ML20062N095

First Interim Deficiency Rept Re Design Error in Test Line Isolation Valves in Borated Water Storage Tanks,Initially Reported 811112.Cause of Defect Being Evaluated.Next Rept Will Be Submitted by 820413

ML20062N095
Person / Time
Site:	Bellefonte
Issue date:	12/11/1981
From:	Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	James O'Reilly NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8112180403
Download: ML20062N095 (2)

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TENNESSEE VALLEY AutAtbRCTVEGnN "

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400 Chestnut Street Tower II December 9

BLRD-50-438/81-73 BLRD-50-439/81-71

\\*Ie Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director 4\\

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Office of Inspection and Enforcement N

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Region II - Suite 3100 7l obc J 7 b b b-101 Marietta Street W

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Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

x BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - DESIGN MISTAKE IN ISOLATION VALVES - BLRD-50-438/81-73, BLRD-50-439/81 FIRST I ERIM REPORT The subject deficiency was initially reported to NRC-0IE Inspector R. V. Crlenjak on November 12, 1981 in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e) as NCR BLN BLP 8125 Enclosed is our first interim report. We expect to submit our next report by April 13, 1982.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, pinse get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

' J2c p L. M. MillN p m to o -

Manager g

Nuclear Regulation and a ety a

Enclosure cc:

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Enclosure)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 8112180403 811211 OlflCI AL COP Y PDR ADOCK 05000438 w-PDR S

g An Equal Opportunity Employer i

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-ENCLOSURE 1

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' BELLEFONTE NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 DESIGN MISTAKE IN TEST LINE ISOLATION VALVES c

j BLRD-50-438/81-73, BLRD-50-439/81-71 10 CFR.50.55(e)

FIRST INTERIM REPORT

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i Description of-D' ficiency e

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i Isolation valves were added to the borated. water _ storage tank (BWST) test line. This test line also' serves as the recirculation line for the train B lt makeup pump when operating in the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) seal injection mode. The closure of these valves doreats the ability of the train B pump to provide backup seal injection flow to the RCPs upon loss of.

seal injection flow from the train A makeup pumps.

With a loss of the train A makeup pumps which provide normal seal injection to the RCPs,t a -low seal injection flow signal calls for automatic start of the. train B makeup pump and opening of the seal injection crosstie valve.

However, since the recirculation line isolation valves remain closed, the train B pump will trip off on high recirculation line pressure, resulting in' total loss of seal injection flow to the RCPs.

Interim Progress TVA is evaluating the cause and various solutions to this problem to I

determine the optimum design.

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