ML20062F870
| ML20062F870 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Bellefonte  |
| Issue date: | 08/04/1982 |
| From: | Mills L TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | James O'Reilly TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| References | |
| 10CFR-050.55E, 10CFR-50.55E, NUDOCS 8208120187 | |
| Download: ML20062F870 (2) | |
Text
%
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA TENNESSEE 37401 N
400 Chestnut Street Tower II August 4,1982 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission Region II C
Attn:
Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street, Suite 3100
~
Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. O'Reilly:
BRrLERJNIE NUCLEAR PLANP UNITS 1 AND 2 - POWER CABLES NCyr QUALIFIED 'IO IEEE 383-1974 FIAME TEST - NCR BIN EEB 8004 - SB00ND REVISED FINAL REEORP On August 19, 1980, F. S. Cantrell, NIC-OIE Region II, was informed that the subject nonconformance was determined to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e). W is was followed by our interim reports dated September 18 and December 10, 1980, our final report dated March 23, 1981, our revised final report dated January 6,1982, and our supplemental information dated April 14, 1982. As discussed with T. Gibbons by telephone on July 16, 1982, enclosed is our second revised final report.
We reason for the revision is to clarify the corrective action taken to correct the deficiency.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please get in touch with R. H. Shell at FTS 858-2688.
Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Licensing Enclosure cc: Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director (Ehclosure)
Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cm mission Washington, DC 20555 FiC L,% Col'Y
[8~ W G208120187 020004
- y " ^" '*
- M y0777vy-
a i
ENCIOSURE t
BELLEED:EE NUCLEAR PLNU UNITS 1 AND 2 POWER CABLES N0f QUALIFIED 'IO IEEE 383-1974 FIES TEST TR BLN EEB 8004 10 CFR 50.55(e)
SFIXUD REVISED FINAL REPORP Description of Deficiency The 600-V and 8-and 15-kV power cables, types CPJ and CPSJ, which have been installed in cable trays at Bellefonte Nuclear Plant are not qualified to the flame test requirements of IEEE 383-1974. 'Ihese cables were purchased before TVA's camiitment to IEEE 383-1974 and were mistakenly installed in cable trays.
Safety Implications Cables in cable trays are required to meet the IEEE 383-1974 flame test to help control the spread of fires in cible trays. Failure of the cables to meet the flame test could lead to spread of the fire beyond limits for which the plant was designed. We subject condition, had it remained uncorrected, could have affected adversely the safe operation of the plant.
Corrective Tction All cable of this type has been identified. These cables, except where they are installed in conduit or protected fran an open flame by an approved method, have been removed fran cable trays in safety-related areas. 'Ihe replacemont cables are qualified to IEEE 383-1974.
The cable types reflected in this ER have been " written" out of the cable routing program at Bellefonte. Since all safety-related cable at Bellefonte is routed by computer, this type of cable is essentially removed from the Bellefonte " stores" for cable trays. 'Ihis action will ensure that this cable will not be used for any future installations. TVA now purchases cable that cmplies with the requirments of IEEE 383-1974.
4