Systens Integration
Enclosure:
As stated cc: R. Plattson P. Leech R. Stark I. Spickler
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7-5 INI TABLE 7.2 t
Sup9tARY OF' RAD 10 LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF p0ST1R ATED ACCIDENTSU E5TImTED ATf'TO ESTIMATED DOSE AT POPULATIf*A IN 50 MILE SITE SOUISARY (REM)
RADIUS '.44N-REM)
CLASS EVENT IN 2 HR.
(DURAT ON OF ACCIDENT)
I 1.0 Trivial Incidents y
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,4; 2.0 Small releases outside y
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,4 3.0 I-3.1 Failure of liquid weste (seet 5'2 KI s q:04
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t 4.0' Events that release rad etivity M D - M 8
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l 5.0 Events that release radioactivity *-Weel
.edS-3'1 N into secondary system (thyroid) 7 6.0 Refueling accidents inside 6
l containment
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6.1 Inadvertent floor valve ing e-498T reactor port plug remove
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E.2 Drop of fuel as ly in
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7.0 Accidents to spent fuel outside containment
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7.1 Loss of Forced Cooling to EVTN AseD2 (tpid) 1
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7.2 EVST ping rupture 9 pump as5 wholebody) 19' O.b M-c. 'f suction 51 g thyroid) 0.407 3.'
2<1i O.oy (thyroid)7f.lo 7.3 Shipping cask drop 5
1 8.0 Accident initiation events 9:007 3.~/ K/.
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E.1 Steam-Generator tube rupture
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9.2 Steam line break
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l Footnotes to Table 7.2 (Continued) e A*
10The source term inside containment s assumed to consist of 100% of the noble f
gases, 25% of the halogens, 1% of the solid fission product inventory and 1%
of the core plutonium inventory.
Th.is source term is judged to be suitably conservative for purposes of site evaluation, in accordance with the require-ments of 10 CFR 100. The RCB is assumed to leak at a rate of 0.032% per day.
The X/Q value used was determined from onsite meteorological data at the 50% probability level.
Plutonium dose factors were taken from Regulatory Guide 1.109.
11This category generally applies to accidents which have a lower probability of occurrence than design-basis accidents.
Th'e applicant and the staff have independently examined a spectrum of possible events leading to core disrup-tion (see Section 7.1.3).
Both have analyzed a range of consequences that might be associated with such events.
The staff concluded that subsequent release of radioactive materi~als could be that resulting from long-term melt through (no large initial source) as well as from energetic disassembly of the core (large initial source).
The event analyzed herein is one which involves a very large initial release.
Specifically, an accident is postulated which results in a core release of 100% of the noble gases and volatiles, 10% of the solid fission product inventory, and 10% of the pluton-ium inventory.
In this scenario, the volatiles, including halogens, are reduced to 10% of the core inventory and the solid fission products and fuel are reduced to 1% of the core inventory during passage out of the reactor vessel and into the outer containment building.
Containment leakage is taken as proportional to the square root of the pressure for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, at which
/
k time containment integrity is assumed to be lost and all airborne material released to the environment. No air cleanup systems are assumed to operate during this period, but aerosol depletion due to fallout is assumed to occur.
Consistent with the scenario, plutonium dose factors for a 0.5 p particle size are used during the 2-hour exposure following the accident, but dose factors for 5.0 p particle size are used for the release after containment failure at 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
These particle sizes are derived from the HAARM-2 fallout. calculations.
Note that the cited site boundary doses are for the l
first two hours after core disruption.
It is presumed that protective measures could be taken on behalf of individuals at that location prior to the release that was assumed to oc:ur 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after core disruption.
e 03/05/82 7-9 CLINCH RIVER FES SEC 7
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